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EDITED BY

HENRY PRATT FAIRCHILD

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SYSTEMATIC SOCIOLOGY

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HENRY PRATT FAIRCHILD

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SYSTEMATIC SOCIOLOGY

On the Basis of the
Beziehungslehre and Gebildelehre

OF

LEOPOLD VON WIESE

*Professor of Political Economy and Sociology
University of Cologne*

ADAPTED AND AMPLIFIED

BY

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To
THE INSTITUTE OF INTELLECTUAL COÖPERATION
OF
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

“Warum ist alles so rätselhaft?

Hier ist das Wollen, hier ist die Kraft;

Das Wollen will, die Kraft ist bereit,

Und daneben die schöne, lange Zeit!”

—So seht doch hin, wo die gute Welt

Zusammenhält!

Seht hin, wo sie auseinanderfällt!

—Goethe, *Problem*

PREFACE

THE opportunity to accompany the present volume with a few words of introduction is to me a source of unusual pleasure and gratification, for this treatise is an amplified adaptation of both the *Beziehungslehre* and the *Gebildelehre* which together make up my *Allgemeine Soziologie*, and is especially designed to correlate certain recent American and German trends in sociology. Howard Becker, who has carried out this arduous task, was for a time an exchange fellow in the sociological division (of which I am the director) of the Institute for Research in the Social Sciences of the University of Cologne. During his stay, acquaintance made possible numerous discussions of the topics covered in this book, and I am convinced that as a consequence of his adaptation American readers will be put in close touch with systematic sociology in general and with my own efforts in particular.

American adaptation is the more welcome because I feel that my own conception of sociology is related to that prevalent in the United States. For example, it is probably safe to assume that the endeavor to view the interconnections of social life *realistically* will meet with a large measure of agreement among American sociologists. By "realistically" is meant the effort to depict life as it is and to avoid the distorting influence of ideologies of any and every kind. So far as is humanly possible, metaphysics is rigorously excluded; the attempt to set forth a sociological system is not in the present instance an attempt simultaneously to propound a social philosophy. Another point of agreement lies in the fundamental categories used, notably "social process" and "behavior"; these are common coin not only in American sociology but in other American social sciences as well. My own work owes a great deal to the sociological research so vigorously advanced by my colleagues on the other side of the Atlantic; traces of such helpful influence will often be noticeable in the following pages.

Cologne, June 13, 1931

LEOPOLD VON WIESE

This book represents an effort to present sociology as a science that is clearly differentiated from other social sciences, such as political science, economics, and history, and that is co-ordinate with them

rather than a pseudo-synthesis of their most general features. In short, sociology is here regarded neither as the mistress nor as the handmaid of the other social sciences, but as their sister.

Further, an effort is made to show that sociology can be a systematic science rather than a *mélange* of topics having nothing in common except the fact that they are not dealt with by other disciplines. Final validity is not claimed for the system presented, but it is felt that in the present stage of sociological development it affords the best method of dealing scientifically with the specifically social.

Again, sociology is viewed as a science, not as a device for ensuring the correctness of ultimate value-judgments. The sociologist can say a good deal about the proximate value of a given social relation or structure, e.g., the function served by the military organization within the larger structure of the state, but he can make no judgments about the final, ethical value of either of these social patterns. Whether they should or should not exist is a question to be answered, if at all, by other than sociological methods.

Once more, the international nature of all genuine science is here exemplified. Simmel, Waxweiler, and Ross—respectively German, Belgian, and American—have perhaps exercised the major influences, but Spencer, Durkheim, Znaniecki, and numerous other sociologists of diverse national origins have left strong traces. If sociology ever becomes international as, for example, biology is international, it will be through such books as this. The most marked tendency of the present volume, to be sure, is bi-national rather than international, for current German and American work receives most attention, but at the same time the signs of a growing consensus among sociologists of many nations are here apparent.

Although this treatise is an amplified adaptation, as Professor von Wiese graciously notes, and not a mere translation, my part is entirely secondary. "Amplified" does not imply any *essential* addition to the original framework, nor does "adaptation" imply any essential alteration. What has been done can best be shown through analogy:

Folk songs are so saturated with local allusions of all kinds, most of which find no place in recorded history, that the stranger is at a loss to understand the rich emotional freightage of seeming common-places. If he is to participate to the full, such songs must be adapted rather than translated; not only words but also allusions must fit into his non-material culture. As examples may be cited the following fragments from poems by Alexander Gray, one of the few contemporary poets who realizes the necessity for adaptation; his poems are

not German folk songs in Scottish dialect, but very, very close approximations of genuine Scottish folk songs:

O Strassburg, O Strassburg,
Du wunderschöne Stadt,
Darinnen liegt begraben
So mannicher Soldat.

O Stirlin', O Stirlin's
The bonniest town o' a',
And mony a sodger's sleepin'
Inside the castle wa'.

and

Es zogen drei Bursche wohl über
den Rhein,
Bei einer Frau Wirtin da kehrten
sie ein.

Three callants cam ower the Water
o' Dee,
'And stopped at the ale-house
in Banchory.

Just as Strasburg has been a bone of contention between France and Germany, Stirling has seen both Scottish and English garrisons—*mutatis mutandis*, the total situation is quite similar. Again, just as the Rhine holds a secure niche in the affections of most Germans, few sons of Scotland are wholly devoid of sentiment where the River Dee is concerned.

Now, the present treatise is not lyric, let us hope, but it furnishes an analogous example of adaptation. Wherever possible the American equivalents of German writers referred to in the text or the footnotes have been substituted or added, and many more who make contributions for which there are no German equivalents are taken into account. Some indication of this is given by the fact that in Part One alone over forty names of American writers not mentioned anywhere in the German basis of this adaptation occur—among them such important figures as Bernard, Dewey, MacIver, Mead, and Ogburn. Again, terminology has been modified in order to evoke American as well as German connotations; neuropsychic pattern, action pattern, socius, temperamental attitude, and many similar terms give all the meaning of the basic German *and* a number of additional implications highly important if American and German sociology are to be correlated.

There has also been a good deal of amplification. Almost every page has an illustration, a qualification, a hint at possible parallels, or a quotation that does not occur in the basic text. In addition to this, some whole sections have been added; e.g., "Individuation and Population Movement"; "The Connection between Abstract and Concrete Crowds Illustrated and Analyzed"; "The Development and Interaction of the Ecclesia, the Sect, the Denomination, and the Cult as Illustrative of the Dilemma of the Church"; "Sociology Is

Normative Science"; "Dynamic and Static Relations"; etc. Again, the very first section, "The Sociological Ferment," and all of Part Four, the "Historical Postscript," are not found in either the *Beziehungslehre* or the *Gebildelehre*, but are adapted from Professor von Wiese's little brochure, *Soziologie: Geschichte und Hauptprobleme*. Finally, the figures have been added, and numerous cross-references have been provided. Unfortunately, space forbids the inclusion of a lengthy selected bibliography. At a later date it may be possible to issue this as a separate publication.

A word or two should also be said about changes in organization. The *Beziehungslehre* appeared in 1924 and the *Gebildelehre* in 1929, and although the fundamental theory is the same in both, a few minor obscurities in the earlier volume made it necessary to devote part of the first chapter of the later to clearing up supposed discrepancies. In the adaptation it was therefore possible to drop some overlapping portions, and either to merge several chapters in others or give them different positions in the sequence. Chapters have also been shortened by sub-dividing; the sixteen of the basic text become fifty in this. But enough of such detail. . . .

(See "Historical Postscript," chap. 1, §5, for essential part of preface of the *Beziehungslehre*.)

In spite of all this adaptation and amplification, however, it is hoped that the only result has been to put the *Beziehungslehre* and *Gebildelehre* in such form that they will make the maximum impression upon American readers; I have spoken as I conceive Professor von Wiese would speak if he were in the American setting. *There has been a consistent attempt to refrain from injection of my own point of view*, although with regard to some matters, notably the relation of history and sociology and of cultural anthropology and sociology, this has been quite difficult. Technical reasons make it impossible to indicate the numerous changes I have made, and the reader must therefore be chary of blaming Professor von Wiese for what may be my fault.

It will be noted that a good many passages in the text are in small type. This has been done in order to help the reader grasp the main outlines of the system readily—he can safely ignore all such passages (except where they are quotations) when reading this treatise for the first time. Moreover, the voluminous footnotes of Part One need not be ingested in the early stages of study; in fact, study will be facili-

tated if they are ignored temporarily. Further, chapters iv and v can be skipped in the same way; footnotes to this effect precede these chapters. All the material is fundamental, however, *and should eventually be read.*

For the opportunity to come into such close contact with German life that my knowledge of the language and other aspects of German culture was greatly furthered, I wish to express my indebtedness to Mr. George Pratt, who in 1923 sponsored the National Student Forum study of the German Youth Movement.

Acknowledgments are due the Institute of International Education, which was instrumental in securing the fellowship that made a stay in Cologne during 1926-7 possible. In this connection, mention should also be made of Dr. Werner Picht, then of the German Ministry of Education and now head of the Institute of Intellectual Co-operation of the League of Nations. My obligation to the Social Science Research Council, which provided a grant-in-aid that materially advanced the work of adaptation, should also be noted.

Professor Louis Wirth kindly waived his prior claim to the present work and placed his version of the table of interhuman relations, made independently of my own (but gratifyingly similar), at my disposal. To him and to the other friends who have given assistance and helpful criticism a measure of gratitude is felt that cannot well be expressed here; it is only fair to say, however, that they bear no responsibility for the form or content of this volume. Professor Harry Elmer Barnes of the New School for Social Research has given unstinting and timely aid; Professor Donald Young was of much help in the matter of publication and in the criticism of parts of the manuscript. Similar acknowledgments are due Professors F. H. Hankins, Stuart Rice, Clifford Kirkpatrick, Thomas D. Eliot, Theodore Abel, Pitirim Sorokin, James Woodard, and Mr. Arnold Winokur.

Permission to use lengthy quotations has been granted by the authors or publishers concerned, and is greatly appreciated, particularly in the case of the translation of Professor von Wiese's *Soziologie: Geschichte und Hauptprobleme*, sponsored by Professors Malcolm Willey and McQuilkin DeGrange. Nearly all of their little brochure has been used in the "Historical Postscript," but the translation mentioned has been so extensively revised and adapted in the process that they cannot fairly be held accountable for the present form of the postscript.

To my wife, however, by far the largest measure of credit is not only for altogether invaluable assistance in the mechanics of the work, but also for cogent criticism of the various adaptations and amplifications, and above all for her never-flagging interest and stimulation under the most trying circumstances.

Northampton, Nov. 1, 1931

HOWARD BECKER

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INTRODUCTORY

CHAPTER I

SOCIOLOGY AS DISTINCT FROM SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AND GENERAL SOCIAL SCIENCE

§1. THE SOCIOLOGICAL FERMENT

Discussions of sociology and its place among the sciences occasionally begin with complaints or accusations to the effect that no unanimity concerning the object of the discipline exists, and that uniform answers are not given to obviously basic questions such as: "What is sociology?" "What is society?"

The most telling reply to these charges is this: Definition of the most general and basic concepts of a science belongs not at the beginning but at the end of analysis; it is the difficult culmination for which systematic exposition of a long train of thought properly prepares the *earnest* investigator. When the question, "What is society?" is adequately answered, there is no more to say.

Further, lack of an unchallenged, all-convincing statement of objective is not peculiar to sociology; economists, psychologists, anthropologists, biologists, and even physicists and chemists disagree upon occasion. If entire harmony prevails in any science, it is a symptom either of intellectual stagnation or of exhausted possibilities. "Conflict is the father of all things!" Multiplicity of attempted definitions, abundance of proposed solutions, is not a sign of anarchy and confusion; on the contrary, it indicates intellectual fecundity and insight into the amazing complexity of this world in which we find ourselves.

Finally, no informed person can justifiably assert today that there is "all-pervasive vagueness" concerning the goal toward which sociology strives, its relation to other sciences, and the methods characteristic of its investigations. No one willing to devote a modicum of time to study of certain modern authors need be sociologically agnostic. Indeed, the mere fact that the discipline has been in existence for many years affords some presumption, although of course no proof, of its scientific warrant. Stronger presumption accrues when it is noted that all over the world sociology is vigorously ex-

nections impose upon it is the notion that sociology is a normative science teaching people to be "socially minded," philanthropic, healthy, wealthy, wise and what not. Even so keen a thinker as Cohen subscribes to the current misconception of sociology as a sort of glorified social philosophy and ethics,² although in his case failure to be entirely consistent robs his error of much of its power to lead others astray.

Part of the prevailing confusion is not due to pseudo-sociological discussion, however, but to the modern worship of science in general. On every hand there burgeon "scientific religion," "scientific ethics," and "scientific philosophy of life"—a general "scientifetishism" prevails. Einstein's or Millikan's pronouncements of the nature of God and religion, for example, are accorded a respect far beyond their actual merits, for without doubt these men are great scientists, and to numerous persons that makes them final authorities on everything from raisins to revelation. The fact that science is purely instrumental in origin and goal has never penetrated as far as the *pia mater* of most laymen and many scientists; the slogan "Freedom from value-judgments" has not been clearly heard in spite of the vigorous tones in which Max Weber (cf. chap. 1, §3) and others have proclaimed it. For this reason, it seems advisable to give here the gist of Weber's challenge to those who seek ultimate norms in science.

If you approach science in the expectation of receiving solutions for your most urgent problems, if you imagine that science can guide you in life, says Weber, you are mistaken and you will be grievously disappointed. All that science can teach you it teaches in the conditional form; *if* you wish to produce this particular effect, *then* you

thropy, social service work, crime prevention, temperance, Americanization, applied Christianity and practical religion, moral reform and social ethics, communal uplift, urban and rural betterment, civic and social reform and reconstruction, and the like.

"A more serious result is that in the program of the principal organization of the sociologists themselves, sociology as the science of society is almost completely smothered under the discussion of a welter of practical social problems. The Society has become in the main a society of *applied* sociology, which is striving to secure as large a membership as possible from philanthropic, religious, civic and social reform groups. Can it be saved as a scientific society? Or will it become necessary for those who are genuinely interested in the scientific study of social phenomena to form an organization of their own? Or can the Society be divided into two parts, the one dealing with sociology as a science, and the other with its practical applications? These are important questions for the present status and future development of sociology" (Maurice Parmelee, circular to members of the American Sociological Society, 1931).

² Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature: An Essay on the Meaning of Scientific Method*, pp. 342-50.

must use these particular means. Whether the effect is desirable as a goal, however, science cannot decide—but science can do something else: it can tell you that those means which you must use produce certain secondary effects that you did not consider when you chose your goal. But whether these unexpected effects are so bad that they disqualify the original intention, or whether the intended effect is of so great value that the unexpected concomitants seem comparatively trivial—this again is a question that science cannot decide.

Why? Because, as Weber goes on to say, the values involved cannot be quantitatively measured, and if they conflict, they cannot be reconciled by proportional mixture.

Instance the fact that if we analyze the basis of truth on the one hand and of justice on the other, taking both in the radical sense dictated by their claims to complete autonomy, a well-known conflict confronts us: in order to be able to judge right and wrong, we must disregard the basic law that every happening has a cause and that there is no such thing as an indetermined, freely elected act. On the other hand, if we keep the law of determination steadfastly in mind, we deprive ourselves of the possibility of discussing good and bad, and yet the difference between the two, as laid down in the mores, is basic to the social order.

A similar conflict goes on between the right and the beautiful. The sense of beauty, if developed to such a degree that it reacts to the subtlest vibrations, discovers a value even in the base. Baudelaire, inhaling with enchantment the fragrance of the "flowers of evil," depicts in his poetry the beauty of crime and perversion. And convinced that the baseness of the subject-matter makes the victory of beauty all the more glorious, he derides his "illiterate" opponents who, as he says, mix up ink and virtue. Among these illiterate people, however, we find a Plato. The man to whom the idea of the good represents the highest of all values can have no mercy on aesthetes who, because of their mastery of art, are able to make his fellowmen enjoy the bad. And the more he himself tingles with the appeal of such debauched beauty, the more he fears it for himself and others. Plato, in expelling artists from his ideally virtuous Republic, acts just as consistently as does Baudelaire in extending the field of beauty beyond all restrictions of morals and law.

Someone may object: Why not choose the Golden Mean? The decision which combines different values by moderating the claims of each, is not this the right decision? The answer is evident: You choose the moderation of values because it enables you to combine a

number of them, to nibble at your cake and have it too. Why is this to be preferred to the radicalism of values that keeps the simple value pure? Is not one as arbitrary as the other? The issue between the moderated but complex form on the one hand, and the radical but pure form on the other, shows better than any other example that the conflict between values can be decided only by an arbitrary choice.

Weber shows with the accuracy of the scientist what science can and cannot do. First, it can supply the technical instruments for the materialization of purposes. Second, it can as a consequence more thoroughly lay bare the precise point where the vital decision lies. Third, it can analyze the structure of decisions as such and show that they cannot be based on reason.

Does it therefore follow that we should never decide? By no means! replies Weber. All that follows is that in the light of reason every decision is arbitrary. Reason says: You cannot decide on the basis I furnish. Life says: You must decide for my sake. Should we then decide between life and reason? The answer to this question determines the way in which the scientist conducts his life. In so far as he is a human being, he will certainly decide for life and its values. In so far as he is a scientist, he will have to admit to himself what he proclaims to others, namely, that those decisions upon which life in its fullest sense depends are not based on reason, and that his science has no normative validity!³

This of course does not mean that the sociologist is barred from dealing with values as data; he has every warrant for attempting to discover what human beings cherish or condemn and how they have arrived at such evaluations. But it does mean that as a sociologist he is barred from *judging* the ethical rightness or wrongness of their predilections! He may say, in effect: If such behavior continues, the social structure within which it occurs will be destroyed—but he may not say: You must stop such behavior because it will destroy the social structure of which you are a member! Perhaps it is a good thing that it should be destroyed, or perhaps it is bad; the sociologist has no *value-judgment* to make.

We should also note, however, that the sociologist may legitimately ask what function a given process, etc., serves within a given social structure, i.e., what functional value that relation has in the mainte-

³ Adapted from Max Weber's essays on "Wissenschaft als Beruf" and "Der Sinn der 'Wertfreiheit' der soziologischen und ökonomischen Wissenschaften" on the basis of Edgar Wind's adaptation in his article, "Contemporary German Philosophy," *J. of Phil.*, XXII, 19, pp. 516-8.

nance of that structure. This is not value-judgment; in stating the fact that *esprit de corps* is essential to the maintenance of a highly integrated and efficient regiment, for example, we are not committed either to approval or to condemnation of the "military virtues" or of the ends military organization serves. (Cf. chap. vi, §2: "Action patterns in their functional aspects.") Similar statements regarding functional values may be made by all the other social sciences without incurring the charge of value-judgment; when once this point is clearly recognized, such misunderstanding as is evident in Hayes' and Ellwood's discussions,⁴ for instance, becomes difficult.

But enough of qualification; let us repeat that science as such has no room for value-judgments; although they will continually be made by scientists as human beings, they are on precisely the same competitive footing as those made by everyone else and must not be accorded the prestige of science.

This does not bar the scientist from expressing his opinion as positively as he wishes about anything under the shining sun, but it does bar him from claiming a peculiar insight into extra-scientific matters that is denied to other men. No man, as Titchener says, can be a scientist for more than about four hours a day; for those four hours he must subject himself to an iron discipline, but for the other twenty he is as free as human beings ever are. Granted, he cannot wholly compartmentalize himself; as a consequence his function as a scientist is continually interfering with his function as a human being and *vice versa*, just as his experience as a scientist is continually contributing to his experience as a human being and *vice versa*—nevertheless, the two aspects of his personality should be not confused.

If the sociologist wishes to be a scientist in fact as well as name, as it is to be presumed he does, he too must avoid the mixture of value-judgments and science. If not, let him frankly call himself a social philosopher; he will then deceive no one else and, what is more important, will not deceive himself. Moreover, the social philosopher has a real function; the pseudo-sociologist or the sociologian has none.

It may therefore be said that even if sociology dealt with every aspect of human society amenable to scientific treatment, if it comprised all the social *sciences*, no normative function could be assigned it. How much easier, then, is it to demonstrate the error of those who would assign it such a function when it is realized that sociology is

⁴ E. C. Hayes, *Sociology*, 2nd ed., pp. ix-xvi; C. A. Ellwood, "Scientific Method in Sociology," *Social Forces*, X, 1 (1931), pp. 15-21.

not general social science but a special social science—but this is the burden of the next section. Value-judgments, adieu!

§3. SOCIOLOGY—GENERAL OR SPECIAL SOCIAL SCIENCE?

If every science dealing with some aspect of human society were to be regarded as sociology, the latter discipline would cover an extremely wide field. Its claims would become still more vast if Ward's dictum were accepted: "The subject-matter of sociology is human achievement. . . . The environment transforms the animal, while man transforms the environment. Now it is exactly this transformation of the environment that constitutes achievement."⁵ This is tantamount to saying that the subject-matter of sociology is culture, for in both its material and non-material forms culture is the achievement *par excellence* of social life. Hence acceptance of Ward's pronouncement would make it necessary to relegate all sciences concerned with culture to the rank of mere subdivisions of sociology. Many of Ward's successors (see chap. xlviii, §§3, 4), oftentimes unaware of the source of their theories, uphold such academic imperialism; they maintain that the other social sciences should merely furnish material for the sociological synthesist. Inasmuch as every separate science of culture—technology, philology, aesthetics, etc.—has its own problems, point of view, and procedure, the hybrid resulting from a mixture of such markedly diverse methods and queries would simply be an *omnium gatherum*, "a science of organized smatter," as Giddings so aptly puts it.

In view of what has just been said about the virtual identity of achievement and culture, it is highly significant to find a recent writer roundly declaring that "a cultural sociology is not possible,"⁶ to read the telling phrase, "the wilderness of 'cultural sociology,'"⁷ and then to turn to Simmel's early utterance:

"The source of error is in the conception that the subject-matter of sociology is the whole sum of occurrences which take place in society. . . . It is plainly nonsensical to throw in one big pot labeled 'sociology' all those researches which have been satisfactorily conducted by economics, history, philosophy, political

⁵ Lester F. Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 15-7.

⁶ Theodore Abel, "Is a Cultural Sociology Possible?" *Am. J. Soc.*, XXXV, 5 (March, 1930), pp. 739-52.

⁷ Carl A. Dawson, "A Useful Approach to Sociology," *Pub. of Am. Soc. Society*, XXV, 2 (May, 1931), p. 199. The delusions of grandeur once characteristic of sociologists have seized upon the cultural sociologists and cultural anthropologists.

science, statistics, demography, jurisprudence, and ethics. That gives us a new name, but no new knowledge."⁸

The serious intellectual confusion resulting from such vagaries is bad enough, in all conscience, when confined to the sociological fraternity, but it becomes still worse when numerous other scholars are thereby emboldened to believe that they too are sociologists because they discuss human achievements and in due course make cursory mention of the society upon which those achievements are based. Moreover, they think it quite permissible to use the same methods and points of view in studying social behavior that prove serviceable in their own specialties. The biologist remains a biologist when he turns to the social field, and so does the psychologist, the economist, the jurist, or the philosopher.

That this has certain advantages, however, cannot be denied. The nature of social behavior is thereby illumined from many angles even if no direct contribution to sociology is made, and it would be cause for great regret if all outsiders were to restrain their "sociological" wanderings for fear of trespass. The multifarious insights already due to such specialists should by no means be despised or even lamented; the only reason for complaint lies in the fact that the luxuriant growth of exotic vegetation has seriously checked the development of plants native to sociological soil. As a consequence the notion has arisen that there is no independent, delimitable science of sociology with its own problems and its own methodology; the sociologist becomes an investigator of left-overs. One cultural sociologist has even advocated this residual delimitation: "[Sociology studies] the data of specific problems that are not *now* subject to investigation by the other social sciences. The field of sociology is the field of these problems that have not received the special attention of the economist, historian, etc."⁹ One is tempted to ask: What would happen if "the economist, historian, etc.," were to decide to take possession of their left-overs? Would the sociologist, with his squatter's title, be compelled reluctantly to quit the field? Probably not, academic tradition being what it is—nevertheless, the questions reveal the weakness of the residual definition.

Such considerations point to the fact that preliminary attempts, partial solutions, and embryonic sociologies are by no means lacking

⁸ Georg Simmel, "The Persistence of Social Groups," translated by A. W. Small, *Am. J. Soc.*, III (1897-8), p. 662.

⁹ Malcolm M. Willey, "A Proposed Reorganization of the Introduction to Sociology," *Pub. of Am. Soc. Society*, XXV, 2 (May, 1931), p. 199. *Italics ours.*

—indeed, are over-abundant—but that no sociology unmixed with other sciences has yet found general acceptance. Time and again it can be observed that those who acquire skill in fields bordering on sociology, and who arrive at the point where interhuman behavior as such engages their attention, succeed for a time in dealing with the strictly sociological as it deserves, but that they sooner or later digress into the more familiar and smooth paths of their old specialties; they never reach the goal. Few thinkers, past or present, perceive that there is a special science of interhuman behavior with its own problems and methods, and most of those who do state their insights in very vague language. The most striking exception, Durkheim, advocated and practiced a sociological method that is quite self-contained. With all his merits, however, he allowed too little independence to the other social sciences; as Sorokin has correctly pointed out, he perpetrated a one-sided “sociologism.”¹⁰

Fortunately, a tendency beginning with the closing decades of the nineteenth century (cf. chaps. xlvii, §3; 1) led many students of the social sciences to the conclusion that it was possible, desirable, and necessary to *complement* them by a sociology conceived as a *special* social science concentrating on interhuman behavior, on processes of *sociation*,¹¹ on *association* and *dissociation* as such. (See chap. ii, “The Frame of Reference Peculiar to Sociology as a Special Social Science.”) This was clearly stated by Simmel:

“If sociology in place of a mere tendency in method, which has been falsely denoted the science of sociology, is to be a true science, the entire province of social science in its broadest sense must be divided for purposes of investigation, and a sociology, in the narrower sense, be separated out.”¹²

The new science should not use as its starting-point the *results* of sociation, said Simmel and others, for even when they issued their declaration such cultural achievements had already been dealt with by other social sciences; on the contrary, it should abstract interhuman relations as such. Abstraction of this kind had already been occasionally practiced, to be sure, in connection with the other social sciences, but usually in subordination to non-sociological goals or as an adjunct of social reform. As a consequence, interhuman processes were not studied with the necessary detachment; proximate purposes

¹⁰ Pitirim Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 463-80.

¹¹ This is a more precise form of what Small and Spykman call “socialization”; the latter term is altogether too ambiguous. Sociation as here used should not be confused with Stuckenbergs usage. See chap. vi, §2.

¹² Georg Simmel, “The Problem of Sociology,” *Ann. of Am. Ac. of Pol. and VI* (1895), p. 413.

of social amelioration, legal control, or economic organization rather than ultimate purposes of scientific prediction were and still are dominant. This necessarily involves a certain telic distortion resulting in an exceedingly narrow view of the field.

The jurist, for example, whose decisions bear upon so many regions of interhuman life, proceeds from the a priori postulates of jurisprudence; so far as he is concerned, human actions are relevant only as they are subject to legal control. In spite of the fact that a great deal of interhuman behavior never comes within the legal zone, jurists (and students of the sociology of law) deal with interhuman relations only when they are formal legal relations. Such rigorous abstraction is absolutely necessary if specialized and exact science is to thrive; he would be a poor jurist indeed who did not regard the social world as a cross-section of life to be subjected to the categories upon which his science of jurisprudence is based. This is also true of the economist, the historian, and similar specialists.

Sociology, however, must deal with interhuman relations without immediate reference to ends, norms, or purposes; it involves a wholly different kind of abstraction.

§4. THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL VIEWPOINT

The present system has been developing over a period of more than twenty years, but from the very beginning answers to the following questions have been consistently sought:

Are there any strictly sociological categories?

Are there any methods which will abstract the specifically interhuman (see chap. ii, §9, for definition),¹³ and that alone, from its entanglements with other manifestations of human life—legal, economic, psychical, etc.?

¹³ In advance of the definition, a few hints as to the meaning of "interhuman" may be acceptable:

"Holt, more clearly perhaps than any other writer, has shown us that reality is in the relating, in the activity-between. He shows us how in the 'behavior-process' subject and object are equally important and that reality is in the relating of these, is in the endless evolving of these relatings" (Mary P. Follet, *Creative Experience*, pp. 54-5).

"1. Behavior is both internally and externally conditioned.

"2. Behavior is a function of the interweaving between activity of organism and activity of environment, that is, response is to a relating.

"3. By this interlocking activity of individual and situation each is creating itself anew.

"4. Thus relating themselves anew.

"5. Thus giving us the evolving situation" (*ibid.*, p. 89).

How may such categories and methods be made as fruitful as the similar principles of abstraction used in the other social sciences?

Practical experience and the reflection of that experience in the various sciences perpetually demonstrates the urgent necessity for systematized knowledge of the behavior of human beings toward each other, especially of that type of behavior which is not primarily prescribed by local and fortuitous circumstances and which is not explicable unless interhuman influences as such are regarded as the chief factors. The organization of an army may be instanced: certain divisions and groupings are the direct results of the particular weapons used, and as the weapons change the outer form of the army changes; e.g., knights in heavy armor and their men-at-arms are superseded by musketeers, and the size and structure of fighting units consequently undergo marked alteration. From this point of view the system of organization is governed by technical considerations. Over and above this strictly technical standpoint, however, military organization necessitates a type of association which is primarily characterized by superordination and subordination. No matter how great the technical differentiation in a modern army, for example, the vast number of heterogeneous human beings composing it must be shaped into a relatively homogeneous body in order that the commanding officers may use it as a "tool" for executing *their* purposes. This kind of organization is extra-technical, is sociological, is, more exactly speaking, interhuman; its successful accomplishment demands systematized knowledge. A good deal is already known about such relatively crude types of interhuman behavior as are inherent in military organization, but there are tremendous numbers of other human relations concerning which little or no systematized knowledge is available. The family, the church, the school, the political party, and the state all bear witness to this fact.

In discussing the need for such systematized knowledge, it soon becomes evident that almost everyone dimly perceives the existence of a plane of specifically interhuman activity pervading all human life, a zone¹⁴ of the strictly social. This dim perception can be explicitly formulated as follows: every human being participates in at least three zones which, although distinct, are nevertheless experienced as a unity—the physical zone, the zone of individual mental experience, and the zone of the social or interhuman.

Thinkers have struggled for millennia with the difficulty of conceiving separately the physical and mental zones, but this difficulty

¹⁴ Such terms as zone, sphere, plane, circle, level, etc., are of course figurative.

is greatly exceeded by the formidable task of isolating the social zone and studying its specific nature. Such concentration upon the distinctively social has been undertaken now and again in the past, but always in a very inadequate way and without the necessary persistence. This is true even at present, as Dewey has pointed out:

"... there are only a few sociologists who have ventured as yet to assert that there is something distinctive or unique in social phenomena; so we are met with a paradoxical situation in which social phenomena are isolated from physical and organic considerations and yet are explained in physical, or organic or psychological terms instead of in characteristically social terms."²⁵

But after all, "a few sociologists who have ventured" (see chap. xlvii, §3) may be enough to turn the tide; the present generation is in a position to make marked progress toward systematic knowledge of the specifically social if only more rigid and consistent procedure is followed. It has long been known that language, religion, politics, art, and science are products of the interhuman zone, but nearly all the study has gone to such cultural achievements rather than to the processes producing them. To be sure, there has been a plethora of inference from the consequents to the antecedents, from the products to the processes—but is inference enough?

If the unbiased observer will vouchsafe one glance at the chaos to which uncontrolled inference has given rise, his answer will be unequivocally negative. Although, as above noted, the unique characteristics and the tremendous influence of the social zone have long been dimly perceived, this perception has all too seldom been accompanied by the desire to abandon distorting preconceptions and unbalanced doctrines. Hence the social zone has often been a battleground of speculative assertions, arbitrary analogies, dogmatic fiat. Unhappily enough, mere "thinking" about social affairs without any attempt at verification has held sway; genuine knowledge has thereby been hindered rather than helped.

It will be recalled that answers to three questions are sought in the belief that when attained they will counteract the prevailing confusion; let us restate these questions in slightly different form:

- (1) Is there really a zone of the specifically social?
- (2) If so, can this zone be analyzed in relative independence of other zones?
- (3) If so, what methods must be used in order to understand its interconnections and to make them understandable to others?

²⁵ John Dewey, "Social as a Category," *The Monist*, XXXVIII, 2 (April, 1928), p. 166.

The answer to the first question is affirmative; proof will be forthcoming as the present work progresses. The second answer is similarly affirmative (although connections with the psychical zone are very close); it will be dealt with in the same way as the first. The third question must be answered in far more detail than the others, and will be the primary focus of attention henceforth.

Now, the phenomena of human life are extremely complex, and can be scientifically mastered only by following the principle of "divide and conquer." In order to concentrate on those elements which belong solely to the interhuman zone, and in order to determine those human manifestations and achievements which derive from interhuman sources, it is necessary to find the basic type of interhuman behavior and make it the point of reference for all further observation. Only when this is done can we attain strictly sociological categories (1) which if consistently used will prevent us from straying into fields that only specialists in the other social sciences can successfully till and (2) which will enable us to cultivate *our* garden.

The precise way in which this basic type of interhuman behavior is determined will later be discussed *in extenso*; suffice it to say here that study of human interdependence reveals the paramount importance of processes increasing or diminishing that interdependence. The most general aspects of these processes have already been mentioned; they are association and dissociation, and may be subsumed under the inclusive concept of sociation. The sociologist must analyze association and dissociation in all their manifold forms and in all the groupings to which they lead. In close conjunction with this analysis, he must also determine the ways in which the influence of these processes is exerted and how they affect human beings and their achievements. Hence it may be said that nothing more and nothing less than the total positive and negative process of sociation¹⁶ must be observed both in its entirety and in its minutest parts, and all its effects upon human affairs must be determined—this is the task of sociology. Its magnitude and moment are not surpassed by the tasks of any of the other sciences, and the present generation of sociologists will do well if they make even a good start toward its accomplishment.

§5. THE NATURE OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM

The treatise now before the reader is neither more nor less than an attempt to set forth a method by which the total process of sociation

¹⁶ The "total process of sociation" is a concept closely akin to Cooley's "social process"—barring, of course, certain unwarranted inferences sometimes drawn from his frequent use of the adjective "organic".

can be observed, analyzed, and systematized. The assertion may confidently be made that contemporary sociology abounds in generalities concerning social life but that a method of observing the specifically social zone has hitherto been lacking. To be sure, most sociologists have not been aware of any such deficiency; they have naively believed that they could borrow the methods of other sciences or that common sense would be sufficient. So far as the latter is concerned, there is no doubt that it is the final and most important source of all knowledge, but it is complex and composite and is essentially untransferable in its original form. It must be made accessible to all minds by the method of delimitation, definition, comparison, and classification. The lack of a single, unified method of studying the specifically interhuman produces disastrous consequences which are all too apparent when we look at the chaotic conglomeration of preachments, dogmas, legislative proposals, philosophical doctrines, statisticoid flights from reality, and what not, currently offered as sociological knowledge.

A word or two regarding the organization of the present work may not be amiss. It seems advisable to set forth in close conjunction the method proposed and the results hitherto achieved by that method. Intensive application should always accompany methodological discussion if such discussion is to carry full conviction, but unfortunately space forbids any detailed demonstration; the most that can be done is to give the results or conclusions deriving from prior use of the method. Genuine proof of its applicability must be reserved for other treatises, based upon the present system, which will deal with the special fields of sociology (cf. chap. xlvii, §3). By far the greater part of the general¹⁷ sociology here expounded is necessarily taken up with statements of conclusions based upon analyses conducted elsewhere.

Above all else, however, it must be emphasized that no conclusions are stated as final, for if they were it would be quite superfluous to recommend the application of the method. The results of previous analyses are announced only to the end that they may be verified by others; there is no intention of adding to the already far too numerous class of prejudices and premature judgments.

Such restriction of purpose affords some consolation for the deficiency inherent in this as in all general systems, namely, that a logically compelling, empirically demonstrable proof cannot be adduced at every point. There has of course been a consistent effort to refrain from all assertions that cannot be proven adequately—which is to

¹⁷ "General" only in the sense of the most general aspects of a special social science; our "special" sociologies are various subdivisions of sociology as a special social science. They might be called "special-special social sciences."

say, immediately and in the same context. Nevertheless, such requirements can be entirely met only in monographic studies; a treatise dealing with the state, church, crowd, group, and similar plurality patterns would have to be expanded into a whole library if more than simple indication of possible lines of proof were attempted. The mere observer advocating a completely Baconian or "inductive" method (best exemplified by Steinmetz or Ogburn) loses sight of the fact that deductions and schematic constructs must be judged and tested with reference to the carrying power of the scientific "scaffolding" they represent rather than to the exhaustive knowledge of single factors manifest in them. No doubt it is vitally necessary to strive *toward* such exhaustive knowledge, but in the very nature of the case the goal can never be reached. It is much more important to erect a scaffold which may be used in working out the minute details of the sociological structure than first to perfect those details. As Jaspers says: "In order to deal with any problem with the maximum theoretical exactitude, it is absolutely necessary to construct frames of reference. Otherwise one remains aphoristic, devoid of any fruitful method of discovering gaps and interrelations, and unable to survey the ground already covered."¹⁸

¹⁸ Karl Jaspers, *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, p. 18.

PART ONE

**OUTLINES OF SYSTEMATIC SOCIOLOGY
AS A SCIENCE OF INTERHUMAN BEHAVIOR**

CHAPTER II

THE FRAME OF REFERENCE PECULIAR TO SOCIOLOGY AS A SPECIAL SOCIAL SCIENCE

§1. THE TWO NETWORKS OF HUMAN RELATIONS: NATURAL AND SOCIAL

The attention of the sociologist is focussed on the behavior of human beings, particularly on those actions affecting or affected by other human beings. Consequently, we choose the more inclusive concept "behavior" rather than "conduct," for the latter refers primarily to conscious actions, and we are not concerned with these alone, although they perhaps predominate. The word "behavior" has the connotations of action, motion, reciprocal influence. This emphasis upon *action* is a distinguishing feature of sociology, rather than of psychology. To call psychology a science of human behavior is from one point of view too narrow, and from another too broad, as will be shown later.

Human behavior obviously differs greatly from place to place and from time to time; such difference is inevitable, for the characteristics of the human beings and the situations in which they find themselves vary markedly. Moreover, the forces which influence human behavior are exceedingly diverse; for convenience' sake, however, they may be placed in two main categories: extrahuman and interhuman.

The extrahuman forces will henceforth be called "natural," using the latter term in the *restricted* sense adopted by Bernard in his classification of environments;¹ Kelsey's "physical basis of society" is an equivalent.² It must be expressly stated, however, that in referring to extrahuman forces as natural there is no implication that the network of interhuman relations is outside the realm of the natural in the *broad* sense of that term; as Major has well said, "Man is organic to nature."³ Bernard's usage is simply that of everyday speech; in this restricted sense, nature is the sum total of everything in the world of sense-perception not attributable to human agency. Hence the

¹ L. L. Bernard, "A Classification of Environments," *Am. J. Soc.*, XXXI, 3 (November, 1925), pp. 318-32.

² Carl Kelsey, *The Physical Basis of Society*, 2nd ed.

³ D. R. Major, "Man is Organic to Nature," *The Monist*, XXXVIII, 3 (July, 1928), pp. 373-85.

natural is contrasted with the totality of everything deriving from human actions and aims.

For sociological purposes this contrast is indispensable; the relations of the human being with the web of nature (in the restricted sense) and his relations with other human beings must be clearly distinguished. The latter are interhuman relations; they are the sole object of sociological investigation. We are concerned only with the behavior of human beings (1) toward each other and (2) toward nature in so far as this second mode of behavior is influenced by interhuman relations.

The latter point once more reminds us that "man is organic to nature"; our proposed isolation of the social from the natural, of the interhuman from the extrahuman, must not be complete. Nature, always persisting in the background of sociological research, irresistibly moves into the foreground whenever it can be shown that interhuman happenings are fundamentally dependent upon its enduring web. Bernard's classification makes this plain.⁴

The behavior of human beings at times takes place within the natural, at times within the social zone—most often, however, in both at once. It is frequently demonstrable that certain human beings have attitudes toward nature markedly different from those possessed by other persons because the former participate in a different network of interhuman relations; contrariwise, their attitudes toward their fellows are sometimes conditioned in essential respects by natural factors.

Any attempt to attribute superior worth or influence to either zone would be quite irrelevant in a sociological treatise;⁵ there can be no doubt that the human being is both natural and social as these terms are here used. Again, any attempt to compare numerically the extent of human participation in the two zones is similarly irrelevant if not impossible. The social zone receives most of our attention, not

⁴ Bernard, *loc. cit.* Cf. his *Introduction to Social Psychology*, chap. vi., and his "Culture and Environment," parts I and II, *Social Forces*, VIII, 3 and IX, 1 (March and October, 1930), pp. 327-34 and 39-48.

⁵ The philosopher may legitimately devote his attention to the problem: "It would . . . appear legitimate to adopt as a hypothesis worthy of being tried out the idea that the ulterior meaning of the mental as well as of the physical and vital is revealed in . . . [the social]. The implication is not that they have no describable *existence* outside the social, but that in as far as they appear and operate outside of that larger interaction which forms the social they do not reveal that full force and import with which it is the traditional business of philosophy to occupy itself" (John Dewey, "Social as a Category," *The Monist*, XXXVIII, 2 [April, 1928], p. 171).

because it is more important "in reality," but only because the special knowledge which we seek necessitates such heuristic concentration.

§2. THE METHODOLOGICAL STARTING-POINT IS THE SINGLE HUMAN BEING

Accordingly, we must henceforth center our attention on human behavior in so far as it is influenced by social life and kinship with other human beings. *Our methodological starting-point is the single human being as known to our naïve sense-perception*; we begin simply by observing what is "given" in concrete behavior. In other words, we do not *begin* with an abstraction, but with direct observation; the basis of the system here set forth is empirical.

But obviously the sociologist cannot observe everything; he spreads his net as widely as he can, but both minnows and whales cannot be caught in meshes of the same size. Most careful students of scientific method know that observation sooner or later means selection in accordance with interest, experience, and implicit or explicit notions of relevance. The scientist, in particular, must eventually concentrate on certain definite aspects of the "given"; even though he begins with his lens set for broad scope rather than sharp detail, the scientific sociologist must finally focus on socially relevant behavior.

Manifestly, such close focussing makes it necessary to leave indistinct a great many traits of interest to other specialists, just as these specialists find it necessary to disregard numerous characteristics of paramount importance to the sociologist. This is one trait of the ideal-typical method, to which we shall frequently refer; all scientists, and especially social scientists, explicitly or implicitly make use of it. The sociologist *constructs* the unit with which he operates.

A word or two concerning the nature of the ideal-typical may not be amiss. The term derives from Max Weber (see chap. I, §3), who applied it to various social phenomena which are never found in an unmixed or "pure" form but which for purposes of conceptual clarity and systematization are dealt with *as if* they so existed. Klüver rightly points out that in speaking of an ideal type Weber does not mean anything empirically exemplary or "average."^{*}

The "economic man," for example, is not an average but an ideal type or construct in the writings of the more enlightened systematic economists; he is an abstraction that has never existed in real life, and yet considerable insight into economic processes can be gained by thus operating with what is after all a *fiction*. The practice of accentuating or stressing certain factors or characteristics results in a distortion of the empirically evident configuration that may never-

* Heinrich Klüver, "Max Weber's 'Ideal Type' in Psychology," *J. of Phil.*, XXIII, 2 (January, 1926), pp. 29-35.

theless lead to important discoveries, as Weber's own work in the sociology of religion has impressively demonstrated.

As already noted, all scientists operate with ideal types or even conscious fictions; the theoretical physicist's world, for example, is an artificially simplified realm in which lines are fictitiously straight, cylinders and spheres are of ideally perfect form, plane surfaces are without even microscopic irregularities, and friction is banished utterly.⁷ Nobody expects him to formulate a "law" (a short-hand statement of his observations) relating to the behavior of a particular knotty, unplanned, kiln-dried, yellow pine two-by-four when struck with a dull axe in the sweaty hands of a 150-pound Italian laborer who receives only thirty cents an hour for his work; ideal-typical and empirical are never confused, either by the public or the physicist himself. The sociologist, on the other hand, is often expected unflinching to prophesy concerning the future behavior of that particular Italian laborer, so to speak, and in the effort to vindicate his science in the eyes of a sceptical world, sometimes attempts to do so, apparently in entire ignorance of the theory of probability and the fact that not even the sociologist, strange as it may seem, is omniscient. Ideal-typical and empirical are not sharply discriminated, and justice is done to neither.

Ideal types are therefore only heuristic fictions, and are never found on land or sea; this insistence seems necessary because by far the greater part of the criticism directed against the use of the ideal-typical method is beside the mark; instead of appraising the *instrumental, pragmatic value* of particular ideal types, an effort is made to find exceptions—as if anything other than exceptions could be found!⁸

Ross says "Only a part of man is molded by association. He gets hungry, tired, or sleepy as a biological organism, not as a socius. Many of his . . . [tendencies are] extra-social."⁹ The sociologist, in other words, does not practice the biological abstraction; the construct *Homo sapiens* is not the particular abstraction upon which he concentrates, and he therefore does not study native endowments or attributes *as such*, although he takes their social implications into account. (See chap. v.) Just as does the biologist, however, he abstracts from the concrete persons of everyday experience by focussing upon only one aspect, as Simmel clearly recognized:

"The sociological type is always an abstraction, but not other than those at the basis of every science. The object of a special science seldom occurs in the purity and isolation with which it is scientifically treated, but in reality is always mixed and entangled with phenomena to which other branches of science are devoted, so that each special science treats only an abstraction. It is there-

⁷ A. Cornelius Benjamin, "On Formation of Constructs," *The Monist*, XXXVIII, 2 (April, 1928), pp. 404-5.

⁸ Adapted from Howard Becker, "Ionia and Athens: Studies in Secularization," pp. 2-3, unpublished dissertation, University of Chicago.

⁹ E. A. Ross, "Moot Points in Sociology," *Am. J. Soc.*, IX (1903-4), p. 198.

fore better to acknowledge freely that this is the case with the new science of sociology."¹⁰

The sociologist begins with the single human being, and, by eliminating traits that are sociologically irreducible, he ends by centering upon the socius, which is simply the spatial locus of sociation, as Cooley indicates: "A man may be regarded as the point of intersection of an indefinite number of circles representing social groups, having as many arcs passing through him as there are groups."¹¹

As will be recalled, sociology as a special science is concerned only with sociation, only with "human behavior in so far as it is influenced by social life and kinship with other human beings"—on the behavior of the socius. We then try to comprehend this locus of sociation in his relations to other men, in the interhuman behavior of himself and his fellows, or, otherwise stated, in and through sociation.

The further this process of sociological comprehension extends, the more thoroughly is our initial concrete perception of the apparently fixed *attributes* of flesh-and-blood human beings transformed into abstract cognition of the *relations* of socii. Such comprehension through abstraction may be carried a long way, but it nevertheless reaches its limit at the point where attributes can no longer be resolved into relationships, i.e., where they merge into the non-social zone because "man is organic to nature." Inasmuch as this non-social or natural zone is not amenable to strictly sociological analysis, the residual attributes must therefore be regarded as sociologically irreducible. But more of this later.

§3. RELATION, OBJECT, AND ATTRIBUTE

It is evident that the concept of relation should be clearly distinguished from the concepts of object and attribute. An object appears as something substantial, a solidly existent datum, with definite attributes or properties which are thought to be virtually immutable. In this sense, the human being is only an object that is seen, heard, smelled, etc., to the naïve person whose mental equipment focusses almost altogether on direct percepts. Consequently the abstract plexus of interhuman relations we term the socius is left out of account; the human being seems to possess fixed attributes determinable once and for all. Even mental characteristics are assumed to be fixed—lump sums, as it were; from this point of view, a given human

¹⁰ Georg Simmel, "Superiority and Subordination," translated by A. W. Small, *Am. J. Soc.*, II (1896-7), p. 177.

¹¹ C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, rev. ed., p. 148.

being is "by nature" wise, courageous, patient, foolish, cowardly, or irritable. His attributes seem inherently and permanently united with him as an object.

From the standpoint of the scientific sociologist, however, these attributes of the mental zone (and, to a lesser extent, physical attributes as well) *partially* resolve themselves into social relations. When this stage of abstraction is reached, the object—in our case the human being—no longer admits of definition by his attributes alone; indeed, his supposedly fixed attributes can largely be explained as the consequences of his relations. These relations, when compared with the putative invariability of the attributes, manifest a relatively high degree of indefiniteness, change, and multiformity.

The concept of relation is therefore of great importance to the sociologist; among contemporary writers, Vierkandt, Todd, MacIver, and several others grant it a prominent place in their thinking. Almost a century ago, however, Emerson wrote, "A man is a bundle of relations, a knot of roots," and, about the same time, Guizot evinced surprising insight in his remark that "Society, in its broadest and at the same time its narrowest sense, is the relation between man and man." Among the sociologists, the writer who did most to bring the concept into general use seems to have been Simmel, but not until a good half-century after the pioneers just mentioned did he arrive upon the scene with his definition: "Society, in its broadest sense, is found wherever several individuals enter into reciprocal relations."¹² This was turned to account by Ratzenhofer early in the twentieth century in the following formulation: "By sociology I understand the science of the reciprocal relations of human beings."¹³ Shortly thereafter, Simmel published his famous *Soziologie*, in which this vivid and valuable passage occurs:

"Men regard one another, and men are jealous one of another; they write one another letters or dine together; they meet in sympathy or antipathy quite apart from all tangible interests; their gratitude for altruistic service weaves a chain of consequences never to be sundered; they ask the way of one another, and they dress and adorn themselves for one another;—these are instances chosen quite at random from the thousand relations, momentary or lasting, conscious or unconscious, transitory or fraught with consequences, which, playing from person to person, knit us incessantly together. Every moment such threads are spun, are dropped and again caught up, replaced by others, woven up with others.

¹² Georg Simmel, "The Problem of Sociology," *Ann. of Am. Ac. of Pol. and Soc. Science*, VI (1895), p. 413.

¹³ Gustav Ratzenhofer, "The Problems of Sociology," trans. by A. W. Small, *Congress of Arts and Sciences, Universal Exposition, St. Louis, 1904*, V, p. 815.

These . . . determine all the tenacity and elasticity, all the variegation and unity of this so intelligible and yet so mysterious life of society."¹⁴

These quotations make plain the fact that although every science is a science of relations, as Stephinger rightly asserts,¹⁵ sociology derives its warrant as an independent and distinct science from its concentration on interhuman relations as such. It does not deal with merely logical or material relations, but with relations as they are *lived* by human beings. The units which sociology takes into account are either those focal points of lived relations here termed *socii* or social structures maintained by lived relations between *socii*. Now, life is manifest in action, and lived relations are therefore the action patterns¹⁶ of human beings. Before engaging in further analysis of the specifically interhuman aspects of relations, however, it is perhaps advisable to devote some attention to an analogical description, cast in more or less physical terms, of relations and their effects.

§4. THE DYNAMIC INTERACTION OF RELATIONS

Relations as they occur in physical phenomena are based upon more or less rapid motion between magnitudes¹⁷—upon interaction. In order to get a clear picture of such interaction and its effects, let us think of the magnitudes as molecules which are made up of atoms. A stream of energy flows between these molecules and produces relations. Many molecules must give up atoms in the process, but nevertheless do not disintegrate completely. The stream of energy carries the detached atoms to other molecules; these therefore change and grow through the combination of the new with their old atoms. At many places where a cluster of molecules forms, where a plural number of them

¹⁴ Georg Simmel, *Soziologie*, p. 19; passage translated by R. M. MacIver and quoted in his *Community*, p. 126.

¹⁵ Ludwig Stephinger, "Zur Grundlegung der Gesellschaftswissenschaft," *Kölner Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie*, I, 3 (1921), p. 20; cf. Johnstone's far more sweeping statement: "Reality . . . consists in relation. And this is true not only of physical things but also of minds. Mind, equally with matter, is constituted by the relations in which it stands" (G. A. Johnstone, "Sensations, Physical Objects and Reality," *The Monist*, XXXVIII, No. 2, p. 370).

Johnstone is of course a philosophical relativist, i.e., he belongs to that school which maintains that ideas are resolvable into series of relationships having an ultimate core of "self-relation," that is, that thinking derives its whole significance from the point of view from which it starts. Spencer says, "We think in relations," and Hayes agrees: "All our knowledge consists in thinking phenomena together in the *relations* in which they exist together" (E. C. Hayes, "Sociological Construction Lines," *Am. J. Soc.*, XI, 1 [July, 1905], p. 29).

¹⁶ F. H. Giddings, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

¹⁷ Magnitude is to be understood in the mathematical sense as anything that may be greater or less than something else of the same class.

accumulates, there results a structure or pattern of more or less definite configuration. Such structured clusters may be termed *plurality patterns*. Remnants of other molecules and plurality patterns which previously had remained isolated become so weak that they finally can no longer resist the stream of energy, and hence permit it to carry them into union with other molecules and plurality patterns.

Watching the process, we conclude that when molecules or clusters of molecules do not possess extremely high resistance as a result of special atomic composition (like that of helium, for example), they cannot well withstand the disintegrating force of such interaction, and frequently break down, liberating their components in a new, mixed form. As a consequence, almost nowhere does there remain a molecule, even among those which appear relatively isolated, which still retains its "original" atomic composition. The process of interaction is unceasing; it builds up in quick succession molecules and plurality patterns both large and small, powerful and feeble, and just as quickly tears them down, only incessantly to build fresh structures with the *débris* of the old.

To abandon the analogy for a moment: Interhuman relations have, as *action* patterns, a decidedly dynamic aspect; they continually lead to various types of association and dissociation, they ceaselessly alter those characteristics of the human being usually considered part of his original nature, and they perpetually bring him into numerous unions with other human beings or with previously existent clusters (*plurality patterns*) of human beings. New "attributes" arise through disintegration, reintegration, mixture and blending; any socius changes in some measure, however slight, when the process of sociation carries him into unwonted relations with other socii and plurality patterns. "External" modification is accompanied by "internal" modification.

These sociological considerations may at first glance lead to the conclusion that the physical analogy used is altogether misleading, for it is commonly assumed that physical phenomena are subject only to the logic of external relations. Such assumptions are erroneous, however, for the concept of physical interaction takes account of internal modifications in virtually the same way as does the concept of social interaction, i.e., of sociation, as Ormond's trenchant analysis shows:

"The notion of interaction is not simple, but very complex. The notion involves, not simply the idea of collision and rebound, but something much more profound, namely, the internal modifiability of the colliding agents. Take an example, the simplest possible case, that of one billiard ball striking against an-

other. We say that the impact of one ball against another communicates motion, so that the stricken ball passes from a state of rest to one of motion, while the striking ball has experienced a change of an opposite character. But nothing is explained by this account, for if nothing happens but the communication of motion, why does it not pass through the stricken ball and leave its state unchanged? The phenomenon cannot be of this simple character, but there must be a point somewhere at which the recipient of the impulse gathers itself up, so to speak, into a knot and becomes the subject of the impulse which is thus translated into movement. We have thus movement, impact, impulse, which is translated again into activity, and outwardly the billiard ball changing from a state of rest to one of motion; or in the case of the impelling ball, from a state of motion to one of rest. The situation is not understandable at all unless we assume the internal modifiability of the participants in such a phenomenon.¹⁸

We may therefore continue to use the physical analogy without too much fear of distorting the sociological frame of reference it is intended to clarify, but let it be strongly emphasized that analogy is analogy and *not* homology!

§5. RELATION-STRUCTURES (PLURALITY PATTERNS) AND RELATION-MOLECULES (SOCI)

In view of the long-continued and futile controversy about the relation of the "individual" to "society," something should be said concerning the genesis of relation-structures, or, in sociological terms, of plurality patterns. These structures may be compared to crystals; the crystallization is effected by the process of interaction, i.e., plurality patterns are established in and through sociation. Now if our analogy of atoms, molecules, and crystals is to be complete, due attention must be paid to certain presuppositions underlying it.

First, we have ignored the relation of the stream of energy, which flows between the molecules, to our cosmos (the totality = molecules + space between them + stream of energy or force to which this totality is subordinate and by which it is controlled). In other words, no attention has been paid to the "ultimate" source of social phenomena, cosmic, divine, or otherwise.

But after all this is a metaphysical question, and we are here restricted to empirical observation; no apologies for ignoring the problem (if problem it be) are scientifically necessary.

Second, it should be noted that the analogy as thus far outlined has been over-simplified for the sake of clarity; we have proceeded on the basis of a state of affairs where at the beginning only molecules

¹⁸ Ormond, *Foundations of Knowledge*, quoted in F. E. Lumley, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 141.

are assumed to be whirling about and no crystals as yet exist. That is, we *seem* to have assumed that human beings did not live in plurality patterns (pairs, families, sibs, tribes, etc.) during the earlier phases of human history, and hence that only by the banding together of previously isolated persons did plurality patterns arise.

Comment on this second point is sociologically relevant.

If we were able to turn the clock back, as it were, and to observe the interplay of molecular motion at an earlier period, the supposedly primordial molecules of the analogy as thus far presented would be found, as compared with the later period, in combinations at least partially new and with internal alterations in composition as well. And even in this earlier period there would also be a strikingly large number of crystals.

If we were then able to turn the clock ahead and make observations, and to repeat them at intervals thereafter, the following remarkable phenomenon would be revealed: not only is the composition of the molecules often peculiarly complex because of participation in numerous intersecting and variously vibrating molecules, but in addition they rapidly surrender atoms to every crystal and molecule that exerts sufficient attractive influence. Quite as rapidly, however, they attach to themselves numerous other atoms or even molecules. All in all, the rapid interchange clearly shows that a clear-cut separation of crystal and molecule is not feasible, as Cooley makes clear:

"Nothing [in the system of relations] is fixed or independent, everything is plastic and takes influence as well as gives it. No factor of life can exist for men except as it is merged in the . . . system and becomes an effect as much as a cause of the total development. What observation shows is a universal interaction, in which no factor appears antecedent to the rest."¹⁹

From this it should be plain that the analogy does not in any sense point to a temporally determinable "beginning of society"; crystals and molecules are co-existent and neither have any priority. To be more exact, now the crystals appear predominant, now the molecules; each crystal appears, with a certain adjustment of the microscope, to be a molecule; with a different adjustment each molecule appears to be a crystal. Further, we cannot ever be sure whether association or dissociation, integration or differentiation predominates; the total process of interaction is too complex and rapid.

Otherwise stated: there is no way of telling whether *socii* or society came first; we always find them temporally co-existent. One is the condition of the other, hence separation of one means extinction of

¹⁹ C. H. Cooley, *Social Process*, pp. 44-5.

both. Human beings, in so far as their social personalities are concerned, constitute plurality patterns; conversely, plurality patterns constitute human beings in so far as their social personalities are concerned!

Hence the analogy might with some justification have been reversed. We might have postulated an "energy-stream cosmos," within which there come to exist large and complex structures that reciprocally influence each other until as a result of this activity molecules, atoms, etc., are detached.

Throughout the foregoing exposition, however, the opposite method of illustration was intentionally chosen and consistently used. The reason is as follows: although social groupings and human beings are co-existent and mutually dependent at every period of human history, it is nevertheless true that in those epochs about which we can make any well-grounded inferences the earlier social groupings and the earlier human beings, with few exceptions, usually seem much less complicated than the later. As time goes on, both society and socii become increasingly intricate. Hence an analogy beginning with the relatively simple and proceeding to the complex affords a closer parallel to developments as they actually took place than one following the reverse order. (This statement does *not* imply any rigid sequence of "evolutionary stages.")

§6. INASMUCH AS MANY HUMAN CHARACTERISTICS ARE EXTRASOCIAL,
THEY DO NOT DERIVE FROM SOCIAL RELATIONS

It will be recalled that the attention of the sociologist is centered on human behavior in so far as it is influenced by sociation, and that as a result an abstraction, the socius, eventually takes the place of the concrete individual. To repeat the quotation from Ross: "Only a part of man is molded by association. He gets hungry, tired or sleepy as a man, not as a socius. Many of his . . . [tendencies are] extra-social." MacIver has said much the same thing: "Not only does the personality of man refuse to be summed up under a single social relationship, but it is not wholly revealed as the total of a series of social relationships."²⁰ (In chap. v, "Selves and Plurality Patterns," this point is discussed at length.)

From this it follows that we cannot attribute all the characteristics of the human being to social relations with other persons and plurality patterns. To begin with, there is the possibility of "divine" or "hyper-natural" influence. In terms of our analogy: it is possible or even

²⁰ R. M. MacIver, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

probable that between the cosmos (whether pantheistically or otherwise interpreted) and the molecule there exist dynamic connections which are not transmitted or mediated by the "everyday" type of interaction we have been considering; chemists and physicists do not reckon with "cosmic rays" in predicting the results of their ordinary experiments, but it may well be that such dynamic connections, such cosmic rays, really exert powerful effects. Moreover, the other extra-social forces mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, namely, the natural relations, frequently have a direct influence on the human being. Although the topographical, meteorological, and climatic determinists, from Jevons and Ratzel to Huntington and Brunhes, often make absurdly extravagant claims, there can be little doubt that the social zone is not completely severed from the natural—quite the contrary, as Bernard has shown. Further, although the racial determinists and the eugenic evangelists have frequently rendered themselves ridiculous by their shoddy logic and turgid emotionalism, the fact of hereditary differences cannot be denied. The human organism is not plastic in the sense commonly assumed by the extreme behaviorists, as Hankins has demonstrated.²¹ The sociologist therefore exceeds his legitimate rights when he attributes all the characteristics of human beings to social relations.

It is pertinent, however, to point out that the extrasocial forces native to or impinging on the human being are never entirely retained or absorbed; they radiate from him in greater or lesser degree as if projected or reflected. This radiation then influences other persons and plurality patterns, and thus through the medium of the human being social relations are sometimes brought within the zone influenced by extrasocial forces. Consequently the extrasocial becomes sociologically relevant, but only within the limits of this indirect connection in which the human being acts as intermediary.

Those extrasocial forces which are absorbed rather than reflected perhaps exert some influence upon the socius of the human being concerned, but in most cases the connection is virtually impossible to trace, especially where so-called divine or cosmic forces are involved. Nevertheless, it is an unwarranted intrusion of sociology into the province reserved to the metaphysician if such forces are denied. The most one should say is that they are not yet within the scope of empirical observation; for the scientist that is sufficient!

Hence the sociologist must grant that all human beings possibly or

²¹ F. H. Hankins, "Organic Plasticity versus Organic Response," *Social Forces*, VI, 4 (June, 1928), pp. 331-44.

probably have certain essential characteristics which cannot be explained on the basis of sociation alone and which derive from extrasocial forces—divine, natural, and what not. We can most simply picture the human being, as empirically experienced, in the form of an extrasocial kernel encased in a great number of social characteristics which are primarily the products of social relations. In many if not most cases, to be sure, after peeling off layer after layer from this human "onion," we find that the extrasocial kernel is almost infinitesimal, and that what at first appeared to be extrasocial and therefore sociologically irreducible turns out to be social and layer-like as the investigation becomes more intensive. Indeed, we may be inclined to ejaculate, with Peer Gynt:

What an enormous number of swathings!
Isn't the kernel soon coming to light?
I'm blest if it is! To the innermost center
It's nothing but swathings—each smaller and smaller:
Nature is witty!

Further, the relative position of extrasocial and social characteristics is not always that of kernel and layers. On the contrary, the forces of one class partially penetrate and combine with those of the other in practically every instance. The color of the kernel, so to speak, may tinge all the layers, and conversely, the irregularities of the layers may distort the kernel. In either case, sociologically relevant phenomena are at hand, as a later chapter will show.

For the time being, however, we may take cognizance of the interrelation as follows: (1) distinction must be made between the *extrasocial* components of the self, which must be explained in terms of philosophy, biology, etc., and not of sociology, and those *social* components making up the socius which chiefly concern us here; (2) as sociologists we must abandon the attempt to interpret man's individual and collective mental life in terms of social relations alone—the problem is wrongly posed and the attempt is impracticable.

It may well be that many strivings, feelings, and thoughts, and many manifestations of human endeavor such as religion, art, science, and *ethos*, cannot be completely interpreted, in their own peculiar natures, by use of the sociological technique alone. At any rate, the possibility that they are sociologically irreducible must be left open by the careful scientist. Nevertheless, the historical forms in which they appear are always influenced by social relations; it is possible to observe sociologically everything that in any way affects human behavior—in fact, it must be so observed if even partial understanding

is to be attained. Even though such metasocial or extrasocial entities are impervious to analysis except where their social components are concerned, it will be found that analysis of these components yields a great deal of insight. The contribution the sociologist can make to the study of religion, art, philosophy, and similar matters is by no means to be despised. Logically consistent research supported by realistic, frequent, and exact observation and comparison lessens the extent of the *a priori* and extrasocial in the human sphere. Indeed, extrasocial components almost invariably recede into the background when social components are given due attention, hence much of what at first sight appears to be essentially and specifically philosophical, religious, aesthetic, ethical, or logical may be reduced to products of social relations.

Some writers take umbrage even at such modest sociological claims. For example, Spann (see chap. I, §4) makes the following assertion:

"Although it is possible to deal with economic behavior from the sociological viewpoint, it is impossible to deal with science, art, religion, and philosophy in this way because the law of their formation and development is not of a social nature at all; *it is normative and a priori.*"²²

From this it is plain that Spann utterly rejects the idea that such non-material culture complexes owe anything at all to biological, psychological, or social processes. Now, it is one thing to recognize the possibility that there is something *a priori* in the innermost kernel of these non-material phenomena, and quite another to maintain that they are wholly uninfluenced by social or natural relations. We may admit that their essence cannot be completely resolved into social relations, but it is nevertheless our task progressively to restrict the field of the *a priori* by use of the sociological method. A great deal that appeared to be entirely *sui generis* to our forerunners, hampered by tradition as they were, has already been shown to be largely made up of social relations. It is not the task of the sociologist to be a priest in the temple of the Lord *A Priori*.

True enough, there always remains a remnant of energy which is sociologically irreducible; even though it may be almost infinitesimal it cannot be disregarded. Nevertheless, the task of sociology is continually to subject this remnant to analysis by using every available methodological resource in the hope of rendering it still smaller. We must assume that it can be diminished even though we do not assume that it can finally be resolved.

²² Othmar Spann, *Gesellschaftslehre*, 2nd ed., p. 90. Italics ours.

§7. PLURALITY PATTERNS ARE NOT PERCEIVABLE, BUT NEVERTHELESS
ARE REAL

The persistence of the fallacious "individual-society" antithesis already mentioned makes it necessary to anticipate later analysis (chap. iv) in order to avoid misunderstanding; it must be explicitly stated that in the sociological system here outlined we do *not* regard the world of interhuman intercourse commonly called "society" as a realm of wholly external to-and-fro between "individuals" who are self-contained and independent of all social bonds.

On the contrary, we have already asserted that the sharp separation of person and plurality pattern is impossible, in spite of the fact that we found it heuristically desirable to choose as our methodological starting-point the single human being as known to our naïve sense-perception. Why impossible? As we have seen, because the initial object and its attributes partially resolve into products of social relations with other persons and plurality patterns, and the concrete, flesh-and-blood human being yields in large measure to the abstract socius, a mere locus of sociation.

Further, many interhuman relations are *regulated*, as Durkheim has pointed out (see chap. I, §2); membership in a plurality pattern (and what *human* being is not a member of many?) prescribes what is sometimes an overwhelmingly large number of relations which must be entered upon, and also the course they must take. The "individual" who is self-contained and independent of *all* social bonds simply does not exist except as a corpse.

To be sure, our senses can perceive only concrete objects in the form of discrete human bodies, and between them only the atmosphere, other organisms, and inorganic matter. Plurality patterns themselves cannot be thus perceived and can be made corporeally apparent only by symbols. Nevertheless, many of them are recognizable in our internal world of presentations, concepts, and images. They live in the minds of tangible men, in the neuropsychic patterns of human beings.

Of course, the more evanescent structures, as we concretely perceive them, approximate mere additive sums of discrete organisms. As we shall see, however, even a transitory clustering of human beings may, under certain circumstances, constitute a plurality pattern, but let it be strongly emphasized that the "organized crowd" thus constituted in and through the clustering is *not* identical with the sum of the perceived human beings; it is the abstract product of certain

relations existing between them. Strictly speaking, a plurality pattern never consists of human beings, but only of the neuropsychic patterns of human beings—habits, attitudes, presentations, concepts, and images which may be traced back to relations. (As here used, “neuropsychic” denotes phenomena included under the same term as used by Bernard, and his “neuro-muscular” and “neuro-glandular” phenomena as well: for some purposes, however, Bernard’s usage and ours may be regarded as equivalent.)

MacIver states all this in slightly different terms, but with great clarity:

“Social relations . . . are simply those elements and functions of personality in each which are dependent on the elements and functions of personality in others. Society is therefore not relations, but beings in their relationships. It follows that there is no social function which is outside the functions of personalities. Society is in us, in each of us. . . .”²³

This is true not only of such transitory clusterings as the “organized crowd” already referred to, but also of plurality patterns which are perhaps as old as mankind itself, namely, the pair and similar small groups. Others arise in the course of history and disappear again. All plurality patterns are intangible, incorporeal; they are nothing more than neuropsychic patterns—and nothing less!

The “nothing less” is extremely important. Merely because a plurality pattern is composed only of habits, attitudes, presentations, concepts, and images we should not assume that it is not *real*. All plurality patterns are causal factors in the world of experience, and are in this degree real. As Thomas puts it, “If men define . . . [them] as real, they are real in their consequences.”²⁴

In sum, the following conclusions seem warranted: the attributes of the single human being, our methodological starting-point, may be explained (1) in part by his natural biological make-up and the direct influence of the natural environment, which concern us as sociologists only indirectly; (2) in part by his connection with the cosmic or divine, which may exist but which is beyond our observation; and (3) in part by his social relations, the proper data of sociological research.

Such data may be initially placed in two overlapping but fairly distinct categories: first, relations between human beings which are *relatively* independent of the direct influence of plurality patterns, and which for this and other reasons may be termed common-human relations; and second, relations between persons and plurality pat-

²³ R. M. MacIver, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-70.

²⁴ W. I. Thomas, quoted in Kimball Young, *Social Psychology*, p. 397.

terns which are largely dependent upon the direct influence of plurality patterns, and which may therefore be termed circumscribed relations.

(Common-human and circumscribed relations will later be discussed in detail [chaps. vi, §1; xxi, §1]; at this point mention must suffice.)

Now from what has already been said it follows that plurality patterns exist only in and through human habits, attitudes, presentations, concepts, and images—in short, in and through neuropsychic patterns. The vitality of plurality patterns is wholly dependent upon the depth, persistence, scope, and communicability of such neuropsychic patterns. Many of the more symbolic patterns, such as those of state, church, and the like, are usually if not always vague and nebulous, but they are so wide-spread, persistent, and recurrent that they come to be abstract powers which to many persons seem both eternal and supernatural. There results a sort of “social animism” that leads its devotees to think and act as if such abstract powers were entities quite apart from mundane things.²⁵ Nevertheless, these purely mental structures are shaped throughout in accordance with the capacities and attributes of the feeling, desiring, and thinking (or rationalizing) human beings who constitute and are constituted by them. Only because the human mind finds satisfaction in striving toward the “infinite” do plurality patterns ever appear infinite.

Even social scientists are sometimes guilty of the social animism mentioned; their vagaries have been mercilessly exposed by Allport. In many instances, however, their errors are more apparent than real; merely to refer by name to a group or similar plurality pattern rather than to its constituent members does not necessarily imply that it is regarded as a super-social entity, as Allport seems to think. Such phrases as “tribal conflict,” “national rivalry,” and “group discussion” mislead no one of scientific competence; they are simply convenient abbreviations or methodological aids, as Simmel states:

“An all-penetrating vision would peremptorily resolve that appearance which seems to announce a new independent unity above individuals into the reciprocity which plays between individuals, and it would see that, if this reciprocity were actually separated from the individuals, nothing of it could remain. The relations of human beings to each other are so complex, so ramified, and so compact [however] . . . that we are compelled to treat them as unities. . . . It is, therefore, only a methodological device to speak of the essence and the development of the state, of law, of institutions, of fashion, etc., as if each of these were a unified entity.”²⁶

²⁵ Cf. Floyd H. Allport, “The Group Fallacy in Relation to Social Science,” *Journal of Abnormal and Soc. Psych.*, XIX, 1 (April-June, 1924). This is also available as a reprint from The Sociological Press, Hanover, N. H.

²⁶ Georg Simmel, “The Persistence of Social Groups,” trans. by A. W. Small, *Am. J. Soc.*, III (1897-8), p. 665.

§8. THE SOCIOLOGICAL PROBLEM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SOLVING IT

Difficult but scientifically necessary is the task of bringing order and perspective into the swirl of multifarious relations and plurality patterns filling the course of interhuman life as it passes in space and time. When we first gaze upon it, there seem to rush before our eyes the threads of a tangled web, sometimes glistening, sometimes somber. Sociology should make it possible to recognize the pattern in this web, to see it not as a mere maze but as a tapestry.

On the methodological side, the sociologist attempts to state numerically the qualitative differences in the continuous sequence of social occurrences by ranging the relevant phenomena along a few distinct lines where only numerically statable gradations obtain. The task is endless; a large part of it, however, is entirely possible of eventual accomplishment, although difficulties are of course presented by the intersecting of the lines and their dense intertwinings and knottings, as Cooley shows:

"Another notable thing about this strange complex is the overlapping and interpenetration of the various forms, so that each part of the whole belongs to more than one . . . system—somewhat as in one of those picture-puzzles where the same lines form part of several faces, which you must discover if you can. Thus one's own personality is one . . . system; the persons he knows are others, and from one point of view all human life is made up of such personal systems, which, however, will be found on close inspection not to be separate but to interpenetrate one another."²⁷

Visualizing the total tangle of social phenomena as a snarled and knotted coil, it follows that it must first of all be uncoiled, the knots untied, and straightened. This initial simplification achieved, we then may justifiably choose as the starting-point for further explanatory effort the simplest location to be found anywhere along the straightened line, for in its coiled and knotted state it had no definite beginning. The precise point at which analysis is begun is therefore a question of utility and convenience alone; our method is systematic and not historical. The simplest methodological starting-point, as already noted, is the single human being and his attributes as known to our naïve sense-perception. From this point we proceed to the common-human relations, observe how they interweave and condense into socii and plurality patterns, and then in the same way study the circumscribed relations within and between plurality patterns.²⁸

²⁷ C. H. Cooley, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

²⁸ On this head the reader may profitably consult Wygodzinski's theory of the group. Unfortunately he was not able to round out and complete his system. A

Parallel to this path is another leading in the reverse direction which may be used to check the observations first made; the return journey leads *from* the plurality pattern by way of social relations to the human being. Analogically: the artificially produced straight line is twisted and knotted into a coil approximating as closely as possible the one originally observed, although the full intricacy of the coil as it exists in reality can never be reproduced by any method, however delicate.

§9. THE TWO FUNDAMENTAL RELATIONS: ASSOCIATION AND DISSOCIATION —*specificum sociologicum*

This process of analysis and synthesis, figuratively referred to as uncoiling to a straight line and then re-coiling, would not be possible if all relations, and by the same token all plurality patterns, were not resolvable into very simple and very general "lines of motion" which are also very few—namely, two. In terms of our analogy: no matter how twisted and intricate the coil may be, it can nevertheless be plotted, as can any other curved line, by the proper combination of two directions of measurement.

There are but two fundamental relations between human beings: relations of association on the one hand and relations of dissociation on the other. All relations and plurality patterns can be resolved into the elementary relations of association and dissociation in their dynamic and/or static forms, i.e., as motions and/or distances. MacIver has pointed to a similar dichotomy: "Social relations . . . are of two types, relations of hostility, the conflict of differences, and relations of reciprocity, the harmony of differences."²⁹

The intricacy of interhuman occurrences is due to the frequent reversal and mutual merging of these two basic relations. Nevertheless, their conceptual separation must be maintained if understanding of their actual inter-ramification is ever to be attained.

In accordance with the foregoing, *all social relations may be placed in one or another of three main classes: (1) those which are associative, (2) those which are dissociative, and (3) those which in certain aspects are associative and in others are dissociative.*

This division is characteristic of and peculiar to sociology; it determines the *specificum sociologicum*. An investigation of any inter-

fragment based upon rough drafts has been published by his step-daughter Hildegard Steinberg-Wygodzinski under the title "Skizze einer allgemeinen Gruppenlehre," *Köln. Vt. Soz.*, I, 3, pp. 45 ff.

²⁹ R. M. MacIver, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

human occurrence immediately becomes sociological when observation is centered upon relations of association or dissociation therein existing or in process, or when the connection between association and dissociation is held in view.

Interhuman relations are regarded from other points of view and classified in accordance with other principles in ethics, politics, aesthetics, etc.; sociology alone focusses upon the kind and degree of association and dissociation and their intermediary mixed relations. Inasmuch as in the present system the dynamic aspects of social relations receive most attention, as they must in any system that is based upon actual observation of interhuman behavior, we may say that scientific sociology concentrates upon actions of approach and avoidance; *tertium in sociologica non datur*.

There is no sociologically irrelevant relation between human beings or between plurality patterns, i.e., there are no relations which are neither associative nor dissociative, just as all motion of objects in space is alteration of relative distance to other objects.⁸⁰ In everything done by one human being with reference to another, the actions involved are classifiable as approach, avoidance, or a mixture of both.

The dichotomy of all interhuman relations into those of association and dissociation, which in their dynamic aspects are respectively approach and avoidance, gives to sociology its own peculiar and independent problem-matter, and also gives it an exact scientific character which it has heretofore lacked.

When we ask why these two relations are fundamental, three different answers come to mind. The first is that association and dissociation are empirically demonstrable everywhere and in every historical period. Second, these relations are linked with man's biological make-up; he has tendencies urging him toward association with others of his kind which, to be sure, may be directed in many different channels but which can rarely if ever be eradicated, and he also has tendencies, which also may be greatly modified but seldom wiped out, urging him toward assertion of his biological claims regardless of

⁸⁰ The use of analogies borrowed from physics must not be taken to mean that social behavior can be comprehended by taking only *overt* behavior into account. We merely lay greatest stress on overt behavior. It is quite possible that as a consequence we will be charged with "spatializing" interhuman relations (which, because they are human, are necessarily inner and mental). It would be quite consistent with the whole idealistic obfuscation of those who confuse religion and philosophy with science (see chaps. xlvii, §§1, 2; xviii, §2) if our division of social relations into those of approach and avoidance should be regarded as insufferable "spatialization." The scientific investigator must commit himself to this kind of heuristic "positivism" if he does not wish to become a mystic.

the counterclaims of his companions. Third, association and dissociation, in their dynamic aspects of approach and avoidance, are the only possible paths of relative motion for magnitudes as such. This third answer accords best with the various analogies that have already been used, and is therefore preferable at this stage of exposition. It is the most general, most mathematical, viewpoint.

Analogically: scientific sociology regards human beings as pieces on the giant chessboard of life; with each succeeding move (social occurrence) they draw closer together, separate, or converge in certain respects and diverge in others. Here they appear clustered in crowds or groups, there in less coherent union, and there in isolation. Such approach and avoidance constitute the basis of the sociological frame of reference.³¹ Inasmuch as thorough investigation of interhuman relations, whether between persons or plurality patterns, must take account of so many complicating factors, and inasmuch as the consequent danger of digression into the irrelevant is always at hand, it is necessary to select the simplest and most calculable frame of reference possible. Such a frame of reference must be like a scaffold; it must be strong and useful, and must not enclose anything extraneous to the task for which it is built. In other words, it must be non-evaluative and non-psychological and in addition must meet the requirement of distinctness. Only through the complete generality, universal validity, and perpetual recurrence of the relations chosen as a basis for the frame of reference can it be constructed in the manner necessary for strictly scientific purposes.

The colorful confusion of interhuman life falls into patterns of approach and avoidance when the sociologist properly focusses the lens adapted to his own specific uses; nothing other than processes of association and dissociation appear in the field of view. Changing the figure: if the sociological Theseus does not let this guiding thread slip out of his hand in the intricate labyrinth of social life, he cannot wander out of sociological into psychological, juridical, or economic research, and above all else, he will not fall prey to that Minotaur to whom so many would-be social scientists have been sacrificed, namely social philosophy.

No other method of attaining an autonomous sociology, a sociology that does not eke out a beggarly existence on the left-overs of other social sciences, seems possible. This sort of abstraction alone separates the specifically sociological aspects of social phenomena from those

³¹ For the implications of the phrase "frame of reference" see E. W. Hobson, *The Domain of Natural Science*, Cambridge: University Press, 1926.

dealt with by other disciplines. In all attempts along other lines, the supposedly "specifically sociological" viewpoint changes into that of culture-morphology, or of collective psychology, or of ethnography, or of some such neighboring science which uses a different frame of reference. By use of the method here set forth, however, it is possible to abstract from the maze of social phenomena only the processes of sociation, the specific object-matter of sociology.

There have been several other attempts at exclusive concentration upon processes of sociation, but they all introduce value-judgments or other considerations foreign to sociology.

Vierkandt, for example, subdivides the relations basic to his system according to the intimacy or remoteness of the *inner* bonds. He attempts to carry further Tönnies' older doctrine of "community" and "society" (*Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*) and Stammier's theories purporting to show the completely "regulated" nature of social relations. In one of his earlier articles, Vierkandt distinguished the following fundamental relations: community, the relation of recognition (also called the legal relation), the struggle relation, and the power relation. In his sociology he lays stress upon the "experience-community" as a transitional form between "society" and the "life-community." The great danger inherent in this emphasis on the "fundamental" nature of certain relations which are concrete rather than abstract is especially evident in the inevitable ranking of relations as higher or lower, and along with this a higher evaluation of "community" as over against so-called "society." This leads to social philosophizing and gives too much scope to personal preferences or even prejudices.

In the system of interhuman relations set forth here, the utmost care is taken to avoid giving any emphasis or predominance to any particular set of concrete relations. (Cf. chaps. xv, §3; xxv, §2; 1, §1.)

§10. THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF SOCIAL RELATIONS IS SOCIOLOGICALLY SUBORDINATE; RHYTHM AND DIRECTION ARE EMPHASIZED

The particular goal, end, or purpose for the attainment of which, in specific cases, human beings associate or dissociate is of minor sociological importance in comparison with the way in which they approach or avoid each other. It cannot be denied that the purpose, in specific cases, conditions the form of connection established and sometimes determines it in all important respects. Nevertheless, the delimiting principle of sociology as a special social science is not based upon any of the purposes of sociation, as are all the other social sciences. Direction and rhythm of motion are often the same where the purposes in view are entirely different; contrariwise, efforts to achieve identical purposes may utilize social relations following widely discrepant paths. The sociologist therefore delimits according to *direction* (approach or avoidance) and *rhythm* of motion; eco-

nomics, jurisprudence, linguistics, etc., delimit according to the *purposes* served by social relations.

The various purposes of human association and dissociation are of course quite as multifarious as the various kinds of social relations, and the other social sciences are active in ordering and classifying them. Systems of human actions, evaluations, and endeavors may be designated as economic, political, juridical, artistic, scientific, religious, or ethical, and we may correspondingly discriminate between the various social or cultural sciences (other than and on an *equal* footing with sociology) according to the purposes upon which they respectively center. The specific, unitary purpose contained in the relations yields, in each case, its corresponding science. Such social sciences are obviously concerned with social relations, *but these are always studied as relations for economic, religious, political, and similar purposes.*

The numerous means corresponding to these ends or purposes must be similarly studied by the other social sciences; they must be coordinated with the purposes or ends which are their necessary postulates. Economics furnishes an example: it is the science of joint action for economic purposes, i.e., for adjustment between human needs and the relatively scanty means for the satisfaction of those needs. This science must show how the task of adjustment is accomplished by the formation of a price-system and by organization. The study of economics soon reveals, however, that social relations are conditioning factors in the accomplishment of the task: competition, the formation of co-operatives, and the division of labor are relations for economic purposes. To be sure, they are also relations of approach, conjunction, avoidance, disjunction. These latter relations *as such*, however, are of no interest in the science of economics, for this science is concerned with relations only as *means* which further economic ends or purposes, and as means alone.

Competition has great interest, as we shall see, for the sociologist as well—not, however, as a means for the most advantageous satisfaction of needs, but as a special mixed form of approach and avoidance which is found in other zones of social life and which often serves other purposes. A *double* viewpoint of competition, at the least, is necessary: one from the side of economic theory, the other from the sociological standpoint. These taken *together* make possible relatively exhaustive and approximately realistic comprehension.

Jurisprudence, to choose another obvious example, also has a great deal to do with human relations, but merely as *legal* relations. The

human being here appears *from the outset* as subject to legal regulation or as creator and maintainer of such regulation. Hence, all investigations into human association and dissociation are placed under the aegis of law; it becomes the basic abstraction to which all others are assimilated. If we garnered everything that jurisprudence could teach us about the behavior of human beings, we should have much illuminating data, but if we were then to assume that we had collected all that could be learned about man as a social being we would be grievously mistaken. Jurisprudence gives a picture, *necessarily* one-sided, which must be rounded out. Human beings are not merely subjects of legal regulation. Indeed, they are as a rule seldom conscious of this legal aspect; it is less important to most persons than the fact that they are economic subjects. As sociologists, we round out the picture of the jurists on one side (which does not by any means exhaust the totality): we show that human beings are *fellow-men* in both the positive and the negative sense; as Laski puts it, "Whether we will or no, we are all bundles of hyphens."

Similar remarks could be made concerning the type of human being observed by the sciences of linguistics, religion, aesthetics, and so on. None of these sciences ever gives a picture of the entire human being or of all the possibilities and realities of relations and plurality patterns. None of these sciences can attain reality; *neither can sociology*. Reality, as experienced in life, cannot be squeezed into the frame of reference used by a single science, nor can the totality of all sciences ever give us reality. Each one must be rounded out and completed by every other. The sociologist attempts to contribute his share toward this rounding-out by describing the human being in so far as his actions involve association with and/or dissociation from other human beings.

Hence the sociological delimitation is fundamentally different from the delimiting principles of the other social sciences, for in the former the purposes or ends of relations are not primary, yet this sociological delimitation enables us to grasp those elements of human action which can be considered interhuman behavior *as such*.

From what has been said, it should also be apparent that sociology as a special social science must be more sharply distinguished from the sociologies of economics, of law, of religion, etc., than is customary, to cite only one example, in the work of Max Weber. By the sociology of law we understand the explanation of legal institutions by means of social relations and the investigation of the effect of law upon social relations and plurality patterns. Rumpf defines it as follows:

"[The sociology of law is] the investigation and explanation of law in its

co-existence with, opposition to, or concurrence with any other force of life and factor of civilization or culture also exerting an influence. This investigation and explanation must be carried out with due regard to the nature of the phenomena in question; this nature is common to both, for they are both social."³³

By economic sociology is meant the explanation of economic conditions and institutions by means of interhuman relations and investigation of the latter with regard to the influence of economics upon them.³³

Of an altogether different sort is the error of the Socialists, who lay one-sided emphasis upon the relation, or rather plurality pattern, of "class." There is a very deep difference of opinion between the orthodox Marxist and the sociologist concentrating on interhuman relations; the former believes that we must derive the social relations from prior economic relations, and in particular from the class structure, held fundamental by the Marxist. Sociologists are inclined to think of their problem as precisely the reverse of this, for they seek to derive the organizational patterns of economic life and the ranking of the classes (which is for them but one of many types of social stratification) from the elementary social relations. Nevertheless, when all is said there need be no impassable gulf in the future between Marxian sociology and scientific sociology; on the contrary, Socialism may receive fresh impetus from sociological analyses of such processes as exploitation, commercialization, perversion, etc. Furthermore, the sociologist by no means underestimates the strength of the class structure even though he traces its efficacy back to social relations which he always regards as *elements*.³⁴

§11. CURRENT MISCONCEPTIONS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM

The discussions of the difference between jurisprudence and sociology occurring in the foregoing section and in the first chapter are important; they are placed at the very beginning of the German treatise upon which the present adaptation is based. In spite of this, Sorokin,³⁵ writing some time after that work appeared, launches a lengthy argument against systematic sociology, contending that it adds nothing to the doctrines formulated centuries ago by the Roman jurisconsults. In his *Contemporary Sociological Theories* he devotes a chapter to "The Formal School and a Systematics of Social Rela-

³³ Max Rumpf, "Was ist Rechtssoziologie?" *Archiv für zivilrechtliche Praxis*, II, 1.

³⁴ For a discussion of the difference between economic theory and the sociology of economics see Leopold von Wiese, "Die Weltwirtschaft als soziologisches Gebilde," *Kieler Vorträge*, Heft 8, Jena, G. Fischer, 1923.

³⁵ Cf. Leopold von Wiese, "Das Wesen der Revolution," *Verhandlungen des dritten deutschen Soziologentages*, Tübingen, 1923.

³⁶ Professor Sorokin recommended that the Social Science Research Council sponsor the present adaptation, and also assisted, through his recommendation, in facilitating publication. The friendly tone of the above criticism needs no emphasis; as Sorokin says, "*Audiatur et altera pars* is a very good rule, and it will only be fair if a counter-criticism is inserted" (letter to the adapter).

tionship" in which the *Beziehungslehre* is taken as representative and is used "to show the pluses and minuses of the formal school."

It might be pointed out that designation of this system as "formal" is here expressly avoided,⁸⁶ in marked contrast to the acceptance of the term by Simmel and Vierkandt, but in view of the fact that Sorokin also includes in the formal school such writers as Tönnies, Stammer, Richard, Litt, Bouglé, Ross, Park and Burgess, and many more, it is apparent that he gives a *very* broad meaning to the term. Exception might be taken to this, but it seems unnecessary, for most cataloging by "schools" is vulnerable at one point or another.

With what does Sorokin take issue? He begins as follows:

"Before discussing what is valid in the claims of the formal school, let us indicate at once what is questionable. In the first place, the school's claim that it is a new one is baseless. It is a very old school, perhaps even older than any other school of social science. In the second place, the fundamental discrimination between form and content of social relationship is either fallacious, or represents something upon which it is impossible to build sociology as a special science. In the third place, the claim that forms of social relationship are not studied by other than sociological disciplines, is not warranted by the facts. Thus far, Simmel's attempt to build sociology as an autonomous science of the forms of social relationship is not valid. In the fourth place, Simmel and other 'formalists' do not keep to their principles, but transgress their own definition, contradict it, and often interpret the same terms in quite different senses. In the fifth place, even if the Simmelian concept of the forms of social relations were true, this would not mean that sociology as the science of general characteristics of, and the correlation between, social phenomena, could not, or should not, exist."⁸⁷

The worthwhile features Sorokin recognizes in formal sociology will here be passed over; attention will be paid only to his negative criticism.

To begin with, most of the authors named would probably care little if at all for the novelty or even for the existence of the school as such; Simmel in particular disregarded such matters. Again, the fact that form as opposed to content plays no part in the system here set forth has already been stated, but it is perhaps best to make no use of such indirect arguments. More directly, we may note the following points:

First, why does Sorokin hold that the analyses of the formal school are not new? The answer lies in his assertion that the forms of social

⁸⁶ Largely because of the tendency to think of it as akin to formal logic, because it calls forth notions of rigidity and dogmatism, and because it has been identified with "social geometry."

⁸⁷ Pitirim Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 495-6.

relations were laid down in brilliant and precise fashion centuries ago by the Oriental and Occidental founders of jurisprudence; the Roman juriconsults, for example, gave excellent definitions of *potestas*, *majestas*, *imperium*, *dominus*, *princeps*, *dignitates*, *subjecti*, etc. Confucius, Justinian, and others were the founders of the formal school!

Although the power of conceptual formulation and systematization possessed by the creators and elaborators of the *Corpus juris civilis* might be envied by almost anyone, nevertheless Sorokin's objection shows that he has not wholly understood the present system. When the jurist analyzes and defines such relationships as *potestas*, *manus*, *beneficium*, *cessio*, etc., he endeavors to indicate the relationship between human beings conceived solely in their legal capacity, and does not attempt to penetrate to the deeper, elementary, extra-legal, interhuman relations as such. The latter interest him only to the extent in which they must be drawn upon to provide explanations of legal relationships. The web woven by interhuman relations has a tremendous number of threads that are not spun of legal yarn; indeed, all strictly legal terms have purposely been omitted from the list of interhuman relations given at the end of this volume (table 2). To be sure, the table includes many relations which, in addition to their specifically interhuman relevance, are also important juridically, but the definitions of basic concepts, arrangement, and method of analyzing relations here set forth intentionally neglect the legal point of view. As a consequence, the definitions as finally formulated differ in many respects from those used by the jurists, *but not because of any desire to supplant the latter*. Such an aim would indeed be foolish and fruitless, more especially in view of the fact that the sociological method is intended to complement rather than to replace the juridical. The wide difference between the two points of view makes the sociological method very well adapted to this purpose. In fact, the difference is so wide that the following assertion by Sorokin plainly misses the mark:

"... the school [is] in a dilemma: either to be perfect and consistent in its formality, thus becoming nothing but a variety of the theories and codes of law; or to lose its 'formality' and become the kind of 'encyclopedic' sociology which is criticized so severely by the formalists."⁸⁸

The "dilemma" does not exist!

A similarly wide difference could be adduced in refutation of Sorokin's arguments purporting to show that the other social sciences

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 499.

already use the methods of formal sociology. The question, however, is not whether concepts have already been defined by other sciences for their special purposes, but whether the general frame of reference is the same or different. The methodological uniqueness of sociology as a special social science is not emphasized here because any particular value is placed on novelty. The only reason for emphasizing such uniqueness is that progress in the investigation of interhuman relations cannot be expected until the need of a method especially adapted to such research is realized. As long as it is possible to believe that the analyses carried out by students of jurisprudence are of the same nature as those here set forth, it is quite evident that the fundamental problem of systematic sociology has not been thoroughly understood. (In the hope of preventing this and similar misconceptions in the future, this adaptation is provided with numerous cross-references. These may seem cumbrous to some readers, but their necessity has already been demonstrated.)

At first glance, it might seem as if Sorokin's second point could be disregarded, for, as already noted, the system outlined here does not make use of the distinction between form and content; his criticism again demonstrates that the use by other systematic sociologists of the ambiguous term "form" inevitably evokes misunderstanding. More thorough inspection, however, reveals that his criticism, although erroneous, is sufficiently relevant to be discussed. It in fact challenges the fundamental thesis of this work, namely, that in strictly sociological analysis it is necessary to concentrate on interhuman relations as such rather than on the purposes, aims, or ends of these relations.

The task of distinguishing between the two aspects of human behavior just mentioned is the function of sociology, and a difficult function it is. In order to fulfill it, a specifically sociological *method* must be developed, for the distinction is by no means easy to make; "common sense" is not sufficient. On the contrary, attainment of the degree of abstraction necessary to resolve an experienced unity into its component parts is a scientific achievement; this work has been written in the hope that to attempt it will not be altogether fruitless. (The chapters on the crowd and the group—xxxiv to xli, inclusive—are perhaps the clearest exposition of this technique of abstraction.)

Sorokin's third point, a restatement of the first, has already been considered at sufficient length.

His fourth point is that the so-called "formalists" do not adhere to their principles. Whether or not this charge is well founded is extremely difficult to say. The fault, if any there be, lies in a failure to

follow out all the implications of the present system and not in the system itself. A cursory reading of Sorokin's book will show that he makes this assertion with regard to practically all the writers with whom he deals, but this should not lead to the Pharisaical conclusion that where all are at fault, none are at fault. There has been a persistent attempt to frame the argument of the present work in a thoroughly logical way, but errors may have crept in; more specific indication of these errors would be appreciated.

The last point in the series of five is as follows: "If the Simmelian concept of the form of social relations were true, this would not mean that sociology, as a science of general characteristics of, and a correlation between, social phenomena, could not, or should not, exist."³⁹ Now, the chief reason for insisting upon sharp delimitation and for the extended series of reasons supporting such delimitation as opposed to the unlimited encyclopedic approach is simply that in the present stage of our science there is grave danger of taking in more than can be assimilated: *Qui trop embrasse, mal étreint*. Further, scholars in other sciences will never cease their justifiable complaints against "sociological megalomania" and "academic kleptomania" as long as sociologists attempt to till fields already well cultivated by the custodians of other disciplines.

The counter-criticism just indulged in is not for the purpose of showing the faultlessness of our own endeavors, for it is possible that flaws inhere in the present system and will at some future date be discovered. The criticisms just dealt with, however, do not seem to us to have undermined our position in any significant degree.

Another sociologist, Abel, has also devoted a considerable amount of attention to the present system.⁴⁰ He criticizes certain of its aspects adversely, but in a much less sweeping way than does Sorokin, and comments favorably on many of its fundamental features. Like the latter writer, Abel had only the first volume of the two-volume German work at his disposal when he wrote, but his misconceptions are not especially serious.⁴¹ Moreover, in a recent article⁴² Abel has expressed himself in such a way that one might infer that he is inclined

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 496.

⁴⁰ Theodore Abel, *Systematic Sociology in Germany*, esp. pp. 80-115.

⁴¹ Cf. these reviews of Abel's book: Louis Wirth, *Am. J. Soc.*, XXXVI, 4 (January, 1931), pp. 664-5; Leopold von Wiese, *Köln. Vt. Soz.* VIII, 2 (1929), pp. 141-64; Howard Becker, *Ann. Am. Ac. of Pol. and Soc. Science*, CXLIV (July, 1929), p. 206.

⁴² Theodore Abel, "Is a Cultural Sociology Possible?" *Am. J. Soc.*, XXXV, 5 (March, 1930), pp. 739-52.

to modify, although not to abandon, some of his previous negative criticism. Finally, he has stated that he considers the second volume of the German basis, the *Gebildelehre* (which was not published in time to be analyzed in his book), to be a "masterpiece and the only adequate contribution to the theory of the group extant."⁴⁸ Consequently, it does not seem advisable to answer him in the same detailed way as in the case of Sorokin. In spite of occasional errors it is possible to get a fairly adequate impression of some characteristics of the present system from Abel's book; as a commentary it is of appreciable value.

Enough of criticism—in closing, let it be repeated that "the sociological delimitation is fundamentally different from the delimiting principles of the other social sciences, for in the former the purposes or ends of relations are not primary," and that "this sociological delimitation enables us to grasp those elements of human action which can be considered interhuman behavior *as such*."

⁴⁸ Letter to the adapter.

CHAPTER III

METHODS ADAPTED TO THE STUDY OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA AS SUCH

§1. SOCIAL RELATIONS ARE BOTH ASSOCIATIVE AND DISSOCIATIVE

We have seen that sociology has its own special field of investigation, its own definite problems. In order to master the task confronting it, sociology must systematize, in the best sense of that much-abused term, all the relations of association and dissociation and, as an indispensable corollary, must make full use of self-observation and the stores of valuable knowledge latent in everyday practical life. Further, it must draw upon the knowledge made available by the observations of the other sciences, for they deal with problems that indirectly involve relations of association and dissociation; sociology should use, wherever possible, the data and theories of economics, jurisprudence, psychology, biology, and similar disciplines. By superimposing pictures of the religious, the artistic, the economic man, etc., we can get a composite picture of the social man. This picture, however, must then be examined through the lens specially adapted to sociological purposes, for otherwise it will remain too indefinite, too hazy at the edges.

Observation of everyday life reveals a tremendously complicated, changeful, mobile interplay of social relations. If we begin by studying present-day human beings, we find them in billions of common-human and circumscribed relations—just as infusoria in the water-drop under the microscope dart from place to place, daily life viewed through the sociological lens offers a picture of ceaseless approach and avoidance. Here again our conceptual frame of reference helps us to get an intelligible view of the whole.

By selecting a narrow field of focus, by making sociology a special social science rather than an encyclopedic hodge-podge, the greatest possible exactitude is achieved. Such concentration also emphasizes the *double* direction of motion in interhuman relations, an emphasis which is extremely important. The phrase “not only . . . but also” and the double conjunction “and/or” should have a large place in the sociologist’s vocabulary, for they stress the fact that unilateral

explanations are inadequate. We are confronted *not only* by association, *but also* by dissociation, *but also* by a mixture of both. In short, we deal with association *and/or* dissociation. These two motions and their combinations alone are traced in all social occurrences.

If full knowledge of the regularities or "laws" pervading their ceaseless shifting is to be attained, these processes must of course be studied in both their temporal and their spatial patternings—that is to say, both in longitudinal section and in cross-section. Association and/or dissociation, in all their historical and contemporary modes of manifestation—nothing more and nothing less than this is the object-matter of sociology.

The serious flaws in many sociological systems and the errors of many critics of our science result from the all too common assumption that sociology should discover and further movements toward amalgamation, "socialization," union, internationalism, collective ownership, fellowship, and what not. Sociology is thought of as a normative discipline—and we have already seen the fallaciousness of sociological "normalcy."

The close affiliation of sociology with social reform, professorial socialism, and social work in many countries has helped to develop this assumption, but it is also rooted in many languages. The word "social" as popularly or even scientifically used often has an ethical connotation. Tönnies, for example, limits the concept "social" to so-called positive, non-inimical relations, thus carrying over into a discipline that should be free from value-judgments all the customary misconceptions. The following incident shows how these misconceptions operate: A professor of sociology, when cornered at a "faculty tea," avowed a marked distaste for small talk and the petty "visiting" practiced by the wives of faculty members, and was overheard by one of these wives, who thereupon turned to another and bitinglly remarked, "It's a pity Professor Blank doesn't practice his sociology. . . ." Whenever there seems to be any danger of such misunderstanding, let us use the word "interhuman" instead of "social"!

Moreover, the naïve belief that in the course of human history as a whole the trend has been toward collectivism¹ is just as unverifiable as the similarly naïve belief that human beings have become more and more individualistic, and the assumption that scientific sociology

¹ Lumley, for example, makes a statement to this effect: "A careful survey of history shows us that human beings have . . . been tending mainly—with many slips, of course—toward coöperation" (*Principles of Sociology*, p. 261).

has verified or sanctioned either "tendency" is wholly erroneous.² The two processes of integration and differentiation, which Spencer so plainly showed to be operative in the social sphere, must both be observed with equal attention. Sociology studies crowds, groups, abstract collectivities such as the church or the state, and collectivistic ideologies in exactly the same way as it deals with the isolated human being or monad, processes of dissociation, and separatistic or individualistic tendencies. Moreover, sociology deals with the single socius, the social personality, with just as much scientific warrant as it does with population aggregates. Again, solitariness is just as relevant a social, interhuman state as is associativeness, so far as the sociologist is concerned.

To repeat: the division of all social relations into associative and dissociative is the proper basis for a science of sociology that avoids value-judgments and that is systematic rather than historical, for it makes possible a frame of reference which is simple and devoid of extraneous elements, and which is nevertheless usable and valid with regard to all times, places, and social phenomena. There is every warrant for retaining this fundamental division—it alone provides the necessary orientation and delimitation.

§2. THE ULTIMATELY QUALITATIVE NATURE OF INTERHUMAN RELATIONS

The use of such terms as association, dissociation, approach, avoidance, motion, distance, atoms, molecules, crystals, and other terms drawn from the vocabulary of physics should not lead to the assumption that sociology is therefore envisaged as a sort of social physics.³

² The one-sided collectivism which regards sociology as a doctrine of association alone has always had many adherents. Vierkandt represents the extreme form of this tendency. See the review (by Leopold von Wiese) of his *Gesellschaftslehre in Köln. Vt. Soz.*, III, 2/3, pp. 176 ff.

³ Comte regarded sociology as a physics of social life (*physique sociale*). Since his time there has persisted a school which proceeds as if sociology were a natural science using the methods of physics. Accordingly the effort is made to show how social processes conform to the laws of motion and such principles as inertia or the conservation of energy. This effort to reduce the phenomena of a complex science to a simpler level must be accorded recognition if we are not asked to regard it as a "complete solution" and if its author remains conscious of the complexity of social causality. Spencer, for example, made much use of the principles of physics, but he never let himself be led astray by them, as others unfortunately have done.

On the other hand, it is also unfortunate that in Germany many social scientists follow the current fashion of rejecting the viewpoint of the natural sciences altogether. The swing of the pendulum away from the high value placed upon the natural sciences in the late nineteenth century has carried us to the present absurdities of an extremely vague and diffuse idealism.

The strictly mechanistic task of measuring (or of stating numerically) the path of motion involved in interaction is only one stage and not the final goal of sociological knowledge, for that goal lies beyond the mechanistic. *The behavior of human beings, when all is said, is something qualitative.* Hence, although we do not in any sense agree with Sombart's completely and dogmatically negative attitude toward the methods of natural science, it must nevertheless be granted that the following utterance cannot be lightly dismissed:

"I have termed the concept of 'understanding' the most important in our science, for the reason that it is a cultural science. All observation in cultural science strives toward 'understanding,' i.e., toward knowledge from within outward. The natural sciences, on the contrary, can only 'explain,' i.e., must infer inner states from outer. All truly scientific sociology strives to become 'understanding' sociology. What we do not 'understand' is either philosophy, in the sense of metaphysics, or crude science. . . .

"We cannot call it anything less than unpardonable intellectual provincialism when we are time and again enjoined to apply the principles of mechanics or some other natural science to the phenomena of culture. Such naïve folk seem to have the delusion that the methods of the natural sciences alone enable us to arrive at 'true' knowledge. As a matter of fact, the situation is precisely the reverse: we have 'true' knowledge insofar as we 'understand'; i.e., our knowledge is limited to the sphere of culture and fails us in the realm of nature."⁴

What position is here taken with regard to the problem of "understanding," and what is the place of "understanding" in the present system?—these questions are inevitably raised by Sombart's statements, and they must be answered, although in order to do so lengthy preliminaries are necessary.

Before launching on these preliminaries, however, let us explicitly state that although the method here proposed aims at abstract exactitude, stated numerically if possible, fellow-feeling is not banished; our ultimate inner participation is after all with the fate of human beings, not with the oscillation of "molecules." In fact, the philosophical premise of the system here set forth is this: The human lot, the earthly destiny of each of us, is in high degree dependent upon the web woven by association and dissociation. We are all "relatives" in the old, now obsolete, meaning of the word—that is, we are all persons relative to, connected with, or dependent on others.⁵


§3. DYNAMIC AND STATIC RELATIONS

Consequently a mere schematic treatment of purely linear, mathematical relations (which could be graphically represented by curves,

⁴ Werner Sombart, *Soziologie*, p. 13.

⁵ *Oxford English Dictionary* (unabridged).

etc.) is not attempted here; systematic sociology must focus on the interhuman *action* or social process which is the dynamic aspect of any given social relation. And now the preliminaries mentioned above begin: the accompanying chart shows the various dynamic and static⁶ ramifications of the all-inclusive concept of social relations, interhuman behavior, or sociation, and we may well pause to examine it.



This portion of the chart should be disregarded until chapter XXI has been read

FIG. 1.—RAMIFICATIONS OF TERM "SOCIAL RELATIONS"

It will be noted that both association and dissociation divide into dynamic and static relations. The dynamic relation has the synonyms of motion, *action* pattern, and process; these may now be discussed.

* Dynamic and static as here used have nothing whatever to do with the once common designation of "progress," etc., as social dynamics and of "backwardness" as social statics. Moreover, the meanings attached to these terms by Spencer, Ward, and others are here excluded. The text makes clear what is meant, and no extraneous connotations should be introduced.

The importance of motion was stressed in an earlier chapter (ii, §4) as follows: "Relations as they occur in physical phenomena are based upon more or less rapid motion between magnitudes—upon interaction." The physical analogy is therefore explicit.

Action pattern, next in order, is a concept which has thus been commented on: "Interhuman relations have, as *action* patterns, a decidedly dynamic aspect . . . they ceaselessly alter those characteristics of the human being usually considered part of his original nature, and they perpetually bring him into numerous unions with other human beings or with previously existent clusters (plurality patterns) of human beings." Here the physical analogy gives way to definitely social considerations.

Hence the term process as it occurs in the chart denotes *social* process. It is of great importance—so important, in fact, that we may say that the relation as such is not the chief point of sociological attention; this place is filled by the social process! If we were interested in mere relations we should not care whether they were caused by human influences or by mechanical forces and chemical processes, or whether they were dynamic or static. As sociologists, however, we concentrate on *human* action.

Static relations, however, have some importance, for at the very most they are only relatively static; they are habit-sets, established tendencies, labile neuropsychic states—the more or less stable products of dynamic relations. As such, they play a large part in the maintenance of plurality patterns, particularly when the latter persist for some time. Synonyms for static relations are: distance, *action pattern*, and *relationship*; brief comment on these is in order.

Distance is but an essential condition of motion and *vice versa*; unless there is a distance to be spanned no motion can take place, and unless motion between points is possible there can be no distance. Here again the physical analogy is explicit. (Distance also has a specifically social meaning to which reference will later be made [chap. xvii, §2].) The next synonym is *action pattern*; the italics denote the subordination of dynamic to static considerations. Giddings' "form pattern" has the same static emphasis.⁷ The more or less stable

⁷ The distinctions he makes are practically identical with those of the present system, and now that our own meaning is fairly clear, his cogent analysis may be quoted:

"A pattern is any arrangement of 'somethings' in space or in time, or in both, for an instant or for a while. . . .

"First, or sometimes to our apprehension, second (and not objectively one or the other) there is a *form pattern* [here termed *action pattern*], in which

patterning resulting from dynamic relations are denoted by the term; as was said above, "they are habit-sets, established tendencies, labile neuropsychic states." Once more the physical analogy merges into definitely social traits.

Relationship, as it occurs in the chart, is therefore social relationship, i.e., the relatively permanent product of interhuman process. The addition of the suffix *-ship* is not accidental, for it denotes, among other things, state or condition, i.e., a static relation. Such a relationship is an interweaving or condensation of social processes, and when sufficiently stable a number of them may give rise to a stable plurality pattern, as already noted.

Whether or not a given relation is static or dynamic can of course be determined only through empirical research; a sharp line cannot be drawn except in the abstract. The present system, for reasons which will develop as exposition proceeds, lays greatest stress on the dynamic aspects, but in view of the difficulty, to say nothing of the frequent futility, of calling attention to the distinction in every instance, terms and phrases such as relation, action pattern (note the absence of italicization), and "processes and relationships," which include both static and dynamic, will sometimes be used. The dynamic emphasis, however, will be by far the most frequent; "social process" is our chief category.⁸

(The other concepts in the chart will receive due attention later.)

space positions are more conspicuous than time sequences, and quiescence is more conspicuous than motion, although time is always discoverable in space, and motion in quiescence, if we look for them. [This links up with what is said above concerning the *relatively* static nature of relationships.] The form pattern is the graphic or the structural, it is the morphological pattern of things. . . .

"Second, or sometimes to our apprehension, first, there is an *action* pattern in which time sequences and change are more conspicuous than space position and quiescence, although these are present. The action pattern is the dynamic, the physiological or functional, the behavioristic pattern of things. The circling of negative electrons about their positive nucleus in the atom, of planets about their sun, the swirling motion of a tornadic storm or of a whirlpool, the turning of leaves of plants toward light, are action patterns [the same as our *action* pattern]". . . (F. H. Giddings, *The Scientific Study of Human Society*, pp. 3-5).

⁸ In agreement with Ross, who speaks of "that primordial fact known as the *social process*" (*Foundations of Sociology*, p. 91), we choose the social process as the unit of the present system—not the group, not the single human being, not the family nor anything similarly static, and finally, not even the institution.

Oppenheimer also regards sociology as the science of the social processes. The second half-volume of his *General Sociology* bears the title, "The Social Process," and begins with these words: "The object of our investigation is the social process. . . . The social process is the action of human 'aggregates or

§4. THE PLACE OF THE CONCRETE SOCIAL ACTION IN THE SYSTEM AS A
WHOLE AND THE PROBLEMS OF "MEASUREMENT"
AND "UNDERSTANDING"

Now, it is plain that association and dissociation are extremely abstract processes; only by disregarding numerous particularities in the web of social occurrences is it possible to arrive at the extreme degree of generality they represent. Such abstract processes are to be sure fundamental in the deductive sense, yet in so far as they are inductively valid they are themselves founded on a large number of concrete social actions, the controlled observation of which they have made possible and yet from which, paradoxically enough, they are abstracted.

It is these concrete social actions, these empirically observable social processes upon which valid generalizations must be based, concerning which the question of "understanding" already referred to becomes most pressing. Let us now attempt to answer it.

The definition of social action basic to the present system is borrowed from Max Weber: "'Action' as here used denotes that type of human behavior (overt or covert, passive or active) to which a *meaning* is assigned by the acting person or persons. 'Social' action differs from this in that it is carried out, according to the intention

masses' (*Massen*), hence 'human mass' is the sub-stratum and 'action' is the manifestation of the impelling force."

He says that he chooses the expression "social process" first of all because of its colorlessness, and further because "the social process is historically and logically prior to society; for the latter has only arisen and can only arise as the result of the former."

Unfortunately, however, he imposes upon this concept the much too narrow restriction of "actions of human masses," although he uses the term "mass" in a very special sense as an equivalent of "aggregate" and finds the origin of his "mass" in the family. Oppenheimer asserts that a "human mass" is fundamentally different from "a mass of human beings," inasmuch as the former has the necessary connotation of psychological relations. Now, although we agree with this assertion it is, to say the least, dangerously vague, for "human mass" also has connotation of "numerous human beings." This introduces false conceptions at the outset, for even if there were only and never had been more than *two* human beings in the world, social processes would go on. The family is itself a plurality pattern constituted in and through social processes. Interhuman processes began with the first human beings. Metaphorically speaking, they began with Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden—unless we wish to assume that God as he appears to Adam in the second chapter of Genesis was quasi-human; in this event we would have three persons, but still no "mass"!

A still more important objection is that we must call sociology a science of social processes. The plural ending emphasizes a fundamental point, as we shall later see.

of the acting person or persons, with reference to the behavior of others and is orientated toward the behavior of those others throughout its course."⁹

There are a great many implications of this definition which cannot be gone into here; each word has a specific meaning to which pages of explanation could be devoted. This is especially true of "intention," "meaning," "orientated," and "assigned"; phenomenology, psychopathology, ideal-typical method (see chap. ii, §2), and other recondite matters all play a part.¹⁰ For present purposes, it is not

* Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 1.

This definition has been paraphrased by Theodore Abel (*Systematic Sociology in Germany*, p. 118) as follows:

"Human behavior . . . is intentional action, i.e., action that has a more or less clearly perceived meaning to the acting individual. Behavior is social wherever it is carried out, according to the intention of the acting individual, with reference to the behavior of others and in its course is determined by the behavior of others."

This is somewhat clearer than that given above, but does not follow Weber's exact meaning so closely. Nevertheless, if the reader wishes to gain as good an idea of Weber's methodology as he is likely to get if he does not read German with great ease, he can do no better than to read Abel's book, especially chap. iv.

¹⁰ The following statement of what is meant by "understanding" is over-brief, but may be of some help:

Human behavior, whether "overt" or "covert," manifests patternings and regularities just as do all other processes. Nevertheless, the patternings and regularities of human behavior differ from all others in one important respect: they alone may be intelligibly interpreted, they alone are *understandable* (*verständlich*) in the full sense of the term. (As here used, "understandable" and "intelligible" are synonymous.) Dilthey formulated the contrast thus: We *explain* in the natural sciences, but we *understand* in the social sciences.

Now, all interpretations of human behavior that produce intelligibility ("understanding") have a certain inherent plausibility; we incline to regard them as self-evident. But such evidential validity (*Evidenz*) is after all qualitative and extremely variable; the mere fact that a particular interpretation is unusually plausible is no warrant of its empirical accuracy. Instances of behavior which, externally considered, run the same course and produce the same effects may be based upon extremely diverse motives, and of these possible motives or constellations of motives the one which is most "understandable" (and therefore plausible or "self-evident") is not necessarily the one actually operative.

Hence, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that any intelligible *interpretation* must be carefully verified by the customary methods of causal inference before it can be raised to the rank of a valid intelligible *solution*—unbridled speculation can find neither aid nor comfort by invoking "intelligibility," for it is not here advanced as the *sole* criterion of validity. As Jaspers properly notes, *insight* into an intelligible relation should not be confused with knowledge of the frequency of the real occurrence of that relation.

At the same time, every emphasis should be laid on the fact that intelligibility is the distinguishing characteristic of *human* behavior, and that where it is wholly

necessary to do more than call attention to the adoption of the definition; *such adoption indicates that we place sociology among the "understanding" sciences, for the element of meaning is thereby recognized.*

lacking no solution satisfactory to the social sciences can be attained. The natural sciences can dispense with the element of meaning; the social sciences cannot.

Let us now consider the ways in which understanding may be achieved.

The greatest degree of intelligibility attaches to interpretation in terms of rational purpose. Human behavior may be termed rationally purposeful when it is completely centered upon means *subjectively* viewed as adequate for the attainment of ends *subjectively* conceived to be unambiguous. Objectively considered, the means chosen to attain a given end may be wholly inadequate, and the end itself may be self-contradictory, but so long as the person or persons in question *believe* the means to be sufficient and the end to be definite, the behavior must be called rationally purposeful. For example, a military leader may count on the certainty of victory and shape his tactics accordingly; his behavior is rationally purposeful even though defeat is certain and victory useless.

A large measure of intelligibility also attaches to ordinary emotional processes and the influences they usually exert upon ourselves and others; e.g., the varieties of sympathy termed compathy, mimpathy, propathy, empathy, transpathy, and unipathy all mediate intelligibility in greater or lesser degree. In other words, there may be emotional "understanding," emotional intelligibility; rationally purposeful behavior is by no means the only kind intelligible to us.

This of course does not mean that all behavior is equally intelligible: ecstatic states, mystic experiences, the inner lives of children, and above all, certain psychopathic conditions are at least partially closed to intelligible interpretation. Nevertheless, a sharp line cannot be drawn; the extraordinary or "abnormal" *as such* is not beyond the bounds of intelligibility—"One need not be Caesar to understand Caesar"—whereas there are many ordinary, "normal," psychical processes lacking in that peculiar qualitative "self-evidence" from which intelligibility derives. Instance the fact that sudden transitions from one plateau of learning to another are only partially intelligible; we may be able to predict them, but we do not have any insight into them. Consequently the social sciences must deal with such determinable but unintelligible psychical regularities in exactly the same way as they deal with the "laws" of physics.

From the foregoing it is apparent that, in spite of the high degree of intelligibility attaching to interpretation in terms of rational purpose, it is not in any sense the goal of sociological solution. Indeed, the knowledge we possess concerning the predominance of non-rational factors such as emotion, sentiment, and habit makes it possible to say that a goal exactly opposite might be easier to reach. The belief in *Homo rationalis* is a delusion and a snare.

In spite of this, however, rationally purposeful behavior as an ideal-typical construct (see chap. ii, §2) is often best adapted to clear analysis of intelligible interrelations. We must first discover what behavior would be rational in a given situation before non-rational factors distorting or preventing such behavior can be determined. Economics makes use of the "economic man" in this way; sociology should construct similar ideal types for its purposes. There is every warrant for so doing, inasmuch as sociology is not concerned with any and every kind of "covert" behavior or with behavior *as such*; its specific object-matter is *social action*, interhuman behavior. Strictly considered, behavior of

In thus agreeing with Max Weber and such closely related thinkers as Jaspers and Spranger, however, we by no means agree with Sombart! We wish only to "understand" the meaning *subjectively* assigned to social action by the acting person or persons—in other words, we wish to gain insight into a certain aspect of motivation, into the socially conditioned wish or wishes. Sombart, however, claims that sociology should search for the *objectively* valid meaning because, forsooth, "sociology is a *Geisteswissenschaft*, a science of objective Mind." But we answer that a sociology which attempts to lay bare the objective, true, and valid "significance" of social actions is not sociology at all, but rather social philosophy and philosophy of history. The sociological method of observation and generalization is not philosophical, for it does not attempt to determine the "worth" or "significance" of social actions in the ethical or metaphysical sense, but merely describes, classifies, and, wherever possible, places in rank order the degree of association or dissociation they represent.

For fear of misunderstanding and imputation of a crudely naturalistic philosophy, let us hasten to add that the rank-order determination of intensity of association and dissociation here proposed is not "quantification" and "measurement" in the usual sense. Social processes cannot be "spatialized" altogether, and as a consequence the most that can be done is to construct a scale grading them from the weakest to the strongest and to assign arbitrary symbolic values to the various points on this scale, i.e., to *rank* them. Thurstone's method of "measuring" attitudes, for instance, amounts to no more than this; in spite of its ingenious technique, ranking and not measurement is practiced. In order to avoid giving an impression of spurious exactitude, we use the letters *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, etc., in our classification of social relations. Eventually, however, numerical statement should be achieved.

Hence, although it is not the province of the sociologist to determine the significance of social actions in the ethical or metaphysical sense, he must "understand" them in some measure if he is successfully to rank them. He must describe the unique essence of each separate, empirical process as well as discursive thinking in general permits;

this kind is always more or less intelligible, for it is specifically directed toward "objects" by the meaning they possess for the subject, even though that meaning often is not consciously apprehended. In other words, objects are "values," and values in this special sense are the correlates of attitudes, as Thomas and Znaniecki have shown. (*Freely* adapted from Max Weber, "Über einige Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie," *Logos*, IV [1913].)

he dare not disregard the qualitative peculiarity of such relations as, let us say, friendship when compared with the inner nature of the erotic, parent-child, master-servant, or similar relations. Connection with the qualitative essence or "kernel" of relations can be established only through sympathy, using the latter term in the broad sense popularized by Cooley and others.¹¹ (Scheler's more precise usage will be noted later—chaps. xvi, §1; xvii, §3.) This connection once established and "understanding" achieved, the relation in question should then be viewed in and through its effects upon association and/or dissociation, and the degree of association and/or dissociation resulting should then be stated in terms of rank order, and if possible numerical or similar symbols should be used. This of course means that comparison with other kinds of relation resulting in different degrees of association and dissociation must be practiced; ranking necessarily involves comparison.

When we have thus ascertained the relative strength of the bond with which a given associative relation unites human beings, or conversely, when we have thus determined the relative strength of the barrier with which a given dissociative relation separates human beings, we have also achieved a more complete "understanding" of the relation; we have, paradoxically enough, come nearer to its special quality by centering upon its comparable aspects. This quality, however, should not be analyzed by the scientific sociologist beyond the point necessary for comparison, for it is in large measure scientifically incommunicable to others even if, as is entirely possible, it can be brought extremely close to our own subjective feeling and desiring through the agency of sympathy. No matter how well developed our sympathetic capacities are, however, we cannot persuade others, who do not or cannot establish the connection as we do, that our description of the subjective aspects of a given case of exploitation, for example, is the "true" one; the exact way in which the exploiting or exploited person feels may be "self-evident" to us but not to others. But what we *can* do is to determine in a great number of observed cases the approximate degree of dissociation and/or association resulting from exploitative actions, and we can therefore say, in relative independence of the personal equation, a good many definite things about the nature of the social process of exploitation.

Some space has already been devoted to the fact that we cannot assume that the "kernel" of the human being is amenable to socio-

¹¹ C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, rev. ed., chap. iv.

logical reduction; at this point we must also state that the qualitative "kernel" of the empirical relation cannot be assumed to be rationally explicable. In the monographic analysis of any single empirical relation we must of course attempt to resolve its particular traits into rationally explicable factors as far as possible, but we must always reckon with the possibility that it is in its essence unique. If we are not engaged in monographic analysis, however, but are merely attempting to assign the relation an approximate rank in the general system, its more particular traits, to say nothing of its qualitative essence, need not receive much attention; the frame of reference rather than the minute detail is determining.

To repeat: the scientific sociologist cannot assume that the special quality of any empirical social action can be entirely grasped by scientific means; his only reason for paying any attention at all to this quality is in order to determine the degree of association and/or dissociation which the relation brings about or because of which it is called forth. This degree can be determined with some accuracy by the rank-order method and the comparison it entails, and when this is accomplished, *partial* rational comprehension of the relation is achieved.¹² The exactitude of this comprehension will be greater the more the method of numerical statement dominates our system, i.e., the more completely we can abstract the processes of approach and avoidance from empirical cases of exploitation, etc.

And this is the place of "understanding" in the system.

§5. THE SYSTEM AND ITS ELASTICITY

From what has just been said, the importance of a closed system for the classification of social relations is perhaps manifest, for classification and the rank-order method go hand in hand. Let us see how

¹² The concept of relation (in the most general form) is a fundamental category of most of the sciences. The analytical procedure almost universally attempted is: (1) that of breaking up "substances" with supposed "attributes," or analysis; and (2) recombination of the resulting relations into structures and their accompanying relations, or synthesis. This general scientific method we merely extend to the special field of interhuman relations, as already noted; the *logical* category "relation" becomes the *social* category "relation."

When we know the mathematical content of the concept "relation," we have an explanation of the fact that relations are important object-matter for every science. *All science strives to transform qualities into "quantities" so far as possible*, i.e., to show that qualities are magnitudes in *one* numerical series. This end is attempted by means of comparative measurements, i.e., by placing in relation to each other magnitudes which at first appear qualitatively incommensurable.

the system is constructed: (1) the all-inclusive concept, *sociation*, divides into the two *fundamental relations* of association and dissociation which are always and everywhere present; (2) these in turn divide into the *principal relations* (which need not be named at this point); (3) these in turn into *sub-relations*; and (4) these finally subsume the actual, empirical, close-to-life *social actions* of which the warp and woof of sociation are composed.

The last group is the only one which is not one or more stages removed from direct observation; all the others are abstracted from these concrete social actions. The importance of such empirical data therefore cannot be over-emphasized—without the concrete where is the abstract? without the *action* pattern where is the action *pattern*? Weber attributes so much importance to such social actions that he always defines the various social relations in his system in terms of the theory of probability: "A social relation . . . has its existence entirely in the probability that mutually-determined social actions of a certain type have taken place, are taking place, or will take place."¹³ Now although we agree with Weber in his contention that social relations are entirely dependent upon social actions, it seems quite superfluous to mention "probability" every time a concept is defined; it is enough to state once and for all that social phenomena are entirely dependent upon social actions and hence have only a probable character, a merely statistical "reality."

By thus taking account of empirical data, our deductive system is continually subjected to the test of induction. When we examine some section of actual everyday life—the experiences of a given family or club, for instance—and extract from it the concrete actions upon which its relations depend, we should be able to classify these actions according to the degree of association and/or dissociation they represent. In other words, we should be able to classify them sociologically. Our frame of reference must contain a sufficient number of niches within which *all* these basic data will fit; should no suitable niche be available for a certain kind, the extension or rebuilding of the frame of reference would thereby be rendered necessary. Only through the perpetual cross-correction of deduction and induction can a genuinely comprehensive science of social relations be worked out.¹⁴

¹³ Max Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

¹⁴ Simmel regards sociology as a science of interhuman relations, for most of his writings on the subject at least implicitly presuppose this. His inclinations and capacities do not tend toward *systematization*, however, and he does little more than analyze separate relations which seem to him particularly significant

As examples, let us assume that we learn something new about the interconnections of sib members among a preliterate people, and that we hear of new advertising methods in some American metropolis. The sociologist then asks himself whether he is confronted by (1) a new form of social action which he has not yet caught in his conceptual net, or whether (2) the novel element lies only in the purposive aspect or the material means for the attainment of the purpose, and not in the relation *as such*.

In the case of the preliterates, e.g., the new element might be the discovery that the sib organization as a whole enters into the determination of certain legal ends or purposes without anything else being altered in the previously known relations of the sib members. Hence, the novel element would not be a primary concern of sociology, but rather of jurisprudence. On the other hand, we might observe an altogether new variety of interhuman bond for which our sociological categories are inadequate; if these remain fixed, facts forced within them will be distorted. Consequently a new category becomes necessary (or perhaps only a new division and subdivision of an already

(e.g., superordination, subordination, conflict, secrecy, faithfulness, gratitude, etc.).

In spite of the highly abstract nature of some of his analyses, Simmel shows himself a master in unravelling the subtle intricacies of human relations. But he never intended to work out a comprehensive system of human relations nor to erect a scaffolding for the work of others; his general philosophic approach is responsible for the disconnected nature of his sociological analyses.

In the list of those American sociologists who have indefatigably devoted themselves to a classification of the fundamental methodological problems of sociology, the late Albion W. Small, for over a quarter of a century editor of the *American Journal of Sociology*, stands among the first. In his historical survey of the development of sociology in the United States he lays stress upon the fact that since the beginning of the twentieth century much less attention has been paid to social forms and much more to social processes, and in the case of the latter, more attention has been paid to the objective content of the separate processes. Small distinguishes "social" and "human" processes; the former have to do with technical phenomena exerting external influences whereas the human processes are those having to do with the internal connection of needs and values. (See his article, "The Category 'Human Process,'" *Am. J. Soc.*, XXVII.) Although this dichotomy is interesting from the standpoint of Small's theory, it cannot help us along the lines laid down in the present work. The processes which Small calls "social" are not, generally speaking, objects for a science of interhuman relations; only the "human" processes are of interest to us. Further, although our *final* concern is with the minute details of the human processes or social actions, before we can deal exhaustively with these concrete phenomena we must build up an orderly system of the more general social processes in their various degrees of abstraction in order to place each separate social action in its proper context and to give us a survey of the whole.

existing category). Genuinely new types of social action do appear from time to time; witness the *kula* described by Malinowski:¹⁵

"[He] here reveals to us an entirely new, never before observed type of inter-human relation, a mixture of friendship, trade, and religion called *kula* in its totality. The human beings, villages, tribes and islands united in the *kula* bond are required to give their neighbors gifts from time to time. These gifts do not become the property of the recipient, however, but must journey farther as a gift to the nearest neighbor (in the *kula*). The recipient is also a donor. Thus the gifts circulate from hand to hand, and as the years go by, pass into the temporary keeping of everyone. Two articles make this journey from house to house, from island to island: necklaces made of small bits of spondylus shell travel in the clockwise direction; large armlets carved out of large white mussel-shells travel counter-clockwise. They journey from house to house, from village to village, from island to island. A man gives his neighbors these articles, and receives two similar articles from them, and the relation thus set up implies friendship and mutual helpfulness. The great journeys from island to island, involving whole communities which have prepared for the event long in advance, carry certain religious connotations and also certain business implications, but both of these are of secondary importance. The really important thing is the law of *kula* making it necessary to bring the costly, eternally wandering gifts across the sea to friends—almost a symbol that friendship and helpfulness may exist outside of merely individual relations. . . ."¹⁶

In the second case, that of modern American culture, the novel element in the advertising mentioned might be, e.g., a new material or method for advertising purposes, such as skywriting or radio announcing from an airplane. This interests the advertising expert, but does not directly concern the sociologist. By use of such methods, however, the merchandiser may be able to focus the attention of the public on his goods more intensely than before; the student of inter-human relations as such should then immediately ask himself whether this method of bringing buyer and seller together has been sufficiently considered in his classification of contacts, and whether its ramifications should be traced.

The system which we shall later attempt to set forth *in extenso* therefore will *not* be presented as final, or as valid in the metaphysical or *a priori* sense. On the contrary, it serves merely as a heuristic device. New or more fundamental experiences should improve, extend, or even abbreviate it—it is elastic, not rigid.

§6. SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

The method of observation basic to the system outlined is not philosophical, for it does not evaluate social relations in terms of

¹⁵ Bronislaw Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, 1922.

¹⁶ F. Thorbecke, *Kölnische Zeitung*, 1924, No. 64a.

final worth and does not attempt to discover their supersocial significance, but merely classifies them according to the degree of association and/or dissociation they represent. And neither is it psychological!

Sociology is the science of interhuman relations and therefore of the social actions of human beings, not of the intra-organic or internal conscious processes of human beings. It is not primarily concerned with subjective, psychic occurrences, but with objective events, with occurrences that produce externally perceivable changes in the grouping of human beings. Spann has objected to this position as follows:

"Inasmuch as an action-in-itself does not exist, but is always the result of a purpose, it can be interpreted only as the expression and development of a mental element (sensation in the broadest sense); it therefore cannot be an object of sociological investigation if the mental element be omitted."¹⁷

That we must take some account of motivation in order to "understand" actions is undeniable,¹⁸ but this does not mean that the sensations underlying the motives should be analyzed by the sociologist. This is the task of the psychologist; sociology deals with occurrences, events, processes taking place *between* human beings and plurality patterns; such happenings can be none other than social actions.

Social actions are data which are dependent on time, space, the laws of physics, and the limiting conditions of the inorganic as well as the organic environments. Further, such actions always have a non-psychical aspect which must always be taken into account by the sociologist; they are objective phenomena which are part of the external world—"Man is organic to nature." Hence some types of social action can be studied with little regard to psychical processes, although this of course does not mean that the extreme behaviorisms of Watson, Weiss, or Bain¹⁹ are generally applicable; interhuman processes always have a subjective aspect, as a study of conative processes or wishes, for example, will show.

Because of this persisting subjective aspect, tyros in sociology frequently have great difficulty in grasping the difference between psychology on the one hand and sociology as a science of interhuman relations on the other. This difficulty is frequently rooted in the layman's ineradicable belief that every study having to do with the

¹⁷ Othmar Spann, *Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 262.

¹⁸ Cf. Georg Simmel, *Soziologie*, p. 21, and the translation and comment by R. M. MacIver, *Community*, pp. 59-60.

¹⁹ John B. Watson, *Behaviorism*, 1930; A. Weiss, *A Theoretical Basis of Behavior*, 1927; Read Bain, "An Attitude on Attitude Research," *Am. J. Soc.* XXXIII, 6 (May, 1928), pp. 940-57.

mind is "psychology." If the beginning student is in the clutches of this belief, he should read those pages in Simmel's *Sociology* which deal with the distinction between a science dealing with mental processes as such and a science dealing with the content of mental life.²⁰ Another writer, Duprat, states the difference between psychology and sociology in much the same way:

"We can clearly distinguish the social and the psychical: every datum is social which springs from group relations; every function is psychical which is known only through individual consciousness; and the phenomena based upon the constant connection between the social and the psychical are social-psychical. Each of these three orders of fact yields its corresponding science: sociology, psychology, and social psychology."²¹

This is clear, but Stoltenberg's works have contributed still more toward clarification. Following the latter writer, we may distinguish between the following sciences sometimes confused with sociology:

(a) Psychology as a special science dealing with the psyche of the single human being and also (as we must add) with its physiological correlates or conditions; (b) socio-psychology; and (c) psychosociology.

The latter two together make up the science of social psychology: (1) in socio-psychology interest centers on the content of conscious processes arising in the single human being as a consequence of relations with one or more of his fellows; (2) in psycho-sociology the viewpoint becomes synoptic, and a co-existing plurality of human beings is the focus of attention—either the same psychic manifestations are found among all the members of a group and the content of this collective psychic phenomenon is studied, or else psychic "exchange" (suggestion, etc.) and the reciprocal relations of psychic intercourse are observed and analyzed.²²

²⁰ A good English version of the passage is to be found in N. J. Spykman, *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*, pp. 45-54.

²¹ G. L. Duprat, "L'orientation actuelle de la société en France," *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, XXX, part 2, numbers 9 and 10 (paraphrased).

²² H. L. Stoltenberg, *Soziopsychologie: Erster Teil der Sozialpsychologie*, 1914, and *Psychosociologie: Zweiter Teil der Sozialpsychologie*, 1922.

Stoltenberg not only makes the difference between psychology and the two forms of social psychology clear, but he also shows that sociology is distinct from psychology in all its forms *if and when* psychology is not so loosely defined that it includes sociology and all the other social sciences. Let us quote Rivers on this point: "The definition of psychology I wish to exclude as a wholly inadequate one of the relation between sociology and psychology is that of McDougall—that psychology is the science of the behavior of living things. This definition is so wide that it would not only include the whole of sociology as ordinarily understood, but also economics, politics, and ethics. The definition

The fascination which psychological problems have for many minds sometimes leads to disregard of the fact that social relations are not caused by motives alone, that extra-psychical, objective factors also play an important part. Even though we grant that motives have a large share in the causation of relations, we must insist that the analysis of the subjective processes in and of themselves is not the primary task of the sociologist; it belongs to socio-psychology and to psycho-sociology. Such analysis will often have to be undertaken in sociological investigation, but should be carried no further than the point where it ceases to be of heuristic service in the analysis and ranking of external, objective, social occurrences.

Further, when we have traced the social phenomenon back to its subjective aspects, i.e., back to the motive or complex of motives,

is so wide as to be useless if those subjects are to be distinguished as separate disciplines" (W. H. R. Rivers, *Psychology and Ethnology*, pp. 3-4). In spite of the fact that McDougall is largely discredited by American sociologists and social psychologists so far as his instinct doctrine is concerned, the confusing effects of his definition of psychology, aided and abetted by the definition given it by his arch-enemy Watson, still persist, as a few sample definitions of "social psychology" will show:

"Social psychology is the science which studies the behavior of the individual in so far as his behavior stimulates other individuals, or is itself a reaction to their behavior; and which describes the consciousness of the individual in so far as it is a consciousness of social objects and social situations" (F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology*, p. 2).

"Social psychology is the scientific study of the social nature and reactions of the mind, of the interactions of individuals and groups, of group conflicts, of group leadership and control, and of the nature of group and societal progress" (E. E. Bogardus, *Social Psychology*, p. 14).

"The aim of social psychology is to give a psychological theory of social organization and evolution. It may be, therefore, best defined as the psychological aspect of sociology" (C. A. Ellwood, *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 62-3).

"Social psychology is concerned with superorganic (as distinguished from mental organic, vital organic, and inorganic) phenomena" (A. L. Kroeber, "The Possibility of a Social Psychology," *Am. J. Soc.*, XXIII [1918], p. 644).

"The subject matter of psychology is action, explicit and implicit. The subject matter of sociology is the forms of social organization. Social psychology is a science of mental becoming, i.e., the arousal of experiences through sensation, memory, reason, and the like, as they take their places in social forms. In brief the subject matter of social psychology refers to what may be called social situations" (Jesse E. Sprowls, *Social Psychology Interpreted*, pp. 38-9).

"Social psychology is concerned with the personality as it operates in a world of other personalities. The writer has tried . . . to show that the behavior of the individual is determined both by the more intimate person-to-person relationships and by those aspects of social interaction which rest upon the conventionalized, group-accepted forms of behavior which the anthropologists call culture patterns" (Kimball Young, *Social Psychology*, p. vii).

more often than not we have failed to achieve comprehension, inasmuch as psychic processes thereby laid bare often point back to the social network with which the particular human being in whom the psychic processes (e.g., wishes) occur is interwoven. And the fact that someone feels or thinks in this way or that can often be attributed primarily to his membership in a certain social order. The psychical is not always primary and the social secondary. On the contrary, the one phenomenon implies the other. The psychical is imbedded in the social, and the social in the psychical, hence the connection between the sciences of sociology and psychology is close. But their tasks, their problems, and their fundamental queries are entirely different, a fact that is frequently ignored. In psychology, we analyze and classify internal processes, conscious or otherwise; in sociology, external constellations of human beings. When we want to make the internal processes intelligible, however, we must often inquire into the external patternings; when we want to make the patternings more evident and plain, we must often investigate the internal processes.

The impelling forces that bring about those re-arrangements and re-groupings of human beings which sociology studies are therefore: (1) external influences (removal of restraints, pressures, loosening), and (2) internal impulses (desires, motives, interests). The first frequently appear in conjunction with the second, and *vice versa*.

§7. THE SPECIFICALLY SOCIAL ZONE

In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, it seems advisable to supplement the foregoing discussion of sociology and psychology by an attempt to show that there is a zone of the specifically social.

It will be recalled that a large number of physical analogies have been used in earlier chapters. This has been done in order to make the difference between sociology and psychology as distinct as possible, although some of the formulations chosen perhaps contrast them too sharply. Such over-emphasis is probably unavoidable, for there are great verbal difficulties in expressing the specifically interhuman as over against the zone of internal psychic phenomena on the one hand and physical-spatial phenomena on the other. Inasmuch as there are only a few words denoting social facts alone, our vocabulary derives largely from the psychical and physical zones. Now in the present work, especially in the earlier portions, it is of extreme importance to distinguish between the social and the psychical, hence it is necessary to borrow a great many terms denoting spatial, physical phe-

nomena. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that, as Dewey puts it, "in the social the physical is taken up into a wider and more complex and delicate system of interactions so that . . . new properties [appear] by release of potentialities previously confined because of absence of full interaction."²³

In spite of obvious drawbacks, it seems imperative to retain such more or less explicitly physical terms as approach and avoidance, association and dissociation, motion and distance, for they make plain the difference between sociology and psychology. If an effort is made to visualize the basic types of interhuman behavior according to the frame of reference comprising these terms, we see movements of *A* toward *B* and of *A* away from *B*, of *B* toward *A* and of *B* away from *A*, and mixed movements in which they come toward each other in some respects and withdraw in others. These may be metaphorically designated as spatial movements if one wishes, but should never be taken to mean that such movement occurs in *physical* space only. Perhaps the most usable metaphor for designating the "moves" that make up the manifold and shifting interaction of the social zone is that of the chess game with all its complex and infinitely variable combinations, for chess "moves" are both physical and psychical.

Moreover, the assertion that the sociologist should state degrees of association and dissociation in terms of rank order wherever possible must not be regarded as an "unwarranted extension of the methods of physical science," but simply as the unavoidable demand for maximum simplicity laid upon every scientist. Even "understanding" by means of sympathy can be regarded as an aid to scientific knowledge only when it is possible to express results in rank-order symbols—which does *not* mean quantitative measurement in the strict physical-science sense.

To many persons, however, the emphasis upon social actions peculiar to the present system will perhaps seem an unwarranted concession to "naturalism," and their opinion may be reinforced by the statement that social actions are externally perceivable whereas processes in consciousness are not, for this apparently implies that sociology is concerned with physical space only. That this is by no means the case we have already attempted to show; the only reason for the statement is this: in order to avoid being led astray by extremely difficult epistemological problems extending far beyond the

²³ John Dewey, "Social as a Category," *The Monist*, XXXVIII, 2 (April, 1928), p. 160.

limits of a special science such as sociology, it seems necessary to define the specific nature of the sociologically relevant action as the "projection" of mental phenomena into the world of physical space by means of sensually perceivable modes of expression. The real object-matter of sociology, however, is not the influence of such actions upon the physical world nor upon the world of inner psychic life, but upon the interhuman, the social world. The alterations they produce in the association and dissociation of human beings and in the configuration of plurality patterns are our primary interest. At the present time it is perhaps too much to expect that a sociologically untrained person should be able to recognize a specifically social zone in addition to the physical and psychical zones, but modern sociological training should certainly make such recognition possible.

Numerous instances show that when the difference between social actions and internal psychic processes is obscured because of psychological prepossessions, it is almost impossible to attain insight into the specific nature of interhuman phenomena—a fact thus noted by Coyle:

"It is evident that the facts of participation and communication which characterize those interactions we call social, form as unique a distinction from the biological or psychological as that which separates the organic from the inorganic. However much society is composed of individuals, the social is itself not the psychological. It is a relationship between psychological entities. To use the categories therefore of a simpler level of interaction to explain it is to court confusion."²⁴

On the other hand, comprehension is equally difficult if the motives associated with the actions are not drawn upon in explanation, as previous sections have pointed out.

The upshot of all these considerations is the conclusion that the social zone, although specific, does not exist in and of itself; as Dewey says, "Social *phenomena* are not of themselves, of course, equivalent to social as a *category*."²⁵

The totality of the *real* world of concrete social phenomena or occurrences is *experienced* as a consolidated combination of *A*, the physical, *B*, the individual-psychical, and *C*, the social. This unified, concrete whole can be divided into these three parts only by means of a process of abstraction—again quoting Dewey, "by means of an intellectual analysis which determines what is their distinctive char-

²⁴ Grace Longwell Coyle, *Social Process in Organized Groups*, p. x.

²⁵ John Dewey, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

acter."²⁶ Nevertheless, the separation of an abstract social zone or category is indispensable for purposes of rational analysis because the concrete social occurrences of the real world of our experience cannot be made intelligible by means of psychical and physical abstractions alone.

What may be called the abstract "physical third" of the experienced world is united with the abstract "social third" thus: phenomena which are not manifested in the humanly perceivable, corporeal world do not play a part in concrete social phenomena. The abstract "social third" is in turn united with the abstract "psychical third" by virtue of the fact that like the latter it is not externally perceivable; it is a network composed of the contents of mental processes which as such take place only within single human beings. Nevertheless, the effects of the "social third" upon the "physical third" are numerous and powerful, for the union of the two results in the "projection" of the former into the corporeal world in the form of concrete social actions. Further, the interconnections existing in the "social third" can be made generally evident only through categories derived from spatial images and presentations, or in other words, by means of physical analogies.

§8. THE METHOD OF ANALYSIS IN THE SYSTEMATICS OF ACTION PATTERNS; GENUINE AND SPURIOUS, OPEN AND DISGUISED RELATIONS

In order to bring about general realization that the social zone exists and to explore it in all its ramifications, it is highly desirable that a great number of sociologists ask themselves the same questions and attempt to answer them by using the same method.

The questions are: How do human beings influence each other? How do they become interdependent? How do they repel and oppose each other? How are plurality patterns and single human beings related? What kinds of plurality patterns are there? How do they differ? How may their formation be furthered or retarded?

The chief category used in answering these questions is that of the social process. The total web of interaction called sociation may be divided into a very large number of empirical social processes. These are here conceived as actions which unite human beings with each other or cause them to separate. The term "social relationship" is used to denote the labile but relatively static conditions of attach-

²⁶ *Ibid.*

ment or detachment resulting from social processes. Inasmuch as the standpoint here taken leads to concentration upon occurrence, becoming, action, social relationships are not the immediate objects of observation; social actions or processes (which eventually lead to more or less enduring relationships) are our primary interest in the first part of the present system, the systematics of action patterns. In the second part, the systematics of plurality patterns, the results of these processes, which consist not only of relationships but also of plurality patterns composed of relationships, are the chief object-matter. Plurality patterns are built up by accumulated repetitions of social processes just as are relationships; in fact, they are merely the plural aspect of relationships.

All the empirical social processes must be analyzed in accordance with one consistent method. These processes are actions (occurrences, data, events, facts) which are studied with the sole purpose of determining the way and degree in which the human beings involved associate and/or dissociate. This is what is here understood by "analysis of interhuman behavior."

From the foregoing it can be seen that the conception of behavior fundamental to the present system is not the same as that commonly held by psychologists and physiologists. The sociologist is not primarily interested in the perceivable alterations of physiognomy or posture evidencing the immediate reactions of the psychophysical organism to external stimuli as such; he concentrates upon the degree and kind of change in social distance.

Such alterations in the distance between human beings must be made sufficiently "understandable" to account for the external happenings of the social zone, but no more than that. Similarly, the psychical and physical components of every social process must receive attention sufficient for sociological purposes, but the sociologist must not go too far in the analysis of external processes, for he is not a practitioner of physics or its derivative disciplines, and conversely, he must not seek a complete explanation of all the ramifications of psychical processes, for he is not a psychologist.

In order to secure uniform application of the method here set forth it seems desirable to make use of pseudo-algebraic formulae indicating the various steps in analysis, but with the clear understanding that these formulae carry no implications of mathematical exactitude and that such terms as product or quotient are not to be literally interpreted. *The formulae are given with a minimum of comment here; in a later chapter (x, §5) they are discussed at length.*

Every social process implies a plurality of participants, sometimes quite large, but the simplest process takes place in an occurrence directly involving but two persons, and we shall here assume that this is what the formula indicates:

That is, every social process is the result ("product") of a personal attitude (A) and a situation (S). In thus calling attention to the observable fact that in every social process both attitude and situation exert influence, there is no claim that both always exert it in the same degree.

Attitude and situation are composite factors. A is the resultant of (1) the socially relevant native equipment, or N (including, among other things, the temperamental attitudes described by Thomas); and (2) previous experiences, or E . The inherited and the experienced are to be taken into account. Therefore $A = N \times E$.

The situation, S , also yields two components: (1) the extrahuman environment, the physical basis, or B ; and (2) the attitudes of the other participant in the process in question, or A_1 . Here also one factor must not be disregarded for the sake of the other. Hence $S = B \times A_1$.

The factor A_1 offers the same possibility of separation into component elements as does the attitude of the person chosen as the point of departure. Native equipment and experiences are as important in one member of the pair as in the other.

Tracing out the ramifications of a given process is a theoretically endless task, but it is actually limited by the available data; sooner or later a point is reached beyond which nothing definite can be said.

The various minor formulae used in analysis combine into the following major formula:

Some psychological or socio-psychological analysis will be necessary, but it should not be carried further than the point where sociological comparison becomes possible, i.e., where the functional unity of diverse psychical processes affecting a particular social process can be classified in one or at most a few simple categories cast in terms of dominant motives or wishes. The sociologist must have at his disposal a schema comprising the major wishes involved in social actions. Obviously the categories in the schema need accommodate only the wishes directly correlated with interhuman behavior—*social* wishes only should be considered. Those propounded by Thomas—security, recognition, response, and new experience—meet all requirements adequately, and will be commented upon extensively in a later chapter.

Although such extreme behaviorists as Bain have insisted that sociology must wholly dispense with such "unscientific" notions as wishes and motives,²⁷ there can be little doubt that they will be retained; indeed, recent works in the field of "social psychology" grant them a

²⁷ Read Bain, *op. cit.*, esp. p. 951.

very important place.²⁸ Analysis of motives is not, to be sure, the primary task of the sociologist, but he cannot assume that all relations externally similar show a like resemblance "internally." We know that there are no *neutral* relations, i.e., that there are none which do not have associative, dissociative, or mixed associative-dissociative effects, but must we not take these interhuman relations out of their specifically sociological setting and study them from the point of view of another science, in the hope that results will accrue which may be of value for sociology as well?

Having asked ourselves this question, we are inevitably led to the perception of an important dichotomy of all human relations in so far as motives play a significant part in them. For example, *A* enters into a clear, unambiguous relation with *B*; in this relation there is no contradiction between the overt action and the subjective intention. *A* offers *B* his friendship because he feels inclined toward him as a friend, or he opposes the plans of *C* because he thinks them mistaken; he makes his opinion known and acts accordingly.

Are not relations frequently much more tangled, even when we take them one by one and do not think of a complicated network of other relations at the same time? Is not the true motive of a relation, and therefore the true character of the relation, often concealed, so that the subjective intention does not appear unambiguously in the action? Do we not often find that an external relation altogether different from that corresponding to the inner attitudes of the human beings in question prevails? That outer and inner relations are not identical?

In the first volume of *War and Peace*, Tolstoi gives a masterly description of Petersburg polite society during a period when a strong tendency to join the Masonic order was manifest. Upon entering into such group relations the cavaliers took upon themselves a number of moral obligations; to all appearances they had entered into a body which aimed at fraternal life and moral conduct. An unprejudiced investigation of their motives showed, however, that purely conventional considerations led to their decisions. Outwardly, the goal was to join a group upholding definite virtues; inwardly, considerations having to do with government posts, success in society, and military careers had the upper hand.

Here we deal only with a relatively simple case in which a relation is enacted when the will to it does not exist; the inner attitude toward

²⁸ J. K. Folsom, *Social Psychology*, 1931; Krueger and Reckless, *Social Psychology*, 1931; Kimball Young, *Social Psychology*, 1930.

the matter in question is quite different. When we glance through the list of more than five hundred relations found in the table at the end of this volume, case after case will occur to us in which such relations had no real basis whatever but were merely enacted or assumed.

Quite as important as these are the cases where an inner relation is disguised. Just as *A* by means of a disguise often deceives *B* as to his identity at a masquerade, in analogous fashion he will deceive *B* as to the motive behind a given relation. The essential point in such cases is not that another relation is enacted (as in our first case), but that the socially effective motive is disguised. The concept of disguised relations is of great sociological importance. Instance the fact that competition, domination, exploitation, contravention ("opposition"), and advance are often disguised.

Spurious and disguised relations are especially frequent in relations between social structures such as political units, etc. In fact, politics in many if not most of its aspects is the art of disguise. Friendship, "covenanting," and similar relations may be spurious, assumed; the actual, disguised relation in such cases is perhaps rivalry or some other form of dissociation.

Is it not possible for sociology, which deals chiefly with externally perceivable actions, to relinquish this whole matter to the student of motives, and hence to psychology? As already stated, it is certainly not the primary task of sociology to plough the field of motives, but the consequences of the double nature of spurious and disguised relations—consequences affecting group life and social processes in general—are much too important to be neglected. Sociology dare not tacitly pass by this fact. Quite often a club, a business undertaking, a sect, or a state collapses (in many cases with apparent suddenness) merely because the relations of the participants were spurious. On the other hand, new amalgamations having great social effectiveness often arise with surprising suddenness, so suddenly indeed that we might justifiably assume that a gradual and time-consuming interweaving of open relations preceded the formation of the new plurality pattern—but these relations were long present and were merely disguised.

Inasmuch as the person or persons seeking to enter into a given relation may be self-deluded as to the true character of the latter, the analysis of many human relations is rendered more difficult and more interesting. For example, the relation may be subjectively genuine, objectively spurious; subjectively disguised, objectively open; the social processes involved become highly complex.

But enough of these detailed matters. Let us turn once more to the larger aspects of the system.

A number of social processes following upon each other in a rhythmic or cyclical pattern, or in a regular order, may be termed a process-series; Bogardus' "race relations cycle" is a fairly good example, and Hiller's "strike cycle" is another. Such series must be analyzed to determine whether the changes occurring in their course result from alterations in situations, changes in attitudes, or both. Explanations of social development are at bottom explanations of complex process-series.

In addition to the analysis of social processes and process-series, the task of placing them in an orderly system of social processes, i.e., the task of systematization, must be carried out as a second step. Inasmuch as a social process is only the way and degree in which the social distance between human beings changes, it can be classified in the system of social actions, sub-relations, principal relations, and fundamental relations already outlined. The intricately intertwined occurrences of social life must be subjected to the requirements of rational thought by placing them in a frame of reference covering, however imperfectly, the whole field of interhuman existence.

The systematics of action patterns comprises one half of the present system, and is an attempt to carry out a thoroughgoing causal and functional analysis of the social processes; the second half undertakes the analysis and synthesis of plurality patterns (for an outline summary of important points of the system, see chap. v, §4). The second part, however, is not possible without the first, for plurality patterns can be analyzed only when the social processes and process-series dominant in them have first been determined.

Does our method of analysis and synthesis permit us to say whether social phenomena are subject to natural "laws"? In answering this question, we must remember the ambiguity of the words "law" and "lawfulness." If by these we mean only regularity, rhythm, or periodic recurrence (and hence predictability), then discovery of the "laws" followed by social phenomena is one of our chief tasks. If the requirement, however, is the revelation of a metaphysical, super-empirical significance which as an eternal law guides these phenomena in harmony with the divine command or cosmic principle, we must relinquish this task to philosophy. And where the conclusions of philosophy are concerned, the cautious scientist must not lay his methodological doubt aside, for if he does, purely speculative notions and value-judgments may slip into the exact researches of sociology.

To this danger we are always exposed, for we are all human beings, with the emotions, hopes, and vanities of our kind. The danger may best be avoided by deferring finalistic interpretation until clearly described and systematically classified material has accumulated in sufficient volume. When that time comes, perhaps conclusions that venture into the obscure depths of final meaning will be less arbitrary than they are today. We must first have a real morphology of "society"; then if we wish we may attempt its metaphysics.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIETY AND PLURALITY PATTERNS*

§1. THE VERBAL CHARACTER OF THE CONCEPT OF SOCIETY

The essence of the present system is found in the fact that it does not issue from a concept of society and hence does not begin with a definition of this concept, but does concentrate upon the dynamic social relation, the social process. From this standpoint, Waxweiler was entirely right in saying that "society" is a word the meaning of which disappears if there is an effort to explore it thoroughly (*"dont le sens s'évanouit, quand on veut l'approfondir"*).

If society is assumed to be something substantive, substantial, and spatially demarcable, there can be no doubt that in this sense it is never and nowhere existent; there is no such thing. Society as a concept is acceptable only when it is explicitly stated that it is a completely *verbal* concept, a happening, a process; there is only *sociation*. To be sure, the word "society" is a convenient abbreviation of everyday speech, and substitution of "sociation" or "the sociative process" for the false substantive is sometimes pedantic. Hence the substantive form should not be entirely banished except where there is danger of perpetuating current misconceptions; the superstition that there is a substantial bodily-organic or spiritually-rarefied something called society must be overcome just as the belief that there is somewhere in space a place called heaven and another called hell must be overcome. The reality which must be substituted for the fictitious substance "society" is merely the sum of those occurrences which have elsewhere been termed social processes.

Moreover, it should be borne continually in mind that the plurality patterns to which the social processes give rise do not, in their totality, constitute a gigantic total structure called "society." Plurality patterns themselves are only condensations, by-products of social processes or *action* patterns, and exist only as neuropsychic patterns within human beings. Nevertheless, they are not unreal because they do not directly impinge upon our exteroceptors, nor unreal because they are consciously evident only as images, etc. They are *real*, be-

* §§ 1-3 of this chapter may be skipped when reading this treatise for the first time. They are fundamental, however, and should eventually be read.

cause they affect human behavior.¹ To quote Thomas again: "If men define . . . [them] as real, they are real in their consequences."

No great harm is done, however, by calling all the various plurality patterns, including their more abstract, symbolic forms, *societies*, as long as this does not involve the assumption that they are somehow joined into *one* universal structure called "society." We cannot produce this phantasm by addition—state + church + trade union + club + corporation, etc.—nor can there be demonstrated the existence of a superphantasm so transcending mundane affairs that it is more than the sum—e.g., the "product" of state \times church \times . . . n —of its "component" plurality patterns. We can only *abstract* the social; when sociative structures such as those just mentioned are classed as components of "society" rather than as more or less abstract derivatives of sociation, utter confusion is the result, for nowhere can we point to an existential, definable something which they compose. The process of sociation, not the entity of "society," furnishes the data for sociological research.²

¹ In his latest work, Gothein also takes the position that plurality patterns are real, but that they exist only in the neuropsychic patterns of human beings. He says, "The fact is of decisive importance that society is real, and is felt by everyone to be a reality in which he feels himself to have a place, but that it is nevertheless only an image, presentation, or concept held by its members. A new element is added: the image, presentation, or concept. All the forms of society are not determined by the mere purpose which unifies them and leads them in a particular direction, but are also determined, simultaneously modified, by these images, etc.: the latter are not only infinitely manifold, but also give various shades of color to the unitary purpose held by each separate individual. These societal forms are all the more manifold because 'every element of a group is not only a part of society, but is something else beside.' This 'something else' not only yields to the observer of the single human being a special *nuance* varying with each person (thus permeating his social picture with extrasocial imponderables), but these multifarious divergent images, presentations, and concepts give their character to the group itself. This character, to be sure, is the result of summation, and is the average of all the separate items; before such summation, however, this summated character could not be observed in the single human being, for the latter contributed only a few of the items" (E. Gothein, "Über einige soziologische Grundfragen," *Hauptprobleme der Soziologie*, pp. 193 ff.).

² One of the most important forerunners of modern sociology of the general type represented here is Émile Waxweiler, whose chief work, *Esquisse d'une sociologie*, has received far too little attention, although it appeared in 1906. Perhaps one reason for the neglect into which it has fallen is its too exclusive limitation to the biological aspects of social behavior; there is no doubt that this constitutes a serious flaw in Waxweiler's work. At the same time, it should not be overlooked.

For Waxweiler, sociology is the science of the processes of reaction resulting from the mutual stimulation of individuals of the same species, or, it is the

§2. THE FALSE ANTITHESIS: INDIVIDUAL—SOCIETY

Perhaps it is not superfluous to point out that every time we take seriously concepts that are even remotely related to any of the four following notions, particularly to the last, we make any real comprehension of the science of sociology quite impossible: (1) society is a

theory of the adjustment of individuals of the same species to each other. The central concept is "social affinity." He too lays stress upon observation of the single human being *acting* in his milieu, and emphasizes the point that his activity is to be viewed from the side of movement, process, action, rather than from the side of results brought about by such movement. Among all the relations of the animal organism to the environment, the sociologist is interested only in its relation to the *living* milieu. This milieu is not to be understood as purely vegetative, but as a relation, based upon specific affinity, between individuals of the same species. This special social affinity, existing in conjunction with sexual affinity and vegetative affinity (which latter manifests itself in the life of the cells) is the special object-matter of sociology.

Social affinity is the initiating cause of the relations established by individuals with others in whom they recognize a certain similarity with their own organic structure. This affinity is not to be explained by particular social instincts or emotions such as sympathy or altruism or by some other teleological influence such as utility (Ammon), nor is it to be explained by the family instinct or play instinct (Spencer, Kropotkin), nor by Giddings' like response to like stimulus or consciousness of kind (which is not a cause but a consequence of affinity), nor is it to be explained by imitation (Tarde), but simply and solely by the physical sensitivity of the organism, which is capable of reacting to stimuli from other individuals of the same species in accordance with the degree of development reached by its nervous system. The specific affinity of the organic structure is the external cause of social affinity.

Sociology, then, must concern itself with phenomena of action and reaction, and its guiding concepts must be "milieu" and "social." Furthermore, "milieu" must not be understood as something rigid, given once and for all, comprehensible as something statically permanent. This concept denotes, on the contrary, the continually changing relations between the organism and its environment. Again, the concept "social" must be divested of its popular and misapplied connotations and must be used only to denote empirically observable actions and reactions (active or passive as the case may be) as they are manifested by individuals in their reciprocal relations.

The interest of the sociologist will of course center itself upon human beings in particular, although a sort of rudimentary social affinity is also present in the higher animals and is the determining factor in the sociology of the animal world. The much more complex nature of the human system, however, has led to entirely different characteristic phenomena; these are so interconnected that, the more "artificially" and skilfully human beings shape the conditions of their existence, the greater is their dependence upon each other. Indeed, says Waxweiler, one could almost say that the human being has become that one of all the other animals whose sole primary "instinct" inheres in the capacity and the inclination to learn. Physical receptivity for social stimulation has reached such a peak of development in the human being that social affinity now makes itself evident in the form of an actual need for other individuals of the same species; in short, the human being transmutes social affinity into *sociability*.

Waxweiler's work is characterized by its precise and closely limited restriction

living being; (2) human beings must be looked upon merely as parts of a great whole called society; (3) society is a mental organism; (4) individual and society are in opposition and must be thought of in the antithesis, individual *vs.* society.

The use of antitheses such as part and whole, individual and society, to denote rigid, substantial, fixed entities or magnitudes is sociologically fallacious. As long as we believe that the totality of all systems can finally be divided into two groups, that "every sociological system is built either upon the principle of individualism or the principle of collectivism," that our sociological knowledge is dualistic, antithetical, that "the answer resounds in an Either-Or,"⁸ and that as our final supreme knowledge we arrive at two mutually contradictory principles—just so long do we remain in the realm of mere *rhetoric*, far away from scientific knowledge and research. We have betrayed ourselves. The doubtfully aesthetic satisfaction of cheap, facile sim-

of sociology to the study of the process by which adaptation of individuals to each other takes place. The data are to be gathered from the specific modes of behavior which externally manifest the mental fact of adaptation. The sociologist, says Waxweiler, is concerned only with these processes of adaptation, and like Lamarck he therefore elevates them to the rank of the sole principle by which the phenomena of life are to be explained—and not only this; they explain the whole ethological process as well. Because of this delimitation and unification, Waxweiler's sociology is markedly different from the majority of other works on biological social science.

Furthermore, he expressly excludes the notion of society as an organism and its accompanying doctrine, developed by the organicists, of "parallelism" between organic systems and social institutions. He calls this doctrine "a shameful abuse of terms which frequently conceals a confusion of facts" (*un fâcheux abus des termes qui recouvre le plus souvent une confusion des réalités* [p. 52]). Waxweiler does not make biology the foundation of sociology because he assumes "society" to be an organism, but rather because the social processes issue from individuals who, being organisms, must be dealt with from the biological viewpoint. It is not the task of "sociology" to explain what "society" is; such abstractions contradict the methodological postulates of a science based upon observation alone.

Waxweiler's scientific originality is evident in all these rejections of previously accepted points of view; furthermore, he refuses to use phrases which have been worn into non-significance by over-use, such as "the division of labor"; and above all he avoids, with a consistency seldom found elsewhere, every teleological element. He therefore rejects the concept of selection, endeavoring to avoid the mistakes of egomorphism; consequently he does not attempt to clarify the problems presented by animal sociology, but devotes his energies to opposing the organicists and historicists. His chief limitation, as already noted, is his failure to take other than biologically relevant factors into account; had he included data of a more directly social nature, he would have anticipated a great deal of modern sociology.

* These slogans, at present (1931) beloved of the Hitlerites or "Nazis," were given currency by Othmar Spann.

plication, the deceitful pseudo-clarity of polar opposites, has been mistaken for knowledge. Real sociologists attempt to understand life, yea, even the social life of human beings, and *this is not* dualistic-antithetical. The simple Either-Or gratifies will and emotion; because we crave validity for our supposedly apodeictic propositions, we drag them into contexts where they are entirely out of place. The world is not dualistic, but manifold, and it continually mingles its elements in a complicated process of change; here it unites, there it divides.

If we think in antitheses, a method well adapted to propaganda, we tear the intricate web of phenomena in two rigidly separated parts: *A* and *B* (= not-*A*); their relation to each other is commonly represented as if *A* wrestled with *B*, and therefore as if the question of sole importance were which of the two forces would gain the victory. In this struggle, the spectator (the reader or hearer) is entreated to take up the cudgels for *A* or *B*; if he supports *A*—lo! a great gulf is eternally fixed between him and *B*.

What atavistic nonsense! If we quietly *observe*, without giving way to the impulse to love here and hate there, the phenomena of life vouchsafe a completely different picture. To our amazement we see how *A* soon reappears in *B* and *B* in *A*, how both surrender parts of themselves to *C*, and then how *C* reacts upon *A* and *B* so that both the latter are changed, and how in their changed forms they again meet, unite, or flee each other.

In the contemporary stage of the social sciences, thinking in antitheses still occupies a very large place. All dogmatists incline to this mode of thought, and by dogmatists is meant those "scholars" who are most dominated by the impulse to (and joy in) polemics and heated contradiction. These persons always need an opponent, and their thesis is always framed with a view to a possible antithesis.⁴ "Logomacious disputes" play far too prominent a rôle.

* Walter Sulzbach, in defining his attitude toward this statement, underestimates the extent to which the present system excludes the antithesis named. We attempt to show that all so-called individualistic systems are strongly infused with the "organic" (universalistic, collectivistic, socialistic) principle, and that the organic doctrines plainly manifest individualistic traits. Sulzbach is of the opinion that this intermingling does not make it impossible to recognize the predominant tendency in a system. It is not merely a question, however, of recognizing to which of the two principals, individualism or universalism, a particular author wishes to ally his system; the proper question is this: Does his wish correspond to the fact? Is his system really in accord with the principle he has chosen? And whenever we raise this issue, we always find that the antithesis upon which the author has erected his system is false. Consequently, we cannot grant any validity to Sulzbach's four systems because his divisions are based upon the false antithesis "individual *vs.* society." We must reject his

Is it not really deplorable that the stupid, ugly, and superfluous word "individual" is so carefully nursed and that it and its progeny ruin so many otherwise realistic social studies? It was once used by the natural rights theorists as an aid to *specific* researches in the philosophy of law, but now receives a *generic* application. In its present usage, it should be blotted out of every language on earth; it has become a symbol inextricably bound up with value-judgments; in daily life, we expect an "individual" to be a somewhat doubtful companion, an egoist or even egotist. Further, the word is false not merely because it is wrongly constructed, but because it does not properly convey the meaning intended. We do not wish to assert that the single human being is indivisible, but rather that he is unique or singular; we should therefore really say "singular" instead of "individual." Further, it is empty of denotations, a perfect vacuum. This is an advantage in only a few very general types of investigation. In the majority of cases, it tends to lead us astray because we can never clearly distinguish just what is meant; it might mean a Patagonian, it might mean Goethe. When someone describes the results of his observation of social interrelations, it is necessary that we know whether by the word "individual" he means this or that type. We might think it beneficial to "society" if cannibals or white slavers were "sacrificed" to that same "society," but we should probably feel differently about the mind of Nietzsche.

We may just as properly question the abstract, undefinable schemas called "society" by their authors. Even in our evaluation of much less vague concepts, such as the state or the church, the deciding factor frequently emerges from still more specific denotations—for example, whether I think of Albania or Prussia, of the Mormon sect or the Roman Catholic Church.

In short, neither pole of the "individual—society" antithesis has any valid sociological meaning, in spite of the fact that both are perpetually used singly as well as in conjunction.⁵

conception of the two magnitudes as substantives, for it is utterly erroneous, as even his own statements show. See Walter Sulzbach, "Vier Systeme der Sozialphilosophie," *Köln. Vt. Soz.*, III, 1, pp. 22 ff.

⁵ The deeply rooted predilection for the antithesis mentioned also makes itself evident in the frequency with which it is used as a title for books. Even Simmel unfortunately added the sub-title "Individual and Society" to his booklet, *Fundamental Problems of Sociology* (*Grundprobleme der Soziologie*). To be sure, Simmel wrote this when he was already suffering greatly from the illness which resulted in his death, and it must be regarded as an unsuccessful attempt to popularize his theories.

In opposition to the work of "antitheticists" Berthold Thorsch as long ago as

By accepting the verbal nature of society, we leave behind us many out-moded, delusive ideas which until now have barred, or at least made more difficult, the entrance into clear, close-to-life, sociological knowledge. For us as sociologists society is not a living entity; neither is it a mental organism.⁶ We do not look upon human beings and their groupings as *parts* of a gigantic *whole* which has once for all been "given." The false antithesis, "individual—society," need not appall us, because in social life there are neither fixed "individuals" nor a "society" remaining always the same. There is nothing that is only "individual" and nothing that is only "society," just as there is nothing that is only part or only whole. Only when we cut a cross-section through the ceaseless stream of change in carrying out an experiment, and artificially stop its flow, can we find anything that is a part or anything that is a whole. When the stream is released, its recurring movement alters the relation in an instant. The whole dissolves into parts or becomes part of another whole, and that which was previously part reveals itself as a composite and complex whole. The social aspect of the human being who has been villified by the wretched word "individual" is revealed to us as a *socius*, as a condensation or nexus of countless processes of sociation, and, conversely, we perceive that all "society" continually arises from the activities of human beings, who are now alive or who once lived, in their capacities as *socii*. When we stand temporally and spatially close enough to particular webs of social life, we recognize that they arise from the continual intersecting of human wills and their attendant desires; the latter in turn are not dependent upon single human beings alone, but also upon

1906 attempted to break up both of these concepts in his excellent treatise, *The Single Human Being and Society* (*Der Einzelne und die Gesellschaft*). By so doing, he also broke ground for a science of interhuman relations. Thorsch clearly shows that the "individual" and "society," commonly set in opposition by those who make a practise of deriving all ultimate social problems from this antithesis, should never be conceived of as absolutes. In particular, he shows that the common inclination to choose one of these terms as the genuine "element" of humanity is completely erroneous. He also lays stress upon the fact that there is no whole of any kind that is entirely self-contained, or that completely absorbs all its parts. Every "society" is as it is only because it has certain relations to the world outside (p. 13). No socialization puts a stop to individuation, and on the other hand no organization, however flexible, can possibly preserve all individual elements (p. 15).

⁶ Even Paul Barth, who elsewhere defends the unfortunate idea that "society" is a mental organism (*ein geistiger Organismus*), recognizes, although he thereby contradicts his principal thesis, that in the strict sense the term has only verbal meaning. (See his chief work, *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie*, 4th ed., p. 114).

countless social relations. Hence, the substantives "individual" and "society" resolve themselves, so far as we are concerned, into the processes of individuation and sociation; consequently they evade the grasp of the hand which seeks the concrete.⁷

⁷ A French sociologist has commented on the point of view above expressed as follows: "[It] . . . definitely puts an end to the old antithesis of society and the individual, which has occupied altogether too much of the attention of sociologists for more than a century, and which has been regarded as a classic theme of instruction" (Gaston Richard, "Nouvelles tendances sociologiques en Allemagne," *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, XXXVII, 3-4 [March-April, 1929]).

MacIver, Martin, Geiger, Cooley, Todd, Orton (and doubtless a great many others) have also seen the fallacy in the antithesis, and although we cannot wholly subscribe to all the details of their statements, they seem worth quoting here:

"There are no individuals who are not social individuals, and society is nothing more than individuals associated and organised. Society has no life but the life of its members, no ends that are not their ends, and no fulfilment beyond theirs. There is no conflict between society and the individual, between the welfare of society and the welfare of the individual. The quality of a society is the quality of its members. There is no social morality that is not individual morality, and no social mind that is not individual mind" (R. M. MacIver, *Community*, p. 67).

"There is no 'sum of individuals,' no 'sum of the parts' of a community. The social relationships of every individual are not outside him, they are part of his personality. How can you sum things if part of their being consists in their relationships to one another? To talk of a 'sum of individuals' is to think first of individuals as abstract, relationless, desocialisable beings. Understand individuals as concrete beings whose relations to one another constitute factors of their personality, and you realise that these are society, these and these alone—and the metaphysical confusion which leads you to look for something beyond this, something beyond these unsummable social individuals, passes away" (*Ibid.*, p. 88).

"There is a popular notion, often shared by scholars, that the individual and society are essentially irreconcilable principles. The individual is assumed to be by nature an anti-social being. Society, on the other hand, is opposed in principle to all that is personal and private. The demands of society, its welfare and aims, are treated as if they were a tax imposed upon each and every one by something foreign to the natural will or even the happiness of all. It is as if society as 'thing-in-itself' could prosper in opposition to the individuals who collectively constitute it.

"It is needless to say that both the individual and the social, according to such a view, are empty abstractions. The individual is, in fact, a social entity. The social also is nothing else than the manner in which individuals habitually react to one another. Society in the abstract as a principle opposed to individual existence has no more reality than that of the grin which Alice in Wonderland sees after the famous Cheshire cat has vanished. It is the mere logical concept of others in general, left leering at us after all concrete others have been thought away" (Everett Dean Martin, *The Behavior of Crowds*, pp. 1-2).

". . . individuality and sociality are but two forms of inward human life. They are not in any sense material entities, but psychical functions. The per-

Just because of this it is necessary to take the separate person, the single flesh-and-blood human being (in typified form), as the methodological starting-point for our investigations—necessary in order to avoid an abstraction too difficult to visualize or otherwise represent. We wish to show and must show that his concreteness (in the sense of persistent substantiality) is a misconception, and that his supposedly fixed attributes can be at least partially resolved into an interplay of relations; therefore we cannot forego some means of visualization or representation. This means that we manage to retain by proceeding from the *fiction* (of which we shall have more to say later) that the beginning, middle, and end of social life is the single human being; we thereby seek to make understandable and intelligible the behavior of human beings in relation.⁸ By thus using this fiction, we

sistent tendency to reify is responsible for their hypostatization into 'individual' and 'society' " (Theodor Geiger, *Gestalten der Gesehung*, pp. 3-4).

"... society and individuals do not denote separable phenomena, but are simply collective and distributive aspects of the same thing . . ." (C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, pp. 1-2).

"Society, then, in its immediate aspect, is a relation among personal ideas. In order to have society it is evidently necessary that persons should get together somewhere; and they get together only as personal ideas in the mind. Where else? What other possible locus can be assigned for the real contact of persons, or in what other form can they come in contact except as impressions or ideas formed in this common locus? Society exists in my mind as the contact and reciprocal influence of certain ideas" (*Ibid.*, p. 84).

"Is the individual, and therefore his self, merely a basket of fruits gathered from the multitude of trees and shrubs that make up the social orchard? Or is he something besides, say, a separate tree? Is the Individual made for Society or Society made for the individual? Neither. Which was prior? Again, neither. They are complementary and indispensable to each other" (A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, p. 45).

"The atomic theory of society, in its dogmatic form, amounts to a denial of the very forces that create society; it is, in fact, not a theory of society, but of the raw material from which society develops under the action of those vital impulses it either ignores or condemns" (William Orton, "The Atomic Theory of Society," *Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, XXIV [1930], p. 636).

⁸ The view that the single human being, the separate person, must be the methodological point of departure for any genuine sociology is also held by Max Weber, Gothein, Thurnwald, and Vossler (the latter three in *Hauptprobleme der Soziologie*, vol. I). Vossler rejects the concept of the group mind (pp. 375-6). Thurnwald says, "Economic activity has its point of origin in the individual. Motivations exist only in single human beings" (p. 286). Gothein arrives at the conclusion that "the quality of the totality does not differ from the summated qualities of the human beings, especially as each of the latter contributes toward the totality a partial quota of his otherwise undivided moral self" (p. 209).

Max Weber terms Spann's effusions in opposition to the method advocated here a "monstrous misunderstanding," for Spann apparently believes that a *method* using the single human being as a point of departure implies, in some vague sense, individualistic value-judgments. Spann attempts to justify himself

do not deprive metaphysics of its right to make value-judgments concerning the relation of the human being and such a plurality pattern as, e.g., the state. (To be sure, our empirical and systematic sociological research can place in evidence a good deal of material which might convince even philosophical speculators that scarcely anything generally valid and provable can be said about the above relation.)

§3. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PLURALITY PATTERNS AND "SOCIETY"

All in all, it is apparent that the concept of "society" leads to so many misconceptions that it should, perhaps be entirely avoided by the careful sociologist unless he can define it in the immediate context as a mere abbreviation, which although incorrect is at times convenient, of "sociative processes." The same is true of "individual"; it may be freely used to denote the biological abstraction *Homo sapiens* or the newborn infant without conditioned responses, but it should never be applied to the single human being, much less to the socius with which sociology is chiefly concerned, without explicit mention of the sense in which it is used.

The concept of plurality pattern of course should not be confused with either of the concepts above discussed; although it is already evident that some writers tend to identify it with "society," there is no excuse for such misapplication. A plurality pattern is merely a nexus of relationships which in turn are condensations of social processes; there arises out of the stream of sociation something of which states and existence can be predicated. Plurality patterns change ceaselessly, but they nevertheless retain distinguishing features for longer or shorter periods. If for no other reason, moreover, they are quite different from "society" because they are many instead of one. There is always a plural number of plurality patterns!

Such interhuman structures exist only in the minds (in the broadest sense) of human beings. They presuppose, however, a plural number of human beings, and if we disregard for the moment the fact that they are often corporeally represented by symbols, we may say that their more concrete varieties are perceivable only because they exist

in a reply ("Bemerkungen zu Max Webers Soziologie," *Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Sozialpolitik*, 1923, Heft 10-12), but only succeeds in showing that he utterly confuses religion and sociology. His attempted justification completely fails, although he tries to prove that his rejection of the so-called "individualism" involved in the method is not based upon value-judgments but upon analysis of "essences." But he fails to recognize that this analysis is in turn based upon arbitrary fiat of his will which completely dominate all his thinking.

in visible connection with such a cluster of human beings. To the naïve eye, a plurality pattern is nothing more than two, three, several, many, or very many persons in contiguity, but inasmuch as such social structures do not arise solely because several persons are perceived in spatial conjunction, the equation, a plurality pattern = a plural number of human beings, can be used only as a methodological starting-point for sociological investigation. If it is called upon to serve any other purpose, this equation is entirely inadequate, for among other things, each member of the plurality pattern takes his neuropsychic pattern, with all its conscious and unconscious components, away with him when he leaves the spatial conjunction of his fellows; when he is alone he is, as it were, a monad that comprises the whole plurality pattern from a certain aspect. Further, both ancestry and posterity frequently belong to the plurality pattern; this is true, for example, of old families that mold their growing members along lines fixed by the past and yet projected into the future.

Indeed, the symbolic mental components correlated with the more abstract types of plurality pattern are at times almost entirely dissociated from images, etc., deriving from the perceived existence of concrete human beings. The result is that the idea "church" or "state" can scarcely be conjoined with an image or other conscious component directly indicative of a great assemblage of men, women, and children. As a consequence of such reification, it is possible for many genuinely benevolent and sensitive persons to assert that the state has been insulted or the church humiliated and, without feeling the least compunction, to demand "satisfaction" from the opposing abstract collectivity that entails great suffering or even death to the concrete human beings involved. Men who would not strike a child will gas whole cities full of children if the "honor of the state" is at stake—their reifications blot out the agony of their victims.

§4. CHIEF TYPES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PLURALITY PATTERNS

In order further to clarify our methodology, three chief types of interhuman structures should be distinguished: (1) crowds; (2) groups; and (3) abstract collectivities. The criteria by which they may be distinguished are: (a) periods of duration; and (b) degrees of abstractness.

(1) Crowds are relatively loose-textured and transitory plurality patterns in which the connection between a large number of concrete human beings and the plurality pattern is clearly recognizable.

(2) Groups possess relatively long duration in comparison to crowds, for the more or less symbolic nature of the conscious elements in the neuropsychic patterns generated in groups gives to such plurality patterns a measure of autonomy, as it were; the persons who "belong" to them seem less necessary to their existence than in the case of crowds. These persons, however, may still be counted and concretely designated. (3) In marked contrast to the foregoing types, the abstract collectivities seem, to those who think, feel, or desire them, to be superpersonal structures that are virtually independent of mere human beings.⁹ The state and the church, so far as their devotees are concerned, are "brooding omnipresences in the sky," to quote Justice Holmes.

Now, it should be obvious that no matter how readily we are able or how frequently we are inclined to think and feel as if certain plurality patterns are existential somethings transcending and dominating man, these social structures nevertheless exist only in our own minds. (The same is true of the social processes, for even when we conceive of these as objective forces of nature, they do not impinge upon the exteroceptors directly; they are always in some measure abstract.)

But because we assert that plurality patterns exist only within human beings and thus banish them from the world of corporeal objects, this does not mean that they are "ghostlike, powerless figments"! Men's own ideas always have the greatest power over them; they are ruled by the living forces in their own minds. Frequently the tangible world about them seems unreal and ineffectual, whereas a mere fancy may seem living and powerful.

Further, merely because we know that plurality patterns are only neuropsychic patterns and therefore not externally perceivable, while the human beings incorporating them are so perceivable, we do not necessarily know anything about the degrees of social effectiveness plurality patterns and human beings respectively possess. This, then, is next to be considered.

⁹ "A *collectivity* may be said to have *abstract* or conceptual characteristics of its own, as distinguished (but not separate) from the more concrete ones of its members. This is particularly true where the members are able to analyze their behavior elements and to relate them up symbolically and abstractly into synthetic concepts. The unity of races, nationalities, classes, and other non-face-to-face groups, is conceptual as it relates to consciousness. And it is *abstract* and general rather than concrete and specific in the totality of its relationships, although it is made up of concrete specific relationships and behavior patterns" (L. L. Bernard, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, pp. 244-5; italics ours).

§5. THE POWER OF PLURALITY PATTERNS

The false antithesis between "individual" and "society" already discussed assumes a great many forms, most of which have far-reaching and erroneous implications. For example, when Comte and his followers state that human beings are abstractions and that "society" alone has real existence, or when it is asserted that social structures have characteristics different from those of their members, such pronouncements confuse the false and the true in ways that entail fateful consequences.

If by abstractness we understand the entire negation of perceivability, it is of course fallacious to call the human being an abstraction. If, however, we wish only to indicate that his supposedly fixed attributes are in large measure due to his relations with plurality patterns which are not concrete, no objection to calling him an abstraction can be taken; he is a *socius* as well as a given quantity of flesh and blood, bone and sinew.

The notion that social structures are something other and more than the mere sum of the persons who compose them has been and still is held by the German idealists, the Romanticists, and the French school clustering about Durkheim. Something other? Certainly. Plurality patterns are the neuropsychic products of the relations of their members. Something more? Yes and no. . . . In a certain sense they are much *less*, because the total personalities of their members are not absorbed by plurality patterns; most human beings participate in such structures as church and state in only a very scanty fragment of their mental lives. At the same time, however, they are *more* in a certain sense, for if we could examine the mental content of each of the members before participation in the plurality pattern and could then compare this with the content present after such participation, a considerable increase would be manifest. Symbols, slogans, and other representations of the social structure and of affiliation with it awaken powers in the human being which otherwise lie dormant; he becomes more than he was before. Nevertheless, this "more" is not a property of the plurality patterns, for although *human beings* may acquire new characteristics when placed in certain networks of social relations, social structures can "acquire" such attributes only in and through human beings.¹⁰ (Only in order to avoid stilted forms of

¹⁰ This point is also stressed by F. W. Allport, "The Group Fallacy in Relation to Social Science" (The Sociological Press, 1927), although some of his conclusions are too extreme; a more acceptable point of view is expressed by an-

expression may we speak of "characteristics of plurality patterns." Although highly inexact, such phrases can scarcely be avoided, particularly in view of the fact that most persons are accustomed to condense mental content relating to the state, family, army, pair, etc., into stereotypes that make such social structures seem quasi-perceivable. Hence, expressions which always laid stress upon the true state of affairs would give the impression of pedantry.)

The transformations undergone by social processes when projected through the medium furnished by plurality patterns make it possible to say that the effects of such social structures are probably quite as powerful, if not more so, than those resulting directly from the fact that "man is organic to nature." This is especially evident when it is realized that in empirical reality there are no social processes which are not projected through plurality patterns; the existing neuropsychic conditioning of human beings perpetually modifies the social relations into which they enter; in many instances, indeed, it literally creates those relations.

other American, Ralph Barton Perry, "Is There a Social Mind?" (*Am. J. Soc.*, XXVII, 5 and 6). Perry concludes that social structures are wholes of a lower order in comparison to single human beings, and that the "group mind" is not a new entity of a higher order. The remarks of Franz W. Jerusalem in his article, "Über den Begriff der Kollektivität und seine Stellung im Ganzen der Soziologie," *Köln. Vt. Soz.*, II, 1, pp. 47 ff., are also quite interesting on this point. MacIver, however, has furnished a statement so cogent that it should be quoted:

"If each man thinks and acts differently as a member of a crowd or association and as an individual standing out of any such immediate relation to his fellows, it is still each who thinks and acts; the new determinations are determinations still of individual minds as they are influenced by aggregation. When sheep play follow-my-leader, we do not attribute the movement of the flock to a flock-mind. When men aggregate, especially as casual unorganised aggregations, each mind responds in a peculiar way to this special crowd-environment, as it responds in a peculiar way to every kind of environment. The environment changes with the response of each who forms a constituent of it, and the change in turn occasions a new response of each, and so on. Thus a peculiarly rapid process of mental change takes place in the members of a crowd. Each becomes to a degree susceptible and imitative. The mood of each is assimilated to that of each other. To the onlooker it seems as though waves of emotional agitation swept through the crowd. Each is less than himself, not surely because he has become part of a greater mind, but because the effect of aggregation is to evoke in each a certain emotional response at the cost of rationality. There is no structure of organisation within which the individual can find shelter for his individuality against the overpowering cumulative influence of mass-suggestion and mass-imitation. But this is merely an extreme instance of the obvious fact that every mind is influenced by every kind of environment. To posit a super-individual mind because individual minds are altered by their relations to one another (as indeed they are altered by their relations to physical conditions) is surely gratuitous" (R. M. MacIver, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-7).

The power of plurality patterns is well illustrated by the fact that a throng of human beings in whom the "idea" of their interdependence is poorly developed may, under certain circumstances, be much less effective than a small group with a strong *esprit de corps* or what is sometimes called "group self-consciousness." It should be plain from what has already been said that the group, itself but a neuropsychic pattern, can possess no consciousness; what is really meant is that its members are endowed with greater efficiency and security because of the group relations in which they stand, and that they are conscious of these relations as a totality. Further, as they become accustomed to the mental content correlated with this totality, they tend increasingly to separate the emotional content "group" from the notion of their own personal existence; they use the group "idea" as if along with and above the members—ten, let us say—there also existed the group itself as one person. This particular way in which the content of an "idea" makes itself independent has in the course of history shown itself to be so extraordinarily fertile and capable of such great elaboration that in most if not all instances there finally resulted, and still results, abject dependence of human beings upon "the creature their own hands have made."¹¹

The great power to influence human beings possessed by social structures is rendered comprehensible in the present system because we show that such plurality patterns, as patterns, are the neuropsychic aspects of interhuman relations. Human beings and social structure are not, however, related in such a way that every person has his own *independent* "ideas" of the latter; on the contrary, his ideas of any given social structure are strongly influenced by those which his contemporaries have concerning the same structure, and by those which his ancestors had about closely similar structures. By means of social processes such neuropsychic patterns are transferred from man to man and from cluster to cluster.

In a great many cases, a man's thinking, feeling, and desiring is determined more by what others think, feel, and desire than by his own initiative. The fact that other persons (parents, friends, neighbors, relatives) have formed or have had formed for them certain

¹¹ A closely related phenomenon is pointed out by Coyle: "... 'social animism' is one of the best devices for arousing emotion and producing conclusions which do not follow from the facts objectively viewed. The false unity and simplicity attributed to the action of Capital, Labor, England, or the Church, for example, by such personification make for the drawing of inferences as if the figure of speech were the reality" (G. L. Coyle, *Social Process in Organized Groups*, p. 168).

ideas of the state, for example, and have then implanted these ideas in him at the age when he is clay in their hands, results in making the idea "state" a *real* social power so far as he is concerned. He defines it as real, and it is therefore real in its consequences. If numerous generations so formulate and authoritatively transmit through tradition the highly symbolic stereotypes in which such plurality patterns come to be epitomized, and if the store of experiences coupled with the tradition is extensive and useful, then the concentrated and steadily accumulating collective power of the plurality pattern in question eventually becomes tremendous; it far exceeds any thinkable amount of tangible human strength—precisely because it is so abstract. In spite of this, it is entirely within the power of many adults to accord or to deny "reality" to any social structure.

CHAPTER V

SELVES AND PLURALITY PATTERNS*

§1. THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF

The untenability of all theories based upon the "individual—society" antithesis is fairly apparent, let us hope, from the considerations advanced in the foregoing chapter. We saw that what is ordinarily termed "society" is nothing more than a number of plurality patterns that have their only reality as neuropsychic patterns within human beings. The next question that arises is the relation of the self of the human being to such plurality patterns, for it can readily be seen that the problem of the relation of the self and the plurality pattern is not the same as the antithesis we have been discussing.

The mere fact that such a question arises, however, is no reason why we should attempt to answer it without an effort to find out whether it belongs in the class of problems with which we, as specialized social scientists, may properly deal. It seems clear that analysis of plurality patterns is definitely a sociological task, but what of their relation to selves, and what of "the self itself"?

Now it would be folly to deny that the question: "What is the self?" is at bottom philosophical. Indeed, the sociologist could justifiably take the position that it is not his concern, that he would be mistaken, not to say foolish, if he were to increase the number of difficult and far-reaching problems now pressing for sociological solution by taking upon himself what is at once *the* philosophical problem and the most generally obscure and unsatisfactory question with which this discipline deals. Our consciences as sociologists could remain quite clear if we selected the empirical, experienced self as a starting-point for our researches and thereafter treated it as an irreducible quantity—just as we all do in everyday life. This would be an entirely permissible methodological simplification; every science is based on certain postulates concerning which no doubts need be raised as long as they assist in, or at least do not hinder, the solution of the problems peculiar to that science. Jurisprudence, economics,

* This chapter may be skipped when reading this treatise for the first time. It is fundamental, however, and should eventually be read.

and other social sciences quite rightly refrain from any attempt to investigate the self—"quite rightly" because such specialized social sciences (to which group sociology as here conceived belongs) will never succeed in mastering their legitimate problems if they do not withstand the temptation to trace out the ultimate ramifications of more general matters.

The sociologist attempts to understand human beings only well enough to determine the degrees of association and/or dissociation manifest in their behavior; from this it might well be inferred that such questions as "What is the human being in and of himself?" are sociologically irrelevant, i.e., that the problems thereby raised properly belong in disciplines preceding or even following sociology in the hierarchy of the sciences. The sociologist could therefore take the position that the epistemological problem of the self is not his concern. He might conceivably say: "I take account only of the fact that human beings in everyday life appear to act as though they know what the self is. I am interested in their social actions, and these are everywhere and always based upon the fiction that the self is known. I deal with the results produced by this fiction in interhuman life, and I deal with nothing more and nothing less."

The philosopher, however, might justifiably answer: "That does not satisfy *me*. I shall ignore your supposed results until you make a contribution toward the solution of my fundamental problem and thereby demonstrate that you have reckoned with the ultimate philosophical question."

Perhaps a working compromise may be stated thus: The problem of the self undoubtedly belongs in philosophy and in its *total* form has no place in sociology, but we may be equally certain that philosophy needs the conclusions of the specialized sciences just as much as the latter need philosophy's critical examination of the postulates of all sciences. Practically every science can contribute some results that will aid philosophy in carrying out its mediating and clarifying function. Such contributions are especially important when they bear upon problems which, like that of the self, are quite unresolvable as wholes but admit of partial solution.

Biology, for example, makes a contribution by reason of the fact that vital phenomena and the self are closely conjoined. The psychologist, who as such studies the stream of consciousness, is also a co-operator, inasmuch as the self and consciousness, in some way as yet unknown, involve each other. The sociologist directs his attention to the behavior of the self in its relations with other human beings and

with plurality patterns. The *philosophical* core of his science is an interpretation of the personal pronouns. Shall the fateful word "I" be omitted? When the sociologist has even partially analyzed the relation of "I" to "you," to "we," and to "they," a great deal will have been learned about the nature of the self.

Upon what conception of the self, taking into account previous philosophical and scientific researches, can sociology as the science of interhuman behavior be based?

It may as well be said at the outset that the essence or innermost nature of the self cannot be defined by narrow and precise scientific concepts, for it roots in metaphysical problems concerning the ultimate meaning of which we can only speculate. Driesch quite rightly states that "elements cannot be defined";¹ comprehension of the self in rational terms is an utterly hopeless task. We can define it only in an entirely formal way; Eisler's statement is as good as any: "'Self' is the term which the knowing and acting subject uses to designate itself in contrast to the non-self and other subjects."² Every attempt at importing content into such formulations fails at the very beginning because a genuine definition must establish clearly marked boundaries, whereas the self as experienced simultaneously manifests sharp separation from and close coalescence with other selves and the whole realm of the non-self.

We can, however, make plain to ourselves the reason why the problem is insoluble, namely, because the self is evident only in experience—that is to say, in processes that shift with extreme rapidity. All that can be observed is a never-ending succession of occurrences behind which, to be sure, we may if we wish infer a relatively changeless bearer, although the latter can never be directly known. Indeed, we might even go so far as to say that the uniqueness and real existence of the self is an indispensable postulate, but that nevertheless we cannot determine the limits of this unique entity. As long as we live we strive for integration of the self, and as long as we live we can never so much as discover this same self by rational means—we merely seize upon its cast-off garments. Sociology, for example (which like all other sciences proceeds by means of rational analysis), can find only processes, never substance. Integration of the self, if and when it takes place, inheres only in form and in experience. The Upanishads offer us the old metaphor:

¹ Hans Driesch, *Grundprobleme der Psychologie*, p. 8.

² Rudolf Eisler, "Ich," *Handwörterbuch der Philosophie*, 2nd ed.

High, without supporting hand,
Is held a curious bowl;
Seven shapes around it stand,
Sensing evermore the whole.

Streams from sources manifold
Ceaselessly the seven pour,
Yet the wondrous bowl—behold!
Never by a drop brims o'er.

Would that someone good and wise
Told us how such things can be!
All the splendor that we prize
Would be ours eternally.*

Is this not a striking picture of the self, which through the portals of the senses is filled with "streams from sources manifold," and which nevertheless is like a bowl held "without supporting hand"?

§2. SEVEN FORMS TAKEN BY THE SELF

The nature of the self could be conceptually defined if the form in which it was manifested were single, unified, and independent. Observation shows, however, that it is extremely manifold, subject to sudden mutations and cleavages, lacking in determinable limits, and closely linked with other occurrences. Following Müller-Freienfels, we may distinguish seven forms in which the self appears.⁴

(1) It is perhaps most persistently present as self-feeling, i.e., as the vague conglomeration of emotionally tinged representations and other psychical contents that constitute the relatively lasting marginal eddies in the ever-changing stream of consciousness; these marginal eddies make possible the feeling that at any given moment a self experiences, thinks, and feels the whole content of the stream. Indeed, all genuine experience is necessarily cast in this self-form. Otherwise stated, self-feeling provides the characteristic "tone-color of the music of experience."

(2) Another aspect of the self is furnished by the body, inasmuch as the latter is usually (but not always) "given" as *one* phenomenon with which the rapidly changing stream of consciousness is quite as closely linked as it is with what we choose to call the psyche (*Seele*). There are of course a great many processes going on within the body of which the self knows nothing; further, every human being has a

* Based on the German translation by Paul Eberhard, *Der Weisheit letzter Schluss*, Jena, 1912.

⁴ Richard Müller-Freienfels, *Philosophie der Individualität*, 2nd ed., chap. i.

great many peculiarities or unique traits that exist quite independently of his consciousness of self. For example, except for the professional criminal the fingerprints are not commonly experienced as part of the self; similarly, the poise of the head as seen from the side or the rear differs from that of everyone else, but except for professional actors, mannequins, etc., such traits are seldom included in the unity of bodily phenomena to which the self is ordinarily linked.

(3) The personal psyche, which we commonly assume to be the underlying basis of conscious phenomena, provides another form. We usually think of ourselves primarily as a psyche and regard the latter as the basis *sui generis* of the mutable consciousness. It is clear, however, that this psyche is not some kind of "immaterial substance," and it is known to us, if at all, only through its cognitive, emotional, conative, and other manifestations.⁵ Most persons all too readily attempt to comprehend this psyche as a whole by thinking of it as a mere summation of sensation plus perception plus cognition plus emotion plus volition, etc. The naïve superficiality of this view soon becomes apparent. Any self can be more readily apprehended in its total aspects by noting how each of its separate psychical phenomena evidences specific differentia from the same phenomena in others. Just as in the case of the body, a great deal goes on in the psyche that is unknown to the self, but at the same time we must take account of the fact that in every psyche much that is unique and particular, that does not take place in the same way in other human beings, is to be found. In short, every self has "thisness" or haecceity. Todd puts it thus:

"... there is in every individual thought an element of originality, due to the universal tendency to mutation and variety: that is, every one is at the same time himself and Herr Omnes; he is an 'absolutely singular and unrepeatable personality,' and withal a bundle of wholesale borrowings and imitations. . . ."

(4) The content of our perception, cognition, and reflection Müller-Freienfels regards as one of the ways in which the self appears, but this seems far-fetched. Be that as it may, however, we shall follow him by including in our list the internal "mine," e.g., "my memories" and other "inner possessions."

⁵ Cf. on this point George H. Mead, "The Definition of the Psychical," *The Decennial Publications*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1903, esp. pp. 36-7.

⁶ A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, pp. 47-8.

(5) The internal image of one's self, such an image as might arise in answer to the question: "How do you picture yourself?" must certainly find a place here. One's particular mode of self-feeling, the conception of one's rôle, is part and parcel of this form.

(6) The external image of one's self is next in order. It is based on the conception others have of our self and of the rôle proper to it. This is extremely difficult to separate from the internal image; Cooley's study of the "looking-glass self" takes due account of this fact. Again we quote Todd:

"... in our knowledge, as in our conduct, we are never conscious of others except as related to ourselves; and perhaps never of ourselves except as connected with other selves. Even in what we are pleased to term our inmost selves we never fail to include 'the silent witness,' 'the all-seeing eye,' 'the still small voice,' or other ideal persons."

(7) The objectification of the self in such results of its possessor's activities as may be termed "works" and "deeds," e.g., Napoleon's battles, Raphael's paintings, Michael Angelo's sculptures, Gibbon's books, and so on, should perhaps be included.

The first impression given by all these forms in which the self appears is that of uniqueness; many persons therefore conclude that no self ever merges its identity with any other. Closer observation, however, leads to an apparently insoluble contradiction, for it is seen that the self cannot be sharply delimited in any or all of the forms in which it is manifested. The self changes with the course of time, and it frequently splits or divides.

Indeed, does not every experience transform the self? We cannot even experience the same thing twice, for the first experience effects some change in the experiencing self. Every habit brings about some alteration; *A* is not the same *A* two moments in succession.

In addition to the transformations are the divisions. The so-called "individual," as Müller-Freienfels has remarked, is quite divisible; with Eliot, we may say that only dividuals exist, that the only individuals are idiots, dead men, newborn babies, and creatures who have been so completely isolated from birth onward that they are non-human.⁸ Thought and feeling, knowledge and faith are perpetually struggling within us. "When all is said there is no doubt that the unity of consciousness is almost always the result of a previous conflict in

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

⁸ T. D. Eliot, "Die Verwendbarkeit psychiatrischer Bezeichnungen bei der Analyse des sozialen Verhaltens," *Köln. Vt. Soz.*, VII, 1 (1927), p. 35.

the subconscious," and the complete integration of the self met Peer Gynt only in the madhouse.⁹

How then is it possible to set limits to the self? As a microcosmos it is at once an epitome and a fragment of the macrocosmos. It is impossible to establish complete separation from the extra-self, i.e., from the selves of others and the "selfless" world, the non-self. Even from the merely temporal point of view, the immediate consciousness of self also bears within it the past and the future. And when does our bodily selfhood begin? From the spatial standpoint does not the rôle of the self frequently depend upon the costume covering the body?

Peer Gynt, when old age forced bitter knowledge upon him, compared the human being to an onion whose layers could be peeled off one by one, and his analogy, although used in a previous chapter, forces itself irresistibly upon us here. We might even echo his ejaculation of horror when he reached the last, innermost layer: "What, all over so soon? Nothing but husks? Is there never a kernel?"

Although this cursory survey of the forms of self-manifestation is cast almost exclusively in terms of "individual" psychology, it nevertheless shows that it is impossible successfully to study the self in complete detachment from the social world in which it is placed. Indeed, many writers would think the statement just made far too conservative; for example:

* "What do we extract, then, as the net results of psychology for our discussion of the Self in human nature? In the first place, we are any number of possible personalities or selves. Our selves are constantly changing. To recall a single example, puberty completely reorientates our selves. Our self is at any given moment only a sort of organic coalition, a tacit working unity. The study of normal and pathological minds among our own people, and the comparative study of tribal mentality agree in the suggestion that 'the logical unity of the thinking subject, which is taken for granted by the majority of philosophers, is rather a desideratum than a fact.' There is in all normal individuals a certain sense of the self. But this of itself is manifestly insufficient to yield that habitual coherence of the personality necessary to confront society and the world with equanimity. . . . Furthermore, recent developments in mental therapeutics and hypnotism prove that what we might call the 'suggested self' can dominate and change bodily sensations; hence, as it were, recreate somatic consciousness according to a pattern suggested either from without or within. The real basis for the solidarity and permanence of the core or nodule of selfhood appears to lie in uniform reactions upon certain situations. These situations or problems are not mere food questions, belly problems. Responses to such situations yield only a general or vegetative sense of self and not the highly specialized self of *human* nature. Apparently social situations and problems alone could develop such a self. And the reason, in psychological terms, is that this idea of the self as a member of a coherent group becomes a dominant and unifying idea in all normal persons. It is the *social* self, then, that is the predominant self (at least for the practical administrator), and it is participation in the give-and-take of social life that unifies consciousness into selfhood" (Todd, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30).

"That a mind is conscious of itself as a self, means at the least that it discriminates itself *from* others, but therefore that it also refers its own defining conceptions *to* others,—is in relation with them, as unquestionably as it is in the relation of different from them. It cannot even think itself; it cannot at all *be*, except as a member of a reciprocal society."²⁰

Whether or not we can go all the way with this radical pronouncement we shall later see; at any rate, there is no doubt that the self must be viewed sociologically, and therefore must be studied in the setting afforded by the ceaseless interplay of social processes and interlinking of social relationships with other human beings and with plurality patterns, for within this setting it lives and moves and has its being from the very beginning. The fundamental principle that the self is dependent upon the situation cannot be too strongly emphasized. Any philosophical doctrine of the self that does not reckon with what the sociologist has to say on the subject is necessarily one-sided, not to say erroneous—*this is our contribution to philosophy*.

To naïve thinkers the subject calling himself "I" is assumed to be an object with fixed attributes inherent in it that "cause" the behavior of the observed person. Closer investigation shows, as we have seen, that these apparently fixed attributes may be almost wholly broken up into relations with the extra-self. That which appeared to be changeless and enduring consequently becomes ductile, dependent upon time and place, conditioned by countless factors over which it has no control of any sort. The self is immersed in and perpetually permeated by the ever-flowing forces of the world—the metaphor of the bowl is apt, still more apt is that of the waterfall; they both figure forth the fact that the self is form and not content. Of all the manifold relations entering into the life of the human being, those uniting him with other human subjects or with social structures and institutions created by such subjects are the most numerous and powerful. Indeed, they are so densely interwoven that in the minds of many persons the notion easily arises that the self is an abstraction, and that the only really existing and living bases of human life are plurality patterns; the human being as distinct from the biological entity seems to them a product of interhuman relations alone.

§3. RELATIVITY IN MAN AND SOCIETY

Inasmuch as the unity of personality cannot be rationally demonstrated, and inasmuch as the self seems to disappear in a network of relations when subjected to rational analysis, does it not therefore

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

follow, if scientific consistency and strictness be adhered to, that everything in psychical life, including the apparently substantial self, is in actuality nothing more than a temporary focal point of mutable relations? This would in turn lead to the conclusion that human nature as a unity, as the central fact in social life of every kind, as the locus of sociation, cannot be recognized as such. Is not this conclusion in closest accord with sociology as here set forth? Should not everything fixed, permanent, and indissoluble, or in other words, substantial, be completely decomposed into interhuman processes and the relationships and plurality patterns arising from them?

These questions have been answered in the affirmative by Bentley.¹¹ According to this writer, a study of human behavior will show that only "cross-sectional activity" is demonstrable, i.e., nothing but overlapping or "transilient" behavior based upon and perpetually creating social relations is scientifically evident. What we have is "man-society activity," nothing more and nothing less. Each social fact can be understood only in and through the place it occupies in a fabric woven of countless other social facts. He demands that Durkheim's guiding principle be taken with the utmost seriousness: "A social fact can be explained only by another social fact." The interhuman can be explained only by reference to the interhuman. Just as social facts cannot be deduced from the *a priori* assumption of a substantial society, neither can they be deduced from human nature or human selves. The varicolored tapestry of social life is woven only by the ceaseless shuttling of interhuman relations. In other words, says Bentley, not only is it impossible to deal with society as an independent magnitude, but it is similarly impossible to deal with the single human being in this way or to constitute him one pole of the subject-environment antithesis. Social occurrences are manifest as transilient or cross-sectional activity and therefore can be defined only in terms of other cross-sectional activity. No single phenomenon in the interacting constellation has a monopoly of determining influence. Moreover, the self with prior, fixed attributes cannot be regarded as the locus of social activity. "Personality is an assumption, most doubtful where most carefully studied."¹² All operations carried out with fixed, self-contained magnitudes are doomed to error; the psychologi-

¹¹ A. F. Bentley, *Relativity in Man and Society* (1926). The position taken by this writer is virtually identical with that of the extreme "cultural sociologists," and for present purposes he may be regarded as representative. Cf. Theodore Abel, "Is a Cultural Sociology Possible?" *Am. J. Soc.*, XXXV, 5 (March, 1930), pp. 739-52.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 153.

cal approach which endeavors to lay bare the psychical root of social occurrences is of no sociological value whatever.

Bentley therefore makes no effort toward unifying and centralizing knowledge of social occurrences; he conceives the task of the sociologist to be that of setting forth the full complexity of interhuman relations without laying stress on any one factor. There is no doubt that such treatment bars every possibility of dogmatism and distortion of scientific discoveries by value-judgments in the form of prejudices, religious principles, and philosophies of life. Everything is equally valuable or valueless, nothing is either beginning or end, purpose or goal, cause or effect. The essentials of social life are found neither in the single human being nor in society, neither in culture nor in original nature, neither in the group nor in the state—everything is relative to everything else.

Those who share the point of view basic to the present work, and who therefore consider systematized knowledge of the network of interhuman relations down to its most minute fibers as the real task of scientific sociology, must also regard Bentley's doctrine of social relativity as correct in many respects. We can concur in his assertion that single-factor causality is quite as inadequate for our purposes as the crudest of the old teleologies. In the science of interhuman behavior we attempt rigidly to exclude extrasocial factors as direct sources of explanation by tracing all social processes to the fundamental interhuman facts of association and dissociation. These are the two specifically sociological categories; as here analyzed they are not the foundation of any other science.

In spite of so much common ground, however, it is impossible unconditionally to surrender to Bentley's principle of complete social relativity. *The reason for this lies in the conception of the self basic to the present system.* With all the relativity manifested in the various forms it takes, we nevertheless regard the self as the point of initial and final focus in any genuine science of interhuman behavior.

Bentley's theory deals with only half of the sociological problem, and consequently must remain one-sided and partial. To be sure, by following him (and we can follow him a long way!) the complexity of the social web is easily recognized, but he can never lead us to a complete intellectual grasp of what we have observed on the way. The road avoids the morasses of over-hasty judgments and crude single-factor fallacies but finally confuses and dismays us by the multiplicity of its forks and branches, by the indistinguishably intricate

maze of social occurrences that flashes by, and we abandon all hope of systematized knowledge, for systematization can proceed only when the main highway is always in view.

But Bentley claims that the value of his method lies in this very fact! "We lose our cocksureness but we gain—knowledge."¹³ Yes, knowledge if by this we mean mere acquaintance with a vast body of factual material, but not in the truly scientific sense of unified, transferable knowledge. The upshot of his method is wandering in the wilderness, travelling hopelessly in a circle. We are interested only secondarily in the innumerable by-paths and obscure trails; our feet are set upon the highroad.

At bottom the question is whether sociology can dispense with an Archimedean point. The thesis here advanced is that it cannot. *The fulcrum of the sociological lever is the living, acting human being whose humanness is at least in part constituted by the fact that he experiences himself as a self, no matter how.* The totality of interdependent occurrences that Bentley calls "man-society" activity and that we here term sociation is a highly complex contexture of approach and avoidance, conjunction and disjunction. The processes in and through which this richly figured fabric is woven issue from selves and impinge upon selves, are refracted by selves and radiate from selves, enter into the very cores of selves and cleave selves asunder—but the loci of sociation are selves and always selves!¹⁴

§4. EXTRASOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE SELF

As soon as we thus assert the importance of the self, we face the very difficult task of correctly appraising it as such a focal point of interhuman occurrences—difficult because, as already noted, the essential nature of the self is rationally inexplicable, unsubstantial, apparently definable only in formal terms, and in its modes of manifestation unstable and without determinable limits.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 296.

¹⁴ "Our world is a world of persons, and only very incidentally a world of things. If man is endogenous, as Emerson insisted, he only knows it because he has compared notes and finds every other person growing in the same way. We are all world builders, true; but our worlds hold together only for the reason that, like the ancients, we build human beings into foundations and walls. Foes and friends alike are worked in. We differ from the ancient builders, however, in this particular, that while they tossed in only now and again a living body, we use nothing else for our worlds; stone, mortar and all are living, throbbing flesh. To quit the metaphor, experience, and preëminently experience of persons, furnishes the materials for our world and for our selves" (A. J. Todd, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-3).

Is it possible that Bentley is right after all? Is the anti-relativistic position here taken indefensible?

No science can justifiably offer intelligible explanation of all phenomena from ultimate source to ultimate goal; philosophers and religionists have attempted to do so—with what success the scientist *as scientist* cannot judge. He seizes the thread of knowledge at a point that seems likely to be heuristically usable, disregarding its beginning and all its ramifications outside his own field; his task is to follow it as far as it can be traced by the methods of his particular science. As a scientist he is interested only in (1) potential or (2) actual control of phenomenal recurrence: (1) potential in the sense that given such and such assumed conditions (which may be actually impossible of attainment at present or in the foreseeable future) he can predict the result of their interaction to a high degree of statistical probability; or (2) actual in the sense that he can set up the conditions, can control all the factors involved, and can *produce* the recurrence. Such control is his only concern; to a scientist truth as such has no meaning.

In the science of interhuman behavior we begin with the human self, trace its relations with other selves, and continue the investigation until the products of such sociation, namely plurality patterns, can be satisfactorily analyzed. It may well be that the final meaning and essence of selves, action patterns, and plurality patterns are extra-rational or even supra-rational, but this is not a matter upon which the scientist can pronounce.

Moreover, the problem of explaining the self in its ultimate nature is not the task of the sociologist; he simply *postulates* the self as an experience that no one seriously doubts, not even the extreme behaviorist. Inasmuch as sociology does not presume to attempt solution of the final questions of human destiny but merely bends its efforts toward the understanding of interhuman behavior, our methodological starting-point is the empirical and experienced self of the single human being.

The reasons for choosing this as a heuristic beginning rather than one or another plurality pattern or totality of such patterns have already been given. There seems little doubt that studies of social life are closer to reality, freer of prejudice, and much more practical if the human being in his full flesh-and-blood reality is the focal point of all observation.

An objection may perhaps be raised: What human being? In other words, admitting as the sociologist does that the self receives its

content chiefly or even wholly from social life, must he not therefore attribute to it such extreme generality that it can be conceived only in formal, abstract, ahistorical terms? And what remains of the self in view of the consequent fact that, quite in contradiction to the announced "flesh-and-blood" basis of the present system, concrete denotation is entirely lacking?

The only possible answer is that there is an extrasocial something that in the past, present, and foreseeable future can be denoted by the much-abused term "original human nature" and that its existence cannot be denied without rendering all sociology meaningless. Setting aside in the present context all extrasocial factors other than the biological,¹⁵ let us say at once that we conceive "original human nature" in terms of native endowment or original nature. Balz has discussed this subject cogently and at some length, but we can give only a few especially apt excerpts here:

"Original nature . . . signifies that, given such and such an environment, a given type of product will result. Within the acorn there is no oak. But the original nature of the oak, passing from potentiality to actualization, gives an oak, not a maple or an elm.

"Original nature . . . never exists as such. . . . Its nature is 'acquired,' in the sense that the developing individual, at every stage, owes its character in part to environmental influences. Nothing given originally remains unaffected. Even this statement is misleading because it represents original nature as a thing. The process of growth is an establishment of inherent powers; the congenital structure conditions the entire process from beginning to end. But the structure at any moment, considered analytically, is a resultant of the interaction of the sum total of forces and structural tendencies in the developing individual and the immediately preceding stage and the sum-total of environing forces . . . at none of these moments do we find original nature, but a character, an organized unity, that represents environmental influences. The nature of the individual at any moment is the result of the combined influence of its nature at the preceding moment together with the results of environing forces, and so on back to the very start."¹⁶

"The causes of variations in human activities . . . whether they refer to differences found as we pass from individual to individual, from one group to

¹⁵ There may well be influences other than the biological or those we call "natural"; the axiom of a "personal self" that cannot be wholly dissolved or scattered by any number of relations, however great, is accepted by the author of the German basis of the present treatise, although he would be the last to deny that this is dogma and not hypothesis. Let us hasten to add that this "personal self" is not in any sense the object of investigation here; whether it be termed "soul," "ego," "essence," or "spirit," it is beyond the range of scientific study. Those who entirely reject this axiom need not therefore reject sociology as here set forth—the "personal self" is merely a private belief and not an hypothesis. See chap. III, §§4 and 5 of the *Gebildelehre*.

¹⁶ A. G. A. Balz, *The Basis of Social Theory*, pp. 53-4.

other contemporary groups, or from one historical period to another, are reducible to two chief sets of causes, namely, original nature and the social environment. They may be described more particularly with reference to individual variations in heredity, to possible changes in the constitution of the human type, to race, to differences in social systems, to differences in the environment in the abstractly physical sense, and finally to the cumulative effects of human activity crystallized in things. But such an enumeration, which might be carried into further detail, is unimportant as compared with recognition of the fact that these factors can be grouped as two.¹⁷

"It is sometimes asserted that the study of human society can be conducted entirely in terms of the study of social institutions ['man-society activity'] without reference to the native equipment of man. The individual, it is said, as a unity of such and such habits, sentiments, abilities, purposes, at a given moment, is a product of institutions. The study of society can accordingly be carried on by utilizing institutions as *the* basis of explanation. This position need not detain us. *The fact that the institutions are social involves some assumptions concerning human nature as a cause.* The institutions of society undoubtedly organize original endowment; the social fact is, so to speak, deposited in and carried on by 'physical' processes. *Mind achieves this discovery.* A given set of institutions, the set into which an individual is born, are conditions of the life of that individual [*but in*] . . . *institutions human nature faces its own objectification in variously specialized and more or less inadequate forms.*"¹⁸

It is for these and other reasons that we include in our general formula for the analysis of social processes (chaps. iii, §8; x, §5) what we term *N* factors, i.e., those generically human (in the *genus Homo* sense) and those specifically personal biological traits that make the selves of the particular participants factors to be reckoned with in every social process, no matter how many persons are involved. It may be thought that in the analysis of crowd actions *N* factors can be ignored, but in spite of current analogies with the sub-human animals ("milling of the human herd," "stampedes," etc.), there can be no doubt that a human crowd behaves differently from, e.g., a flock of sheep, and this difference is *partially* explicable as a result of generic difference in biological equipment. In the analysis of group behavior, particularly of pairs and triads, specific differences between members in such basically biological traits as reaction time, memory span, temperamental attitudes, etc., are obviously of great importance. The human self, then, must be taken into account both generically and specifically. Woodard has thus commented on some of the above points:

"The self is neither 'fixed' nor 'fluid,' but ductile; i.e., it is relatively *both*. Hence it is a real factor and a real resultant; you cannot explain in terms of

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 72-4.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 75-6. Italics ours.

it alone; you cannot wholly explain without it. And the latter especially, since quite extrasocial items (neurological, physiological, toxic, etc.) *also* affect it and thereby affect its responses to, and its further influence upon, interhuman relations."¹⁹

Let us therefore repeat (§3) that "the fulcrum of the sociological lever is the living, acting human being whose humanness is at least in part constituted by the fact that he experiences himself as a self, no matter how. The totality of interdependent occurrences that Bentley calls 'man-society activity' and that we here term sociation is a highly complex contexture of approach and avoidance, conjunction and disjunction. The processes in and through which this richly figured fabric is woven issue from selves and impinge upon selves, are refracted by selves and radiate from selves, enter into the very cores of selves and cleave selves asunder—but the loci of sociation are selves and always selves!"

¹⁹James W. Woodard, statement written for this chapter. See also his article, "The Biological Variate and Culture," *Social Forces*, IX, 1 (October, 1930), pp. 10-20.

CHAPTER VI

SYSTEMATIC CONSIDERATIONS

§1. THE DIVISION OF THE SYSTEM INTO TWO PARTS

From numerous references already made, the reasons for dividing into two parts the total system of sociology as here conceived should be fairly clear: the first part is the systematics of action patterns; the second is the systematics of plurality patterns.

In the first part the single human being in his full living, acting reality is the starting-point of our systematic study; in the second, such social structures as the crowd, the pair, the state—in short, plurality patterns—provide the object-matter. This means that in the first part *action* patterns, social processes, or dynamic relations will receive most of our attention; we shall study the ongoing rhythms and cycles of sociation in both their positive and negative forms. By the same token, we shall observe in the second part chiefly action *patterns*, relationships, or static relations, and the interweaving of these into plurality patterns. At the same time, in the second part we shall continue to pay some attention to the social processes in their primary significance, for they cannot be disregarded; conversely, in the first part we cannot overlook the existence of plurality patterns when studying social actions and processes as such, even though we focus on the latter.

In the first half of the systematics of action patterns we deal with what we may term common-human relations, i.e., relations between single human beings that are relatively uninfluenced by existing plurality patterns. In the second half and in the systematics of plurality patterns, on the other hand, we deal with circumscribed relations, i.e., relations between human beings which have as their immediate postulate the influence of existing plurality patterns—otherwise stated, relations which occur within and between plurality patterns.

At this point we are confronted by a difficulty. In “reality” as we know it, there are no relations between single human beings that are absolutely uninfluenced by existing plurality patterns. Every person “belongs” to certain social structures—in other words, he and his fellows “believe,” consciously or unconsciously, that his existence is some-

how coupled with the existence of these structures. In spite of this, we can and must theoretically isolate the separate person, the single human being; we must at first disregard the interconnection. This delimitation is rendered less objectionable by the fact that many of the ways in which human beings affect each other are actually independent of special influences of plurality patterns—they *are* common-human. This is another reason why sociology must begin with the single human being rather than with “man-society activity” or social structures; without such theoretical separation the sociological nature of erotic and friendly relations, for example, could not be made clear. Furthermore, interhuman relations of all kinds are continually adding to and building up plurality patterns, hence we must theoretically delimit a state of affairs where only this activity, this continuous operation of human intercourse, is going on, and where no social structures are yet to be found. Only in this way can we demonstrate the activity which builds up plurality patterns; the social processes can be seen in their full, elemental power only when they are not treated as if they were wholly derived from social structures. We may legitimately proceed as if these common-human relations existed alone if we later complement our first point of view by another which takes plurality patterns into account. We must be granted the right to study the influence of one human being upon another without forever tracing their behavior to a particular set of circumstances in the social milieu.

This method has been objected to by some sociologists who attribute exclusive importance to such plurality patterns as class and nation; the Marxian scholar Max Adler is perhaps the most vigorous critic. He maintains that human beings cannot enter into relations with social structures of which they are not parts, but we know that travellers and ethnographical field workers, for example, may allow themselves to be influenced by persons belonging to plurality patterns to which the former have previously been strangers.¹ We must of course take into account the fact that the mental content of such travellers is also influenced by the fact that they “belong” to their “own” social spheres and that they therefore figure in part as the mere exponents of social structures, but even when we grant all this,

¹ W. B. Seabrook, *Adventures in Arabia, The Magic Island, Jungle Ways*; Maj. Yeats-Brown, *The Lives of a Bengal Lancer*; Klaus Mehnert, “Student und Kumpel,” *Die Neue Rundschau*, XIII, 6 (June, 1931), pp. 819-33; Peter Freuchen, *Eskimo*; Margaret Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa*, etc.; Bronislaw Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, etc.; and the various reports of General Hugh L. Scott, the Plains Indian authority. (The adapter is indebted to Professor Donald Young for most of these examples.)

it is by no means false or even superfluous to view the contacts they establish as those of single human beings influencing and being influenced by strange persons—the relations set up are common-human.²

Circumscribed relations take place only in and between plurality patterns (cf. chap. xxi, §1), and inasmuch as these exist only as neuro-psychic patterns within human beings, circumscribed relations are always psychical, a point to which we shall again have occasion to refer.³ The systematics of plurality patterns, which comprises the second part of the present system, will deal with (a) plurality patterns themselves, and (b) circumscribed relations within and between them. The two divisions will not be explicit, of course, for it is virtually impossible to separate them without a great deal of duplication and needless cross-reference.

It should be clearly understood that common-human relations occur within the circumscribed zones as well as without; in the chart entitled "Ramifications of Term 'Social Relations'" (chap. iii, §3, fig. 1) this is indicated by the words: "Common-human (also present under circumscribed conditions)." Association and dissociation are always and everywhere present, and may take place when no plurality patterns are exercising direct influence.

§2. ACTION PATTERNS IN THEIR FUNCTIONAL ASPECTS

All action patterns or social processes, whether common-human or circumscribed, may be studied in two ways: (a) as existent processes; and (b) as functional processes.

In studying social processes as merely existent, we restrict our researches to a very limited zone, and do not ask what part these processes play in the total process of sociation. Such an approach is perhaps advantageous in the first stages of monographic study, but

² Cf. Leopold von Wiese, "Die Problematik einer Soziologie der Revolution," *Verhandlungen des dritten deutschen Soziologentages in Jena*, 1922, pp. 6-23.

³ MacIver has clearly pointed out the difference between social relations and plurality patterns in the following passage, and also has implicitly distinguished between common-human and circumscribed relations:

"We may now summarily distinguish the main types of social fact.

"These fall into two great classes, (a) social relations proper—the actual interrelations of wills—and (b) social institutions, which are not actual interrelations of wills but the determinate (and therefore willed) forms in accordance with which men enter into social relations. [Here he apparently assumes that all relations are circumscribed.] The distinction is very important, and the confusion of the two classes has led to serious errors. A law or code of laws, a form of government, a class or caste system—these are not actual relations of men, but the conditions and consequences of relationship. Social relations are activities, the threads of life; social institutions form the loom on which the threads are woven into cloth" (R. M. MacIver, *Community*, p. 7).

sooner or later we must determine the function of the process being studied if we are to comprehend thoroughly even its existent aspects.

The difference between the two methods is well illustrated by the analogy of the chess game. Looking at a game in operation merely from the existent point of view, one may note the initial juxtaposition of queen and king, and after patient inductive observation may discover just what the relation of the two pieces is with regard to possible moves. The same mode of study may be applied to all the other pieces until it is possible to describe all the lines of movement they may take and thus, for example, to describe the difference between German and Italian rules with regard to the movement of certain pieces. All this study, however, lacks co-ordination and genuine intelligibility, for the function of all these separate movements is not known and cannot be known in this way. There must be some knowledge of the total process of the game, so to speak; the moves of each piece must be viewed in relation to the intentions of the two players and the fact that it is a game of skill, not an effort to secure aesthetic gratification by putting the pieces through a sort of minuet. There must be some conception of the total process of sociation, in other words, before the full import of separate processes can be discovered, for the essential factor in such discovery is that of specific function within a co-ordinated whole.

This emphasis on function may cause some confusion at first glance, inasmuch as the term is at present used in two senses. First, it occurs as an equivalent of task, achievement, performance, fulfilment, or execution; here its antonym is substance. If one ascribes a function to anything in this sense, it takes on a final meaning, is related to an end. Spencer, among others, uses the term in this way. Second, function is used to designate the mathematical relation of dependence in which two variable quantities change in correlation with each other. This functional relation is now frequently used as a substitute for the causal relation, and is of considerable importance in modern economic theory, particularly that of the mathematical school of Walras and Pareto.

Now in the present system we use the term function in the *first* sense to indicate task, achievement, etc., within the total process of sociation.⁴ It may seem that the investigation is shifted from the em-

⁴ W. Malgaud places the concept of function at the center of his theory, as may be seen from his book, *Le Problème logique de la Société*, and his article in the *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie*, IV^{me} Année, Tome 1, No. 2, referring to specific points in the book. He regards function as the fundamental formula and the least common denominator making it possible to reduce the whole

pirical to the teleological sphere (chap. i, §2) when we say that social processes are to be dealt with primarily from their functional aspects, i.e., in accordance with the task which they perform. Nevertheless, questions as to function, end, or purpose can be answered *sociologically*; we have simply to determine the interconnections of the separate process with the total process of sociation in either its integrating or differentiating aspects. Thus, for instance, we may say that competition has the *function* of assigning to human beings their places in many plurality patterns. Cooley has used this same illustration:

"The function of personal competition, considered as part of the social system, is to assign to each individual his place in that system. If 'all the world's a stage,' this is a process that distributes the parts among the players. It may do it well or ill, but, after some fashion, it does it. Some may be cast in parts unsuited to them; good actors may be discharged altogether and worse ones retained; but nevertheless the thing is arranged and the play goes on."⁵

It is plain that in saying what he does Cooley has made no pronouncement whatever about the *ultimate* value of competition in the function noted or any other—and no more do we!

Moreover, it should be clear that function or end in the total process of sociation, i.e., of association and/or dissociation, is not the same as purpose in the proximate sense! It will be recalled that in an earlier chapter (ii, §§10 and 11) the statement is made that the purposes of social relations are not primary in sociological investigation—let this be re-emphasized. We wish only to determine the degree of association and/or dissociation present in an existing relation, and we can best do this if we also discover what its function in the total process of sociation is—in other words, toward what *sociative* end it tends.

As already noted, all the social processes taken together yield the total process of sociation. It has been necessary to take Stuckenberg's old term and give it an altered meaning in order to have a word that comprises both basic processes, association *and* dissociation.⁶

mass of sociological material to unity. He declares that he uses the concept of function in the mathematical sense, but we are of the opinion that he really uses function in the first sense, as we do, i.e., that it denotes task, achievement, performance.

⁵ C. H. Cooley, "Personal Competition," in his collected papers, *Sociological Theory and Social Research*, p. 164. First published as *Economic Studies* (American Economic Association), IV, 2 (April, 1899).

⁶ In Stuckenberg's usage, sociation merely denotes the "social" as distinct from the "private" sphere; he does not free himself from the grip of the "individual—society" fallacy, as the following excerpt shows:

"We seek a term . . . which gives the idea of association, but confines this association to that which is actually associated. Now it happens that sociate is used in the same sense as associate; but *sociation* is not in use. . . . We use it

"Socialization" is not usable in this context, although valuable elsewhere (chap. xxvii), for it has come to mean a specific type of association only, as the following quotation from Ross shows: "By 'socialization' I mean *the development of the we-feeling in associates and their growth in capacity and will to act together.*"⁷ It should also be noted that although we occasionally refer to association as positive sociation and to dissociation as negative sociation, no value-judgments are thereby implied. Many persons think of "positive" as designating something peculiarly valuable, whereas "negative" carries with it a connotation of worthlessness or actual evil. From what was said in the very first chapter (§2) concerning value-judgments, it should be plain that we do not use positive and negative in this popular sense. From the standpoint of the scientific sociologist, negative sociation (dissociation) is quite as valuable or the reverse as is positive sociation (association).

Association and dissociation are wholly colorless terms; singly and in combination they provide the frame of reference for sociological research. Our investigations would soon diverge and submerge in the river-beds of other sciences if the specific delimitation of sociology which they provide were not retained.

These *fundamental processes* we have already divided into *principal processes*, *sub-processes*, and concrete social actions or *single processes*. A large number of the latter must be collected, analyzed, and classified in the more inclusive processes. The conceptual net of common-human relations thus constructed should be spread over any factual complex of actual human life which we wish to study, and the single processes found therein should be analyzed for the purpose of discovering the relation-categories within which they should be placed. Inasmuch as these categories are arranged in rank order of association and dissociation, determination of the place of single processes is tantamount to ranking such processes within the larger frame of reference. In this way we hope to learn what degrees of affiliation or alienation exist between human beings in the various fields of life.

It is not enough, however, merely to study the flowing, rhythmically

to designate those personal forces which interact between men, to indicate what men share, what associates. . . . Sociation deals exclusively with the social personality. Regarding a man as social plus private it has nothing to do with the latter but to eliminate it from the sphere of its inquiries. . . . Thus sociation always considers individuals only so far as they have associative, interactive factors, leaving a large realm of the individual unconsidered" (J. H. W. Stuckenberg, *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, pp. 127-8).

⁷ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, rev. ed., p. 375.

recurring succession of common-human relations in this way; we must also be able to show how they condense and interweave into plurality patterns. That is to say, we must depict the processes by which both evanescent and permanent interhuman relations generate neuropsychic patterns, particularly of the symbolic type, and how, as these become firmer and more coherent, they then react upon the common-human relations and characteristics from which they are derived. From the simplest street crowd to the abstract collectivities of church and state, such plurality patterns need be studied in the systematics of action patterns only with regard to the continuing effects of the social processes within and between them. Common-human processes are therefore studied under circumscribed conditions as well as processes arising only under such conditions. Everything that has already been said about the division of common-human processes also holds good with regard to circumscribed processes; principal, sub-, and single processes must be distinguished.

§3. PRESENT-DAY RELATIONS ARE THE PRIMARY CONCERN OF THE SOCIOLOGIST

It has several times been indicated that sociology, as the science of interhuman relations as such, is not a historical but a systematic science. By its means we do not attempt to set forth the course of historical development in the sense of genesis and chronologically ordered sequence. Nothing could be more erroneous than to assume from the way this system is constructed that we assume that "in the beginning" of human evolution there were only isolated human beings, that these then came into relation with each other, and that in the course of time there finally arose a series of social structures such as family, sib, tribe, state, etc.

On the contrary, we attempt to show that, from both the historical and logical points of view, human beings, social relations, and social structures are simultaneous, that each is a necessary condition of all the others. Because we are forced to follow the only workable method of presenting such a simultaneous interconnection, namely, the plan of arranging the parts so connected in a series that progresses from chapter to chapter, we are exposed to the fallacious assumption that we are presenting a chronological, historical sequence. *Nothing could be further from the truth.* The present system is primarily a system of simultaneous elements which in some instances at least are spatially contiguous. We always attempt to resolve a nexus of social phenomena into those components present in cross-section, i.e., into its simul

taneous elements. Not until the stage of intensive, monographic research is reached do we devote much attention to temporal sequences. These cannot be ignored in so far as they contribute to the understanding of the phenomena in question, but historical considerations have no weight in determining the divisions of the frame of reference.

A pertinent question at this point is: What period shall we choose for our investigations of co-existent social phenomena? Where shall we cut our cross-section? The answer is as follows: In their most general form the patterns of interhuman behavior are timeless. Association and dissociation are relations found wherever and whenever human beings co-exist, and we may hazard the assumption that this will not be otherwise in the foreseeable future. To be sure, the more these general relations ramify the more apparent the historical conditioning of the minute offshoots becomes. For this reason it seems advisable to pay most attention to the *present* period of European-American culture; present-day problems are preferable to those of the past because they are more directly accessible to observation and the conditioning factors are therefore easier to determine. A great many relations, especially of the circumscribed variety, are so complicated that in order to make a valid analysis and synthesis it is necessary to have before us the occurrences as they now take place.

This does not mean that we reject the historical point of view—not at all! We merely claim the right of existence for our system as a complement of the predominantly historical method. This claim is of course contested by some persons; Paul Barth, for example, apparently could not see the necessity of complementing the historical method concentrating on chronological sequence by the systematic method centering on co-existence and spatial contiguity. As a result, he could not do justice to Simmel, and he also underestimated the contributions of American sociologists. His utterances regarding Ross show this:

"The way in which he [Ross] develops his theory shows the limitations peculiar to American sociology in general. Groups and group relationships, interests, oppositions, . . . are discovered in the present and formed into a theoretical system; the past, in all essentials, is used only as an illustration of the already-constructed system. This practice, in my opinion, should be reversed; a survey of the past should enable one to recognize, as I have frequently insisted, the mighty streams of physical and mental life which have led to the present state of affairs—thereby explaining the latter and enabling us to draw conclusions as to the future course of events."⁸

⁸ Paul Barth, *Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie*, 4th ed., p. 485.

But may we not travel both roads? Is there no place for those investigators who attempt to study co-existent phenomena and who thereby complement the historians? Is it necessary so completely to neglect this non-historical work or so summarily to dismiss it? (Simmel's work has already been unfairly waved aside by certain super-patriotic "Germans.")

In Germany and elsewhere there is a great deal of confidence in the revealing power of history. This circumstance has led to an extremely close connection between sociology and the philosophy of history in some quarters, and also to the fact that under the name of sociology a great many more studies have been devoted to chronological sequence than to co-existence, to longitudinal sections than to cross-sections. Because of this, speculation has gained a greater place in sociology than any science that strives toward empirically demonstrable results should grant. As Demolins has vigorously queried: "What sophism is this—to study the past before knowing anything about the present?"⁹ Small has said much the same thing; he declares that American sociologists have given up the fruitless effort to explain the whole of the visible universe, and now concentrate their attention on carefully delimited phenomena observable at first hand. He quite correctly asserts the superiority of this method:

"In and of itself this change is a scientific achievement. . . . We are becoming aware of the relative superficiality of our knowledge of the most immediate and ordinary units of experience. What, for instance, are the springs of motives, the processes of the fusion of motives, and the resources for the control of motives in the different boys' groups in our own community? What is the precise series of antecedents and consequents that have resulted in the breakup of a given family—not to speak of a formula of causes of family disintegration in general? What is the precise composition of interests which furnishes a constituency for a given local elective official?"

There are a few sentences in the same article which seem expressly written as a warning to Europe, where at present fantastic and presumptuous speculations and schemes about the total structure of society greatly impress the gullible public:

"The people who have focussed their attention upon such questions can no longer be hoodwinked by the scientific pretensions of any more wholesale and summary methods of asking and answering questions about human experience. If we are at our wit's end to understand the boys in the nearest school-

⁹Edmond Demolins, lecture delivered in the fall of 1886, quoted in Paul Bureau, *Introduction à la méthode sociologique*, p. 12, footnote.

yard, it is barely possible that no one has better understood the crusade of the children."¹⁰

Preference for present-day problems rather than for historical questions is plainly manifested by contemporary American sociologists; they prefer to unravel the complications of those interhuman relations which may most readily be tested, for even when the most simple are chosen, it frequently becomes evident that "simple" analyses are difficult enough. This tendency is not confined to American sociologists, however; the French sociologist, Worms, has expressed himself in similar vein:

"It is necessary to study both the origins and the present state of human societies. But from our point of view, the study of the present state is more fruitful. The material for such study is richer, more complex, more worthwhile. It is also of more direct practical interest. In addition to this, it leads to more definite knowledge. For, first of all, the present can be tested, whereas the past can never be restored for testing. And above all, the present is directly intelligible to us. . . ."¹¹

In the system which follows, therefore, we are concerned chiefly with conceptual and not with historical interrelations; the conceptual predominate because it is believed that by their help something may be contributed toward the understanding of the present and "the discovery of the future."

§4. OUTLINE SUMMARY

Before going further, it seems advisable to present in schematic form some of the more important conclusions thus far reached concerning the conceptual frame of reference.

- I. Sociology, as the science of interhuman relations *as such*, has two main divisions:
 - A. The systematics of action patterns or social relations;
 - B. The systematics of plurality patterns or social structures.
- II. The most important element in both divisions is that of the *action pattern* or social process.
- III. The systematics of action patterns in turn has two main divisions:
 - A. Action patterns between human beings relatively uninfluenced by plurality patterns, i.e., common-human relations;

¹⁰ A. W. Small, "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," *Am. J. Soc.*, XXI, 6 (July, 1915).

¹¹ René Worms, *La sociologie, sa nature, son contenu, ses attaches*, p. 32.

- B.* Action patterns within and between social structures, i.e., circumscribed relations.
- IV. All action patterns may be studied in two ways:
 - A.* As existent;
 - B.* As functional.
- V. All action patterns are sociative in one of three ways:
 - A.* Associative;
 - B.* Dissociative;
 - C.* In certain aspects associative and in others dissociative.
- VI. All plurality patterns or social structures may be divided into three main categories:
 - A.* Crowds (patterning of the lowest power);
 - B.* Groups (patterning of the intermediate power);
 - C.* Abstract collectivities (patterning of the highest power).
- VII. The total process of sociation comprises all social relations, whether associative or dissociative, circumscribed or common-human.
- VIII. The two fundamental processes of association and dissociation may be divided into principal processes, which may in turn be divided into sub-processes, and these in turn into single processes subsuming concrete social actions.
- IX. In the systematics of action patterns, all the inclusive and single processes, whether common-human or circumscribed, are to be dealt with as follows: they are to be
 - A.* Conceptually delimited and described;
 - B.* Assigned places within the total system;
 - C.* Analyzed as
 - 1. Objective phenomena if they are common-human;
 - 2. Subjective phenomena, i.e., as neuropsychic patterns;
 - D.* Ranked ("measured") according to the degrees of association and/or dissociation they manifest;
 - E.* Compared with other action patterns.
- X. Plurality patterns and single human beings do not stand in the position of earlier and later; neither has any priority; they are simultaneous and of equal importance and validity.

PART TWO

SYSTEMATICS OF ACTION PATTERNS

CHAPTER VII

A SYSTEMATIC CLASSIFICATION OF INTERHUMAN ACTION PATTERNS

§1. A TABLE OF INTERHUMAN RELATIONS

It is high time that the reader be given a synoptic, bird's-eye view of the intricate web of social relations in order that the interconnections of that branch of our science which deals with them, namely, the systematics of action patterns, may be made clear. The chart given here (table 1, p. 124) is merely a condensation of the longer table at the end of the book (table 2); the latter should receive at least cursory inspection before the condensed chart is closely studied.

From the upper left- to the lower right-hand corner of the chart we follow a path from the single human being in isolation (a working fiction!) to the processes taking place within and between plurality patterns. The path ends at the general category of remodelling and upbuilding processes; these lead to more complex forms of social structures. In the terminology of the table, we travel from contacts to *A* and *B* relations, and from these to various intermediary stages ending in the *Fd* relations.

In accordance with this general plan, the upper half of the table, or Part I, contains the common-human relations; these do not necessarily presuppose the prior existence of specific plurality patterns. The lower half of the table, or Part II, contains the circumscribed relations; these take place within and between plurality patterns.

Common-human processes give rise, among other things, to inchoate conditions of interhuman relationship providing the plastic material for plurality patterns; once these conditions have arisen (dependence, emotionally toned fellowship, isolation, aloofness, etc.), the circumscribed social processes they generate react upon them and bring about more definite configurations; firmly textured plurality patterns appear. For present purposes we may place them between Parts I and II; they will be considered at length in chap. viii.

§2. ASSOCIATIVE AND DISSOCIATIVE PROCESSES

We must not lose sight of our fundamental processes of association and dissociation. Accordingly, our table is divided vertically; in Part

FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR THE SYSTEMATICS OF ACTION PATTERNS

PART I. COMMON-HUMAN RELATIONS

Prerequisites of Processes: Contacts (Socio-Psychological Factor)

A. PROCESSES OF ASSOCIATION					B. PROCESSES OF DISSOCIATION				M. MIXED PROCESSES	
General Processes of Association	a. Advance	b. Adjustment	c. Accordance	d. Amalgamation	General Processes of Dissociation	a. Competition	b. Contravention	c. Conflict	Primary	Secondary
Concrete Data: Single Social Actions or Processes	Concrete Data: Single Social Actions or Processes	Concrete Data: Single Social Actions or Processes	Concrete Data: Single Social Actions or Processes	Concrete Data: Single Social Actions or Processes	Concrete Data: Single Social Actions or Processes	Concrete Data: Single Social Actions or Processes	Concrete Data: Single Social Actions or Processes	Concrete Data: Single Social Actions or Processes	Concrete Data: Single Social Actions or Processes	Concrete Data: Single Social Actions or Processes

*Conditions Arising from Common-Human Processes:**A Processes Predominant = Associativeness, etc.**A + B + M Processes = Genesis of Plurality Patterns**B Processes Predominant = Solitariness, etc.*

PART II. CIRCUMSCRIBED RELATIONS

C. DIFFERENTIATION			D. INTEGRATION			E. DESTRUCTION				F. CONSTRUCTION		
a.	b.	c.	d.	e.	f.	a.	b.	c.	d.	e.	f.	g.
Concrete Data: Single Social Actions or Processes	Concrete Data: Single Social Actions or Processes	Concrete Data: Single Social Actions or Processes	Concrete Data: Single Social Actions or Processes	Concrete Data: Single Social Actions or Processes	Concrete Data: Single Social Actions or Processes	Concrete Data: Single Social Actions or Processes	Concrete Data: Single Social Actions or Processes	Concrete Data: Single Social Actions or Processes	Concrete Data: Single Social Actions or Processes	Concrete Data: Single Social Actions or Processes	Concrete Data: Single Social Actions or Processes	Concrete Data: Single Social Actions or Processes

g. Outcome of E: Deterioration

a. Outcome of F: Reconstruction

I the associative processes are comprised in those under the subhead *A*, in Part II those under the subhead *D*. The dissociative processes are subsumed under the *B* processes in Part I, and in Part II under the *C* processes.

The common-human processes of association (*A* processes) may be most conveniently arranged in principal processes according to the degrees of association they respectively represent; hence *Aa* comprises those processes with the weakest tendency toward association and *Ad* those with the strongest. In the latter, the transition to the group is already plainly discernible, and a sharp line between them and the *D* processes is not possible. We may distinguish as principal processes the following:

- Aa*, Advance;
- Ab*, Adjustment;
- Ac*, Accordance;
- Ad*, Amalgamation.

Conversely, we discriminate between the principal *B* processes in accordance with the degree of dissociation:

- Ba*, Competition (these processes, being the weakest, contain some elements of associative tendency);¹
- Bb*, Contravention or "opposition" (preparatory stage of the completely dissociative processes);
- Bc*, Conflict (externally perceivable antagonism).

Among the *A* and *B* processes there are sub-processes the names of which do not clearly indicate any specific degree of association or dissociation. It is therefore necessary to introduce a series of *general* processes in both the *A* and *B* divisions under which to group the *special* sub-processes just referred to. Finally, we must take account of the fact that, as above indicated, a great many processes are so stamped with the mixed character of association and dissociation that even their names indicate their dual natures. In order adequately to deal with them, we add to Part I a third series supplementing *A* and *B*, the mixed or *M* processes.

Inasmuch as these mixed processes must be discussed at some length and with reference to concrete examples, they will not be dealt with at this point although they are next in order, but will be considered at the end of the present chapter. We shall merely note here that analysis of such processes involves greater reference to socio-psychology than is necessary elsewhere except in the distinctions be-

¹ Cf. Leopold von Wiese, "Konkurrenz," *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, 4th ed.

tween genuine and spurious, and open and disguised relations already mentioned (chap. iii, §8).

§3. PROCESSES OF DIFFERENTIATION AND INTEGRATION, DESTRUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION

Although detailed description of the relatively static structures arising from social relationships belongs in the second half of the present system, namely the systematics of plurality patterns, clear comprehension of the first half is nevertheless rendered somewhat easier when we introduce, between Parts I and II, the inchoate conditions already referred to resulting from the common-human processes *A*, *B*, and *M*. These conditions, in their more elementary forms of solitariness and associativeness (chap. viii, §1), are first thought of as brought about by the relatively exclusive action of *A* alone on the one hand and of *B* alone on the other, and later as the resultants of the joint action of all the fundamental processes, *A*, *B*, and their mixed form, *M*.

In Part II, it should be fairly obvious that the *C* and *D* processes correspond to the *A* and *B* processes in the first part. The *C* processes are dissociative and the *D* processes associative, so that *A* and *D* are associative, *B* and *C* are dissociative. This order is followed in Part II merely because we are usually accustomed to think of the process of division in a social structure first and of amalgamation or unification second, in spite of the fact that they frequently go on simultaneously. For example, the phrase "division of labor" suggests that division was prior to the "combination of labor," although there certainly is no reason why this implicit assumption should be recognized as valid, nor is it so recognized in the table, although the sequence followed may give this impression.

In the circumscribed social processes we use terms quite different from those used in Part I: differentiation (equivalent to dissociation) and integration (equivalent to association). These have been generally current since the time of Spencer, and express clearly the idea of processes going on within and between social structures (see chap. iii, §3, fig. 1, lower half).

In the *C* and *D* processes the general are divided from the special just as in Part I.

The categories of the special *C* and *D* processes cannot be arranged according to mere differences in the degrees of association or dissociation. Instead of this, the two fundamental sections must be divided into a number of principal processes which, although they imply

and complement each other, *frequently indicate nothing more than different aspects of the same complex process*. The only warrant for distinguishing between them is that such partial aspects frequently have unique characteristics that enable us to extract them readily from the more complex occurrences. The *C* processes may be divided thus:

- Ca*, Genesis of disparities;
- Cb*, Domination and submission;
- Cc*, Gradation and stratification;
- Cd*, Selection;
- Ce*, Individuation, separation, and estrangement.

In each of the five principal processes we find a different kind of differentiation; disparities indicate dissimilarity *as such* without differences in rank; the division of domination and submission is of a special nature; in *Cc* sub-groups are formed; *Cd* comprises relations of marked difference in social status and rank; *Ce* comprises processes leading to separation from plurality patterns formerly adhered to: these processes are therefore not identical with those comprised under the *B* categories.

In the *D* processes, having mentioned those of a general or fundamental nature, we need only stress three principal processes in addition to the general:

- Da*, Uniformation (correlated with *Ca*);
- Db*, "Ordination," superordination, and subordination (correlated with *Cc*);
- Dc*, Socialization (correlated with those *C* processes which denote values, especially *Cd* and to some extent *Cb*. The principal process *Dc* has to do with a more intimate, emotionally based type of union than *Db*).

The *E* and *F* processes are differentiating and integrating, respectively. They bring integration and differentiation into a new light, however, for in *C* and *D* the ceaseless flux of plurality patterns does not receive sufficient emphasis; the social structure may be permeated by a stronger, less intermittent vital current than is designated in the single processes under *C* and *D*, but so long as we have only these two latter categories such structures appear to be relatively permanent, in spite of the fact that the ceaseless senescence and rejuvenescence and the development of more abstract and complex plurality patterns must receive adequate attention. Consequently destructive as well as remodelling and upbuilding processes must be listed in order to supplement the *C* and *D* relationships. The concepts of destruction and construction must not be given any ethical connotations; they must be understood *sociologically*. The general process

leading to destruction of plurality patterns we call deterioration (*Eg*); the general process of construction we call social reconstruction (*Fd*).

The questions still remain, however: What principal processes are particularly adapted to the destruction of social structures? What principal processes lead to construction?

We list six of the former, three of the latter:

- Ea*, Exploitation;
- Eb*, Favoritism and bribery;
- Ec*, Formalism and "ossification";
- Ed*, Commercialization;
- Ee*, Radicalization;
- Ef*, Perversion;

and

- Fa*, Institutionalization;
- Fb*, Professionalization;
- Fc*, Liberation.

(The more detailed expositions in the following chapters will show that we do not introduce value-judgments by the use of these terms; we must become accustomed to using them sociologically and not ethically.)

§4. THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF LANGUAGE

Now that we have erected the scaffolding of our system of relations by arranging the more abstract processes in order, our next task is to place the concrete processes, with all their wealth of detail and closeness to life, in the rubrics selected. In performing this task we must call to our aid the sciences that deal primarily with *language*; furthermore, we must reckon with the inevitable hindrances and defects (which we cannot consider extensively at this point) presented by the formation of words. Language did not arise for the purpose of furnishing a conceptual network for the sociologist. Just as must all other scientists, we too bear the yoke laid upon us by "that arrogant master, the word." We can proceed only by searching through the great store of word-symbols to find how many designate social processes.

This means that the main categories of the table, although arrived at deductively by subdividing the total process of sociation, are subjected to constant inductive verification by means of lexicographic study. The idea of deriving sociologically usable materials through intensive analysis of words denoting relations, etc., has already been

advanced by Waxweiler, Michels, and, in more recent years, by Eubank.²

Waxweiler appends to his *Esquisse d'une sociologie* a so-called *lexique sociologique*, a collection of 2200 words made by Christian Beck. All these words, according to Beck, have definite sociological meaning, but the collection is only tentative and makes no claim to completeness. Nothing more has been done than to arrange alphabetically verbs, nouns, adverbs, adjectives, etc., without any explanation or systematic classification. In an earlier chapter of the present work, it is noted that Waxweiler's work is largely based on biology; this is made especially plain in the words chosen by Beck, for most of them have biological rather than strictly sociological connotations. In spite of this, Waxweiler's assertion of the value of such a list cannot be contested; it is usable not only for reference purposes but also as a basis for further sociological research. His early death, however, prevented any utilization of the material in accordance with his plan.

In the fall of 1919, a sociological seminar was instituted in the re-established University of Cologne, and over a series of years lexicographic research, along with other modes of investigation, was carried on by the participants. The following schema was used:

- I. Strictly sociological expressions denoting:
 - a. Social processes
 - b. Social relationships
 - c. Social structures
 } Action patterns.
 } Plurality patterns.
- II. Socio-psychological and psycho-sociological terms.
- III. Social-philosophical concepts.
 - a. Logical and epistemological.
 - b. From other social-philosophical sub-disciplines.
- IV. Terms from fields bordering on sociology.
 - a. Political science.
 - b. Ethnology and ethnography.
 - c. Sociology of law.
 - d. Biology.
 - e. Political economy.

It soon became evident that the plan covered far too much territory, for in spite of relatively minute division of labor a full year was consumed in working through the letter A. If mere listing of words had been our object we should have progressed much more rapidly, but it was necessary to analyze carefully the meaning of every term, especially of those in categories II and III.

² Earle E. Eubank, "The Vocabulary of Sociology," *Social Forces*, IX, 3 (March, 1931), pp. 305-320. See also his *Concepts of Sociology* (1932), chap. iv, table 2.

Consequently later researches were limited to category I, but even with this concentration upon strictly sociological terms our co-operative enterprise went forward slowly; hours were sometimes devoted to tracing out the sociological ramifications of one single expression. Nevertheless, the table given here profited greatly thereby, although we were able to get only as far as the letter H.

Now, there can be no doubt that these efforts to collect, analyze, and classify sociological terms cover only a fragment of the field of research. *Sociology is not philology!* At the same time, it must be granted that a modicum of the meticulous or even hypercritical and hair-splitting spirit of the philologist would not do the sociologist any harm; he is at present afflicted with a sublime vagueness. As Blumer has cogently said in a review of recent works on scientific methods in sociology, "Just as the differences between . . . key concepts . . . are indistinct, so are the relations between them amorphous."³

Further, the studies of Mead and others have shown the profound significance that communication by means of "verbal gesture" has for social life. If we interpret the term "image" in the sense of neuropsychic pattern, we can agree with Todd's estimate of the importance of such communication: "Since society is merely our mental image of one another, and language is the chief means of communication, it is evident why the science of society must treat it with the profoundest respect."⁴ Dewey has similarly stressed the social function of communication:

"Report, communication, is not a bare emission of thoughts framed and completed in private soliloquy or solipsistic observation. The entire operation of individual experimentation and soliloquizing has been influenced at every point by reference to the social medium in which their results are to be set forth and responded to. Indeed, what has been said is an understatement. It is not simply that the characteristic findings of thought cannot pass into knowledge save when framed with reference to social submission and adoption, but that language and thought in their relation to signs and symbols are inconceivable save as ways of achieving concerted action."⁵

In view of such unequivocal declarations of the social relevance of language, it is highly gratifying to note that the stock of words which more or less distinctly express interhuman relations is remarkably large—at least, so the lexicographical researches of the seminar mentioned would lead one to conclude. Moreover, much light is thrown

³ Herbert Blumer, book review, *Am. J. Soc.*, XXXV, 6 (May, 1930), p. 1110.

⁴ A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, p. 407.

⁵ John Dewey, "Social as a Category," *The Monist*, XXXVIII, 2 (April, 1928), p. 174.

on the opinion, expressed by Sorokin and others, that the *forms* of relationships cannot be practicably distinguished from their *purposes*. Research shows that the German language, and presumably others as well, offers far more possibilities of expressing the former than the latter! If the opinion is to be maintained successfully in the future, it must, paradoxically enough, cease to be opinion through the amassing of data that will bear it out—but the data all point the other way. . . .

None of the sciences offers greater aid to sociology than do those dealing with language. They are a greater help than psychology, for inasmuch as social structures exist "in and through communication," language, being the chief means of communication, has implicit in it, as just noted, a mass of social relations. When we said that language did not arise for the purpose of furnishing a conceptual network for the sociologist, we certainly did not mean that language should not be thoroughly studied by the sociologist.

Since the store of relation-words is, so to speak, inexhaustible, we cannot even make a start toward a complete list in our table. The words, adverbial phrases, etc., therein listed *are only examples which may and should be added to indefinitely*.

To be sure, the aid rendered the sociologist is sometimes of doubtful quality; inasmuch as words have their genesis in the processes of daily intercourse they are seldom unambiguous and definable in a way generally valid. Beyond a doubt, there will be much disagreement about the order and arrangement of the few examples we have given; other sociologists will assign to them slightly different meanings. Frequently it is necessary to class a word under several principal processes; when this is the case the other processes where the same word may be found are given in parentheses, e.g., "proletarianization" is entered under *Da*, Uniformation; it is also entered under Exploitation and Deterioration; in the first instance we therefore use parenthetical references (*Ea* and *Eg*).

Whenever possible, we choose active verbs to designate sub-processes, for the fundamental categories of systematic sociology are *verbal* in nature. It is frequently necessary, however, to use an adverbial phrase including a noun; when this occurs, the word used to designate the sub-process should be added by the reader; e.g., we find under *Ad* the adverbial phrase "in the Dionysian spirit"; this should read "amalgamation in the Dionysian spirit." Moreover, the progressive verb-form is used wherever possible; "—ing" implies *action*.

The deductive method leads to progressive splitting up of fundamental processes until we arrive at single processes. For example, we start with the general category "relations of association" and finally arrive at the irreducible single process "confiding in" listed under the principal process, advance.

Merely to have assigned a word to a definite place in a schema is far from sufficient, however; we must make use of induction if we are to progress further after thus finding the single process. For instance, ten-year-old John Jones may, upon some special occasion, have confided to his mother something that disturbed and disquieted him. Analysis of the case reveals that we have here a process of "confiding in"; the single process thus extracted from the particular case is then to be placed under the proper sub-process and consequently under the principal and fundamental processes.

We have just cited a *very* simple (or even over-simplified) case of a common-human relation. The inductive method used here must also be used in the more complex circumscribed processes going on within and between plurality patterns.

The writer has purposely attempted to lay down a plan of classification with nothing less than scholastic pedantry. Those aware of the pressing need of present-day sociology—namely, of permeation with strictly defined concepts—will not sneer at this effort. We are laying foundations; above all else these must be firm and schematic. The sociologist has often been accused (and with some justice) of "academic kleptomania" and "sublime vagueness," but the science of sociology *can* be strictly and clearly delimited, as our frame of reference should show.

We do not stop with mere scaffolding, however, although the systematics of action patterns is devoted to little else. There must be thoroughgoing analysis of concrete social actions; when this has been accomplished the characteristics of particular relations will finally be clear. We must also probe more deeply into the activity we call "society"; this is the province of the systematics of plurality patterns.

§5. MIXED PROCESSES

It will be recalled that mixed processes were not dealt with at the point where rigid adherence to the arrangement of the table would require it; such discussion was deferred because the place of language in sociological analysis had first to be made clear. Moreover, discussion of mixed processes involves mention of psychological considerations that are somewhat extraneous in a strictly sociological frame of

reference. Now, however, we may safely proceed. (At this point reference should also be made to (1) genuine and spurious and (2) open and disguised relations; see chap iii, §8.)

The difference between the psychological and the sociological viewpoint shows itself plainly in this fact: the fundamental sociological division into relations of association and dissociation cannot be carried out in psychology. The motives upon which actions are based are always of a mixed character. Action and reaction within the psyche follow upon each other so rapidly that they have the effect of a complex but unitary phenomenon. For example, a wish for association with *B* is at the same time a wish for dissociation with *C*. Rarely is an emotion simple; it is generally composite. In the world of action, which can be schematized and simplified into mere spatial interconnections, the great majority of processes can be placed in one or the other of our chief categories; either approach or avoidance is their primary feature. When placing them in these categories, however, we must not confuse external arrangement with explanation nor with the motives correlated with the relations. We would never place a process of accordance (*Ac*) among the *B* relations in our table, nor would contravention (*Bb*) be assigned to the *A* relations. Yet it is plain upon analysis—but only upon analysis—that traces of the opposite category appear in each relation. As soon as analysis leads us to motives we are confronted by mixed phenomena. When *A* attempts to adapt himself to *B* by means of imitation, study of the psychical processes involved demonstrates that a tendency toward separation is also present, for the feeling of dependence bound up with imitation frequently calls forth a reaction against it. Or when *A* contravenes *B*, he must in some measure attempt to live himself into *B*'s thoughts and intentions, and consequently is inwardly united with *B* in greater measure than either of them may desire. Because every relation can summon up a mental reaction containing the seeds of the opposite relation, and consequently is capable of leading to a reversal of the obtaining relation, *it is necessary to regard our division into A and B relations as a mere heuristic device*, simply as an aid in analysis, herein differing from the division into common-human and circumscribed relations (see chap. x, §2, "Primacy of the common-human"). Every relation may be rapidly dissolved by another which very often is its polar opposite. From the standpoint of psychological analysis there are almost no unmixed relations, i.e., there are only *M* relations uniting within themselves the tendencies of association and dissociation. In the "spatial" arrangement of our sociological table, however,

the fundamental idea of the social *action* is decisive; an action which in everyday experience contains more than fifty per cent of approach elements belongs among the *A* relationships; those having more than fifty per cent of avoidance belong with the *B* relationships. At the same time, it must be admitted that there are certain interhuman relations that cannot be squeezed into this dichotomy without doing them violence, for it may be quite doubtful whether they contain more approach than avoidance; these we call *M* relations. Psychological analysis alone does not lead to the recognition of this mixed character; spatially orientated observation of *typical (not individual) external behavior* is equally if not more necessary.

We distinguish between primary and secondary mixed relations; in the former only two persons are involved, *A* and *B*; in the secondary cases there is a triadic relation among *A*, *B*, and *C*. In the former the mixture is primary because it appears in the simple pair-relationship, the dyadic group, whereas the mixture in the secondary cases results from the fact that we observe not only the relation between *A* and *B* but also with a third, *C*; this yields the further result that the relation between *A* and *B* is based upon a process of approach and that between *A* and *C* upon a process of avoidance. As *examples* let us briefly characterize the sub-processes designated as primary *M* relations in our table, retaining the alphabetical order:

"Arguing it out," making reasons for disagreement plain: a mixed relation of accordance and contravention. The process of conversation associates *A* and *B*; but at the same time volitional tendencies, viewpoints, and interests leading to antagonism are externally and therefore sociologically recognizable.

Becoming personal or unduly familiar: *A* shows contravention to *B* in the form of criticism, irony, scorn, or indiscretion which presupposes a certain intimacy (an association).

Chaperoning: *A* has the duty of watching and protecting *B* (sometimes a pair); *A* has a certain distrust of *B* and fears that if oversight were relaxed a misuse of freedom might result; *B* on the other hand is in opposition because the supervision is regarded as an interference or as an affront to his or her dignity.

Chastening: "For whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom he receiveth" (Hebrews, 12:6).

Confronting: persons are brought together in the expectation that they will directly contravene each other or at least that their utterances will show enmity.

Coquetting, flirting: by coquetry in the primitive sense we under-

stand the behavior of a human being (or animal) who attempts to call out desire in another by offering pleasing stimuli. When this is the case we have a process of approach. A closely graded series of refined forms of coquetry lies far beyond this elementary and most immediate variety; in the higher ranges of the series mere titillation becomes more and more an end in itself and is far removed from the simple invitation to sexual intercourse. Indeed, this elevation of the game of love to a position relatively independent of its sexual starting-point or conclusion is the very essence of coquetry in the narrower sense. It is a stereotyped mode of conduct which frequently shows only the appearance of infatuation and complaisance; it is thus behaving *as if* one were ready to enter into a serious erotic relation when in reality this intention does not exist. In such cases, association and dissociation obviously interpenetrate.⁶

Criticizing: all criticism presupposes that the critic is for a time at least engrossed in the object of criticism, while at the same time he is on the watch for defects and if they are found is ready to show them to be such.

Doing business, carrying on a trade: providing others with goods or services not otherwise temporally or spatially obtainable, hence a process of approach: this is at the same time exploitation of needs, inasmuch as the conditions of exchange have a tendency to grow more unfavorable for one party in the degree to which the good is in demand; thus we have the beginning of dissociation in the higgling of the market.

"Giving satisfaction" by duelling: this method of carrying on a conflict is usually granted only to persons who are somewhat near one's own social rank.

Impressing another with one's own importance: *B* makes an impression upon *A* by certain actions tending to produce respect; at the same time *A* feels the gap separating him from *B* and recognizes *B*'s superiority. Approach arising from admiring approval of certain actions also carries with it ideas of strangeness.

Masquerading: this can bring *A* and *B* into the closest contact although neither knows anything of the other outside the ballroom. Nearness and distance are united in the process.

Nothing could be more alien to the nature of the present system than to attempt to define the words just listed or exhaustively to describe them by the processes so briefly indicated. The sole intention

⁶ Cf. Leopold von Wiese, "Koketterie," *Handwörterbuch der Sexualwissenschaft*, Bonn, 1923, pp. 276-7.

is to sketch roughly their mixed character. The fact should not be lost sight of that although we continually use expressions which, whether we like it or not, make reference to motives, the mixed character of the relations is always externally perceivable as well, manifesting itself in the social *action*. This is perhaps least obvious in the process of *impressing another with one's own importance*. We could regard this as a purely internal conscious process; in this event, it would not be usable as a sociological concept. Nevertheless, when an orator impresses a crowd or a vaudeville artist his audience, or any similar examples one may choose, the process evidences itself in the behavior of the participants, e.g., in applause, in scornful silence, in rapt attention. And whenever perceivable behavior of human beings is influenced, there exists a sociologically relevant state of affairs.

Mocking: this kind of raillery is not possible without in a certain sense drawing near to the person insulted, although raillery in general tends to be a *B* process.

Obligating: a community of interest is set up between *A* and *B*, but at the same time the obligation under which *A* is placed creates a gap between himself and *B*.

Playing at games of chance, gambling: this has as its basis community of interest and at the same time contravention. When money is at stake one attempts to win it from one's opponent; but *B*'s willingness to enter into this sort of gambling bond with *A* is thereby presupposed.

Playing fair: this is a principle regulating struggle, especially in sport (and therefore a relation of contravention) in which each of the participants in the struggle has a ruling consciousness (which may become ingrained habit that is virtually unconscious) that all have a common interest in excluding the use of certain methods.

Practising the confidence game: this semi-colloquial expression designates a process of approach (in common undertakings, business, sport, contract, intimate relations of every variety) which leads to deception by the use of disguised conduct.

Relations based upon common artistic interests: these are quite close because art frequently evokes the deeper, more "inward" emotions; simultaneously, however, the resulting work of art embodying this inwardness tends to separate and divide because it is the material representation (necessarily inadequate) of an ideal content.

Relations based upon influential connections ("pull"): these unite *A* with *B*, but in particular cases social distance of varying degree is also set up. The poor man whose connection with a wealthy relative

procures for him certain advantages associates with the latter and at the same time dissociates from him because of class differences.

The secondary mixed relations, with similarly brief characterizations, follow:

Gossiping: *A* tells *C* gossip about *B*. The unfriendly action of *A* toward *B* is simultaneously a confidential approach of *A* to *C*.

Maligning, calumniating: *A* becomes intimate with *B* in order to damage *C*. *A* and *B* are in a relation of approach; *A* and *C*, in a relation of avoidance.

"Opening another's eyes" about someone else: this most frequently takes place when *A* approaches *B* in order to destroy *B*'s favorable opinion of *C*. (The connection with maligning is plain. Less frequently *A* makes use of this intimate conversation in order to destroy an unfavorable opinion *B* has of *C*. When this occurs the above idiom is hardly usable; we prefer to say "setting someone right about someone else." This kind of "eye-opener" does not have a mixed character, but needless to say is also a triadic relation.)

Playing off similar persons or groups against each other: Simmel deals with the principle of *similia similibus* in the second chapter of his *Soziologie*, and among other things says:

"It is precisely those who are dependent upon each other because of similarity of interests who best know each other's weaknesses and vulnerable points, so that the homeopathic principle of *similia similibus*—the annihilation of any condition by arousing a similar condition, [i.e., "curing like with like," "fighting the Devil with fire"]—can in such cases be most frequently applied. Although mutual aid and united effort can best be attained when a certain measure of qualitative difference obtains, for the reason that organic interaction of functionally diverse components thereby results, it seems that mutual destruction best succeeds when qualitative identity prevails. In the latter case we of course do not take into account situations in which one party has such a great quantitative superiority of power that virtual incommensurability obtains."

Here the mixed character of the process lies in the fact that the purpose is contravened but the means of contravention is found in the previously existing association.

Revening: to revenge someone upon someone else. (*Requiting* may also be used in the same sense as revenging; e.g., *C*, out of loyalty to *A*, requites the injury *B* has done to *A* by injuring *B*. A quite different situation obtains when good is requited with good or when there is only a dyadic relation, i.e., *A* requites *B* for what *B* has done to *A*.)

The "tertius gaudens": this is a fruitful subject for sociological analysis. *A* and *B* are in conflict and injure each other, whereas *C*

* Georg Simmel, *Soziologie*, p. 125.

profits by the struggle. (It must be admitted that in this case there is a certain deviation from our type of secondary mixed relations, inasmuch as there need be no relation between *A* and *B* on the one side and *C* on the other. It may come about, however, that an objective situation is created by the opposition of *A* and *B* which *C* uses to his own advantage. As used here for purposes of our sociological table we postulate a situation in which *C* might have acted in open antagonism to *A* or *B*, or to both at once, but has not done so, consciously preferring to maintain a sham relation of peace and friendship.)⁸

We quite frequently meet with cases in everyday life which are extremely difficult of sociological analysis; instance the situation where a secondary mixed relation is contained within a primary mixed relation in some such fashion as the following: one girl helps another revenge herself upon a man by carrying on a spurious flirtation with him.

These examples and brief characterizations of mixed processes are perhaps sufficient for the time being to show the observational bent of the present system; the deductive frame of reference is indispensable, but only as a means of concentrating effort upon specifically sociological phenomena which when analyzed may make necessary some modification of the scaffolding used to conduct the analysis. Cross-correction of induction and deduction is the best warrant of genuinely scientific rather than merely speculative results.

⁸ Cf. Georg Simmel, *op. cit.*, pp. 123 ff. on "the art of being a third party," which, e.g., may follow the principle of "divide and conquer."

CHAPTER VIII

SOLITARINESS AND ASSOCIATIVENESS

§1. CONDITIONS ARISING FROM THE EXCLUSIVE INFLUENCE OF DISSOCIATION AND OF ASSOCIATION RESPECTIVELY

Let us again call to mind the two-fold nature of the frame of reference in which we attempt to comprise the lines of motion followed by the social processes:

(1) We first proceed from the single human being in isolation (a methodological fiction) to the "reconstruction" of relatively simple plurality patterns into types relatively complex—from the separate person to the abstract collectivity. This "ascent" is comprised in the scope of the systematics of action patterns.

(2) Next, we follow the line of motion tending in the opposite direction, i.e., from the abstract collectivity to the single human being. This "descent" is the field of the systematics of plurality patterns.

In the latter half of the schema, the elements upon which the plurality pattern is based seem to be its organs; conversely, in the systematics of action patterns our attention is fixed upon the social intercourse of human beings, and we seem to see plurality patterns arise as a result of such intercourse. Implicit in this double viewpoint are three important facts which will repeatedly engage our interest in the systematics of plurality patterns; they may be summarized thus:

(a) If a more complex form of plurality pattern has been reached, it attempts to make its constituent elements dependent upon it; hence they appear to be mere instruments or organs of such a social structure.

(b) When a more complex (i.e., more extensive, more general, more abstract) plurality pattern is compared with simpler (i.e., smaller, historically earlier, more concrete) plurality patterns partially contained within it, the latter appear from the standpoint of the more complex structure to be nothing more than its subordinate parts, absolutely dependent upon it, and as mere means for the purpose of maintaining it in ways determined without reference to them. From the standpoint of the simpler structures, however, the more complex plurality pattern seems to exist only in order to serve *their* purposes.

(c) It is not possible to derive such complex abstract collectivities

as the state and the church from common-human relationships without intermediate steps, but it can be shown how relationships result in simple plurality patterns, and from these more abstract structures, until finally the most abstract of all, e.g., state and church, make their appearance.

A point has now been reached where the reader's attention must be called to the particular conditions resulting from the relatively exclusive action of processes of dissociation (*B* processes) on the one hand and of processes of association (*A* processes) on the other. The former, or *B* processes, lead to solitariness, isolation, detachment, reclusion, independence, etc., whereas the later, or *A* processes, lead to associativeness, affiliation, attachment, absorption, dependence, etc.

If we were forced to adhere strictly to the frame of reference as outlined in the table, we should not be able to consider these conditions until all the *A* and *B* processes had first been discussed in minute detail. Inasmuch as rigid one-two-three order is not necessary, however, and inasmuch as the detailed discussion of *A* and *B* processes will be facilitated by the deviation, we shall continue as indicated.

Conditions such as solitariness and associativeness are, so to speak, the important stations on our railroad, the terminal points of our line of motion. We have undertaken a round trip, and may therefore choose the most convenient station from which to start; we therefore begin with the single human being in isolation.

§2. ISOLATION

In everyday life human beings occupy various points on the continuum of approach and avoidance. The end-points, which are never completely reached except by the mentally ill, are absolute withdrawal from all social intercourse at one extreme and absolute absorption of separate personality in plurality patterns (crowd, tribe, family) at the other. The life of the human being fluctuates between these antithetical conditions. Although most persons are inclined toward one or the other extreme, and although this inclination may be regarded as a relatively permanent tendency, it is nevertheless true that in practically all cases conditions favoring withdrawal give way with more or less frequency to conditions favoring social intercourse, and *vice versa*. The two tendencies complement each other in countless infinitesimal gradations.

Our concept of isolation therefore is not absolute. Just as man is the result of bisexual union, so is it his life-long fate to develop attachment to others in forms that change ceaselessly and vary widely

in the closeness of the bond. The course of human existence from birth to death is a motley mixture of isolation and affiliation, of solitariness and associativeness.

Moreover, it is not at all uncommon to find a condition of isolation dominant over someone who longs, even though he is surrounded by companions, for other persons temporally or spatially distant. Longing accentuates the idea of separation and this in turn intensifies longing. Here the desire for amalgamation is present, but obstacles stand in the path, and hence this kind of isolation is also relative. In such circumstances contacts and relationships may be very numerous, but the human being feels himself far away from a particular affiliation which he thinks supremely valuable.

It is utterly false to depict the history of mankind as if it leads from isolation to amalgamation, and it is quite as false to fancy that it leads from herd-like coalescence to the autonomy of the self-sufficient personality. On the contrary, the possibilities and varieties of attachment and detachment develop along parallel lines. Much of what former generations believed to be fellowship now seems more like aloofness, and *vice versa*. Every increase in sensitiveness brings with it fresh capacity for both conditions. What is regarded as a detached condition is not the same today as it was yesterday, nor is it the same in different contemporary cultures. With every increase of relations of association and every new plurality pattern there also arise new conflicts and seeds of deterioration. And this means that conditions of isolation arise that were previously unknown.

Solitariness and associativeness are genuinely contradictory terms only when purely external factors are considered to the total exclusion of internal. It is possible to be really solitary only when one has once lived in close association with others, and association is the more effective the greater the extent to which it is infused with personal values formed in solitude. On this head Simmel says:

"The concept of solitude, insofar as it is important in man's inward life, certainly does not denote mere absence of all affiliation. On the contrary, social intercourse is in some fashion imaged or presented to the mind's eye and *then* is abjured. The result is solitariness in the true sense; its unambiguous, positive meaning is given it by influences radiating from an ever-so-distant set of associations—whether these influences are reverberations of past or anticipations of future relationships, whether felt as longing or as voluntary renunciation. We do not call a human being solitary because we imagine him to be the only inhabitant the earth has ever had; his state is determined by the process of sociation even though this process may be negative, i.e., dissociative. All the bliss as well as all the bitterness of solitude is brought about by different reactions to stimuli which are social in their origins; solitariness is a sort of interaction between persons, one or more of whom are no longer present al-

though they at one time exerted certain influences. These influences are no longer 'real' in a certain material sense) but continue to live and act ideally in the mind of the solitary one."¹

Spykman quite properly heads his adaptation of the foregoing passage "The Monad," and begins with these words: "The simplest structure which may be subsumed under the sociological category is the individual, however paradoxical and essentially contradictory this may seem."² In other words, the solitary human being is after all a nexus of relationships; most of his humanness would disappear if they were to be suddenly wiped out. Neuropsychic patterns persist, however, and thus the term "monad" is not a misnomer; the solitary person is really a mirror of the social order even when removed from it. It would be entirely possible to begin that part of the systematics of plurality patterns dealing with the group (chaps. xxxviii to xli inclusive) by first analyzing the monad and then following with the dyad (pair), triad, tetrad, and so on. As it is now, the dyad comes first, inasmuch as the systematics of action patterns requires us to consider the monad here. The point is raised only in order to show how closely interwoven the two divisions of our science really are, how necessary it is to abandon the "individual-society" antithesis—in short, how relative the concept of isolation as we use it actually is.

Furthermore, we cannot take the concept of isolation in any but a relative sense because the differences between man and man are too great. Certain it is that the influences of solitude upon the emotional and intellectual life are as varied as are the personalities subjected to it. It may indeed be true that primitive man could not bear his external solitude without fear and longing for others of his kind, for in general "original human nature" is apparently associative, and not only strives toward opportunities for joint action but also inclines toward dependence. Where, in what degree, and for what period the human being seeks social intercourse, however, are factors that vary widely.

The sophisticated person, for example, frequently seeks solitude because of disillusionment. He has not found *the* association of heart's desire; he had far rather be alone than mingle with *these* men. Although perhaps suppressed, there may still stir within him the wish for a more perfect fellowship—in all probability with only one other person from whom he expects liberation from the feeling of forsakenness that at times threatens to overwhelm him with dismay and dread.

¹ Georg Simmel, *Soziologie*, p. 77.

² N. J. Spykman, *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*, p. 129.

Following the division proposed by Schmalenbach,⁸ we discriminate active and passive varieties in this first sort of solitariness. A self dominated by the active variety longs to participate in matters external to it; a self under the sway of the passive variety longs to have others participate in its affairs. This is a division paralleled in the associative type of human being: one sort wants to associate with human beings because he can use them as tools to do his will; the other offers himself as an instrument for the will of others with whom he is associated.

Thoreau explains the need for solitude felt by such seekers for fellowship in this way: "The reason of isolation is not that we love to be alone but that we love to soar; and when we soar the company grows thinner and thinner until there is none left." Further, many sensitive, gifted, and creative men love solitude for its own sake because all great works grow out of self-collectedness, and this presupposes freedom from the countless petty bonds imposed by daily intercourse. Schopenhauer says, "He who loves not solitude loves not freedom."

At the opposite extreme from the solitary type is the associative. When analyzing the associative type we must discriminate between two varieties just as in the former case. First, associative may mean "social" in the ethical sense. We find the most extreme form of this urge to be bound by social ties in the man who is ready to sacrifice himself for others unreservedly. His social function is also his individual need. Here we may plainly see that the solitary and the associative are not antithetical in every sense, for as already indicated, this exalted solicitude for the social order is almost exclusively the result of the condition of solitariness. A sacrificial or altruistic frame of mind requires solitude (for a time at least) for its genesis and maintenance.

Completely different from this is the associative type *per se* in which altruism is not found in conjunction with the tendency to associativeness. In this sense, "associative" means "more or less unable to rely upon one's self." The self of such a person is strong only in and through union with others, and association is often sought out of sheer egocentricity. We frequently place our trust in the associative person when some co-operative effort is to be put forth, but if he happens to be of the self-centered associative type, as is often the case, we find that our confidence has been grievously misplaced. To our sorrow

⁸ Herman Schmalenbach, "Die Genealogie der Einsamkeit," *Logos*, VIII (1919-20), pp. 62 ff.

we sometimes learn that the man who is rather reticent and apparently quite reserved and exclusive is a better ally in a co-operative undertaking.

Above all else, we must distinguish between the craving to be in a crowd or a group (so often conjoined with a lack of self-reliance), and the sympathetic feelings which unite men inwardly (chap. xvi, §1).

In the first case we have to do with a person who joins any crowd or group which he meets accidentally or which seems useful to him. He loves processions and military displays; utterly barren of deeper insight, he applauds or denounces in unison with others; he betrays every secret and has no respect for personalities he does not understand.

Reserve is often confused with egotism, but it is precisely the person lusting for recognition who seeks every opportunity for association; the man who is well pleased with himself is always glad to have other persons reflect that same opinion. Solitude is unendurable to him because he can draw power and satisfaction only from the reflection of his own self in the applause and admiration of others.

The ethically social type (often solitary as well) is repelled by mere indiscriminate association with human beings. He seeks personal emotional participation; if he strives to feel a bond of sympathy with great throngs of human beings, he must generalize them into one abstract personality (Mead's "generalized other") with whom he can share ideals and aspirations.

From the foregoing it becomes clear that we must supplement the apparently contradictory dichotomy of solitariness and associativeness with a more profound distinction based upon types of personality and the realm of motives, by more differentiated and complicated discrimination: *the solitary type is closely linked with the ethically social*. Thus we find united in this type a condition of inwardly motivated solitariness correlated with acting and thinking for fellow human beings and for plurality patterns, especially abstract collectivities.

There is another type of solitariness, however, that is quite "unsocial" in the ethical sense; it is linked with a lack of sympathetic capacity and hence is not greatly different from the self-centered associative type, for such a condition of inert and vapid solitariness is quite as fruitless as indiscriminate and characterless association with all and sundry.

To be sure, it is also possible to find haughty but capable solitaires

who harden themselves against the world and their fellow-mortals; they renounce all service to others, even refusing to increase socially viable values which they are eminently qualified to create.

When we find somewhat similar personalities who are nevertheless creative, it is hard to say whether their fruitful isolation awakens forces more serviceable to themselves or to the common good. Most of us have been baffled by the strange connection between such solitariness and great achievement, but it seems that we may regard many (although not all) conditions of creative solitariness as a sort of sublimated associativeness; contrariwise, we might call the everyday associativeness of superficial back-slapping and "joining" as a sub-variety of solitariness, if such a paradoxical exaggeration is permissible. At any rate, it helps us to fix upon and distinguish a series of conceptual formulations that seem important.

(1) Isolation is from the sociological point of view a triply relative concept: (a) it is impossible to be completely separated from human beings; (b) persons may nevertheless be barred from relations they think desirable; (c) ideas of what constitutes isolation vary from person to person and from culture to culture. Because of its relativity, isolation can therefore be defined only in the negative sense, i.e., as a condition in which certain bonds with one's fellows are lacking.

(2) Solitariness and associativeness are conditions relative each to the other.

(3) There is (a) a consciousness of solitariness which arises from the desire for attachments to human beings other than those immediately experienced; and there is (b) a kind of solitariness which is felt positively (or negatively) merely as a condition of solitude without any comparison of the various qualities of association.

(4) The solitary person who longs for the company of others either (a) wishes other men to participate in his self, or (b) wishes to relinquish his self to the selves of others or to the non-self.

(5) The solitary human being may be "social" in the ethical sense; the associative human being may be "unsocial" in the same sense, i.e., he may be incapable of putting his self in the background.

(6) We should distinguish between (a) lasting and (b) temporary isolation.

(7) Another valid distinction is that between (a) forced and (b) voluntary isolation.

(8) Two antithetical ideal types of personality may be distinguished: (a) solitary and (b) associative.

§3. THE SOCIATIVE FUNCTION OF RELATIVE ISOLATION

In all the foregoing we disregard the condition of *absolute* isolation; it is of biological and psychological rather than sociological interest to discover how a human being is constituted who grows up without association with others. It is probably true that when applied to such creatures the term "human being" is a misnomer; "Man is not born human." The capacity for thought, for many emotions, and perhaps for awareness of self is dependent upon the mutual influences of human intercourse.

We are, however, interested in the effects of lasting *relative* isolation, for it always leaves the sufferer socially abnormal (no value-judgment implied!) in some degree. The hermit is subject to melancholy and is visited by illusions and hallucinations. The solitary punishment of prisoners is frequently all too severe (although sometimes the lack of an occupation or revulsion against a forced mode of labor, rather than solitude, is the unbearable element). Who does not recall stories of the ever-renewed efforts of prisoners to get into communication with their fellow-sufferers? Solitary children create for themselves imaginary companions:

When children are playing alone on the green
In comes the playmate that never was seen.
When children are happy and lonely and good,
The Friend of the Children comes out of the wood.

—Stevenson

Lasting and forced isolation we may in general regard as a negative state, socially and personally damaging; our verdict concerning temporary and voluntary isolation can be much less sure and uniform. Certain it is that some measure of reclusion is frequently necessary for socially important achievements. The kind and quality of the human being also play a part, but so do the kind and quality of the proposed achievement.

Achievements which lie in deeds (the work of politicians, business men, organizers, officials, etc.) require moments of concentration, of debate and decision within oneself, of reflection—but moments only; long solitude is seldom necessary or desirable, for such achievements take place in the world of men and events. Conversely, achievements of thought and fantasy in the arts and sciences, philosophy and religion demand solitary and social relations of longer duration. For many tasks it is sufficient if men make contact with the mere surface layers of each other's mental selves, and as a result their behavior

is the more easily influenced by others. Leadership in collective enterprises is made easier—indeed, it would frequently be impossible if the contact were anything else than superficial.

In the solitary state the single human being is thrown back upon himself, primarily. To be sure, he brings countless reflexes of social life into his solitude, but he mixes them with his personal longings, urges, and volitional impulses. His own being offers the stuff of thought.

When in the company of others achievement is quite dependent upon the forms and intensity of communication, but we cannot immediately transmit from mind to mind anything beyond the superficial, the technical. Everything that is really vital is manifested only in hints and overtones; the processes of speaking, reading, and thinking must lead the emotions of other men to vibrate in unison if communication is to lead beyond the rationally comprehensible.

Of course, the solitary state does not merely aid in profound penetration of the material of knowledge; it also fills it with more or less subjectivity. The sort of knowledge which because of its function is not compatible with subjectivity is often distorted and led astray by solitary thought; it needs the sober daylight of superficial social transmission. Knowledge which springs from intuition, contemplation, profundity, deep emotion, or fantasy abjures social intercourse. It is quite possible that lightning-like insights into "the nature of things" may flash into mind even in the turmoil of the crowd—but when this occurs we have been solitary in the midst of society!

Knowledge has a long history; when we glance over its wide expanse should we grant permanent value only to that knowledge which solitude has imparted to the solitary? Or should we grant the place of honor to collective achievements made possible by the help of external social organization and technical apparatus? The answers to our two questions are simple, for we have to deal in part with more or less technical problems which may be solved by division of labor and by clever organization, and in part with purely mental tasks which cannot be accomplished by any apparatus no matter how technically perfect. For the first type, association is clearly indicated, for the second, solitude. From the former we look for exactitude, erudition, discipline; from the latter, originality, independence, mental penetration. We must also know where we may expect deficiencies: on the one hand absorption in externals and empty convention, and on the other arbitrary subjectivity.

Even the best formula is of little avail, however, if the personality

of the mental worker is not properly understood. To ask the associative type to achieve what one expects of the solitary will frequently result in failure; conversely, to saddle the solitary man with the yoke of the collectivity will quite as frequently lead to results just as disappointing.

The quality of the ties which knit minds together also has an influence upon the permanence of their co-operative achievements. The Platonic Academy,⁴ the monastery, the faculties of universities, the congresses and conventions of learned societies, and all the numerous modern groups dedicated to the ends of the mental life bind (each in its own way) the solitary and the associative into a unit aiming at collective mental achievement. Much that is unique is consequently suppressed, but it is also true that powers which would otherwise lie fallow or consume themselves are in this way guided and made fruitful. The result always depends upon whether the gifted single mind is still able to feel free enough for creative work or whether, detecting superficiality and "ossification" in such groups, it goes its way alone.

The overflowing abundance of "facts" and the boundless material of knowledge, the specialties and applications, all have their origin in social life; collective labor usually accumulates them in great heaps (*Social Science Abstracts!*), and they tower upward into the plane of solitude. The solitary worker alone can form this collective experience into true knowledge, can vivify it with *mind*. Fruitful knowledge cannot be created by organization; it can only be prepared for and communicated. The danger is always present that the scholar will make the apparatus and the division of labor an end in itself, will magnify unduly the technical element. Yet, with all its evils, organization vouchsafes the solitary mental worker the opportunity of making his solitude socially fruitful; organization should at least partially relieve him of the merely mechanical tasks, and should make accessible everything in the technical sphere that can further knowledge.

Although the foregoing discussion has been largely confined to more or less intellectual matters, the sociative function of isolation could be demonstrated in other regions of human life as well. This seems hardly necessary, however, for it would be more or less a demonstration of the obvious—in fact, what has already been said could have been omitted were it not for the negative value-judgments which have been imposed upon the condition of isolation by those who regard sociology as a doctrine of and propaganda for association only. Need-

⁴ Paul L. Landsberg, *Wesen und Bedeutung der platonischen Akademie* (1923).

less to say, we are here interested in social facts of every kind, and praise or blame may be left to others.

§4. DEPENDENCE AND ASSOCIATIVENESS

The discussion of isolation here and there hints at forces which lead the human being to end the condition of solitude. We might well ask at this point: What are the immediate causes, the impelling forces, of association?

The answer cannot be given at length here; it must be reserved for the analysis of general processes of association to be given later. We must be content to glean a few conclusions in advance:

(1) The external factors of social phenomena cannot be co-ordinated with the internal; the active agents in association are human wishes.

(2) These wishes have as components: (a) urges, (b) emotions, and (c) interests.

(3) Any or all of these components in varying combination may influence tendencies toward association.

(4) The immediate situation plays a large part in conditioning the intensity of tendencies toward association.

These anticipated conclusions provide a sufficient basis for our remarks concerning the condition brought about by the relatively exclusive action of processes of association, namely, associativeness. This condition may be manifested merely in being with others, in physical contacts and perceptual interrelations; usually, however, it has an additional element, viz., co-operation or action in common, the manifestations of which vary widely.

The interactions occurring among associated persons eventually become "crystallized" in structured clusters varying in plasticity or rigidity. Hence the concept of structured cluster, i.e., of plurality pattern, presupposes the concept of associativeness. Nevertheless, plurality patterns exist which are not dependent upon this condition; they endure no matter how greatly associativeness may fluctuate. In such cases, plurality patterns, being as *patterns* merely neuropsychical, live on in the minds of spatially separated persons. Ordinarily an occasional meeting, perception of similar modes of life, symbols or representations of the plurality pattern, etc., are sufficient to maintain its neuropsychic "reality." The more abstract the social structure, the less it needs a type of associativeness derived from all the human beings who compose it. A "social set" requires frequent association

of its members at various "functions" if it is to survive; a world empire needs only its symbols and the manifestations of its power.

As already stressed, association cannot be assigned any ultimate value by the scientific sociologist; to him it is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy, although many of the evangelically inclined devote their efforts to the creation of "bigger and better" associations. The supposed increase in tendencies toward association in human history cannot be regarded as "progress" in the absolute sense even if it could be proved (which is more than doubtful). The condition of relative isolation has perhaps contributed quite as much to "progress" (whatever that may be) as all co-operation and division of labor. If a value-judgment interjection may be permitted, we may say that social intercourse often degrades, debases, engrosses men in the trivial. And altogether apart from value-judgments of any kind, it may be asserted that extreme associativeness makes men incapable of detachment and independent thought and action. This result may be desirable or undesirable, but it is a result.

Hence we may say that association leads not only to co-operation but also to *dependence*. By the latter we understand that condition in which magnitudes are so related that the action of the dependent magnitude is determined, in greater or lesser degree, by other magnitudes incorporated in the interacting configuration to which it is conjoined or attached. *Dependence* and *attachment* are correlates.

One-sided and mutual dependence may be distinguished. Strictly speaking, there can be only mutual dependence, for although *A* may be the sole active member of the configuration, *B* reacts and thereby influences *A* in some measure. Practically speaking, however, the gap between activity and passivity is frequently so great that the category of one-sided dependence is indispensable. In mutual dependence the *activity* of each member is partially determined by every other.

Dependence is a condition that shows clearly the great importance of interhuman relations for life. Every approach or avoidance creates dependences. It cannot be said, however, that they are always felt to be burdens; unpleasant emotions are not always coupled with them. A certain amount of dependence, particularly mutual dependence, is all that makes life supportable. The decisive question is: In what and upon what are we dependent? Nevertheless it is unfortunately true that the condition is visualized by many of us in some such way as in the graphic sketch of Sascha Schneider entitled "The Feeling of Dependence": a man slinks along with bowed shoulders, dragging behind him heavy chains; on either side are high rocky walls by which

freedom is shut out. Such dependence is subjectively felt as a diminution of life and self-respect; opportunities for a richer, more beautiful, more productive life are barred, and a more miserable or rigorous state must be endured.

Relations of association are not solely responsible for dependence; relations of dissociation also link men together and thereby create dependences. Furthermore, competition, contravention, and conflict often issue in dependence of some kind. These are not the essential characteristics of *B* relations, however, for processes of separation, antagonism, and struggle have as their goal the abolition of certain dependences. It is true that they may lead to new dependences, but this merely shows the empirical complexity of processes which must nevertheless be conceptually analyzed and separated. When this is done, the concept of dependence is seen to have its primary connections with the associative or *A* processes.

The core of all the experience a lifetime can give consists in the recognition that there are dependences. Here lies the difference in the attitudes toward life of youth and age.⁵ Youth does not realize (and herein lies its salvation) the oppressive multiplicity of dependences; it fancies there is freedom where in reality bondage lies hidden. Impulsive youth is inclined to attribute defects in personality or social organization to incompetence or weakness (cf. chap. xix, §3) when as a matter of fact the decisive factor is a *vis maior*, the power of circumstances.

The entanglement of the single human being in the net of relations, the superior might of the collective forces, the irresistible nature of the social processes—to teach the recognition of all this is a major task of the science of sociology. In other words, it tries to give some inkling of the limitless number of dependences, and in addition, to discover the processes through which they arise.

⁵ Cf. Leopold von Wiese, "Väter und Söhne," *Der neue Strom*, I, 3.

CHAPTER IX

CONTACTS AMONG HUMAN BEINGS

§1. SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO PROBLEM OF CONTACTS

All relations of approach and avoidance begin with contacts in the broader sense of the latter term. Contacts may be regarded as social processes, but although all interhuman relationships are the results of interhuman processes, not all such processes lead to relationships. Those which do not necessarily involve the establishment of relatively stable relationships are here called contacts. Their function is that of releasing interactions; they are phenomena of relatively short duration, which do not manifest with sufficient clarity an intention toward association held by one or both of the "contacting" persons, and they therefore cannot be termed processes of advance (*Aa*), although they may later develop into such processes. Like sparks that flash into view and then disappear, contacts may be quickly extinguished; the moment when two persons meet each other may be followed, literally speaking, by eons of separation, and in countless instances contacts once made are speedily forgotten. Moreover, they may frequently serve to release processes of contravention, enmity, or estrangement, so that although contacts are undoubtedly prerequisites of association, association is not the inevitable result of contacts. Again, though contacts often lead to new relationships, they also bring about modification, intensification, diminution, or displacement of relationships already existing.

Contacts may be physical, psychical, or psychophysical facts; they are properly objects of psychological and especially of social-psychological investigation. The sociologist cannot deal exhaustively with them if he does not have the aid offered by physiology (particularly neurology), psychology, and similar sciences. This, however, is not always necessary, for the sociologist regards them chiefly from one point of view to which his own methods are adapted. He has little interest in exhaustive psychophysical studies of the processes of contact as they affect human beings considered as self-contained entities; contacts are object-matter for the sociologist only when regarded as the connecting links between the sociologically relevant condition of

solitariness or isolation and the processes of association. He asks this question: What do contacts supplant and to what do they lead?

§2. CONTACT AND PROCESS

It is impossible to draw a sharp line between occurrences that bring about contact and the elementary stage of actual processes of association, namely, advance (*Aa*). The phrases "Thank you," or "Which way?" may evidence contact alone; yet they may also initiate processes of association. Frequently the concept of contact is used quite loosely, and thus becomes confused with such *A* relations as advance or even adjustment. Witness the fact that "imitation" is sometimes termed contact. This is a serious error, for the term "imitation" is continually applied to processes of copying or mimicry which not only have no intention of advance connected with them but actually tend in the opposite direction. When a pupil is detected in the act of caricaturing the gestures of his teacher while the latter's back is turned, existing or ensuing relations, so far as the particular pupil and teacher are concerned, are all too likely to be those of contravention, a *B* relation. (This use of "imitation," like so many others, is of course non-sociological; the sociological concept does not include inimical mimicry and like phenomena—see chap. xvi, §3.)

It is therefore desirable to distinguish as clearly as possible between contact and advance. Generally speaking, more than one contact is necessary in order to produce definite association—indeed, relatively frequent repetition and accumulation of contacts are almost always necessary. It will later be shown (chap. xi) how in most cases the sequence of social processes leads from frequent contacts, often the result of external necessity, through the stages of sufferance and compromise, and thence to advance. But this is not always the case; there are primary contacts which with elemental power unite pole with pole; leaping all intermediate steps they result at once in amalgamation if insurmountable obstacles do not stand in the way: this is exemplified by many erotic relations.

§3. CONTACT AND ISOLATION

Between isolation and contact the difference is not one of kind, but of degree. Ideal-typically speaking, contacts sometimes lead to membership in plurality patterns and thus end the condition of complete solitariness. At best, however, they can never do more than render it incomplete; isolation always exists in some measure. Indeed, contacts frequently produce for the first time a clear consciousness or

definite feeling of isolation in its social or mental forms. The essential elements in all intercourse with others are determined by the specific regions of contact and the specific regions of isolation resulting from such intercourse. Superficial physical contact may co-exist with the most profound social or mental isolation on the part of either or both participants.

This is well exemplified when a person entering a café seats himself at a table already occupied by others: visual, auditory, and similar contacts automatically arise, and there may even be some interchange of words, but in most cases strangeness persists in ways grotesque, awkward, or even painful. Peculiar contacts arise when persons ignorant of each other's languages voluntarily or involuntarily remain in close physical proximity. European or American travellers among various preliterate peoples frequently testify to the unusual contacts of which they are aware when placed in the midst of a native group engaged in lively but to them unintelligible converse. The ears and eyes of both travellers and natives are keyed to the highest pitch; every least detail of dress, gesture, inflection, and facial expression is avidly seized upon. Some persons assert that in such situations they learn from the general demeanor of the strange person or group a great deal that would have been lost if attention had been distracted by intelligible language. The lack of contact through mutually meaningful verbal symbolism is frequently more than made up for by other types of sense-perception, especially when favorable emotional sets (e.g., the desire for friendship, love, sympathetic understanding) establish "wordless intimacies." Is there not eloquent silence that unites, and is there not chatter that opens gulfs between human beings?

§4. DISTANCE

If the web of social life be observed in static cross-section, it will be seen that the components of the web are social relationships of persons and plurality patterns. These relationships may also be regarded as specific social distances, sometimes but not always spatially evident, among the persons and plurality patterns in question. In order to explain these almost infinitely differentiated distances, the sociologist must of course shift from the static viewpoint to the dynamic, for only in this way is he able to do justice to the ceaseless flow of social processes without which the specific distances and the plurality patterns maintained by them would collapse.

At first glance it may seem as though the discussion of distance

should serve as an introduction to the chapter on processes of dissociation, just as the foregoing discussion of contacts led at once to mention of processes of association. This assumption is quite erroneous, for distance in the sense of mere absence of contact is not a concept relevant at this point. The strictly sociological meaning of distance always implies contact; for example, the actual physical distance which must always separate a Pariah from a Brahman involves a contact even though it be negative, just as it also involves psychical distance resulting from social processes initiated by contacts. Further, contacts in which specific social distances are primary often lead to advance (*Aa*), or even culminate in amalgamation (*Ad*), although it cannot be denied that contravention and conflict are more frequent results.

Contacts which are cumulative or monotonously repeated may have eventual consequences that contrast markedly with the effects of the initial stages. The first contacts may bring attraction and interest but frequent repetition may repel, and *vice versa*.

§5. VARIETIES OF CONTACT

Let it be emphasized that contacts between single human beings are by no means the only varieties that affect interhuman behavior; contacts between plurality patterns are at least equally important and will later receive due attention.

Other distinctions, however, are more relevant in the present context; hence the following classification:

(1) Primary and secondary contacts. The former are directly mediated by the senses; persons in primary contact must also be in relative spatial proximity. What Cooley has termed face-to-face contacts, in which the eye is the organ most active, and other types involving smell, sound, and touch therefore fall in this class. The secondary variety is indirectly mediated and usually involves greater spatial separation; letters, telegrams, and similar means of communication are comprised in this category.

(2) Physical and psychical contacts. The contrast between these is closely related to but is not identical with the foregoing contrast between primary and secondary. Contacts resulting from relative spatial proximity are usually (but not always) both physical and psychical.

(3) Voluntary and involuntary contacts.

(4) Sympathetic and catorgic contacts.

5. PHYSICAL CONTACTS

Sense-perception is the indispensable basis of physical contact; the tactile sense, the elementary protoplasmic property from which all other senses have developed, gives rise to contact in the root meaning of the word. Little need be said to recall the inexhaustible importance which contacts mediated by that all-encompassing organ, the skin, have for interhuman relations. The caress, the kiss, the handclasp, the slap, the kick, the jostle, the nudge, the gentle and apparently unintentional brushing against clothing, and similar primary contacts often initiate long process-series and chains of relationships, or give to already existing interhuman bonds new or intensified trends.

The close union if not fundamental identity of body and mind, the utter dependence of all vital sensations upon the nerves, and the corporeality of human nature (which no airy talk about "spirituality" can dissipate) are strikingly evidenced by the dominance of physical contacts. Human beings wish to grasp and fondle what they love, they wish to clutch and rend asunder what they hate. The hand is not only the model for the simplest tools and thus the organ with which *human* history definitely begins, but it is also the ultimate symbol of association and dissociation.

§7. ATTRACTION AND REPULSION

Contacts mediated by the eye, the ear, or the nose are oftentimes prior to tactile contacts; moreover, they exist in much greater variety than the latter and are capable of greater elaboration and symbolization. The concept of contact comprises a tremendous range of sense-impressions and derivatives which are capable of entering into extremely complex cross-connections with each other. Indeed, it may be said that interconnections are so numerous that one sort of contact always supplants or calls forth other kinds.

Two fairly distinct configurations of contacts may nevertheless be distinguished; they may be termed attraction and repulsion. Their connection with the different kinds of sense-perception cannot be dealt with in detail here; all that can be said is that these configurations include certain psychical processes which accompany, guide, and divert sense-perceptions and in turn are markedly influenced by them; the causal connection is often extremely complicated. The following examples are arbitrarily simplified but may be of some service: *A* feels himself erotically attracted to *B*; the desire to touch *B* arises. In this instance, the attraction is prior to the wish for tactile contact,

and in most cases it is prior to the unintentional establishment of such contact. There are other instances, however, in which *A*, unintentionally coming in tactile contact with *B* for the first time, feels erotic attraction to *B*; i.e., the attraction results only when tactile contact has been established.

The interest of the systematic sociologist in physical contacts arises solely from the part they play in attraction and repulsion. What happens when two strangers meet? Complete indifference is rare. The usual consequence is some measure of interest on the part of one or both, although this is often slight. Such interest is partly conditioned by external circumstances, partly by the behavior and attributes of both persons. Sometimes extremely strong interest develops almost immediately; for example, if love be taken to mean inclination, infatuation, or passion, "love at first sight" is not merely a well-worn device of the novelist but an *experience* to which many persons can testify.

§8. SYMPATHETIC AND CATEGORIC CONTACTS

One general type of reaction to primary contact may be stated thus: when two or more persons meet and attention is not diverted by other persons, objects, etc., attraction or repulsion becomes evident to one or more of the persons within a very short time—in a fraction of a second in some cases. Small says, "Each is a magnet acting upon the rest." When attraction occurs it may be assumed to be accompanied by the vague or unconscious feeling that it would be better to establish a relationship with the other person than to remain detached and aloof. Practically nothing is known of the basis of such interhuman influences; metaphors such as "magnetic personality" are often used, but they explain nothing. Instance the fact that the erotic attraction sometimes arising when strangers meet cannot be wholly traced to notions of the beautiful held by either or both participants; such attraction seems much more elemental, and oftentimes is in direct opposition to conscious personal preferences. The extent to which obscure habits, repressed emotions, and similar factors also figure in such attraction of course varies markedly. This is also true of the strength of its manifestation, inasmuch as the person experiencing such attraction may not be fully conscious of it, or, if he is, may disguise, rationalize, or dissipate it at once.

The same may be said of repulsion. The inexplicable antipathies that sometimes arise at the very first encounter, the aversions for which no reason can be given (and which indeed are often contrary

to all reason) must be accepted by the sociologist as basic data; the causal nexus can usually be discovered only by prolonged social-psychological investigation.

Especially important is the rapidity of emotional reaction to perception of the other person or persons. Shaler has aptly said: "If we observe what takes place in our own minds at such meetings, we will see that the action in its immediateness is like that of the eyelids when the eye is threatened. As we say, it is done before we know it."¹

There is a second general type of reaction to primary contact; the feeling of attraction or repulsion is not always evident. Frequently newcomers evoke no perceivable preference or distaste on their first appearance. Reaction is more objective; rational criteria or accepted social standards inhibit the emotions linked with sympathy or antipathy. The stranger is promptly labelled or assigned a niche in a familiar plurality pattern. His social affiliations with a class, a cultural or racial group, etc., are matters of primary interest for the observer.

In Shaler's terminology, this is a categoric contact; it is markedly in contrast to the emotional attraction and repulsion sometimes called forth in the observer as a result of the newcomer's relation to his own tastes, inclinations, desires, and experiences—in brief, to positive or negative sympathetic contacts. The two varieties are of course ideal-typical; in empirical instances, practically every sympathetic contact has some categoric elements, and *vice versa*; for present purposes, however, there is every reason conceptually to separate them.

The question that next arises is this: What is the consequence of closer acquaintance, i.e., when the contact gives rise to social processes culminating in definite relationships? Frequently there results a rapid mutation or a slow alteration leading from the sympathetic to the categoric or from the categoric to the sympathetic. Let us take as an instance the classification of strangers in social categories in agreement with conventional symbols. Clothing, posture, habitual gestures, and similar external traits lead to such stereotypes as "That is a scrubwoman"—or a leisure class "lady," a typist, a postman, a policeman off duty, a parvenu, a spy, a teacher, a social worker, etc. Such categoric classification, although often emotionally toned, is *effected* primarily by non-emotional means; emotional preference or aversion comes about only indirectly as a consequence of classification. The first reaction does not necessarily involve attraction or repulsion. Or on the contrary, the first encounter brings about a certain type of

¹ Adapted from N. S. Shaler, *The Neighbor*, pp. 207-27, in Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, 2nd ed., p. 295.

common-human, intimately personal, psychophysical reaction and its emotional correlate; as a result, social affiliations are at first almost completely disregarded. It may be frequently observed that as such contacts develop into definite social processes the sympathetic reaction gives way to the categoric; the reverse, however, may also take place. In the first case, the newcomer evokes attraction or repulsion primarily by qualities relatively independent of social categories. The interest attendant upon such reaction brings with it an effort at comprehension through "placing" the stranger in his appropriate social niche. One result of this sequence may be that what was at first an intense attraction or repulsion connected with a specific person is transmuted into a similarly intense interest in a particular social type. Or, on the other hand, the initial classification of a newcomer as a parvenu or a Babbitt may give way to sympathetic relations with this *particular* parvenu or Babbitt. Not infrequently the second stage of contact brings with it hesitation between attraction and repulsion. If the first impression evokes an emotional predilection, the categoric classification following in its train may bring about tendencies toward aversion which then conflict with the earlier inclination. The last stage, just before the contact develops into a definite social process, may effect a transition from a more or less vague state of indecision to a clearly defined sympathetic or antipathetic standpoint.

The effects of repeated contacts cannot readily be expressed in a concise formula. At times repetition may intensify the initial impression; at times it may call forth contrasting or opposing tendencies. Frequently external circumstances, unusual or exotic nature of contacts, and personalities involved introduce many complicating factors. It may be that disillusionment (positive or negative) takes place, or that confirmation and consolidation of the initial reaction ensue.

§9. EXAMPLES OF PRIMARY CONTACTS

Let us survey a few random examples² of primary contacts contained in the table:

Looking at directly, and *glancing at furtively* are close-range visual contacts which usually presuppose well-marked attitudes toward other persons in general.

Behaving in such manner as to evoke like response is sometimes termed "infectious." Laughing, yawning, screaming, weeping, and coughing fall in this class. Genuine social processes and relationships need not necessarily result, in spite of the frequently grotesque nature

² All words and phrases in the text that also occur in table 2 are italicized.

of the contact; in some instances, however, "infection" may lead to a type of conformity which, although often unintentional or involuntary, must be classified as accordance. Consequently a cross-reference (*Ac*) appears after this type of contact in the table; it may be either a simple primary contact or a relatively complex social process.

Interrogating may be merely a contact, although it often implies a well-marked process and its consequent relationship. Cases in which contact only is present may be furnished by the formal interview, asking for and giving information in public places, cross-examination, etc. Only when the reciprocal responses of questioning and answering lead to more than merely formal results are definite social processes initiated.

Greeting and making another's acquaintance are well-marked examples of primary contacts.

Sounding out is a type of contact frequently resulting in a definite rational or emotional decision to enter upon the stage of advance (*Aa*).

Reacting is a general psychological term, but is here used in the semi-colloquial but nevertheless sociological sense of reacting when meeting another person—"How do you react to him?"

Vierkandt notes a somewhat different process, that of *reacting sensitively*: "The mediating mechanism is most evident when physical contact is direct; in this way the horse reacts to the security or insecurity of his rider and behaves well or badly in agreement therewith. Similar phenomena are evident among human beings, as the following case demonstrates: A commercial 'baby food' which had been used in the diet of a particular infant could not be obtained because of a railroad strike, and a local physician who knew the formula prepared an exact duplicate for this child. When the mother, holding the infant in her arms, attempted to administer the preparation, prompt and persistent refusal resulted. When the father offered to assist, and took the child in *his* arms, the food was accepted at once. It was discovered that the mother had been much agitated, believing that the substitute was likely to be worthless or harmful, whereas the father reposed complete trust in the physician."³ Among many preliterate peoples a child is carried upon the mother's back or hip until the fourth or even fifth year; it seems probable that as a consequence of this prolonged direct physical contact the relationship between parent and child is much more intimate, affectionate, and lasting than among many civilized families.

³ Alfred Vierkandt, *Gesellschaftslehre*, 1st ed., p. 115.

Reaction of the first type may be manifest in *pleasing and being pleased by another*, or contrariwise in feelings of rivalry and enmity that lead to *cool appraisal* or *contemptuous scrutiny*.

Laughing gives rise to a wide variety of contacts. The fact that *blushing* and *flushing* are plainly perceivable oftentimes brings about contacts. Such instances may evoke the criticism that laughing and blushing are not in themselves contacts but are only occasions upon which contacts are consequent. The sociologist, however, is not primarily interested in psychological analysis of such happenings; the fact that interhuman connections are overtly expressed in this way is his *chief* concern. It may indeed occur that *A* laughs and *B*, hearing it, directs his attention to *A*, thus initiating a contact, but we are equally interested in the familiar case where the laughter of *A* is the way in which perception of *B* first becomes manifest, as well as the similar instance of *A*'s laughter when he becomes conscious that *B* is regarding him.

Kissing and other contacts of *tenderness* and/or erotic interest may best be dealt with in the special division of our science termed the sociology of sex.

Speech mediates countless contacts and offers a wide field for research. Gossip, the *tête-à-tête*, conversation, discussion, and debate are examples of social-psychological or sociological subjects.

Hypnosis and *suggestion*, ranging from cases almost indistinguishable from normal influence to the extreme examples offered by some spiritualistic mediums, are of quite as much interest to the sociologist as to the psychologist.

Arousing emotion and *stimulating thought* are types of contact which in many ways are antithetical and in others are strangely similar.

Portraying another by means of drawing, painting, sculpture, etc., involves prolonged gazing by one or both persons concerned, but it should by no means be taken for granted that genuine primary contacts are thereby brought about. Quite frequently the interest of the artist in his work precludes anything of the sort. In some instances, however, the conflict between the function of the artist as such and his interest in the model as a person may be of great sociological interest. The question which then arises is: What are the social processes and relationships that may emerge? Erotic relations are by no means the only possibilities.

Curiosity frequently leads to the search for and the establishment of contacts. One problem which occurs in this connection is the degree

of intensity and permanence in the social processes initiated by such contacts when compared with sympathetic contacts (in which greater interest in specific personalities may be assumed to exist).

Advertising and *publicity* evoke numerous contacts; socio-psychology has already found this a fertile field of investigation, and much *terra incognita* still remains.

Joking, jesting, and playing have extremely important rôles as contact-initiating actions. The *dance* is a similar instance; it is hard to resist the temptation to discuss at length the multifarious influences which dance-mediated contacts have produced and still produce in personalities and plurality patterns. The sociology of sex, of religion, of art, the history of labor, and the disciplines concerned with the contrast between preliterate and "higher" cultures all may find tremendous amounts of relevant material here. The strongly marked rhythm in the movements of group dances at times leads to virtually complete lapse of personal consciousness. Grosse has shown that among some preliterates the separate dancers *seem* to merge into a single entity infused with one emotion. The social significance of the preliterate dance lies chiefly in the amalgamation (*Ad*) it so often produces. Such effects are not confined to the preliterate dance alone; the modern dance, as the recent war and postwar periods show, may also give expression to or generate strong tendencies toward amalgamation.

§10. SECONDARY CONTACTS

From the standpoint of the science of interhuman behavior, the greater part of the history of material culture may be regarded as a lengthy contribution to the discussion of secondary contacts, for they are primarily long-range contacts which have been facilitated by diminution of time-cost distance. Persons and places formerly far apart have been brought into such close connection that time and distance seem almost annihilated. Means of communication, from the horse and wheeled vehicle to the airplane, postal service, telegraph, telephone, radio, press, cinema, water-borne traffic, writing, printing, photography, money, and credit are exceedingly effective devices of secondary contact. Recent events have repeatedly drawn attention to the significance of our present gigantic apparatus of communication for the total process of sociation. So far as technical means are concerned, it is now possible to place all the human beings on the planet "in touch" with each other, as well as to effect an external union of past, present, and future (cf. chaps. xv, §3; xxv, §2).

Secondary contacts are at present quite as numerous as the primary variety, if not more so. They are predominant in city life, particularly in metropolitan or megalopolitan centers, whereas the village as a locality pattern is chiefly based upon primary contacts. Intercourse between nations and peoples is largely mediated through secondary contacts.

It should be noted that the tremendous technical development of the apparatus of communication has not yet brought about genuine emotional rapport. Moreover, the gigantic mechanism effects contacts which divide and estrange as well as those which initiate processes of association. The perfection of the means of intercourse affords an ironic contrast to the present-day alienation and enmity so often evident among peoples, nations, races, and classes. The fact that in a fraction of a second a radio message may be sent around the world has peculiarly dubious implications in view of the further fact that the message may be far removed from the truth. The haze of publicity that befalls modern life can by no means be regarded as absolute progress; it is merely a vast culture-complex the worth of which is purely instrumental; the final values or ends to which it is applied depend upon the attitudes of fallible, gullible human beings. No matter what strides may be made in perfecting apparatus, nothing of really essential nature can be accomplished if the directing mind is lacking. Humanity is confronted by the inescapable fact that the peoples of the world know each other little if any better than in the distant past; indeed, it has even been asserted that general agreement concerning fundamental values is further away now than it has ever been.

The bristling frontiers of such countries as France and Italy, Germany and Poland, China and Russia, the systems of protective tariffs and subsidies, the ever-recurring attempts to monopolize the means of communication, the insatiate expansion of imperialism, the unprecedented growth of war-waging systems, the startling proliferation of technical means for mass destruction—all rendered possible by the facilitation of secondary contacts—can be regarded as advantages only by optimists of the most myopic, resolute, and unwavering stamp.

The sociology of economics (which being in the special rather than the general field of systematic sociology can here be dealt with only in passing) offers an almost inexhaustible amount of material for the study of secondary contacts. Consider the implications of the words "money" and "credit"! In the complicated system of world economy

that has developed in the past two centuries, secondary contacts play a dominant rôle. Between the office of the importer and the plantations in the tobacco country of Sumatra or the rubber plantations of India, complicated chains of secondary contacts maintain communication and control. The lives of many persons are linked in such a way that one becomes Destiny, as it were, to another, yet they may never meet face to face. Extremely interesting studies might be made of the varieties and effects of contacts between persons of different races who become dependent upon each other as a result of world trade. Before the World War, for example, the German merchants in Bombay had a custom of visiting native traders on what might be termed the Hindu New Year's Eve in order to pay the compliments of the season and to get new business for German firms. The particular time was shrewdly chosen, because on the night in question the natives begin a new fiscal year, closing old day books and ledgers and beginning afresh under the blessing of priests. The Germans were therefore well advised to establish primary, local contacts as the terminal points of secondary, international contacts.

Moreover, contacts falling in other categories may play important parts in world economy; the sympathetic and categoric contacts noted above may be instanced. Business contacts with foreign lands generally fall in a categoric class; rational, objective utilization of persons as instruments is regarded as more important than emotional inclinations. There can be little doubt, however, that sympathy or mere pleasure at the presence of the other person leads to personal attachments that in turn lead to stable economic relationships; and on the other hand, business connections frequently generate personal regard and such concomitant social processes as advance, adjustment, or accordance. Investigation of the extent and significance of sympathetic contacts in world economy might be very fruitful indeed; sociology at present knows little or nothing definite about such matters. The economic theorist as such would not find it particularly relevant, but the economic sociologist would certainly grant it an important place.

Two other contrasted categories listed above remain to be discussed: voluntary and involuntary contacts. Not only the history of colonies but also that of foreign trade on the European continent provides an abundance of examples of involuntary contacts; their economic appraisal and utilization should be along lines different from those of voluntary contacts.

§11. THE RELATION OF PRIMARY TO SECONDARY CONTACTS

Every socius is a focus and an integral part of a system of close-range and long-range contacts which as specific phenomena are continually changing. Further, the influence of both kinds of contact reciprocally and ceaselessly waxes and wanes. At one time proximity and primary perceptions predominate; at another, remoteness and recollection. It is by no means safe to assume that fellowship induced by propinquity is always dominant; at times emotion and volition are controlled by half-forgotten experiences once shared with persons far away. Memories of the dead, imaginary presence of distant friends, fear of persons to whom account must one day be rendered, longing for the far-away loved one, worry about children no longer under the parental roof—these and similar remote contacts oftentimes outweigh the influence of close-range contacts and condition behavior in much greater degree. This is oddly facilitated by constant intermingling of mental images of the distant person or persons with day-dreams, evasions, fantasy-thinking, cravings, and fears. Hence multifarious illusions are associated with remote contacts. Continual close-range contacts are generally controlled and in some measure rendered objective by the frequent recurrence of direct perception, which is *comparatively* free of illusory elements.

The power of the immediate moment, directness of perception, and physical proximity of course render the influence of primary contact more intense. Although there may be a strong effort to call up memories and expectations that transcend the present and maintain connection with the spatially or temporally remote, it is usually difficult or impossible to harmonize what is recalled with the immediate situation. The resulting tension is frequently resolved in favor of the certainties offered by the concrete, vital present; close-range contacts become supreme. Of course, ideologies, completeness of personality integration, symbolic presentations, and so on, may in some cases bring about conditions favorable to remote contacts, but nevertheless Penelopes are not found everywhere. If nothing else, the inevitable passage of time obscures memories and attitudes once thought everlasting.

Proximate and remote contacts, however, are not necessarily antagonistic. At times a physical contact may arouse the dormant or weakened influence of a secondary contact; contrariwise, a secondary contact such as a letter may engender receptive attitudes favorable to close-range contact.

Psychological analysis of secondary contacts must be based upon careful distinction between conscious phenomena as such and the technical means of transmission; the distinction must be made even more meticulously than in the case of primary contacts. The psychologist is (or should be) primarily concerned with intra-organic processes, leaving description and explanation of transmission, etc., to one or another of the sciences dealing with material culture. The sociologist must pay due regard to both internal and external aspects, but may and should relinquish the task of exhaustive unilateral investigation to allied disciplines which, especially with regard to material culture, have already accomplished a great deal. It seems advisable to call attention to the two aspects above noted: (1) material-cultural and (2) psychological means of contact.

(1) A wide variety of secondary contacts are brought about by technical devices such as the telephone, radio, and the various means of postal service. Such externally effected communication manifestly produces psychological ramifications of which only a few hints can here be given. Take the letter, for example: a business letter, a love letter, a letter returned unopened, a letter of dismissal, an anonymous threat, and similar communications effect secondary contacts of greatly varying degree and kind. It should also be noted that the subjective factor which we may term "receptivity for letters" is similarly diverse. In almost all parts of the European-American culture area, for instance, women seem to desire and to write intimate and lengthy personal letters more than do men. Once more, many persons are able to dramatize, to vivify, the letters they receive, whereas others seem incapable of reading between the lines or of practising Reade's injunction to "put yourself in his place." On the other hand, there are many persons who possess a positive genius for misunderstanding written communications because of their insatiable desire to extract more than the writer ever intended. The telephone also presents striking differences in the way contacts may be established. Many persons find it much easier to part with a friend or loved one if a promise to "call up in the morning" is made. Some persons seem to be able to say as much over the telephone as they could face to face; bystanders are often amused or embarrassed by the extremely intimate nature of the one-sided conversation. In direct contrast, others seem wholly incapable of using a personal or confidential tone in telephone conversation; they seem to regard the instrument solely as a tool for strictly categorical, "business-like" interchange. The question may well be asked whether rapid "progress" in the techniques of

sound transmission has contributed to the mechanization of social intercourse or whether, on the contrary, the superficiality of the bonds at present uniting human beings has favored the mechanization of communication.

(2) Secondary contacts may also be dealt with by the socio-psychologist as processes in consciousness; the table affords such examples as *thinking of someone who is absent*, *wishing oneself with someone*, *inclining favorably toward an absent person*, and *yearning or longing for someone*. A further difference between this type of contact and that effected by technical means lies in the fact that the former often involves only a search for a remote contact, and hence is usually one-sided rather than reciprocal. To be sure, letters may be lost and telephone connections may be faulty, but in general it may be assumed that *A* and *B* are brought in contact by a letter, for example, in such manner that *B* is aware of *A*'s remembrance of *B*. Moreover, letters sometimes close with the well-worn phrase: "*Remember me to your family and don't forget to write.*" Here, however, we are chiefly interested in those conscious processes which do not become manifest in such external symbols but remain more or less implicit, namely, *wishing to be with*, *longing*, or *yearning for someone*. Such processes in consciousness may be termed "search for remote contacts." The phrase *inclining favorably toward an absent person* is also listed; this denotes a special form of sympathetic connection with a distant loved one which is established after a period of fluctuation, of alternate disinclination and "pro-inclination," that finally terminates in an attitude sentimentally expressed in the once popular song, "Absence makes the heart grow fonder."

CHAPTER X

PRINCIPAL VARIETIES OF SOCIAL PROCESSES

§1. SIMILARITY AND DISSIMILARITY

Waxweiler has maintained that all association is based upon feelings of similarity or identity, and Giddings' "consciousness of kind" has been interpreted, as Ogburn aptly says, "as a sort of all-round social cement."¹ Abel has recently attempted to revive the thesis that human beings unite because of felt similarity, and avoid or oppose each other because of felt dissimilarity, but there can be little doubt that the thesis, stated in this all too general way, cannot be successfully defended.² Fellow-feeling or consciousness of kind is a prerequisite only of a certain type of association, and by no means of every variety. A great many factors must be taken into account; for example, there is polar association, a type that precisely reverses the above thesis inasmuch as it is correlated with consciousness of dissimilarity. Each of the polar persons seeks a *complement*, and the result is oftentimes a stronger form of grouping than could ever have resulted from mere *supplementary* summation. In spite of its antiquated turn of thought, the familiar passage from Schiller's "Lay of the Bell" may well be instanced:

For still where the strong is betrothed to the weak,
And the stern in sweet marriage is blent with the meek,
Rings the concord harmonious, both tender and strong.³

Many processes of advance (*Aa*) and accordance (*Ac*) would be wholly unintelligible if resort were had only to such "explanations" as the "attraction of like for like" or "like response to like stimulus." Moreover, dissociation not infrequently is consequent upon the "consciousness of kind"; there is sometimes an effort to establish relationships with the strange, the unfamiliar, the exotic, and thereby to sever connections with the accustomed, the similar, the commonplace. Often-

¹ Lecture, 1927.

² Theodore Abel, "The Significance of the Concept of Consciousness of Kind," *Social Forces*, IX, 1 (October, 1930), pp. 1-10.

³ Hempel's translation.

times perpetual agreement becomes wearisome and search is made for a source of stimulating contradiction.

Waxweiler is quite right, however, in asserting that although interaction is necessarily reciprocal in some degree, reaction cannot be assumed always to be in direct proportion to action. The kind and intensity of interhuman behavior are conditioned by at least three factors: (1) by the behavior of *A* (here assumed to be the initiator of the process); (2) by the behavior of *B* in reaction; (3) by all the environmental and situational factors which affect *A* and/or *B*. If attention is paid only to the stimulus issuing from *A*, *B*'s behavior may be wholly inexplicable; *A*'s action may be almost wholly transformed because of the configuration into which it enters, i.e., because of the idiosyncrasies of *B* or unusual environmental influences. Speaking in the most general terms, it may be said that an action normally symbolic of association may evoke a reaction of dissociation; in addition, the environmental factor may produce dissociation even though the persons primarily involved desire association, and *vice versa*.

We may therefore say that Spencer, Schmoller, and especially Giddings are wrong in their contention that all plurality patterns are constituted through the feeling or knowledge of similarity; we have seen that this is an erroneous generalization. Even such relatively simple plurality patterns as the group frequently owe at least part of their stability to relations rooting in dissimilarity.

The utmost that can be said is that perceptions or presentations of similarity are in many instances correlated with processes of association, and that consciousness of dissimilarity is frequently linked with processes of dissociation. No statements more general than this should be made.

§2. PRIMACY OF THE COMMON-HUMAN

The distinction between common-human and circumscribed social processes (chap. vi, §§2, 3) is fundamental, not merely a heuristic device for scientific purposes. Certain processes are really elementary because the particular configuration of the particular plurality pattern or patterns to which the participants belong is of secondary importance. This is not to assert that human beings ever or anywhere exist who are wholly uninfluenced by the crowds, groups, and abstract collectivities peculiar to their given time and place; such theorizing leads to the crudest kind of biological determinism. Present-day emphasis upon culture, however, should not result in neglect of the fact that there are basic types of interhuman behavior which are only

superficially altered by changes in existing plurality patterns. Social processes and relationships called forth by love, hatred, envy, hunger, thirst, lust for power, and similar elemental forces are always influenced, modified, diverted, weakened, or strengthened by the forms of the existing folkways and mores, church, state, economic organization, class stratification, law, and so on, but they can never be created or destroyed thereby. It should be noted, however, that these common-human processes are not evident in all spheres of social life; the great majority are found only in the dyadic or pair relationship, and even here may be traceable in only one of the participants. Nevertheless, such processes may at times be quite widely manifest.

§3. COMMON-HUMAN AND CIRCUMSCRIBED PROCESSES

The common-human processes, it will be recalled, are here labelled *A* and *B* in contrast to those occurring only within and between plurality patterns, which are termed *C* and *D*. The most general common-human varieties, it should be repeated, are not *determined*, although they may be strongly *conditioned*, by the presence of particular plurality patterns. At bottom they are more strongly influenced by biological factors than by all others combined. It is of course obvious (if only from inspection of the sub-varieties included in the table) that the specific forms in which the common-human processes appear are markedly affected by the degree of cultural complexity, the historical uniqueness of certain social structures, and similar modifying conditions. *Co-education*, "Southern courtesy" and similar types of *gallantry*, professional *colleagueship*," and so forth, are not exclusively common-human relations; they only contain a few common-human components. *These* components, however, give warrant for placing the sub-processes named in their respective categories under *A* and *B*.

The social processes to which the qualifying adjective "circumscribed" is applied must not, however, be thought of as derivative or secondary. It is wholly erroneous to suppose that these circumscribed processes are based upon common-human processes and thus differ from the latter merely in point of greater complexity. This is sometimes but not always the case; there is nothing inherently necessary about it. The only reason for distinguishing circumscribed processes is that they take place only within and between plurality patterns and thus fall in the *C* to *F* categories of the table. One may of course use such concepts as "domination" and "submission" so loosely that

common-human as well as circumscribed processes are designated, but in all such cases different terms should be applied to the former, using the latter only to denote processes and relationships circumscribed by definite plurality patterns having more or less coherent organization and relatively large membership. Domination and submission apply only to circumscribed sociation, whereas such terms as "leading" and "following" should be introduced to designate common-human behavior.

Furthermore, the antithesis between the processes grouped under *A* and *B* on the one hand and *C* to *F* on the other do *not* point to a contrast between interhuman behavior (1) in small groups such as the dyad, triad or tetrad and (2) in larger plurality patterns. It must be granted that in the pair or dyad, common-human social processes are more frequent than in plurality patterns which have a membership running into two or more figures, and conversely that circumscribed social processes are far more frequent in the latter. Nevertheless, *fighting, trading, establishing a home*, etc., may involve many or few persons; the same is true of *corrupting, coercing, "playing politics,"* and so on.

It should therefore be quite plain that extreme difficulty may arise in deciding whether a particular process or relationship is to be classified as common-human or circumscribed. Heuristic considerations, however, make it permissible to define marginal cases in such a way that relatively clear distinctions are possible. Thus when we place *coercing* among the circumscribed processes it is regarded as that type of compulsion associated with domination or submission only, whereas the common-human coercive processes are designated by a number of terms making closer discrimination possible.

§4. PRINCIPAL PERSONAL ATTITUDES

When discussing mixed processes (chap. vii, §5), the statement was made that the basic sociological dichotomy of interhuman behavior into processes of association and dissociation cannot be applied to the motives associated with such behavior. This gives rise to the question whether these motives might not be classified in a way that is fruitful *and* sociological rather than psychological. In studying each separate process it would therefore be necessary (in so far as the process has any significant subjective elements at all) to determine the general category or categories in which the motives concomitant with it should be placed. We have previously asserted that the whole range of urges, emotions, interests, convictions, and ideas must be

taken into account, and hence that determination of the connection between psychical phenomena and social actions can be undertaken only in monographic study of separate processes, not in the present general system.

Certain it is that if the sociologist is to achieve any general control of the object-matter of his science, he cannot engage in minute and exhaustive analysis of motivation; there is literally no discernible limit to the ramifications involved, as any psychiatrist can testify. It therefore seems necessary to select a few categories sufficiently comprehensive to include the mass of detail confronting us and at the same time sufficiently definite to be of some heuristic value. What is wanted is a classification of the typical human attitudes of chief importance in conditioning (*not determining!*) behavior toward other persons or plurality patterns. Thomas' familiar four wishes seem more adequate than any other formulation: (1) the wish for new experience; (2) the wish for security; (3) the wish for recognition; (4) the wish for response. They have been characterized by Thomas as follows:

"(1) The desire for new experience is seen in simple form in the prowling and meddling activities of the child, and the love of adventure and travel in the boy and the man. It ranges in moral quality from the pursuit of game to the pursuit of knowledge and the pursuit of ideals. It is found equally in the vagabond and in the scientific explorer. Novels, theaters, motion pictures, etc., are means of satisfying this desire vicariously, and their popularity is a sign of the elemental force of this desire.

"In its pure form the desire for new experience implies motion, change, danger, instability, social irresponsibility. The individual dominated by it shows a tendency to disregard prevailing standards and group interests. He may be a complete failure, on account of his instability; or a conspicuous success if he converts his experience into social values—puts them in the form of a poem, makes of them a contribution to science, etc.

"(2) The desire for security is opposed to the desire for new experience. It implies avoidance of danger and death, caution, conservatism. Incorporation in an organization (family, community, state) provides the greatest security. In certain animal societies (e.g., the ants) the organization and co-operation are very rigid. Similarly, among the peasants of Europe, represented by our immigrant groups, all lines of behavior are predetermined for the individual by tradition. In such a group the individual is secure so long as the group organization is secure, but evidently shows little originality or creativeness.

"(3) The desire for recognition expresses itself in devices for securing distinction in the eyes of the public. A list of the different modes of seeking recognition would be very long. It would include courageous behavior, showing off through ornament and dress, the pomp of kings, the display of opinions and knowledge, the possession of special attainments—in the arts, for example. It is expressed alike in arrogance and humility, even in martyrdom. Certain modes of seeking

recognition we define as 'vanity,' others as 'ambition.' The 'will to power' belongs here. Perhaps there has been no spur to human activity so keen and no motive so naively avowed as the desire to secure 'undying fame,' and it would be difficult to estimate the rôle the desire for recognition has played in the creation of social values.

"(4) The desire for response is a craving, not for the recognition of the public at large, but for the more intimate appreciation of individuals. It is exemplified in mother-love (touch plays an important rôle in this connection), in romantic love, in family affection, and in other personal attachments. Homesickness and loneliness are expressions of it. Many of the devices for securing recognition are used also in securing response.

"Apparently these four classes comprehend all the positive wishes. Such attitudes as anger, fear, hate, and prejudice are attitudes toward those objects which may frustrate a wish. There is of course a kaleidoscopic mingling of wishes throughout life, and a single given social action may contain several of them. Thus, when a peasant emigrates to America he may expect to have a good time and learn many things (new experience), to make a fortune (greater security) to have a higher social standing on his return (recognition), and to induce a certain person to marry him (response).⁴

Burgess has made some generalizations about the four wishes that seem relevant here:

(1) No wish can immediately supplant another.

(2) Every person seeks to shape his life in accordance with *one* of the four.

(3) In most cases it is the wish that developed most vigorously during childhood that plays the greatest part in influencing later life.

(4) With advancing age the wishes frequently change.⁵

The last point has certain interesting corollaries; the development of personality in many persons can be typified as follows: the wish for new experience is succeeded by the wish for recognition and this in turn by the wish for security; the wish for response is frequently linked with the wishes for recognition and security.

It should be apparent from the foregoing descriptions and generalizations that the example of some American writers who have reified the wishes in such a way that they become almost equivalent to clear-cut, separate, virtually unmodifiable instincts cannot be followed; the four wishes are not the sources of all interhuman behavior, and at best provide only a convenient means of conducting sociological analysis without either neglecting or over-emphasizing psychical correlates. Wishes are nothing more than the internal aspects of biological

⁴ W. I. Thomas, "The Persistence of Primary-Group Norms in Present-Day Society," in Jennings, Watson, Meyer, and Thomas, *Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education*.

⁵ E. W. Burgess, seminar discussion.

make-up and environmental conditioning; they are very hard to trace, but short of a biological typology that is far more reliable than Kretschmer's and a complete talking-picture record of every moment of the person's lifetime, they provide the best clues of dynamic personality tendencies now available. In short, they are not animistic entities that "make people do things," but indices of profound unconscious tendencies that eventually issue in actions of some kind.

Hence we may say that good use can often be made of Thomas' classification, especially when it finds its appropriate place in a general formula by means of which social phenomena are analyzed.

§5. A GENERAL FORMULA FOR THE ANALYSIS OF CONCRETE SOCIAL ACTIONS

Presentation of such a general formula is next in order. It seems advisable to use algebraic symbols as a means of ensuring uniform application, but such symbolization should not be construed as a claim to mathematical exactitude, i.e., terms such as product or quotient must not be literally interpreted.

Every social action in one way or another involves a plurality of participants that is sometimes quite large, but it may with some justification be assumed that the simplest processes are found when an occurrence directly involving but two persons is studied. The procedure advocated is to take one of the persons as a point of departure and to trace his behavior throughout the course of the whole process. In many instances this is sufficient; at times, however, it is necessary to trace the behavior of each of the participants alternately throughout the entire sequence of occurrences.

The basic formula is

That is, every social process is the resultant ("product") of a personal attitude (A) and a situation (S). (Cf. chap. iii, §8.)

More is implied here than is evident at first glance. Most previous explanations or interpretations of interhuman occurrences have been marred by one of three errors: either (1) the attitude alone is drawn upon in explaining behavior, an error common to the psychologistic school; or (2) the external circumstances of the situation are exclusively focussed upon, an error frequent among the extreme environmentalistic school; or finally (3) the social process is not regarded as a resultant or product, that is to say, as a mixture, but rather as a simple summation.

These one-sided attempts are erroneous because even the immediate situation changes the inner nature of the human being in a remarkable way; he must behave in conformity with the situation even when he would like to be entirely sincere and direct. On the other hand, situations are never registered with photographic exactitude and completeness by the human being, but are transformed when they impinge upon his particular equipment; the phrase "definition of the situation" implicitly stresses this fact. Hence it can be seen why the statement that the factors *A* and *S* compenetrates or permeates each other is made, why we speak of the resultant or product.

In thus calling attention to the observable fact that in every social process both factors exert influence, there is no intention of asserting that both exert it in the same degree. There are many social processes the course and consequences of which are conditioned to a much greater extent by the situation than by the attitudes of the participants, and there are also a large number of processes in which the attitudes of the persons concerned almost completely dominate.

Attitude and situation, however, are composite factors. *A* is the resultant of the socially relevant native equipment (*N*), in which the so-called "temperamental attitudes"⁸ play a large part, and the expe-

* Although we cannot wholly follow Thomas in his *sharp* separation of biological and social as reflected in the following analysis of "temperament" and "character," there can be little doubt that for heuristic purposes the distinctions made are useful:

"We may call temperament the fundamental original group of attitudes of the individual as existing independently of any social influences; we may call character the set of organized and fixed groups of attitudes developed by social influences operating upon the temperamental basis. The temperamental attitudes are essentially instinctive, that is, they express themselves in biological action but not in reflective consciousness; the attitudes of the character are intellectual, that is, they are given by conscious reflection. This does not mean that the temperamental attitude cannot be experienced; it usually is experienced when for some reason the activity is inhibited. But with the temperamental attitude there is no conscious connection between the separate actions in which it expresses itself; every single feeling and satisfaction (e.g., hunger), is for the individual a separate entity; the living being does not generalize these feelings as forming one series, one permanent attitude. On the contrary, every manifestation of a character-attitude is given to the subject as a single expression of a more or less general tendency; a helpful or harmful action is accompanied by a consciousness of sympathy or hate, that is, by a conscious tendency to the repetition (or remembrance) of actions with an analogous meaning; the attitude accompanying the actual production of some piece of work is given as one element of a series that may be willingness or unwillingness to do such work, desire to realize a plan, to earn money, etc. This consciousness need not be always explicit, but it must be implicitly present and become explicit from time to time if the attitude is to be defined as a character-attitude" (W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, 2nd ed., II, pp. 1844-5).

riences (E) undergone by the person during his lifetime. Now, in making this division we by no means lose sight of the fact that "original nature" and "acquired nature" are abstractions, neither of which has any specific social meaning apart from the other. Nevertheless, they are permissible working fictions and should be used for what they are worth. For example, we know that a tremendous number of extra-organic influences modify the biological types of Kretschmer and Jaensch, but the basic tendencies they indicate cannot be disregarded. We may therefore say that $A = N \times E$.

The situation (S) also yields two elements: (1) the physical environment (B); and (2) the attitudes of the other persons participating in the process in question (A_1). In this case as well one factor must not be neglected for the sake of the other. At times influences of the physical environment, such as topography, climate, tools, etc., may be of chief importance for the course of the process. Hence $S = B \times A_1$.

The factor A_1 offers the same possibility of separation into component elements as does the attitude (A) of the person taken as the starting-point of analysis. The socially relevant native equipment (N_1) of the other participants in the process must be taken into account, as must also the experiences (E_1) they have undergone. Hence $A_1 = N_1 \times E_1$.

The task of tracing out all the ramifying interconnections of a given case is theoretically endless, but it is actually limited by the data available or obtainable; sooner or later a point is reached beyond which nothing definite can be said. Hence, without adding further detail, we may say that for all practical purposes the various minor formulae combine into the following major formula:

When observation is focussed upon the various items of this formula, it is found that those most difficult to determine are the N factors, with the earlier E factors only a trifle less obscure. All our modern tests for endocrine functioning, basal metabolism, reaction time, etc., do not yet enable us to make any far-reaching generalizations about N factors that are likely to be of sociological utility. In spite of the life-history technique, the same is almost equally true of E factors; if every sociologist had to secure for every concrete social process he studied such elaborate documentation as was furnished by Wlodek in Thomas and Znaniecki's *Life-History of an Immigrant*,

very little in the way of general systematics could be accomplished—there are not enough subjects like Władek!

It seems advisable, therefore, to use a set of categories that classify attitudes (A factors, or $N \times E$) in terms of the chief satisfaction striven for in the social action under investigation. Inasmuch as what men strive for often gives a clue to both native equipment and experiences undergone, such a set of categories, if sufficiently comprehensive, should prove an acceptable substitute for exhaustive analysis of N and E factors in all but the most minute monographic researches.

These categories need accommodate only the desires directly involved in human intercourse; *social* wishes alone need be considered. For example, a person who visits a sanitarium may be consciously dominated by the wish to become or to remain healthy. The proselyte of a new sect may assert his wish to find his way to God. From the sociological point of view, such expectations are either sociologically irrelevant or (much more frequently) rationalizations of social wishes. The supposed desire to become healthy, however, may be a mere rationalization of a wish to abandon oneself to the treatment of an adored physician (response), and religious longing may be a correlate of the desire to yield oneself completely to the emotions evoked by leadership in a body of sectarians (recognition); if so, the wish-classification is of considerable value.

Further, this method of classification by wishes is based upon the epistemological thesis—which cannot be discussed here—that the immediate motives to action or restraint are always desires or wishes. For non-sociological purposes, and in a few rare instances for sociological as well, these wishes may be traced to ideas, convictions, ethos, education, interests, temperamental peculiarities, hypersexuality, atavisms, or racial endowments. The sociologist, however, will seldom find it necessary to go back of the wishes; whether positive or negative (fears, etc., may be regarded as negative wishes) they may usually be dealt with as the sociologically irreducible elements in the inner occasions of social action.

The four wishes, then, find a place in the present system; numerous analyses already conducted in the most widely divergent fields seem to make possible the assertion that the categories of new experience, response, recognition, and security are sufficient to comprise the whole range of motives sociologically relevant.

Consequently the analysis of factors N and E reduces, at least in part, to the relatively simple task of (1) inferring from the overt behavior of the human being in question what the wishes conditioning

this behavior are and of (2) assigning them to one or more of the four categories. In other words, the problem is to determine whether all four or a lesser number of the wishes play a part, which if any predominates, and which of the four mutually limit or intensify each other. Sometimes a social process may be regarded as a collision, so to speak, between a long-suppressed wish and an environment that affords no opportunity for its gratification; sometimes the situation, especially if it be new, is an agent in the release of such wishes.

In view of the foregoing, we shall usually refer to the principal attitudes dealt with in the present system in terms of one or another of the wishes primarily involved; anything more than this leads to socio-psychological rather than strictly sociological analysis.

§6. SOCIAL ACTIONS AS CLASSIFIED BY WAXWEILER

Waxweiler's categories are also of some value, but cannot be taken over so directly as can the four wishes. He too speaks of "social wishes" (*désirs sociaux*); they are the sources of various modes of overt behavior oriented toward particular persons or toward mankind at large. Waxweiler gives a list of the actions which result from the social wishes, hence this list is somewhat similar to the table of social processes used in the present volume.

Before discussing the list, however, let it be re-emphasized that Waxweiler's theory that social processes result solely from instincts and emotions of similarity or identity, and these in turn from the social wishes, is rejected; as already noted, the instinct theory is untenable, and felt dissimilarity may play a part in association.

But to resume: Waxweiler distinguishes nine principal forms of social actions. These are: (1) conjunctive actions which are immediately consequent upon physical proximity; (2) then follow actions tending to protect or to injure others; (3) competition; (4) efforts to evoke in others behavior like one's own; (5) spontaneous gregarious association independent of conscious imitation and dependent upon fear and similar emotions; (6) repetitive actions, which are placed in four subdivisions⁷—(a) imitation, a type in which the initiative toward repetition is furnished by the imitating person, (b) suggestion, a type in which initiative proceeds from the person whose action is repeated by another, (c) contagion, a type in which there is no conscious initiative on the part of either imitator or imitated, and (d) reproduction, which occurs when repetition is for the purpose of duplicating in every respect a particular social action; (7) initiative

⁷ Following Vigouroux and Juquellier.

action, occurring when a person behaves in any respect differently from the way to which education and prior experience have accustomed him; (8) acquisitive action, a type particularly important in the economic zone; (9) selection, the last in the list.⁸

How does this set of categories compare with those fundamental to the present system? First of all, it should be noted that in the latter but two fundamental processes, association and dissociation, are used; all other categories (advance, adjustment, competition, contravention, etc.) are subordinate to these two. Waxweiler's categories are all of equal rank. He too distinguishes associative processes (conjunctive actions), but he does not give them the importance they deserve. Actions in defense of others are not indiscriminately mixed with actions designed to injure others in the present system; Waxweiler fails to make the necessary distinction. Competition is given an important place in both systems, although in our own it is subordinate to the general category of dissociative processes. Efforts to evoke in others behavior like one's own, termed by Waxweiler *activités divulgatrices* and given rank co-ordinate with his other categories, are in our own system reduced to subordinate importance and appear as single processes such as *being a partisan*, *behaving so as to evoke like response*, and *treating* (to a drink, etc.). His fifth category, which he appears to regard as a relatively simple process of crowd formation, is here regarded as a sociologically complex process that is not explicable in terms of social wishes alone. In fact, this category does not seem to fit into Waxweiler's classification at all. The whole process of crowd-formation is dealt with extensively in the systematics of plurality patterns and is consequently regarded as dependent upon circumscribed rather than upon common-human processes. In most instances the persons who participate in crowd behavior have no specific desires or wishes inclining them toward such action; the most

⁸ Waxweiler's original list is as follows:

- (1) *Activités conjunctives.*
- (2) *Activités protectrices ou novices.*
- (3) *Activités compétitrices.*
- (4) *Activités divulgatrices.*
- (5) *Activités grégaires.*
- (6) *Activités répétitrices:*
 - (a) *imitation.*
 - (b) *suggestion.*
 - (c) *contagion.*
 - (d) *reproduction.*
- (7) *Activités initiatives.*
- (8) *Activités acquisitives.*
- (9) *Activités sélectives.*

that can be said is that, in panics and similar occurrences strongly conducive to the emotion of fear, many persons experience a desire to join an existing crowd, but have no specific intention to create one. Again, repetitive actions are co-ordinate in Waxweiler's grouping, whereas in our own they are given subordinate rank among other *general* conjunctive relations. Initiative actions are a particular mode of individual behavior but do not necessarily involve interhuman processes or relationships. Some sociological aspects exist, however, and are adequately accounted for in such concrete social actions as *deciding an issue, domineering, dominating by reason of importance, etc.* Acquisitive actions find a place among such circumscribed processes as "*ordination,*" *superordination, subordination, exploitation, and commercialization.* Finally, selective actions find their place among the circumscribed processes under a rubric with a similar caption, namely, *selection.*

The defects in Waxweiler's grouping may be explained as the result of his biological prepossessions; had he restricted himself to sociological considerations, he might have developed a system much like that presented here. Faulty as it is, however, Waxweiler's list is nevertheless important, for it includes conjunctive, defensive, offensive, competitive, imitative, acquisitive, and selective categories, all of which are highly significant although neither co-ordinate nor inclusive.

CHAPTER XI

PROCESSES OF ASSOCIATION: INITIATING FACTORS

§1. FROM CONTACT TO AMALGAMATION

The nature of contacts was considered at length in one of the foregoing chapters; the conclusion reached was that processes of approach on the one hand and of avoidance on the other—in other words, of both association and dissociation—are latent within them. In this chapter the first set of possibilities will be analyzed; processes of association are the object-matter of investigation. It should be noted that we are to deal only with common-human processes at this point; circumscribed processes, although comprised in the general categories of association and dissociation, are not included because conceptual clarity demands special terms such as integration, differentiation, and so on, to designate processes which take place only within or between plurality patterns.

An ideal-typical cycle of association reaching all the way from contact to amalgamation can be outlined on the basis of present knowledge. The heuristic or fictional character of such constructs must be re-emphasized; a great many varieties of positive interhuman behavior do not reach the final stage, namely, amalgamation, but become static in earlier stages or are diverted or even nullified by intervening dissociative processes. Further, links in the associative chain are sometimes skipped; contact may be almost immediately followed by amalgamation. But these are exceptions, and the ideal-typical method expressly ignores exceptions until a usable frame of reference has been established. The various stages in this frame of reference are as follows:

- (a) Preliminary stage: isolation, strangeness, segregation, enmity.
- (b) Transition: contact.
- (c) Prerequisites of association:
 - (1) sufferance (toleration);
 - (2) compromise.
- (d) Processes of association:
 - (1) advance;
 - (2) adjustment;
 - (3) accordance;
 - (4) amalgamation.

Although empirical plurality patterns contain all stages of association, for present purposes we may regard the stage of amalgamation as transitional between common-human and circumscribed processes, or in other words, immediately antecedent to the formation of plurality patterns.

§2. HATRED OF THE STRANGER

The preliminary stage (a) has already been discussed at length so far as the component of isolation or solitariness is concerned. It will be recalled, however, that the monad (isolated human being) of the European-American culture area was the almost exclusive object of analysis; his behavior under the influence of solitude was our chief interest. One important conclusion was that his state of detachment is not necessarily due to enmity toward other human beings, and a further conclusion was that the situation of isolation may at times intensify tendencies toward sympathy rather than toward antipathy or enmity.

But only the voluntary type of isolation received much attention; the conclusions reached are therefore greatly limited in their implications. For example, the monad whose solitude is forced upon him is likely to develop antipathies rather than sympathies. This is still more true of human beings living in isolated *groups*, particularly in the simpler stages of culture; members of such groups may indeed manifest a certain loyalty and consideration for all fellow-members, i.e., for the "in-group," but where strange persons or "out-groups" are concerned, strangeness, segregation, and enmity are usually the order of the day. This may best be illustrated by momentarily deviating from the cross-sectional method usually followed here in favor of a longitudinal section; the course of association may be traced genetically from the small isolated sib to the tribe, thence to the larger and still larger political unit, and finally to the super-national, super-racial culture area. From this developmental point of view it is obvious that the modern monad (who is usually subject only to transitory isolation in one or another respect) is replaced by the small kinship group, the sib, as the element of sociation. This kinship group is isolated first in the form of the sib and then in that of the tribe, experiences contacts with other sibs and tribes, and passes through the stages of sufferance and active or passive compromise, until repeated amalgamations of the expanding plurality pattern with other tribes, peoples, states, and nations eventually culminate in the great

political structures of modern times. The cycle by which such association with other groups is effected almost always resembles that given under (d) above. Advances, adjustments, accordances continually follow each other, culminate in amalgamations, and lead to repetitions of the same cycle.

Now in tracing the ideal-typical course of processes of association, it is possible to start either with single human beings in isolation (monads) or small plurality patterns (groups, etc.), and in either case it is possible to regard the preliminary stage as one in which the feeling of difference from other persons or plurality patterns prevails. The more undeveloped the monad or plurality pattern, the more this feeling of difference (the "differential affect") will approximate antipathy or hostile strangeness. Ratzenhofer was not guilty of such gross exaggeration as Gumpłowicz in stating the hypothesis that the "primitive horde" is dominated by absolute hostility to all persons and plurality patterns not sharing in the same kinship bond, and with some qualifications his formulation may be accepted as ideal-typically useful. Hostility of the in-group against out-groups has almost wholly controlled political life from the earliest times to the present except where metapolitical factors¹ (religious, economic, etc.) prevent extreme manifestations of purely political forces. Most preliterate sibs and tribes regard all strange plurality patterns as potential or actual enemies, although some exceptions occur where strange persons traveling singly or in very small bodies are concerned. By and large, the precept "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth" is rigidly observed; the *lex talionis* is all in all. It appears subjectively impossible to the "we-group" that the earth should also have room for the "they-group"; the only thinkable outcome seems to be complete extinction of one or the other.

No matter how great the difference in other zones of interhuman behavior, there can be little doubt that political affairs are still very much as they were when *Pithecanthropus erectus* was slowly becoming *Homo faber* and *Homo loquens*. Latent or active enmity toward all those beyond the boundary, and peaceful unification of all those within, has for millennia been regarded as the quintessence of political experience and wisdom. There are of course occasional relaxations and abatements of such attitudes, but in general the dominating criteria have remained "we" and "they." The greater the area controlled

¹ Cf. Leopold von Wiese, "Einführung in die Politik," *Rothschilds Taschenbuch für Kaufleute*, 59th ed., p. 153.

by the we-group, the greater the pride of its members and the greater their eagerness to extend it still further. Everyone not included is regarded as a potential or actual enemy, and the ethical code governing relations with such persons is altogether different from that controlling conduct toward one's fellows.

The chief reason for the persistence of the feeling of enmity toward strangers appears to be mental immobility, i.e., the persistence of neuropsychic patterns which have been developed in isolation and which therefore cannot be changed without intense emotional resistance. Here Schiller's words apply:

For of the wholly common is man made,
And custom is his nurse! Woe then to them
Who lay irreverent hands upon his old
House furniture, the dear inheritance
From his forefathers! For time consecrates;
And what is grey with age becomes religion.

This aversion to everything strange is not explicable in rationalistic or utilitarian terms. The struggle for the means of livelihood, for instance, does not explain it; the notion that the preliterate fears and hates the stranger because he is a potential competitor who will diminish the supply of consumable goods is one of the most absurd speculations ever advanced. Isolation and its concomitant influences are quite sufficient as explanations. For example, isolation is favorable to the development of rigid social control, and when the latter is established, cultural fixity and mental immobility follow.² Again, prolonged interaction within the kinship group produces a type of control that welds its members into a homogeneous structure and forges them into relatively uniform types.³ Such persons are wholly unable to adapt themselves to situations different from those to which they have so long been habituated. The deep-rooted emotional antipathy opposing disturbance of any ingrained habit, any automatic reaction, comes into play. "To witness an act contrary to our automatic behavior excites at once intense attention, and the strongest resistances must be overcome if we are required to perform such an action."⁴ Without going into further detail, it may be said that some correlates of this mental immobility are uneasiness, fear, hatred, aversion, and so on.

² Howard Becker, "Pastoral Nomadism and Social Change," *Sociology and Soc. Res.*, XV, 5 (May-June, 1931), pp. 417-27.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Franz Boas, *Anthropology and Modern Life*, p. 16.

Political groups in particular have at all times and places fostered the feeling among their members that they alone are perfect, elect, destined to victory, and morally superior (the "centrical affect"). Whenever contact with alien persons or plurality patterns comes about, this feeling or belief is shaken and lively uneasiness is evoked in those holding it; in order to get rid of the disquieting intrusion, compensatory hatred is automatically generated.

Not only is this true of political groups but it is frequently true of monads as well. Those who live in relative isolation with comparative satisfaction to themselves oftentimes are quite averse to meeting strangers. The accustomed equilibrium is disturbed; hence, instead of abandoning reserve or developing avid curiosity the monad endeavors to exclude the disturbing impressions, or finally manages to interpret them in such a way that he can regard the stranger as inferior. There are of course many striking exceptions to this general rule, for monads who are not mentally immobile—perhaps because of the plasticity of youth, biological deviation, or personality disorganization—at times welcome the stranger as a source of new experience. Again, oppressed strata in many preliterate plurality patterns are extremely receptive of alien elements, not because of rational planning to better their condition, but solely because of the unrest and tension which make them mentally mobile. Not infrequently the same person manifests marked mental immobility in one portion of his personality and extreme mental mobility in another—in other words, a mixture of rigid rejection and admiring acceptance of the unfamiliar. Such persons may eventually achieve greater insight, power of observation, and experience, thus merging both extremes in a more objective attitude—thesis, antithesis, synthesis.

When the strange person or group cannot be annihilated or crowded out, a common reaction is the development of prejudices (which are but one aspect of mental immobility). The in-group member surrounds himself and the out-group with an unscalable wall of rationalizations. Wholly trivial differences are regarded as evidence of fundamental superiority on the one hand and of inferiority if not depravity on the other. Ross has graphically described this tendency:

"Each people notices and plumes itself upon cases in which its standard is higher or more exacting than that of another people, and overlooks cases in which its standard is lower. . . . The American is shocked by the Chinaman's lack of chivalry toward his wife; the Chinaman is shocked by the American's lack of reverence toward his parents. The American jokes about the absence of toilet soap in his chamber in a French hotel, while the hotel keeper

shrugs his shoulders at the American's willingness to use a cake of soap after previous guests instead of carrying his own soap."⁶

It is clear that such prejudices hinder processes of association, but when plurality patterns become more and more accessible as a result, e.g., of changes in the material culture, contacts necessarily become more frequent; vicinal and social isolation is broken down. Nevertheless, it must not be assumed that prejudices will automatically disappear as accessibility increases; impartial judgments and exact comparisons are difficult for the sociologist, to say nothing of the man on the street. Readiness to recognize the results of objective observation is not a quality possessed by everyone. In many instances the first effect of increased vicinal and social accessibility is the development of new varieties of mental isolation; mental immobility does not readily give way. New grounds for segregation, ostracism, aversion, and self-aggrandizement are quickly searched for and easily found.

At the same time it must be admitted that increased accessibility not infrequently brings about willingness to waive former prejudices and to engage in fairly intimate relationships. Considerations of utility as well as essential sympathy often play a part in producing this mental mobility, but this is not of primary importance in the present context.

When prejudices are thus waived and fairly intimate relationships are entered upon, one of the prerequisites of association, namely, sufferance (toleration), becomes operative. It is not the same as sympathy, neither is it the same as tolerance, and it is also quite different from the prerequisite that immediately succeeds it, namely, compromise.

§3. SUFFERANCE AND COMPROMISE

In Max Scheler's valuable book, *The Nature and Forms of Sympathy*,⁶ a wide range of emotional responses frequently lumped under the term "sympathy" are analyzed and the following types are distinguished: (1) compathy or emotional solidarity (*Miteinanderfühlen*); (2) mimpathy or emotional imitation (*Nachfühlen*); (3) propathy or emotional participation (*Mitgefühl*); (4) transpathy or emotional contagion (*Gefühlsansteckung*); (5) empathy or emotional introjection (*Einfühlung*); and (6) unipathy or emotional identification (*Einsföhlung*). These are not "distinctions without differences";

⁶ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, rev. ed., pp. 249-50.

⁷ Cf. Howard Becker, "Some Forms of Sympathy: A Phenomenological Analysis," *Journal of Abnormal and Soc. Psych.*, XXVI, 1 (April-June, 1931), pp. 58-68.

Scheler has rendered a great service in pointing out the gross inaccuracy continually practiced by many contemporary sociologists (Giddings, *et al.*) as a result of failure to discriminate among the various emotional phenomena listed above; the social psychologist of the future will regard with mingled amusement and amazement that quaint historical epoch when "sympathy" was talked about as if it were a homogeneous entity. In the present context it would serve no useful end to delve into the multitude of problems these distinctions raise; Scheler himself has perhaps done this more thoroughly than anyone else can, hence the reader in search of detail is referred to the book above named. For present purposes, it is necessary only to describe briefly those emotional responses to which the term sympathy can with some justification be applied:

First is compathy or emotional solidarity; this is immediate sharing of the *same* emotion with someone. For example, father and mother stand by the body of a beloved child. They feel with each other the *same* sorrow; the emotion of the father is not an object of cognition for the mother as it would be, let us say, for a friend who additively joins the parents and has pity "for them" or "for their misery." Emotional solidarity can be experienced only with reference to psychical suffering; physical pain as such evokes a wholly different type of response.

Second is propathy or emotional participation. This is idiomatically indicated in the familiar phrases "rejoicing *in* another's joy" and "having pity *for* another's suffering." Emotional participation always postulates some kind of knowledge concerning the facts and quality of the experience of those with whom propathy takes place; it is not the mere automatic emotional contagion described by Adam Smith. Values and not abstract physical states must be apprehended.

Third and last is unipathy or emotional identification of self with other. Examples are afforded by the ecstasies of the mystery cults in which the worshipper felt himself identical with the god, by some forms of hypnosis, by the psychic life of children, and by the phenomenon of mutual coalescence found in the erotic sphere, in crowd phenomena, and so on.

Now, the sociologist cannot do the work of the phenomenologist; he cannot occupy himself solely with psychical states. A definition that takes account of most of the essential points in the above three forms of sympathy may not be phenomenologically sufficient or even accurate, but will suffice for the sociologist: sympathy comprises the emotional responses of compathy, propathy, and unipathy, and is

characterized by a certain emotional rapport of the self with the other or with certain activities of the other. It ranges from (1) mere joy in another's achievement or sorrow (even though slight) at another's misfortune to (2) the culminating emotional identification occurring in the *unio mystica*.

The sociologist is primarily interested in the modes of behavior through which such sympathy is projected into the real world of men and events; he cannot assume, however, that the various stages by which association progresses run parallel with stages of more and more intense sympathy. On the contrary, mere advance that remains permanently short of adjustment may be actuated by profound emotional identification with the strange person, whereas amalgamation may under certain circumstances take place without any discernible measure of sympathy, or at any rate with a qualitatively lower intensity of the response.

Of great importance in the present context is the fact that sufferance (toleration) does not include the higher forms of tolerance, for these are based on sympathy. Tolerance may be the expression of the most profound emotional participation or identification, and from the sociological point of view may be the distinguishing characteristic of amalgamation, the ultimate stage of association. Sufferance is merely a connecting link between strangeness and compromise, a condition in which there as yet exists neither sympathy, voluntary co-operation, nor even voluntary approach, but in which the feeling of enmity or aversion toward the stranger no longer is the chief determinant of behavior; he is there "on sufferance." The behavior peculiar to the stage of sufferance may best be described negatively: it is simply behavior in which implicit or explicit antagonism does not provide the *controlling* component. The result is a relatively pacific proximity, a condition of affairs in which no genuinely mutual aid is practiced, but in which there may be a certain symbiosis. The general mood is that of live and let live; nothing is done by either party actively to hamper the other in the struggle for existence.

Sufferance does not involve any voluntary relinquishment of privileges or prerogatives by either party, and this characteristic provides a means by which it may be distinguished from the second preliminary stage; for in compromise both parties waive certain claims in favor of each other, thus making a greater or lesser degree of co-operation possible.

Association is almost always characterized by the temporary foregoing or complete abandonment of a real or fancied advantage con-

nected with isolation. If the parties concerned do this rationally and voluntarily, it may be assumed that the benefits to be derived from association seem to them greater than the values which must be sacrificed. To be sure, compromise is often involuntary; the superior power of one party or external circumstances may permit no other course. Just as various types of sufferance are repeatedly necessitated after co-operation has begun, in the same way compromises must be continually made even when the stage of amalgamation has been reached. But we are here concerned only with those types of sufferance and compromise which must usually be entered upon and passed through before genuine association can begin at all.

The above distinction between sufferance and tolerance is similar to a further distinction that must be made between compromise and concession. Concession in the sociological sense takes place only when the effort expended and the results achieved are incommensurable because external success is not the goal of the behavior. This is in marked contrast to compromise, for in the latter some sort of rough equilibration may always be externally discerned.

Compromise, however, may be and often is based upon sympathy; as a rule association is preceded by types of compromise which combine nascent sympathetic inclinations with considerations of material advantage. Not infrequently participants in certain types of behavior are not fully aware of the compromise which they in fact are making. Such behavior passes over into advance and adjustment without any clearly marked transition. The feeling of difference or "differential affect" which is characteristic of the stage of acceptance becomes gradually weaker in succeeding stages and hence is not, as it previously was, the chief conditioning factor of the concomitant actions.

§4. TOLERANCE

The distinction between sufferance and tolerance might also be stated as the difference between raw fact and social system. Tolerance as a social system provides a series of principles which are realized in the fact of sufferance. Such sufferance is therefore given the sanction of principles that are essentially ethical, and hence sufferance becomes the visible expression of a specific *Weltanschauung*. In accordance therewith, acts of sufferance, "sufferances," must be carried out as often and as expressly as possible, whereas the sufferances occurring in the preliminary stage of association are not carried out with regard to principles of any kind; in other words, they are extra-ethical, without special emphasis, and often explicable in terms of

utility, coercion, accident, and at the most, vague foreshadowings of later stages.

This antithesis between fact and social system may be found quite frequently in other social processes—for example, in competition. The frequent confusion of one with the other is a fruitful source of sociological error. The majority of social actions are not at first carried out in agreement with principles or as means to an ideal end, but on the contrary, occur in connection with series of events to which no particular meaning is ascribed until repetition leads to rationalization. This may be most clearly observed in the case of competition, but tolerance is an almost equally good example. In those occasional instances where the social system dominates the minds of its members, the actions carried out in harmony with it receive positive or negative valuation; they lose their ingenuous and neutral character.

The point has now been reached where several questions having to do with the fact of sufferance and with the possibility of realizing tolerance as a general social system must be considered. An interesting paradox appears when it is realized that in many instances sufferances practiced in one sphere of social life may necessarily involve intolerant behavior in another. The result is that the principle of tolerance seems to lead to irreconcilable contradictions when applied to everyday affairs, inasmuch as tolerance of intolerance gives aid and comfort to the latter. This is the uncomfortable dilemma in which the "liberal" is placed; a dilemma which he rarely if ever faces directly. He contents himself with proclaiming his principles, and ignores the plain fact that the value of tolerance is wholly relative to what is tolerated. As Carlyle has aptly said: "Tolerance may be a vice as well as a virtue unless one is prepared to admit the possibility of a Heaven and Hell Amalgamation Society." In other words, tolerance is a relative norm without absolute validity.

Every person finds himself confronted by a difficult question whenever he comes in contact with a person he has never met before, or whenever contact develops tendencies toward closer connections. This question is whether and to what degree sufferance is possible or desirable, how much sufferance he himself is likely to encounter, and whether the overt acts of sufferance are accompanied by covert retention of indifference or dislike or whether genuine tolerance issuing from sympathy is expressed.

The history of peoples, states, and classes yields a number of highly instructive variations in the tendency, kind, and degree of sufferance. From the point of view of norms and principles, it may be said that

genuine tolerance or genuine intolerance has never existed anywhere in thoroughgoing fashion. Who is friend and who is foe is decided differently in different historical periods. If the principle of tolerance is applied to heterodox religious beliefs, it is usually withheld from political heresy. If one is "broad-minded" on principle and assumes an air of easy indulgence toward minor peccadilloes or even major moral divagations, intolerance of the moralist, "reformer," or "wowser" almost inevitably follows. The anti-Semite overlooks or wilfully denies the fact that avarice and aggressive obtrusiveness are found among Nordics; he much prefers to assign his unacceptable comrades to the Semitic group rather than to admit that the latter do not monopolize the vices he abhors—he will not admit that there are sinners *intra muros et extra*.

The problem of tolerance is most acute among the various confessions. New sects and cults almost invariably invoke the principle of general tolerance, just as new political doctrines usually claim to serve the cause of "true Freedom." Ross has graphically described this phenomenon:

"The promulgators of universal religions, Buddha, Zoroaster, Jesus, and Mahomet, preached toleration of the stranger. Jesus . . . launched a mighty influence for fraternity. But the Church came to cultivate hatred of the heretic, while belief in collective responsibility for individual error made each community or nation intolerant of heterodoxy. Thus Christianity became one of the most terrible dividers and embroilers of men and brought on the devastating 'wars of religion,' 1546-1648.

"Mahomet, with his doctrine of the brotherhood of all the 'faithful' broke down innumerable tribalisms; but by teaching his followers to draw the line against the *unbeliever* rather than against the *stranger*, he replaced one kind of intolerance with another."

It has often been observed that preliterate peoples accept strangers more readily than do peoples with complex cultures. When the first extreme shyness or aversion has been overcome, preliterate peoples are generally less constrained, more confiding, and inclined to allow greater scope to the stranger than are the representatives of civilized nations, and particularly than are the upper strata of the latter.

The reason for this seems to be that the various sufferances of the preliterate are not dictated by principles of tolerance but arise largely from passivity, naïveté, and simple kindness. In marked contrast to such persons, the man with a greater range of knowledge and more definitely formed opinions finds it rather difficult to be tolerant. He has clear-cut ideas of supreme values, takes account of imponderables,

¹ E. A. Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

and moreover, often conducts himself in accordance with elaborate ideologies that would merely evoke the bewilderment or laughter of the "simple-minded" preliterate. The more complete is the surrender to definite ideas and abstractions, the more difficult it is to be tolerant of those who do not subscribe to them. National antagonisms, for example, are all too often cultivated by the fairly well-educated portions of the population; the ideologies of national hatred would not exist if the world were made up only of proletarians. To be educated in the upper or middle class sometimes means to be able to hate along the lines of an ideology, whereas the class hatred of the proletarian is primarily actuated by his immediate material needs. Persons who have not developed the power of and desire for rationalization do not feel impelled to proselyte for an ideology. The proletarian begins to disseminate his own belligerent doctrine only when ideologies have rendered him fanatically class-conscious.

Nothing can be more erroneous than the belief that human beings become antagonistic or cruel to others only when their own self-interest is involved. On the contrary, realization of self-interest usually brings with it rational planning that leads to compromise with opponents whenever greater advantages will thereby accrue.

Moreover, experience and knowledge of human behavior, otherwise called "worldly wisdom," which normally leads to opposition to all extreme ideologies, may at times lead to lack of overt opposition because it is known that suppression is well adapted to win new adherents to whatever fanatical faith supplies martyrs to the cause. The Romans permitted cults of every kind to flourish within the limits of the empire, contenting themselves with the cool contempt of the master morality. The British in India follow a similar practice, and their grip on that country would have relaxed long ago had they not done so.

The transition to sufferance first occurs, in most instances, when issues which once evoked profound emotions in their defense become of minor importance and consequently no longer call forth the former fervor. Men become lukewarm where they once hotly championed; opposition to innovations introduced by strangers comes to seem reactionary or absurd. Gradually the zone of "sufferability" widens; the criteria of permissible behavior and opinion change.

But as already noted, sufferance is not compromise. That which is only suffered remains alien; not until compromise appears does fellowship become even incipient. External necessities eventually force the persons they affect to become accustomed to them, and when

new habit patterns are initiated, the emotional resistance to change tends to disappear. The greater the pressure of circumstances, the more compromises are necessary; the less the intensity and frequency of pressure, the fewer the points of agreement. Many marriages provide apt illustrations of this fact; it is no accident that the number of divorces increases in periods of prosperity. Equally cogent exemplifications in another field are provided by the history of the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy; irreconcilable differences were allowed to develop during the piping times of peace, and the external pressure of war came too late to close the gaps between Czech and Austrian, Slovak and Hungarian.

Readiness to compromise is in very great measure engendered by experience. Young persons and visionaries despise compromise until they are eventually forced under its inevitable yoke. Without some readiness to compromise it is impossible, in the long run, to retain a place in organized social bodies. The really important thing is, after all, the particular zone of activity in which compromise is practiced. In order to preserve or achieve the more important values it is frequently necessary to give ground in minor matters. There are always choices on either hand, and it is frequently necessary to renounce one for the sake of the other. Eating cake and having it too occurs only when we are through the looking-glass.

There can be no doubt, however, that over-readiness to compromise before issues are squarely faced is just as great a weakness as is obstinacy. Among other things, it makes the art of balanced compromise difficult if not impossible; the opponent endeavors to make few or no concessions, and all too often his dogged self-will carries off the victory. Moreover, every concession, every waiver, undermines independence and originality. In at least some instances the unwillingness of youth to sell its birthright of moral integrity for a mess of comfort-pottage is justified. It is the resistance that the hero always offers to the steady progress of the Philistine. Sooner or later, to be sure, the hero must give ground, but sometimes he discovers too late that the worldly wisdom acquired with increased experience has led him to surrender far too much, and that his moral sovereignty is lost. In such cases it may be better to "die, driven against the wall."

CHAPTER XII

PROCESSES OF ASSOCIATION: ADVANCE

§1. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ADVANCE

The stage where incipient association is possible has now been reached—isolation has been disrupted by the intrusive factor, contact; this in turn makes eventual sufferance necessary, and sufferance slowly generates compromise. Disregarding for the time certain general processes of association (chap. xvi) which cannot be unambiguously placed under any of the four principal processes of association, let us again list the latter: (a) advance; (b) adjustment; (c) accordance; and (d) amalgamation. Under advance the first tentative stages of association may be included; under adjustment may be placed associative processes accompanied by recognition of difference; under accordance, efforts to overcome such difference may be classified; and under amalgamation we may note instances which represent the development of a type of intimate unification that is regarded as self-existent by its participants.

Now, it must again be explicitly stated that association does not necessarily include a stage of advance. From compromise the path may lead directly to adjustment and thence to accordance. In advance there always remains some feeling of hesitation; the incipient association is still regarded as a more or less doubtful experiment. Usually one of the two participants manifests greater reserve and is less desirous of closer approach than the other. The conscious or unconscious resolve to break the spell holding them apart falls to the latter, who then carries out an act of advance or, as it were, makes advances or overtures. Exceptions to this rule are fairly numerous, however; oftentimes advance on both sides takes place because mutual desire for it is latent or manifest.

§2. EXAMPLES OF ADVANCE

The following instances of concrete social actions classifiable as advance may make the foregoing discussion more intelligible:

Adoring or *worshipping* may be practiced with reference either to gods or men. Such practices present in well-marked form the hesitation, meekness, and timidity characterizing many processes of ad-

vance. The adorer or worshipper makes advances to a being, human or divine, whom he regards as greatly superior to himself but whom he nevertheless hopes will condescend to notice or even favor him.

Alluring or *enticing* is an altogether different type of advance, yet it also represents a tentative or hesitant effort to determine possibilities of further approach.

Admitting to "social" intercourse: whoever admits in this sense permits advance; and whoever seeks admission also endeavors to become more intimate, i.e., to advance.

Cheering, amusing, entertaining, instilling confidence in something by personal example, toasting, and serenading are of course not sufficiently analyzed or even described merely by designating them processes of advance; nevertheless, certain aspects that are sociologically important are thereby emphasized.

Confiding in and *entrusting to*: these raise at once the multitude of problems involved in sociological study of secrecy. The starting-point of a secret is not always the fact that someone has confided in another person, but the connection of secrecy with advance is thereby established. The scope of sociological study of secrecy is very wide: the secret society, for example, might well occupy a whole chapter in such a general sociology as this if space did not forbid; the secret functions involved in the political plurality pattern (the state) are indicated by the phrase "privy counsellor"; the antithesis between a confidential statement and remarks intended for publication is known to most of us; the struggle of the gossip and the spy to ferret out secrets is a familiar instance; the fertile soil which the political plurality pattern offers for the cultivation of secrecy and counter-secrecy should be intensively tilled by the sociologist; *et cetera, et cetera*.

Accompanying, escorting, requesting, thanking, being spokesman for, rewarding, applauding, voicing approval, acknowledging, confessing, interpellating, consulting, petitioning, comforting, consoling, dedicating, and assenting can only be mentioned here.

Referring to another as a means of entrée is a two-fold process of advance. A establishes more intimate connections with *B* by referring to his (*A*'s) connection with *C*, who is intimate with *B*. This might well become a secondary mixed relationship, but in the form described above it is only advance; *A* advances toward *B* but simultaneously links himself more closely with *C*—the advance is two-fold.

In his excursus on the topic "Faithfulness and Gratitude,"¹ Simmel

¹ Georg Simmel, *Soziologie*, pp. 581-98.

discusses the sociological functions of *giving* and *reciprocal giving*. He says:

"Giving is one of the most important of all sociological functions; society would not exist at all if giving and receiving of a character altogether different from economic exchange were not continually practised. Why? Because giving is much more than a simple influence exercised by one person upon another; over and above this it manifests the characteristic of a genuine sociological function, for it calls forth a reciprocal influence. The other person either receives or rejects the gift; in either case he exercises a very definite influence upon the giver. Moreover, the way in which he receives it is of great importance: he may be grateful or ungrateful; he may take it as a matter of course or be visibly surprised; he may appear satisfied or dissatisfied; he may feel humiliated or exalted by it; and so on. All of these varying responses exercise a well-marked effect upon the giver even though this cannot be expressed in definite concepts with quantitative indices. Every act of giving involves some type of reciprocal effect."¹

The kind of giving of most interest here is that which initiates a definite process of advance.

Condescending is the first stage in the advance of a person of higher social status toward one of lower.

Becoming familiar does not here denote a long and gradual process of establishing genuine intimacy, but on the contrary the over-hasty, tactless procedure of a person extremely desirous of advance. *Adulating* is a somewhat similar process.

Obtaining patrons, customers or clients is a process of great importance in the sociology of economics, and in its earlier stages may be regarded as advance. This is particularly evident in advertising, the offering of rebates, underbidding, unusually prompt delivery, etc.

Pardoning presupposes conflict; former antagonists effect the transition to pacific intercourse when the victorious party accepts the surrender of the other through the formal act of *granting amnesty*.

Acclaiming finds its place among the manifestations of the crowd and in this capacity has been of tremendous historical importance; it manifests, among other things, successful advance by the person acclaimed.

Various types of advance merit special study from the standpoint of the sociology of sex. The history of *gallantry* has many sociological chapters. Ovid's *Ars amandi* is a rich source for types of gallant advance. At least one other side of amorous gallantry is indicated by also including it under processes of selection, which in turn fall under the general category of differentiating processes. All gallantry aims

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 592, footnote 1.

at distinction (recognition) for one or both of the persons concerned; in periods when it flourishes with particular luxuriance it may even become institutionalized in courts and aristocratic circles.

A well-chosen *compliment* possesses marvellous powers of facilitating advance, and it also affords good evidence of the insatiability of human desires in one field at least.

Co-education is also classified as an integrating process because of its tendency toward uniformation, but it also involves certain processes of advance which are not always intended or desired by deans and other administrators.

In thus running hastily through the list, there is no remotest notion that satisfactory sociological analysis has been achieved. The only object in giving these examples is to make clear what a specifically sociological point of view really is. The jurist, to use our familiar example, necessarily regards such processes as *assenting* quite differently from the sociologist because the former abstracts with reference to specific purposes whereas the sociologist does not. Similarly, *interpellating* and *petitioning* are treated quite differently by the political scientist from the way in which they are treated here, and to the physician the processes involved in *consultation* are not exhausted by the simple term advance. It should by now be evident, however, just why the sociologist has special interest in the social processes thereby presented; he studies them *as such*.

CHAPTER XIII

PROCESSES OF ASSOCIATION: ADJUSTMENT

§1. TYPES OF ADJUSTMENT AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES

Advance oftentimes has features that almost place it among the prerequisites of association rather than among the genuinely associative processes; in specific cases there is frequently some doubt whether applauding, complimenting, confessing, etc., really represent genuine association. When the stage of adjustment is reached, however, association is clearly manifest, although the connotations of the term indicate that the persons associating retain many of their differences. Adjustment implies similarity but by no means identity.

When the great differences prevailing among human beings are recalled, it is evident that a very large proportion of all social processes are classifiable under the category of adjustment. Every such process emphasizes and utilizes whatever similarity may be present, but in order to do this attention must be paid to points of difference as well. If the latter are overlooked, the eventual consequences nullify the adjustive efforts.

We may distinguish between one-sided and mutual adjustment. In the former instance, one of the participants, *B*, remains relatively unchanged because he makes only unimportant compromises or even goes no further than sufferance, whereas *A* endeavors to change some of his own characteristics or permits such changes to be made in order to attain better adjustment with *B*. The consequence is that in nearly all cases of one-sided adjustment the participant who in one or another respect is weaker molds himself to the stronger.

Yet there are a great many cases of mutual adjustment resulting from reciprocal influence. This occurs most frequently in pair relations; it is by no means so common where larger groups are concerned. Such mutual adjustment simply continues tendencies initiated by mutual compromise in intensified form. Actions which in compromise are unrelated and transitory become incorporated in an on-going, continuous configuration in adjustment.

Externally observed, the adjustment of the weaker noted above sometimes takes place through the process of subordination. Now the concept of subordination as used here denotes sharply circumscribed

processes; it can take place only within and between plurality patterns and is classifiable under the general head of integrating processes. Nevertheless, if subordination is so conceived that it may be regarded as an extremely general form of common-human process, it is possible to assert that adjustment is frequently manifested in subordination. It is also true, however, that adjustment of the weaker to the stronger may upon occasion be a more voluntary, conciliatory, and less external process, which therefore cannot properly be designated as subordination.

The observation that the more highly organized and fragile adjusts to the cruder but more forceful may often be made; in many instances this is a result of the lack of insight, adaptability, and developmental capacity on the part of the latter. The adjustment thus forced upon the highly organized participant often engenders suffering if not resentment, for the consciousness of coercion and humiliation by an unworthy partner remains vivid and immediate. Far-reaching generalizations should not be made, however, for such relatively crude plurality patterns as the crowd usually are more able and willing to adjust than are more abstract bodies.

But the crowd is after all an exception; the group, which usually is inferior to its better members and which in its volitional aspects corresponds to the sub-average types represented by its cruder elements, demands that its super-average members adjust to the cruder contingent. This may be observed in any boarding-school, fraternity, military group, or political party. Members who manifest tendencies toward refinement in aesthetic, moral, or intellectual matters are sooner or later made to feel the pressure of the group, for the latter rarely if ever raises itself to the level of its better participants, but on the contrary develops antagonistic trends and attempts—frequently with success—to force adjustment and co-operation at a lower level. The result is sometimes a gain in unity but always a loss in quality.

The rise of great abstract collectivities in the political, economic and ecclesiastical spheres has always necessitated processes of adjustment which in most cases devolve upon the weaker segments. The relative unity of the Roman Empire at the peak of its power, the fairly close texture of the British Empire, and the co-operation of different races in various colonial areas rest upon compulsory adjustment.

To be sure, the transition from one-sided to mutual adjustment is often almost unnoticeable and varies greatly in many respects; moreover, mutual adjustment often leads in the long run to a reversal of

relations of dependence. What at first appeared the weaker eventually becomes the stronger. This is particularly true of military victories or other successes due to physical force; the conquered often possess an old and complex culture that generates increased power after defeat. The conquerors endeavor to take over the culture of the conquered, and hence adjust to the weaker contingent and are thereby drawn further and further into the charmed circle of an alien people—in the majority of cases with results disastrous to themselves because their own peculiar virtues are consequently destroyed. The relation of the Romans to the Greeks, the fate of many Germanic tribes in the *Völkerwanderung*, and the absorption of the victorious Manchus by the Chinese culture they had apparently conquered are all cases in point.

Culture contact, particularly when mediated by population movement, always brings about certain processes of adjustment, and the almost inevitable mixture of blood, especially when sanctioned by any or all of the cultures involved, leads to the further stage of direct amalgamation. Vicinal proximity, such as neighborhood, frequently leads to adjustment only; persons or peoples who have long lived near each other usually avoid possible sources of overt enmity, but they need not necessarily lose feelings of profound difference or even of incompatibility.

§2. ADJUSTMENT IS NOT THE SAME AS ACCOMMODATION, ADAPTATION, OR ASSIMILATION

Some notice should be paid to terms not infrequently used in a sense similar to adjustment. These are assimilation, accommodation and adaptation; although closely related to adjustment, they are by no means identical, as shown by the following distinctions made by Park and Burgess:

"Accommodation has been described as . . . an organization of social relations and attitudes to prevent or to reduce conflict, to control competition, and to maintain a basis of security in the social order for persons and groups of divergent interests and types to carry on together their varied life activities. Accommodation in the sense of the composition of conflict is invariably the goal of the political process. Assimilation is a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments and attitudes of other persons or groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life. In so far as assimilation denotes this sharing of tradition, this intimate participation in common experiences, assimilation is central in the historical and cultural processes."¹

¹Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, 2nd ed., pp. 735-6.

The term "adaptation," in contrast to the two just discussed, is exclusively biological, being applied solely to organic modifications passed on in the germ plasm, and hence has no strictly sociological meaning.

The concepts of accommodation and assimilation are beyond a doubt useful, but they cannot properly be applied to common-human processes. Park and Burgess fail to make the distinction between common-human and circumscribed processes, and hence use accommodation and assimilation in ways that are superficially explanatory but that are highly confusing at bottom. They really have to do primarily with integrating processes occurring within and between plurality patterns, and therefore should not be used to apply to other than circumscribed processes. The concept of adjustment is much more general in one respect, inasmuch as it applies to common-human processes as well, and at the same time is more specific, inasmuch as it is distinguished from accordance and amalgamation. The same might be said, *mutatis mutandis*, with reference to the other terms mentioned.

Let it be expressly stated that adjustment as here used has no normative connotations, and hence no implicit or explicit value-judgments are connected with it. This has not always been the case; Spencer, for example, identified adjustment with progress; he regarded the end and aim of human endeavor to be the adjustment of internal relations to external relations. With this ethical demand we have nothing to do; adjustment is used here only in the formal sense, for it is in itself devoid of value except as it makes for prediction or control. In case someone wishes to pronounce upon the value of the different sub-processes classifiable under adjustment, he can do so only when he has determined the quality of that to which adjustment is made as well as of that which adjusts, and in addition the kind, intensity, and persistence of the adjustive process. The supreme value which many psychiatrists place upon adjustment as such cannot win for it similar adulation from the sociologist; if and when he engages in the extra-scientific activity of value-judgment, he wishes to know the respective qualities of the participants, whether persons or plurality patterns, in the process he evaluates. In general, it may be said that he should resolutely refrain from ascribing superior merit either to processes of association or of dissociation; *sub specie æternitatis* no realistic sociologist would or could express a preference. The mere fact that adjustment represents association is no reason for making it the goal of all interhuman behavior.

§3. EXAMPLES OF ADJUSTIVE PROCESSES

Inculcating denotes a process of planned habituation designed to shape the person into a form acceptable to the plurality pattern, and it therefore represents adjustment. *Instilling knowledge* is a closely related process.

Ingratiating oneself can usually be brought about only by adjusting to the implicit or explicit requirements of the circle to which admission is sought.

Feeling approval and agreeing: approval expressed in applause has already been considered as a process of advance, but feeling approval as defined by Stoltenberg is somewhat different; it is a process in which someone says to himself, in effect: "In his case, I should have felt in the very same way and should have acted, spoken, and thought just as he did." Stoltenberg also points out that feeling approval in this way is not the same as agreeing:

"The latter word does not apply to emotional and volitional phenomena but only to cognitive judgments. Witness the fact that I may feel approval of someone, i.e., I have the feeling that I understand him because I myself once experienced the same mood and evaluative attitude and even arrived at the same conclusion. Agreement, however, is not involved; this takes place altogether apart from prior experience and is of rational rather than of volitional character."¹

But why should these processes be classified as adjustive? To the superficial view this is a questionable procedure, but closer examination will show that mere approval or agreement is still a long way from amalgamation—so far, indeed, that even the stage of accordance is not necessarily reached. The psychologist thinks of the separate processes in consciousness (which may indeed be regarded as sufficiently similar to produce accordance or amalgamation), but the sociologist is concerned with the person as an acting whole that does not become accordant or amalgamated merely because a few emotions or judgments are similar to those of others.

Palliating is a process which, because of the element of motive, is extremely interesting psychologically, but although the sociologist cannot disregard this aspect he is primarily interested in its adjustive features. *A* attempts to make something acceptable or pleasant to *B* by concealing its flaws and doubtful components, and thus presents the imperfect as relatively perfect. The sociological emphasis is placed on this masking of the spurious or unattractive, for it is often done

¹ H. L. Stoltenberg, *Soziopsychologie*, pp. 76-7.

for the sake of a third person whose behavior is excused or palliated. When thoroughly analyzed it is apparent that this is more than mere advance; it is an attempt at association in which the divisive factors are consciously recognized but at the same time are deliberately concealed, and the process, therefore, may properly be classified as adjustment.

Covenanting or forming an alliance will be more extensively considered in connection with amalgamation, for it obviously reaches far beyond advance. Nevertheless, its relatively unorganized forms remain in the stage of adjustment, although the tendency is toward greater co-operation.

Believing in someone engenders a degree of internal accord, but the consciousness of difference is usually strong enough to prevent accordance in the full sense, i.e., accordance of the whole personality, hence adjustment is the stage of association usually manifest.

"Living oneself into a situation" is an especially clear-cut example of adjustive process.

Giving credit is not regarded in this context as a specifically economic process but as a particular type of human relation. Credit is given because confidence is placed in the future willingness and ability of the debtor to pay. Creditor and debtor are linked together by this process; in certain respects they have the same and in others opposing interests. Without some willingness on the part of the person in a position to give credit to meet the would-be debtor more than half-way, the process is not initiated. It may be placed between advance, a type of behavior incumbent upon the man who is seeking credit, and accordance, which goes considerably beyond most debtor-creditor relations.

Moving to pity figures as a process of adjustment chiefly in a passive way.

Imitating is in some aspects purely adjustive, as will be shown in the discussion of the general processes of association in a later section of this chapter.

Coming to terms is manifestly a process that involves far-reaching mutual adjustment; nevertheless it seldom reaches the stage of genuine accordance.

Civilizing represents the attempt to refine cruder types of behavior by subjecting them to external adjustment.

"Collegueship" is a relation existing between persons having common professional interests, and is frequently assumed to generate a sort of *esprit de corps*. When the latter exists at all, however, it is

usually quite weak, for rivalries expressed in competition, faint praise, or openly expressed doubt of another's competence, maneuvering for position and influence, attempts to shift irksome burdens to colleagues, and the familiar phenomenon of envy offer almost insuperable obstacles to accordance, and accordance is necessary to intense *esprit de corps*. A system of regulated adjustment is the most that can reasonably be expected; indeed, many persons would regard this as an over-optimistic statement and would equate colleagueship with actual enmity. The task of the sociologist is to discover the circumstances under which transition from one stage to another in the wide range between open antagonism and friendship takes place; he should know the conditions that create, destroy, intensify, or diminish colleagueship.

Mimicry is a process of adjustment to situation or environment by means of which possible enemies are to be deceived concerning the genuine nature of the adjuster; the effort is to appear as a person or social type who cannot or should not be persecuted, ostracised, or otherwise disadvantaged. Countless analogies are afforded by protective coloration and similar mimicry in the sub-human world; others are provided by high and low visibility, camouflage, etc. Processes surprisingly similar are found in the realm of interhuman behavior, and merit the attention of the sociologist. They are usually quite complex, but can be dealt with by stressing the process of adjustment and treating the relation with the opponent as secondary. In some instances, however, the latter cannot be neglected; it will usually be found that such instances represent secondary mixed processes. Mimicry cannot be regarded as accordance because it does not produce similarity in more than a few respects, and these are frequently superficial; accordance as a functioning whole does not occur. Still less can mimicry be classified as imitation. Interhuman processes in particular make it necessary to introduce mimicry as a concept independent of imitation. When someone "runs with the hares and hunts with the hounds," his behavior is here classified as mimicry, not as imitation.

Influence exerted by the "spirit of the times" (Zeitgeist) is most strikingly manifest in the numberless adjustments it necessitates. The late war clearly demonstrated that the great majority of persons, particularly of the educated classes, are almost wholly controlled by the prevailing "mental weather." Not a single nation touched by the struggle was or is an exception to this rule. A glance at the contemporary written record will reveal the tremendous number of intellectuals who regard themselves as megaphones for the *Zeitgeist* and

seem to put more confidence in it than in their own considered conclusions. This leads to painful contortions in the effort to adjust, and the result frequently is evident in marked lack of personality integration. Such cases clearly demonstrate the fallacy of regarding adjustment as a supreme social virtue.

CHAPTER XIV

PROCESSES OF ASSOCIATION: ACCORDANCE

§1. THE NATURE OF ACCORDANCE

Even at the stage of adjustment certain requirements of association are already fulfilled. There arises a more or less orderly and regulated system of social intercourse, and in some instances nothing more than processes of adjustment are necessary even when persons or plurality patterns are associated for relatively long periods. For example, when two groups are forced into conjunction by external circumstances and remain in physical proximity, adjustment alone will make possible regulation of trade, prevention of friction and conflict, and pacific channelizing of the competition that inevitably arises. All association makes greater efficiency possible, and advantageous adjustment alone frequently results in a marked increase in efficiency, inasmuch as the mutual attention to idiosyncrasies required for successful adjustment also increases the certainty and precision of joint achievement.

Nevertheless, mere adjustment does not wipe out feelings of difference; the latter persist, although they are usually somewhat less intense. Profound emotional and intellectual participation is of course out of the question. When once the stage of accordance is reached, however, mutual participation in emotions, memories and habitual attitudes ensues; behavior becomes more and more in accord, grows more and more similar. There is a large store of shared experience both deriving from and issuing in common culture traits and culture patterns that play a large part in the culture complexes concerned. Such accordance falls short of amalgamation only because it has not yet reached the stage when it is taken for granted, when it is automatic and unconscious, when accumulated convergences have brought about virtual uniformity and hence one inclusive culture complex. Accordance does no more than bring about similarity; it does not achieve identity: hence, though in many respects very close to amalgamation, it is still distinct enough to be treated separately.

Great leaders who attempt to merge two peoples into one exert every effort to transcend mere adjustment. They enjoin a common

language, religion, law, education, and family structure. Whenever and wherever there is an effort to weld heterogeneous elements into a plurality pattern of great uniformity, the struggle against differences in religion and language is relentless. On the other hand, it is sometimes a favorite device of political control to perpetuate religious and linguistic differences in order that the principle of "divide and conquer" may be realized.

Tactics of the first variety were practiced by Bismarck, who opposed Catholicism and its separate system of education, in part at least, because of his desire to break down South and West German particularism and to ensure the continuance of German unity. The opposite type of political maneuver is illustrated by the deliberate effort to perpetuate differences between Hindu and Moslem in the interests of British control in India.

§2. EXAMPLES OF ACCORDANCE

Adherents and partisans attempt to merge their own convictions and desires with those of the leader; this effort to wipe out all differences is characteristic of the process of accordance.

Behaving so as to evoke like response is superficially similar to the "infectious" contact described in an earlier chapter, but is fundamentally different because it involves a deliberate intention whereas the contact mentioned does not.

Deferring to another's judgment is manifestly an act of accordance if it is not hypocritical; in the latter case it is a mixed process.

Whoever engages in the process of *vouching for or endorsing another* becomes jointly responsible for anything subsequently occurring as a result of such endorsement; accordance is necessarily well marked.

Submission is properly a correlate of domination and must be dealt with along with other circumscribed processes; there is a sub-variety, however, which may be termed *serving a master's interests* as if they were one's own, and which is classifiable as accordance.

Being "permitted" is a process in which *A*'s "desires" are first made known to him when *B* graciously grants him "permission" to carry out some act. This is manifestly tantamount to an order; *A* must see that his behavior is in accord with the announced purposes of *B*.

Sharing another's burden is a metaphorical phrase which is here given a special meaning. *A* suffers misfortune of some kind and *B* attempts to wipe out or diminish the harmful consequences of this misfortune by taking them upon himself. This is much more than

adjustment; it is a form of accordance that in some instances may pass over into amalgamation.

In *forming a friendship* or *establishing a home* for someone the ultimate goal is amalgamation, but it is necessary first to undergo a process of accordance; friendship and conjugal harmony are end-results of a relatively long series of processes.

The term *harmonizing* may be applied either to attempts at harmonization, in which case the stage of accordance is indicated, or to the actual achievement of the aim, in which case amalgamation takes place.

Simmel discusses the intersection of social circles in the sixth chapter of his famous *Soziologie*. Although extended analysis of this phenomenon properly belongs in the systematics of plurality patterns, it has one or two aspects that may profitably be considered here. One is that a number of social circles having objective form and organization sufficiently different to permit the manifestation and gratification of all the essential social traits of a versatile personality are sometimes established through the activity of that personality. These different social circles intersect, as it were, in the socius; they are combined in and through him. This type of intersection is paralleled by another: any single circle may be made up of any number of persons who outside of that circle combine with other persons for other purposes, thus establishing fresh intersections. The processes called forth are by no means entirely classifiable under the concept of accordance, but we are chiefly interested here in the numerous possibilities of accordance thereby afforded and their indefinite increase through increase in the number of social circles which can be combined.

Interceding or *mediating* almost always necessitates accordance with the interests of one of the contending parties even though superficial impartiality may be preserved.

In the chapter on superordination and subordination in Simmel's above-mentioned treatise, the process in which *condensation* of real social powers into ideal principles occurs is thus characterized:

"Subordination to impersonal principles is of direct sociological interest in two special instances. The first occurs if the ideal, superior principle can be interpreted as a psychological condensation of an actual social power. The second occurs if this principle establishes specific and characteristic relationships between those who are subject to it.—The former case is illustrated in the moral imperative. . . . The norms originally derived from the will of all are . . . conceived as impersonal, factual norms, and the individual reproduces within his own consciousness the external relations between himself and his group. Subordination to the

moral imperative is therefore a peculiar form of interrelation between the individual and his group.— . . . subordination to an impersonal principle has also a sociological aspect if it leads to specific and characteristic relationships between the subordinate individuals. In this case also the subordination to an ideal principle has usually been preceded by a subordination to an actual power. . . . This development can easily be traced in the history of the *patria potestas* among the Aryan peoples. The power of the father was originally unlimited and entirely subjective. His momentary desires and his personal advantage might be the sole basis for his decisions and regulations. But this arbitrary power gradually became limited by a feeling of responsibility. The unity of the family group embodied in the family spirit grew into an ideal power, and the lord of the family merely undertook to execute its commands. . . . This leads to a very interesting sociological constellation, the subordination of the superior to the laws which he gives himself.”¹

Through this process of condensation, principles of domination are transfigured and are rendered more abstract and profound. The process is noted here because it seems desirable to emphasize the fact that a more or less external and consequently somewhat lax association may be strengthened by support from ideal forces. What was previously adjustment has at least the possibility of becoming accordance.

Accordance may be brought about by *cant*, that curious mental state thus brilliantly characterized by Scheler:

“Cant is a tumor of the mind produced by irritants . . . [such as] lying, Pharisaism, cold formality, hypocrisy, false piety, and social self-deception with regard to morally damnable and flagrantly public conditions. . . . Cant is first of all a peculiar state of mind that makes it permissible to do and say a great many things which others who are not thus peculiarly gifted can engage in only as conscious liars and hence with ‘bad conscience,’ but which the ‘cantor’ not only can refer to with every *appearance* of sincerity—a skilled liar can do that much—but also with the experience and conviction of ‘good conscience’ and all its accompanying manifestations. To put it differently: Cant is an ingrained attitude making possible the art of reaping all the advantages which a breach of moral and ethical principles may upon occasion bring with it, while at the same time excluding all the painful and inhibiting emotions frequently aroused by a breach of these principles. The man accustomed to cant is able to utter the equivalent of a lie and nevertheless retain a good conscience.”²

This analysis certainly is not free from over-emphasis, but nevertheless Scheler puts his finger on an interesting and wide-spread phenomenon which not infrequently plays a part in accordance.

Actions characterized by *discretion* or *tact* represent a type of process or relationship which must be regarded as mixed even though the element of dissociation probably is predominant. It is of great

¹ Georg Simmel, *Soziologie*, pp. 172-7 as translated by N. J. Spykman, *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*, pp. 103-5.

² Max Scheler, *Der Genius des Krieges und der Deutsche Krieg*, pp. 357-8.

importance in the analysis of many social configurations but at this point must be considered in the specific form thus described by Simmel:

"Discretion does not consist merely of respect for another's secrecy, for his conscious desire to conceal particular matters, but is characterized by deliberate self-restraint with regard to knowledge of anything that another does not explicitly reveal. Hence discretion does not apply in principle to specific matters about which one should not inquire, but rather to a wholly general reserve with regard to the total personality of the other person and to a modified form of the balanced imperative: What is not forbidden is permitted and what is not permitted is forbidden. This antithesis creates a fundamental division in the relationships of human beings: What is not concealed it is permissible to know, and what is not revealed must not be known. The latter principle corresponds to the widely prevalent feeling that every person is surrounded by an ideal zone which, to be sure, varies greatly in different directions and with regard to different persons, but into which one cannot intrude without destroying certain values of the individual's personality."⁸

Obviously this kind of reserved intimacy is closely bound up with social distance, and at first glance seems as if it should be discussed only in connection with the latter. At this point, however, we are justified in calling attention to discretion as a form of accordance; certain limits are recognized and maintained, thus making amalgamation out of the question, but at the same time transcending mere adjustment.

The interhuman processes called forth by *style* have been frequently studied by sociologists. And with every warrant—style is a virtually inexhaustible theme. Yet it has one all-pervasive characteristic: individual urges and desires are led into channels of association by the external accordance style brings about.

Complaisance, as a psychological characteristic leading to accordance without the stimulus of a special interest of any sort, is important because of its frequency and its still more frequent admixture with other motives of accordance. Many persons are apparently unable to resist the slightest pressure making for social conformity, but this persistent tendency toward *complaisance* may be supplemented by desires for recognition, response, etc.

⁸ Georg Simmel, *op. cit.*, pp. 348-9.

CHAPTER XV

PROCESSES OF ASSOCIATION: AMALGAMATION

§1. THE MEANING OF THE CONCEPT OF AMALGAMATION

The commonly used words available to designate the highest degree of human association are all lacking in precision; if it were not for the current aversion to neologisms a wholly new term would be used.

When the writing of this treatise was first undertaken, "organization" was used to denote the culminating stage of association, but it was soon discovered that not only were a series of connotations altogether out of place in the present system inseparably bound up with the term, but in addition that organization does not necessarily involve a high degree of association; the process of organizing may be satisfactorily carried out through mere advance, adjustment, or accordance.

Several other terms were then considered, among them agglomeration, aggregation, and conglomeration, but these have the disadvantage of applying only to external processes whereby human beings are brought into close proximity without necessarily associating. The culminating stage of association obviously must be designated by a term that denotes and connotes close interaction, functional unity, union, or even coalescence. All in all, the term best adopted to these requirements seems to be amalgamation. A metaphor may help to make its meaning clear: a gigantic chessboard, the field of human life, is dotted with figures which although markedly different are nevertheless modifiable, and processes of interaction constituted by the influence of these figures upon each other are in fact continually producing modifications. These figures may advance toward each other, thereby coming one or two squares closer and evidencing slight alterations; later they may adjust, which means that they move still closer and one or both become markedly changed; still later accordance may set in, i.e., figure *A* attempts to remove differences in the same way as a similar effort is engaged in by *B*. Finally the figures amalgamate by joint occupancy of the same square and concerted activity in pursuit of a common goal.

Analogies can never be made to go on all fours, however; we know

that human behavior never leads to complete amalgamation in the sense of coalescence; processes of dissociation are always going on simultaneously with processes of association. At certain times these opposing tendencies may be so nearly balanced that only an almost infinitesimal shift in one direction or the other may be noticed; at others association or dissociation almost wholly prevails. Amalgamation is characterized by the marked predominance of association, but this does not necessarily lead to permanent relations of association; on the contrary, it is precisely amalgamation which may at times bring about a reaction issuing in conflict, the ultimate stage of dissociation.

Moreover, the mere fact of amalgamation tells us nothing about the particular portions of the participating personalities that are included. The more numerous the possibilities of membership in divergent interest-groupings afforded modern man, the less profound is his allegiance to any one of them and the less frequent are processes of relatively complete amalgamation or coalescence. The residential mobility and anonymity found in modern cities, for example, almost inevitably precludes intense attachment to any one plurality pattern, whether family, church, political party, or secret society. When this is contrasted with the almost total absorption of the personality in the larger whole represented by many isolated social structures (peasant villages, etc.; see §3 of this chapter), the rarity of far-reaching contemporary amalgamation becomes strikingly evident. But to be a useful heuristic concept, amalgamation need not denote complete coalescence; it may be divided into numerous sub-processes which in the sociological as well as the psychological sense display an extraordinarily wide range of partial amalgamations. Each sub-process in turn may be simply an abstraction representing an extremely large number of empirically manifest separate processes, i.e., of concrete social actions, which vary greatly in degree of intensity and depth. The task confronting the sociologist is that of more adequate comprehension of the nature of amalgamation, and this can be achieved only by analyzing concrete, close-to-life cases such as are afforded by particular family groups, marriage groups, betrothal and engagement pairs, "elective affiliations," and covenants, leagues, and other elective associations. The interhuman behavior called forth in such amalgamations furnishes the basis of co-operation, but in widely different degree. Weber's use of the concept of statistical probability in all definitions of social processes and plurality patterns is eminently justified in the case of amalgamation. Here, as in all other inter-

human behavior, empirical cases provide only possibilities—widely divergent empirical instances of ideal types that in pure form are never seen on land or sea but are simply working constructs.

Many of the points already noted in discussing the lesser degrees of association—advance, adjustment, and accordance—must be more strongly stressed when considering amalgamation. When is the latter stage reached? *When the wishes conditioning it are strong enough.* These wishes may flow from sympathy, from perceived utility, or from the situation. In the latter instance, however, co-operation appears objectively or even materially rather than subjectively determined; the “logic of events” establishes it, so to speak, in its own right, so that instead of being dependent upon positive desire a definite negative decision is necessary if it is to be avoided.

Hence, although the fact that the immediate occasions of amalgamative behavior are human wishes cannot be ignored, it is nevertheless entirely false to obscure the equally certain fact that external circumstances play a very important rôle in amalgamation. All the psychologism and other-worldly idealism now rampant cannot obviate the ever-recurring situations that make wishes for amalgamation inevitable. They are inevitable because experience has shown that amalgamation may be a means for overcoming unfavorable external circumstances, that it may be a source of new strength. Only when conduct can be guided by exclusively rational considerations is there any likelihood of genuine comparison of factors exerting pressure toward amalgamation with factors inclining toward detachment and isolated endeavor, and of following the course that offers greater advantages. The other person or persons concerned must of course be similarly free to decide on rational grounds whether or not the sacrifice of independence is compensated for by the advantages amalgamation affords. Now, there can be little doubt that voluntary rational decisions based upon the felicific calculus are, to say the least, extremely rare. The exigencies of daily life provide little scope for decisions determined by free reflection, manifold opinions to the contrary notwithstanding.

Although, as suggested above, amalgamation sometimes provides valuable assistance, it should by no means be assumed that this is always the result. Current over-estimates of the worth of collectivistic activity have led to uncritical acceptance of the aphorism “Organization always assures success” as an absolute truth, whereas organization actually has very limited applicability. At times and for certain purposes isolation may be more enduringly effective than amalgame-

tion. Further, the similar but less dogmatic slogan, "In union there is strength," is not always correct. Its truth or falsity depends upon the qualities of the participants and upon the end and means for the attainment of which union is instituted. A great deal of amalgamative behavior is hampering and harmful because it suppresses divergent elements that alone could supply the necessary efficacy. Further, unity, which is presumably a necessary correlate of amalgamation, cannot be set up as an unqualified ideal. Its desirability can be determined only when we know what the bases of unity are. Some types of unity, for example, can be maintained only through silence. Unwelcome but vital truths remain unuttered; fresh stimulation is lacking; constructive criticism is impossible. There may be unity on the basis of the highest aims and the most sacrificial endeavor, but there may also be unity rooted in general slackness and complacent mediocrity.

§2. TYPES OF CO-OPERATIVE AMALGAMATION

Some indication of a few of the chief influences leading to amalgamation is in order. In discussing them it is well to do so with reference to the following different types of amalgamation:

- (a) Amalgamation in the dyad or pair.
- (b) Amalgamation in the triad, tetrad and other relatively small groups numbering up to fifty or one hundred.
- (c) Amalgamation of a large number of persons for co-operative purposes.

Let us consider these in the order given.

(a) Sexual pairing is biologically caused; it serves the function of reproduction or of sexual intercourse. Non-sexual pairing leads to mutual aid, to increased efficiency, to diversion and mental stimulation, and to liberation from loneliness. To be sure, these concomitants of non-sexual pairing may also play a secondary or even primary part in sexual dyads. In addition to these two varieties may be noted involuntary pairing imposed by external circumstances. When a pupil is placed under a tutor, this may be regarded as involuntary pairing; a similar illustration is afforded by the young lady and her duenna or chaperon.

(b) Triads, tetrads and relatively small groups numbering up to fifty or one hundred persons are almost the sole types of amalgamative plurality patterns in economically primitive, technically undeveloped cultures with low density of population. As Goldenweiser has pointed out, the exigencies of existence made for small rather than large groups in the earlier stages of history.¹ Indeed, it may even be

¹ A. E. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, p. 402.

said that pastoral nomadism, later the great consolidating force to which most historically important states owe their origin, is in its simpler forms but poorly adapted to the maintenance of large groups. Only when raiding and counter-raiding gives way to exclusive or inclusive conquest does nomadism contribute to expansion.²

The chief factors leading to the formation of small groups ranging from three to one hundred or thereabouts are in most instances those noted with reference to non-sexual pairing. Pairing probably appears much later in the developmental sequence, however, for most preliterate live in larger groups. Pairs temporarily and partially amalgamate into minor nuclei within these major amalgamations; such nuclei fulfill reproductive or vocational functions—inner needs leading to pair-reciprocity are rarely involved. All in all, it may be said that the preliterate spends his whole life in linkage with the major group; the relative isolation of dyadic or monadic existence is at best transitory in preliterate society, for only fairly complex cultures render it feasible. Complex cultures usually develop only when population density is fairly great. Groups of only fifty to one hundred do not fulfill this basic requirement.

(c) Large groups alone can fulfill it, and nearly all large groups are political in origin. Indeed, it is frequently possible to trace historically the transition from small sibs to large tribes as it is effected by warfare, particularly by inclusive and exclusive conquest and their attendant social stratification. Even if conquest is almost wholly lacking, however, the necessity for warding off raids and similar attacks necessitates co-operative defense. The discipline and other group organization necessary in preparation for defense was probably quite effective as a means of intensifying amalgamation and also as a means of increasing the number of those amalgamated. As Ross aptly says:

"... *attack is optional, whereas defense is imperative.* For not being ready to attack there is no such penalty as for not being ready to defend. Hence *fear of being attacked* is the master builder of big permanent unions. The antagonism between tribes and nations has forged men into solid masses."³

The national states of modern times are primarily gigantic organizations for the defense of their citizens. Like most earlier states, it is entirely probable that they were not founded and are not maintained

² Howard Becker, "Pastoral Nomadism and Social Change," *Soc. and Soc. Res.*, XV, 5 (May-June, 1931), pp. 417-27; —, "Conquest and Pastoral Nomadism," *ibid.*, XV, 6 (July-August, 1931), pp. 511-26.

³ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, rev. ed., p. 265.

for purposes of attack. Nevertheless, every strong defensive organization seems to the outsider to be designed for aggression, so that what may at first have been intended for protection only sooner or later induces attack by those who think themselves threatened, or by that same organization "for protection only" on the assumption that attack is the best defense. Further, it is never possible clearly to determine the extent to which defense only is really intended or is merely pretended.

Great political bodies therefore arise on the basis of co-operation against outer enemies, but they also arise for the purpose of exterminating or quelling inner enemies; in most instances both external and internal functions are closely associated. The ceaseless and suicidal dissensions of small groups are terminated when they are subordinated to a great total group which adjudicates their controversies and assures peaceful settlement.

Sometimes great technical tasks, which can be successfully accomplished only by the co-operation of many persons, lead to extensive amalgamation. The necessity of regulating the overflow of the Nile, Euphrates, Ganges, Hoangho, and Yangtze-kiang led to co-operative actions that eventually produced amalgamation transcending the immediate and more or less transitory needs of the common task.

Compulsion, frequently in the form of physical coercion, has played a large part in amalgamation, particularly in the formation of large groups. It is entirely possible that very few such groups could ever have been created by purely voluntary association. Smaller groups, on the other hand, have often been the necessary concomitants of mutual aid. In many instances vocational amalgamations of the Middle Ages and modern times (guilds, trade unions, and similar bodies) were originally defenses against misery and need common to all their members.

When once the larger organization has come into being, a division of labor develops which (1) increases the dependence of its various members, whether smaller groups or single persons, upon the larger whole and (2) provides technical means for maintaining that whole.

In addition to the foregoing distinctions certain others seem necessary:

- (1) (a) Occasional, transitory amalgamation.
(b) Relatively permanent amalgamation.
- (2) (a) Amalgamation based upon compulsion.
(b) Voluntary amalgamation.
- (3) (a) Co-operation through amalgamation of physical and technical forces (similar to Ross' "organization of effort").

(b) Co-operation through amalgamation of purposes (similar to Ross' "organization of will").

(c) Intellectual amalgamation (similar to Ross' "organization of thought").

Some comment on these forms is advisable; it follows in the order indicated above:

(1) The routine relationships of neighbors often afford examples of compromise, advance, and adjustment, although sometimes an almost routine condition of conflict and estrangement is evident. Such routine does not necessarily make for amalgamation, but when it is interrupted by emergencies, e.g., floods, forest fires, and like disasters, these neighbors not only protect their common interests by *en masse* assembly and effort, but may even form a genuinely co-operative group that endures beyond the particular crisis. This is true in other spheres of life as well; unusual circumstances, particularly misfortunes, often-times transform transitory union into relatively permanent functional integration.

Such types of association inevitably direct our attention to the next stage, in which amalgamation is relatively permanent and the efforts of a plurality to reach a common goal are patterned in an orderly way. Such regulated activity, which assigns a definite function to each person and co-ordinates the efforts of each with those of all the others, and which therefore increases the efficiency of everyone, may be regarded as a process of organization.

The maintenance of such permanent amalgamation for purposes of common endeavor makes necessary the development of a functional leader or leaders to whom the other members of the group are more or less subordinate. But this should not be taken to mean that the relation of domination and submission is inevitable in human association. In the first place, leadership is not necessarily domination; moreover, the leader may be in certain respects dependent upon those he leads and may share with them responsibility for the co-operative enterprise. Still further, leadership may be the function of more than one person, as already indicated. There are a great many ways in which domination as such may be avoided or at least mitigated. Without leadership, however, permanent co-operation, and at times even transitory co-operation, cannot be carried out; the common will and common purpose of the amalgamation must be manifested in at least some measure of common subordination to leadership.

The need for unified and firmly regulated leadership is usually greater among large groups than among small because the latter can be taken in at a glance, as it were, and necessary adjustments made,

whereas the former must conform to a relatively fixed pattern if the leader is to depend upon subordinates with whom close touch cannot be maintained. The small groups which combine to form the more extensive body must give up a great deal of their independence, autonomy, and power exercised by whatever leaders they may have had previously; the new leadership of the combined body may in favorable circumstances incorporate all the separate leaders of the constituent groups, but under less favorable circumstances some groups must become accustomed to strange masters.

(2) This fact alone makes friction and coercion almost inevitable in large amalgamations, especially if permanence is one of the chief objectives. Coercion in one form or another must almost always be used. Voluntary amalgamations frequently evidence a persistent tendency to collapse and thus to reinstate the absolute sovereignty of their several components. For this reason, the art of the statesmen who guide the destinies of large national amalgamations incorporating conflicting interest-groups—and no group is without its interest⁴—consists of a more or less judicious use of persuasion and coercion, either by turns or both at once. Examples of such political strategy are afforded by Bismarck's use of both military measures and appeal to common interests in effecting the amalgamation of the particularistic principalities of North Central Europe into the German Empire, and by the tactics of the various ministers who by force and by guile managed to hold together for centuries on end the heterogeneous mixture that was the Dual Monarchy.

(3) A great deal depends on the purpose controlling co-operation; for example, it determines the forces which can be drawn upon for co-operative action. Many amalgamations leave the most of the attitudes and opinions of their members untouched; others, on the contrary, exert their major effort in gaining and holding control of these attitudes and opinions.

Collective efforts toward technical and economic goals usually draw upon the physical strength of their rank-and-file participants and upon certain of the intellectual and executive capacities of their leaders. It is of little avail and oftentimes absurd to attempt control of attitudes and opinions irrelevant to the purpose in hand. The policy of large industrial concerns in ignoring the political and religious opinions of their employees is on the whole wise; amalgamation of will, so far as subordinates are concerned, is not necessary to technical and economic achievement; the only requirement is that

⁴A. F. Bentley, *The Processes of Government*, *passim*.

each separate worker bend his efforts toward the successful accomplishment of the particular task assigned him.

Amalgamation of will is best exemplified by those institutions which have most consistently attempted to place the moral will of each member in subjection to co-operative ends; military and ecclesiastical co-operation aims at this pre-eminently. Both institutions demand a maximum of discipline and hence a subordination of personal preferences to collective purposes. Both have little faith in the possibilities of personal liberty, and both firmly believe in the absolute superiority of the "group mind." In spite of these common traits, however, military and ecclesiastical plurality patterns differ as the purposes they pursue differ, and they therefore differ in the particular personal tendencies which they seek to subordinate. Military bodies must be welded into powerful weapons against outer foes, and consequently demand unquestioning obedience above all else. The soldier must carry out commands regardless of his own opinions—"his not to reason why." Mental obedience is of course desired, but at best is indirect; physical obedience, however, must be direct. The church, on the other hand, demands inner obedience; this is especially marked in the religious orders. Although the military leader can be relatively indifferent to the thoughts and emotions of his subordinates so long as his commands are strictly obeyed, the religious leader, whether bishop, moderator, or patriarch, always endeavors to control the thoughts, feelings, and desires of the clergy and laity in his charge.

Some mention of mental co-operation has already been made in connection with the discussion of solitariness in an earlier chapter (viii, §3). The contrast between solitary endeavor and collective effort there set forth need only be supplemented here by a related contrast between unconscious (or unintentional) and conscious (intentional) co-operation. The former is exemplified by great mental achievements such as the *Iliad*, the *Mahabharata*, Roman law, the *Nibelungenlied*, and Islamic theology; they represent the non-material collective labors of many generations in the same way as the great cathedrals of the Middle Ages represent the material achievements of centuries of co-operative toil. The thoughts of many men merged into a whole composed of diverse yet harmonious elements adjusted to each other like groined arch and flying buttress. This mental co-operation may in some respects have had conscious attributes, but great cultural achievements such as language, proverbs, myths, and folk-lore undoubtedly were almost wholly unconscious creations; each contributor

to the harmonious whole was unaware of the niche his fragment was to occupy.

Earlier periods seem at the present time to have brought forth anonymous collective achievements almost altogether; the names of their authors are either omitted, wholly obscured, or so numerous as to resemble the "begat" chapters of Genesis. The great minds of the past—prophets, legislators, teachers, canonists, philosophers, and founders of religions—appear only to interpret, supplement, and improve the traditions in which they participate, rather than to depart wholly from the ancient ways and follow their own bent as isolated geniuses. In modern times and in recent centuries, however, the great mass of the population seems mentally sterile, and the productivity of a relatively few striking innovators appears almost wholly responsible for cultural accretions.

This contrast is in part the result of optical illusion; the temporally distant and imperfectly transmitted yields only its most general outlines to the investigator, whereas in later periods details can be more distinctly perceived. The mountain range, that from a distance seems only one jutting crag of indistinct contour, upon closer approach becomes a bewildering collection of ravines, foothills, precipices, and outcroppings.

Nevertheless, no matter how much allowance is made for the effect of distance, there can be little doubt that the above contrast is not solely due to optical illusion. To begin with, the influence of cultural change, both material and non-material, has been extremely important. The more simple the culture and the less widespread the ability to read and write, the more is left to memory, improvisation, and creative imagination. Almost everyone who sang a ballad, for example, added lines, stanzas, new episodes, aphoristic comment, and so on; poets were not few but many. Written and printed creations, on the other hand, are more exact, preserve names and specific events associated with their formulation, and generate in most readers a type of activity that is almost wholly receptive rather than creative. Still more important is the progress of professionalization; each of the various kinds of mental labor develops a specialty. Processes of differentiation separate laymen and initiates; the musician as such, the poet as such, the writer as such, appear on the scene. Again, the perpetual re-creation of the valuable elements in tradition becomes a specialized activity in which the scholar and occasionally the artist play chief parts. Schools of thought—the Platonic Academy, the Aristotelian Lyceum, the Augustinian and Thomistic systems—pre-

serve and defend their specific characteristics. The time when any and everyone could naïvely and gladly bring his scrap of song or incisive proverb to the common store of mental goods soon passes; the creative *folk* becomes the *public*; the latter body is forced out of the circle of creative workers, but revenges itself in part by reserving to itself the power of criticism. Thus there develops a fateful division between the public on the one hand and the "intellectuals" and the liberal professions on the other. Much more might be said on this theme, but again the well-worn phrase "space forbids" must be invoked.

§3. SUB-PROCESSES OF AMALGAMATION

The illustrations grouped under the rubrics of advance, adjustment, and accordance are far from covering the whole range included under those heads, but they are much more indicative of the scope comprised than the few instances of amalgamation chosen from the tremendous number that exhaustive study reveals. Those presented are selected for the purpose of showing the multifarious and highly diverse characteristics of associative processes at the stage of amalgamation. Further, sub-processes which do not represent the phase of actual amalgamative co-operation but rather its preparatory levels have been chosen. Co-operation itself will be more extensively dealt with when circumscribed processes of the integrative type (*D* processes) are analyzed; our present concern is not so much with co-operative occurrences conditioned by existing plurality patterns as with attempts to bring new plurality patterns into existence. If attention were to be riveted exclusively upon co-operation, there would be some danger of overlooking those forms of amalgamation which do not lead to synergy (Ward) and which remain, from the co-operative point of view, more or less sterile. In short, only the *possibility* of co-operation need be taken into account here.

This, for example, is the case in *giving shelter* or *lodging*. Such an action may involve nothing more than spatial amalgamation under the same roof. The association thus brought about may remain altogether external, e.g., the economic relationship of the hotel-keeper and the transient guest. In other cases, however, this may lead to a sense of obligation, gratitude, and the development of enduring ties.

Inclusion in a party, circle, or similar group has possibilities similar to those just mentioned, although the tendency to initiate co-operation is somewhat stronger.

In endeavoring to discover the more profound sources of co-operation, which are destined to relative permanence, there is some danger

of overlooking the oftentimes accidental, sometimes transitory, but frequently important amalgamation of crowds. The co-operation which under certain circumstances is evident in a riotous mob or crowd may be remarkably complete; many of the Sacco-Vanzetti demonstrations in Europe and elsewhere, and the 1927 Vienna riots in which the building occupied by the higher courts was burned, afford excellent examples (see chap. xxxv, §3).

The strong effect of amalgamation upon the moods of the participants is especially evident on such occasions as the *feast*, *kermis*, *fair*, *picnic*, etc. The social psychologist here finds a rich field for study; the influence of common games, dances, songs, and similar activities has never been thoroughly investigated.

The processes which Thrasher terms *ganging* and the somewhat similar processes to which Schmalenbach gives the name *clubbing* cannot be analyzed here, but attention may be called in passing to the importance of the amalgamative processes thus indicated.

Two important forms of amalgamation take place in and are characteristic of two contrasting ideal-typical plurality patterns which may be termed "the isolated sacred structure" and "the accessible secular structure."⁵ Good empirical examples of these ideal types are furnished respectively by peasant villages, preliterate communities, etc., and by large metropolitan centers. This is essentially the familiar distinction between "community" and "society" made by Tönnies (see chap. I, §1), who points out that these contrasting plurality patterns evidence in their mental aspects *non-rational acceptance of the mores* (*Wesenwille*) and *rational decision in the light of conscious choice* (*Kürwille*). He writes about as follows:

"The mental configurations with which non-rational acceptance of the mores is correlated are the endopsychic phases of isolated sacred structures (*Gemeinschaft*), whereas the mental configurations correlated with rational decision are the endopsychic aspects of accessible secular structures (*Gesellschaft*). The mental processes roughly denoted by the terms habituation, tradition, and loyalty are characteristic of isolated sacred structures insofar as they approximate ideal types; whereas on the other hand conscious deliberation, definite choice, and rational formulation characterize accessible secular structures. In either case social relations are involved; but the contrast is as great as in the mental processes with which they are associated."

⁵ Cf. Howard Becker, "Prozesse der Säkularisation: Eine ideal-typische Analyse mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Persönlichkeitsveränderungen und ihrer Korrelationen mit Bevölkerungsbewegungen," *Köln. Vt. Soz.*, X, 2/3 (1932).

* Adapted from Ferdinand Tönnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, 7th ed., p. 101.

Cf. chap. I, §1; and Louis Wirth, "The Sociology of Ferdinand Tönnies," *Am.*

Isolated sacred structures, being ideal-typically and therefore completely isolated, are of course composed only of human beings born into them; amalgamation is therefore altogether independent of volun-

J. Soc., XXXII, 3 (November, 1926), pp. 413-32. The following analytic description of the isolated sacred structure and the accessible secular structure as ideal types may assist the reader to appreciate the importance of distinctions similar to that of Tönnies:

The isolated sacred structure is isolated in three ways; vicinally, socially, and mentally. Vicinal isolation leads, among other things, to the fixation of motor habits and intense opposition to change; social isolation leads to habitual relations of avoidance and the fixation of attitudes toward the in-group and out-group; mental isolation, as in the case of under-privileged classes or races, rigid sects, etc., may be the result of illiteracy, early indoctrination, language handicap, real or imputed psychological inferiority, etc., is usually associated with social isolation, and leads to similar results. As an ideal type the isolated sacred structure has all three kinds of isolation to the *n*th degree.

In addition to being isolated this structure is completely sacred (in the special sense here given the latter term). No comparison, classification, analysis, and abstraction, habitual or otherwise, is practiced; everything is unique, concrete, and personal, for all contacts are primary. The organism is so thoroughly adjusted to definite motor habits, attitudes inculcated in childhood, and certain types of association between sense impressions and definite activities that there arises "a feeling of impropriety of certain forms, of a particular social or religious value, or of superstitious fear of change" (Franz Boas, *Primitive Art* [Instituttet for sammenlignende Kulturforskning, Serie B, viii, Oslo, 1927], p. 150). Tradition and ceremonial play a large part in the life of the structure, and every situation is defined in customary and sacred terms; Tarde's "custom-imitation" prevails. The folkways and mores rule; there is a minimum of rationalistic criticism, and of individuation a similar minimum. Even the maintenance folkways and the material objects associated with them are under the sacred sanction; as in the cases of some pastoral nomads and some simple agriculturalists, the herd animals are sacred and the soil is sacred. In other words, rational and utilitarian considerations do not have wide scope even in one of the most organically "utilitarian" of all activities, that of gaining a livelihood. This dominance of sacred sanctions is facilitated by the fact that the isolated sacred structure is economically self-sufficient; there is no foreign trade nor any other opportunity for the intrusion of pecuniary valuation and the development of detached economic attitudes. Inasmuch as there is no trade, the division of labor is simple, and there is no town, urban, or metropolitan economy; further, no strangers, with their detached, critical attitudes leading to disregard of or contempt for sacred matters, are tolerated. What is sacred is kept sacred; isolation has a powerful ally in the emotional resistance to change it engenders. The form of the kinship group is that of the large family, the *Grossfamilie*, the *genos*, and is completely under the control of sacred sanctions. Production and consumption are exclusively local matters affecting all the members of the structure virtually alike. Property is largely subject to collective and sacred considerations; "rights" of testation are strictly (although unconsciously) limited as a consequence. There is, however, a minimum of social control by physical force, and even of overt control; offenses against the mores are punished by general aversion, indignation, and traditional and spontaneous verbal or corporal chastisement, and not by attempts at the Guilt = Punishment equation. Gossip is the most powerful medium of social control within the isolated sacred structure, which perforce closely resembles the Polish *okolica* or region within which "a man is talked about." Verbal or

tary action, but it should by now be obvious that association as here conceived comprises not only behavior immediately related to human volition but also behavior due to processes of objective character.

even tacit "understanding" usually prevails instead of formal written contract; when unusually binding obligations are entered into, the promise given in the presence of the whole society or of its traditionally delegated, especially sacred representatives is the method followed. The home or familiar domestic environment, as well as the *milieu natale* or place of birth and upbringing, are closely linked with fixed motor habits and the correlated emotional responses lending them a strongly sacred character; pecuniary valuation is altogether excluded, and change of such environments is attended by marked emotional resistance. The function of training the children is completely under sacred control; parenthood is a cultural far more than a biological fact. Irrationalism and supernaturalism, whether traditionally religious in derivation or otherwise, are completely dominant; rationalism and scepticism are only potentially present. Rational science is unknown.

Here, then, is one of our ideal types—the isolated sacred structure.

The accessible secular structure, its methodological antithesis, is accessible in three ways (all of them secondary): vicinally, socially, and mentally. Its vicinal accessibility is the result of geographical location that furthers to the utmost limit all the cultural factors leading to such accessibility; terrestrial, maritime, and atmospheric conditions make possible the fullest utilization of all the devices of rapid transportation. In this way the fixation of any dominant percentage of motor habits is rendered practically impossible among a large proportion of the population; there is a premium upon change of every kind, and Tarde's "mode-imitation" prevails. The social accessibility of this secular structure is the result of the complete absence of occupational, professional, class, caste, racial, religious, or moral barriers; there is nothing whatever to hinder social circulation. Competition is consequently unrestricted, for there are no non-competing groups, and the free movement made possible by vicinal accessibility facilitates the spatial allocation of the members of such a structure in strict accordance with their economic status. Topographical irregularities being "ideally" absent, zones of population distribution arise that in their spatial patterning reflect exactly the competitive order. The mental accessibility of the members of this structure is the result of common basic education, complete literacy and lack of language barriers, popularized science and scholarship, a press or similar agency that distributes uniform news to all, etc., etc. As an ideal type the accessible secular structure has all these characteristics to the *n*th degree.

In addition to its accessibility this structure is completely secular (in the special sense here given the latter term). Every relationship is treated as a means to an elusive end, "happiness" as consciously defined in terms of the strictly egoistic wishes of the individual, and never as an end in itself. Comparison, analysis, classification, and abstraction are habitually practiced; the unique, concrete, and personal are completely set aside. Nothing is sacred, for the lack of fixed motor habits and the continual contact with new sensual values puts a premium upon change; instead of inability to respond to the new there is inability to refrain from responding to the new—one aspect of mental mobility. Tradition and ceremonial play no part in the life of such a structure, and every situation is defined in rationalistic and secular terms. The readily perceivable folkways and mores give ground to rational constructs; there is a maximum of rationalistic criticism, and of individuation a similar maximum. The maintenance folkways are subjected to rational analysis, and are changed with whatever frequency and completeness such analysis shows to be necessary. None

Amalgamation resulting from *consensus* probably corresponds most closely to that associated with Tönnies' conscious deliberation, definite choice, and rational formulation, i.e., to mental processes charac-

of the domestic animals is sacred, nor is the soil exempt from thoroughgoing pecuniary valuation. This dominance of secular standards is reinforced by reason of the fact that the accessible secular structure is highly differentiated economically; it has a complex metropolitan economy, with a territorial as well as an occupational division of labor. Trade is carried on with all parts of the world; there are no political barriers, such as protective tariffs or immigration restrictions, of any kind. The stranger is free to come and go as he will; inasmuch as everyone is more or less a stranger, cosmopolitanism acquires prestige value and becomes a further aid to the detachment characteristic of the stranger. Not only *ubi bene ibi patria*, but also "wherever my economic good is found, there is my country"; not only *homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto*, but also "I am an economic man; I deem nothing that relates to man a matter *economically* foreign to me." The kinship group is reduced to the particularistic family, and all the production and almost if not all the consumption functions of the latter are taken over by the metropolitan economy. Property is entirely free of collective and sacred considerations; rights of testation are unlimited, and the individual can "do what he will with his own." There is a minimum of informal social control; offenses against the laws frequently involve no social ostracism, and the Guilt = Punishment equation has full sway. Inasmuch as the metropolitan economy with its anonymity and differentiation prevails, social control in the form of gossip has little or no power; men do not fear being "talked about." Formal, secular, rational, legal contracts are the rule; even the marriage relationship is cast in the form of a secular contract between two individuals—a contract in which the kinship bond plays no conditioning part. The home has no sacred character, but is a secular stopping-place changed without emotional reluctance—indeed, with gratification. The function of training the children is under the complete control of secular agencies. Irrationalism and supernaturalism of *traditionally* religious derivation are not found; rationalism and naturalism have prestige value, and all irrationalism and supernaturalism must seem to be their opposite, i.e., "scientific." Genuine science has great power and wide range.

Here, then, is the second of our ideal types—the accessible secular structure (from an unpublished dissertation by Howard Becker, *Ionia and Athens: Studies in Secularization*, University of Chicago, 1930, pp. 4-10).

These ideal types are by no means altogether new; they show points of resemblance to Tönnies' *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*; to Durkheim's *solidarité mécanique* and *solidarité organique*; to the contrasting types of social organization pervading Simmel's *Über soziale Differenzierung* as well as his *Philosophie des Geldes*; to the classical division into Golden and Iron Ages; to Vinogradoff's kinship society and political society; to Cooley's primary and secondary groups; to Ross' community and society; to Redfield's folk culture and urban culture; to the differing types of social structure depicted by such social organism theorists as Müller, List, Carey, and Spann on the one hand, and such social contract theorists as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau on the other; to Maine's "status" and "contract"; to the antithetical social processes, *Vergemeinschaftung* and *Vergesellschaftung*, discussed by Max Weber; to Sorokin's empirical dichotomy into farmer-peasant and city types; and most of all to the concepts underlying the analyses of rural and urban life made by Park, Faris, Burgess, Thomas, Znaniecki, and others influenced by them. It goes without saying that the content given to this wide range of words and phrases varies somewhat from writer to writer, but as Park has well said, "while these terms may not refer

teristic of the accessible secular structure. Amalgamation taking place at a *conference* may sometimes manifest similar features.

Betrothing and similar pre-nuptial processes are of course antecedent to amalgamation in the strict sense, but may be noted here because they represent a high probability of amalgamation.

In giving examples of accordance, mention was made of *adherence* or *partisanship*; the same processes may be classified under amalgamation when stress is laid upon the behavior of the person who actively seeks to gain adherents or partisans.

The *formation of academies, lyceums*, and similar bodies is, as already noted, a frequent concomitant or even condition of mental co-operation.

Compurgation was frequent in the Middle Ages, particularly in ecclesiastical courts, and when successful was the clearing or exculpation of a defendant or accused person by the oaths of persons who swore to his veracity or innocence. Compurgators were sometimes termed "oath-helpers" and were originally chosen by the defendant; manifestly all the compurgators were united with the defendant in an amalgamative process that at times may have produced enduring bonds.

The sociology of sex has a tremendous amount of material to offer the student of amalgamation. *Amorous or affectional connections and liaisons* represent one large group of intimate associations, and *lasting conjugal unions* of the type analyzed by Max Weber represent another. The task of determining the degree and form of amalgamation associated with variously patterned matrimonial institutions has been frequently undertaken, but to date no conclusions that seem likely to withstand the test of time have been forthcoming.

Legal and blood relationships indicated by such kinship terms as brother, brother-in-law, stepson, etc., form one widespread and important set of amalgamative connections; a marked contrast to these is afforded by *elective affiliations* as Goethe used the phrase. The former are usually regarded as "natural" relationships and accordingly receive positive value-judgment; the assumption is that they represent more lasting, satisfying, and morally worthy forms of association. If only as a means of counterbalancing such unwarranted

to exactly the same thing, I think the differences are not important. What is important is that these different men, looking at the phenomena from quite different points of view, have all fallen upon the same distinction. That indicates at least that the distinction is a fundamental one" (R. E. Park, letter to the adapter).

value-judgments, some attention should be paid to those "unnatural" ties established by human beings in disregard of or indifference to prevailing conventions.

Settlement, colonization, and population movements in general play a part in amalgamation that can hardly be over-estimated (see chap. xxv, §2) but discussion of this topic properly belongs in a more specialized treatise.⁷

Amalgamation in the Dionysian spirit is orgiastic behavior to which Park has applied the striking phrase "the crowd that dances."⁸ The Dancing Mania of the Middle Ages described by Hecker affords numerous examples, the Mystery cults so prominent in the Mediterranean world from 500 B.C. until well into the Christian era effected virtual coalescence of their adherents at certain times; revivals of all sectarian or denominational brands furnish further illustrations. The type of amalgamation resulting is in marked contrast to the type denoted by *consensus* and similar terms, and may even relate to widely different portions of the nervous system. Kempf's "The Autonomic Functions and the Personality" should be consulted in this regard (see chap. xxxiv, §1).

The sociologies of religion and of sex can probably contribute a great deal to our knowledge of amalgamation when they are able to tell us more about the groups united by *fetishism*.

⁷ Cf. Howard Becker, "Forms of Population Movement," I and II, *Social Forces*, IX, 2 and 3 (December, 1930, and March, 1931), pp. 147-60, 351-61.

⁸ R. E. Park, lectures on "The Crowd and the Public," University of Chicago.

CHAPTER XVI

PROCESSES OF ASSOCIATION: GENERAL ASPECTS

§1. ASSOCIATION: ITS GENERAL CONDITIONING FACTORS

The foregoing chapter and the discussion of isolation here and there cursorily mentioned factors that influence human beings in such a way that they seek to end their condition of solitariness. What are the immediate causes, the motivating forces of association and associativeness?

One obvious answer would be that they are found in the external conditions of life. More exact observation of the causal nexus, however, shows that cultural anthropologists and others are right when they assert that the external factors of social phenomena cannot be co-ordinated with the internal; it is a gross error to assign as the causes of social phenomena influences exerted by geographical surroundings, for example, however great these influences may be, or even to equate the two series: objective and subjective. This dualism is expressed in such phrases as "race and locality, man and environment, folk and land," and has thus been commented upon by Ross:

"The fact is . . . migrations and colonizations, the territorial distribution of population, its occupational choices, the location of cities and the lines of investment have human volitions as their proximate causes, not geographic features. It is only when, pressing further back, we seek the causes of these volitions that we come upon considerations relating to climate, contour, topography and soil. For example, all the causes of the location of a settlement are in the minds of the settlers. Geography enters into the case only as affecting the motives which determine their decisions."¹

By saying this we in no way deny that human wishes are dependent upon objective factors (B). We merely interpose the wish, as the dynamic integration of native equipment (N) and experiences undergone (E), between such factors and the process of association.

Further, we are easily led astray when we regard human *needs* or human necessity as the immediate causes of association, especially when this assumption leads to the conclusion that the process is simply an effort to avoid injury or that it has a mere utilitarian purpose. These notions make it easily possible for a type of rationalism to

¹ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, 1st ed., pp. 41-2.

seep into our science that substitutes for the subjectively intended either the objectively valid, the obviously useful, or the morally imperative. Association is not determined by human needs but by human wishes—therefore by that which man *thinks* or *feels* suited to *his* needs. To quote Ross again:

“Usually *need* means what we think people ought to want; but human nature, including its follies, vanities and lusts, is in the members of society and must be reckoned with. Nothing is more foolish than to imagine that all the defects in people flow from defects in society and will vanish if only we organize society on right lines.”^a

In and of itself, nothing stands in the way of our making *need* the starting point of association in the same way as we have made it the basis of economic theory; we have only to conceive of it in the subjective sense. In order to avoid confusion with the objective category, however, we prefer to say with Ward, Ross, and Thomas that the active influences in association are human *wishes*.

These do not always lead to the formation of plurality patterns; the wishes of single human beings seldom coalesce into a “collective wish” to which a social structure then owes its origin. Such cases are altogether exceptional. The desires of human beings who come into relation with each other may be and usually are quite diverse. It quite frequently occurs that men on a high plane of mental and moral development are convinced that a plurality pattern which it lies in their power to create would favorably influence general welfare in certain ways; this conviction dominates them and leads to a “collective wish” to set up such a structure. The more elementary process of association (of which we must here sketch only the simplest features) and the condition of associativeness which it produces do not thus originate, however; they are derived primarily from manifold personal and subjective cravings.

The intensity of the wish for association varies. It usually slackens as the number of associative processes increases. In lonely mountain regions, oases, and on deserted coasts, the infrequent guest is greeted with much more joy and satisfaction than in the teeming metropolis. The wish for social intercourse is soon satiated; but the longing for fellowship lives in the recluse as well as in the man whom the crowd has begun to fill with loathing.

Quite frequently it happens that behavior traceable to other wishes is attributed to the mere wish for association. A man may wish to be active, to find a use for his energy, and requires other men to carry

^a *Ibid.*

out *his* purposes; he seeks tools and not comrades. Or a man wishes to rule, to exercise authority and power; such persons want servants and dependents, not human beings as such. Again, there may be craving for sexual love, and women (or men) are sought. Similarly, there is the desire for favorable comparison, for a trial of strength; an opponent is needed. In all these cases and many others a certain sort of association is sought, but not as an end, merely as a means to an end.

Again, the prisoner, the criminal, the penitent, conjure up human shapes; they want to undo past injuries and to hear from those they have wronged that forgiveness is granted. Others crave the company of the beloved dead in some hour of distress; they hope for the return of long-past moments which will once again bring to them association with those beyond life. The pious believer yearns for union with God rather than for association with men. There is a great emotional gulf between the longing of the lover for his beloved and the impatience with which an absent "business friend" is awaited by the merchant, but all expectation is comprised in the word "association."

Although nowhere strongly stressed, the three chief influences leading to association have already been mentioned here and there in the section on amalgamation. It should not be supposed, however, that these three influences affect amalgamation only; they are fundamental to every other associative process, whether advance, adjustment, or accordance, and may be classified as follows:

(a) Emotionally toned urges, vague affective tendencies, and sympathetic impulses that find their most satisfactory outlet in association. Examples are afforded by friendship, love, liking, and sympathy (as previously defined); some general processes to which they give rise are: *helping, inspiring, taking interest in, sharing another's joys and sorrows, being faithful or loyal*, and so on.

(b) Interests which, although emotionally toned in some degree, usually are consciously recognized as conducive to the enhancement of self. Some general processes to which they give rise are: *acting as go-between, i.e., pandering, match-making, etc., making pliable or suggestible, imitating, urging, pressing upon*, and similar activities.

(c) Objective factors (frequently in the realm of material culture) which make association virtually inevitable. Some general processes resulting are: *employing, acting as patron, customer, or client, having patrons, customers, or clients*, etc.

In short, the influences making for association may be (a) sub-rational or extra-rational, (b) more or less rational and conducive to self-enhancement, and (c) objective.

The peculiar mixtures of the three typical influences (in widely varying degree) warrant some special attention. Frequently the combination is as follows: a particular situation makes the establishment of certain personal relationships objectively desirable, self-interest also exerts pressure toward establishment of these connections, but there is no emotionally toned urge or tendency sufficiently strong to overcome minor obstacles to the association. If the affective factors alone were decisive, probably the stage of advance would never be reached, but pressure exerted by the self-enhancing and objective factors is so strong that the step is finally taken. In terms of the above classification, the low intensity of component *a* is compensated for by the higher intensities of *b* and *c*, and the associative process begins.

Now, every associative process must be analyzed with a view to determining the chief influences at work and their respective intensities if general sociological knowledge is to be achieved. All three components and their manifold sub-varieties must be considered, for if any one is taken as the sole or basic source of association, the door is open to the ever-present single-factor fallacy. No priority that holds good for all social processes can be assigned any of the three influences; the question as to whether social life is based upon emotionally toned urges toward association or upon self-enhancing interests cannot be answered. In fact, the question is falsely put, for the socius is but the singular aspect of the plurality pattern, as we have already seen. It is worse than useless to ask: Why do human beings associate at all? for we know that *Homo sapiens* becomes fully human only through a long series of associative-dissociative relationships with his fellows. No general answer can be returned to the above question; it has no sociological meaning. The question which may properly be asked and in most instances eventually be answered is: Why does this particular type of socius enter into this particular type of association? But even here the answer is by no means simple; it is wholly erroneous to think that economic association, to choose an extreme example, results solely from self-interest, or that familial association derives from emotionally toned urges alone. Further, the interconnections of subjective and objective factors, oftentimes of great intricacy and peculiarity, cannot be disregarded. The fact that certain persons fail to enter upon particular forms of association by no means argues that tendencies in that direction are lacking; there may be strong drives or interests that have not yet found (and indeed may never find) the proper external circumstances or objective factors which permit their associative realization.

§2. ASSOCIATION: GENERAL SITUATIONAL LIMITATIONS

A word or two concerning personality and situation may not be amiss in the present context. Most of us are much too ready to believe, with Edward Bok and his *confrères*, that "Every man is the shaper of his own destiny." Many biographers attempt to explain the lives of their subjects by pointing to innate qualities on the one hand and to the positive events which have impinged upon these particular qualities on the other—the resultant supposedly accounting for everything. How childish a procedure this is at once becomes apparent when we realize that the course of many human lives is determined not by positive but by negative occurrences, by the mere absence of events that presumably would have aroused the dormant powers and capacities; "chill penury repressed his noble rage. . . ." Our eagerness to schematize, to force the complexities of life into a few simple categories (all too often moralistic), our optimism, and our continual overestimation of the rôle of unilinear causation in human life lead us to assume a close correspondence between innate qualities and capacities and the life actually led by their possessor. Only in exceptional instances, however, is there any marked harmony between the two; almost everyone manifests numerous discrepancies, although it is also true that talent usually finds some kind of an outlet, inadequate to full realization though it frequently is.

The situation, then, is an extremely important factor in affording or denying outlets for native potentialities. This is still more true when tendencies inclining certain persons toward association with others of a particular type find no opportunities for gratification, no appropriate channels of release. Without falling into the fallacious belief that each person can achieve happiness with only one particular mate, friend, or group of intimates, it may nevertheless be said that many persons will inevitably fail to live lives satisfactory either to themselves or others if association with definite complementary or supplementary personality types cannot be effected. Such association, moreover, may be necessary in other than dyadic groups (pairs); vocational, national, cultural, and other relationships involving numerous persons may be indispensable to enriching association. When it is lacking, a life which might have developed in ways highly beneficial not only to a few persons but to large plurality patterns as well remains imprisoned by a rigid situation or even dwindles into insignificance . . . "and froze the genial currents of his soul."

The tremendous waste and destruction of which the biologist has

made us aware, by pointing out that thousands or millions of lower organisms perish for every one that ultimately survives, offer a striking parallel to the waste of personality powers brought about by the lethal action of external circumstances. The tremendous importance of the situation, the frequent discrepancy between capacities and desires on the one hand and the opportunities available on the other, and the enormous waste of human energy resulting from this discrepancy, cannot be overlooked in any thorough analysis of association.

§3. GENERAL PROCESSES OF ASSOCIATION: CORRECT AND ERRONEOUS USES OF THE CONCEPT OF IMITATION

Of all the sub-processes contained in that division of the table labelled "General Processes of Association," none yields so many problems for sociological investigation and none has been so frequently investigated as that of *imitation*. Tarde, the master of the earlier "psychologicistic school" (Sorokin), even ventured this assertion: "Society is imitation." His search for the most elementary social phenomenon ended when he arrived at the concept (not the empirical datum!) of imitation. If his train of reasoning is closely followed, one soon discovers that only one form in which imitation appears is analyzed, and that he attributes to it altogether too much significance. Indeed, it becomes the key by which not only sociology but the philosophy of history and of culture as well may be unlocked—but only for Tarde and his disciples.

Before considering Tarde's theory in detail, it seems advisable to define imitation independently of his over-accentuated use of the term. The word imitation is extremely general, and is applied to highly diverse activities by many of the sciences. The student of aesthetics speaks of imitation in the sense of representation; objects existing in the corporeal world are represented by one or another of the graphic or plastic arts. The scientist not concerned with aesthetics, however, cannot use the word imitation in this way; for him it must always denote re-enactment of the behavior of others (in Waxweiler's terminology an *activité répétitrice*). Such behavior interests the psychologist primarily; a great deal has been written about imitative instincts in the higher mammals and man, to say nothing of the less complex forms of life. A very common psychological classification of the forms of imitation is that of voluntary, involuntary, and reflex imitation. The sociologist, however, can make little use of such distinctions; he

is interested in interhuman behavior, and his concepts must be constructed for his own special purposes.

The most fruitful distinctions from the sociological point of view seem to be those made by Stoltenberg;⁸ he divides the inclusive concept of imitation into non-social and social forms. The non-social variety he terms representation, and the meaning he attaches to it is practically identical with that given in the preceding paragraph. Social imitation is of course the chief object of his attention; he divides it into four main categories: (1) duplication; (2) reproduction; (3) correspondence; and (4) repetition. Let us consider these in the order given:

(1) Mere *duplication* is an objective act which in some respects is similar to the act of another although there is not the slightest social relation between the two.

(2) *Reproduction* is an act objectively influenced by the similar act of another, but one which is not accompanied by any consciousness of the connection.

(3) *Correspondence* is an act which is accompanied by the consciousness that it corresponds in some respect to the action of another, but in which there is no consciousness of dependence upon the latter act in the causation of the correspondence.

(4) *Repetition* is an act accompanied by the consciousness that the previous act of another serves as a model. Among the phenomena associated with repetition are two which may be termed (a) exemplification and (b) rehearsal. (a) Exemplification is an act accompanied by the conscious desire that others will repeat it or at least become acquainted with it. (b) Rehearsal is an act undertaken with a conscious view to its later re-enactment in the presence of a specific person or group.

All four main forms of imitation and their sub-varieties Stoltenberg regards as proper object-matter for social psychology. It will be recalled that he divides social psychology into socio-psychology and psycho-sociology (chap. iii, §6). Socio-psychology is primarily concerned with the analysis of correspondence and repetition; psycho-sociology is primarily concerned with duplication and reproduction. Some of these distinctions may be more factitious than real, yet they provide useful points of departure, and above all they do not lead to the error of which Tarde was guilty, namely, that of using imitation

⁸ H. L. Stoltenberg, *Sociopsychologie*, pp. 85 ff. Cf. the distinctions made by Ellsworth Faris, "The Concept of Imitation," *Am. J. Soc.*, XXXII, 3 (November, 1926) pp. 367-78.

in so loose a sense that it comprises social phenomena of any and every description.

Now that the foregoing distinctions have been made, the theory advanced by Tarde can be discussed in detail. From his point of view, imitation is simply a manifestation of personal influence exercised by one human being upon another: *A* gives *B* occasion to imitate him. Tarde regards the influence exerted as different in degree only from that exercised by the rapport of the hypnotist, hence imitation is "a mild sort of somnambulism." The sociologically important point in Tarde's theory is the assertion that all new culture traits, e.g., words, mythological images, ritual acts, etc., emanate from creative "individuals" and are imitated by the "crowd." In order for new kinds of social behavior to arise, two processes are therefore necessary: the creative process in the individual and the imitative process in the group.

The trait imitated Tarde terms an "invention"; this is always the product of a creative mind. The basic theme of history is invention and imitation.

Tarde further asserts that the creative man is qualitatively different from the crowd of imitators. The latter are passive, credulous, and impressionable, and in addition do not know that they possess these traits. The innovators, on the other hand, appear odd or even monomaniac; an impregnable self-confidence is characteristic of most of them, and hence the gaping imitators often regard them as "fools of an odd kind." The ideas of the inventor, says Tarde, do *not* originate in the society surrounding him; the process of invention is the secret of genius, cannot be rationalized, results from free combinations, and is not the result of scientific method.

This is interesting speculation, but the conclusions reached must be greatly modified if they are to be rendered acceptable to the modern sociologist. To begin with, Tarde's use of imitation is in some respects too far-reaching and in others too restricted. As here modified, imitation includes repetition in the sense previously noted and hence is somewhat similar to Tarde's concept, but above and beyond this our use of imitation also includes correspondence (which like repetition has already been defined). In other words, imitation may be accompanied by the consciousness that the previous act of another serves as an example, but it may also be marked by the entire absence of this characteristic—it may be accompanied only by the consciousness that the act engaged in corresponds in some respect to the act of another, without any consciousness of dependence upon the latter act in the

causation of the correspondence. Of the two varieties of imitation, correspondence is much more frequent and important than is repetition, but even the latter is of much greater socio-psychological importance than the mere connection between "inventors" and "imitators" discussed by Tarde. The effects of repetition and correspondence are far-reaching, for instead of a mere one-way influence of inventors upon imitators it may be said that everyone imitates someone else in some respect. Imitation thus becomes one form of sociation, of the general reciprocal relation existing among human beings; the influences exerted by the older upon the younger generation, for example, may in many instances be comprised in the inclusive concept of imitation. But although a great many varieties of associative processes may in certain of their aspects be regarded as imitative processes, it is by no means permissible to identify all associative phenomena with imitation. We have already seen how necessary it is to build our conceptual frame of reference along extremely broad lines; the table of social relations, or even that section of it devoted to associative processes alone, bears witness to this fact. Imitation is a sub-process of association, but it is not a principal process and least of all is it a fundamental process; it is merely co-ordinate with other sub-processes so far as the sociologist is concerned, although it may well be that from the psychological point of view a stronger emphasis may sometimes be justified.

§4. GENERAL PROCESSES OF ASSOCIATION: LEADING AND FOLLOWING; MISCELLANEOUS

Not only is it necessary thus to qualify and extend Tarde's concept in its most general bearings, but modification of its more specific aspects is also necessary. The particular relation between inventors and imitators focussed upon by Tarde is important and warrants close attention, but it should under no circumstances be identified with the general imitative processes; he should have used other terms to denote the specific type of interaction with which he dealt, i.e., with the influence exerted by a relatively small number of creative persons upon the passive majority. In the present system, this phenomenon is entirely cut off from any direct connection with imitation, inasmuch as most genuine "inventors" are not imitated in any way directly connected with their "inventive" characteristics, and in fact cannot be so imitated by any appreciable proportion of the population. The proper terms to designate the relation seem to be *leading and following*, and the table accordingly includes them.

Following is not imitating; the only common trait is that the follower is dependent upon the leader and the imitator is similarly dependent upon the person imitated, but dependence is found in a great many other social relations and cannot be regarded as a characteristic distinctive of any. Most of what Tarde has said about "inventors and imitators" can be accepted if sufficiently qualified and if applied to leaders and followers. (The substantive "following," e.g., "he has a large following," cannot be used to replace the plural noun "followers," for the denotation would be much too restricted. Objection may also be made to the use of "partisans" as a substitute for the more general term "followers," for the behavior of followers is frequently based upon unconscious or distasteful dependence and not upon voluntary partisanship.)

The common-human processes associated with leading and following are not the only ones; circumscribed processes, some of which are classified in the table under domination and submission (*Cb*), are also relevant. Further, the influence of the old upon the new has definite imitative aspects and is dealt with in connection with new formation or reconstruction (*Fd*).

Much of the difficulty in assigning imitation its proper niche in the general system of interhuman behavior is due to the fact that it is primarily a *socio-psychological* rather than a *sociological* concept. Tarde did not clearly discriminate between the two fields, and inasmuch as he was primarily a social psychologist and not a sociologist, he felt no difficulty in assigning imitation the central position in his system. Nothing but confusion arises, however, if we use the pseudo-psychological expression imitation, which properly stresses the psychical aspects of behavior, in a definitely sociological way to indicate externally perceivable actions, i.e., interhuman behavior.

The types of behavior with which imitation is most frequently *correlated* are adjustment and accordance, and it is incumbent upon us as sociologists to concentrate upon these. Indeed, it would have been quite unnecessary to mention imitation at all if there were not certain specific imitative *actions* which may lead to adjustment or accordance and to other associative relations, such as advance and amalgamation, as well.

The remaining general processes need only be listed here, inasmuch as in the light of the foregoing discussion most of them are more or less self-explanatory: *influencing, liberating, advising, educating or training, advancing another's interests, promoting, becoming accus-*

tomed to, familiarizing oneself with, inclining toward, cultivating the acquaintance of, caring for, providing for, nursing.

It should be noted that all the multifarious processes akin to the above examples have another aspect indicated by the passive verb-form: *being liberated, being advised, being nursed*, and so on; these all represent general processes of association which are overlooked when attention is paid only to the active forms.

CHAPTER XVII

PROCESSES OF DISSOCIATION: GENERAL ASPECTS

§1. DO PROCESSES OF ASSOCIATION PREDOMINATE?

The social scientist works in a field abounding in value-judgments, and one of his most difficult tasks is that of separating observed and observable realities from ethical injunctions, religious or metaphysical precepts, and rationalizations of the *status quo*. One of the most all-pervasive and appealing value-judgments is that associative processes such as advance, adjustment, accordance, and amalgamation are to be diligently cultivated, whereas dissociative processes such as competition, contravention, and conflict are to be sedulously avoided and wherever possible abolished. Association is identified with altruism, with fellowship, with a warm and intimate feeling for humanity, whereas dissociation is identified with egotism, malevolence, and hatred of mankind. Frequently economic collectivism in its various forms, e.g., state socialism, guild socialism, syndicalism, and communism is infused with positive ethical content because of its assumed furtherance of association; on the other hand, economic individualism in the form of *laissez-faire* liberalism and capitalism is placed at the very lowest rung of the ethical ladder because of its accompanying "individualism" and consequent tendency to generate dissociation. These value-judgments being postulated, the sociologist is admonished to aid in the struggle against the powers of darkness and to ensure the victory of the children of light.

But the sociologist in his capacity as a scientist is interested in such confessions of faith only because they illustrate very common types of erroneous thinking—indeed, of rationalization. To begin with, there is no historical evidence for the assumption that association has ever predominated; the Middle Ages, the Neolithic "pre-State" epoch so hotly upheld by G. Elliot Smith, or the era when Dharma prevailed in Indian history, are all adduced as examples, and all are false. No candid historian can be found who will bear out the contention that these periods were peculiarly free of competition or conflict; the outer coverings of such dissociative processes change from time to time, but there is nothing to show that they are ever wholly or partially absent; the detachment of social molecules and their

attachment to other molecules and crystals go on simultaneously—dissociation and association go hand in hand. In a ceaseless dialectic interplay, each continually generates the other; each is dependent for its very existence upon the other; and even as data of empirical observation they are virtually co-incident. The ever-present practice of making value-judgments in agreement with emotional needs, however, leads to exclusive stress upon one and to ignoring of the other, for by thus subjecting the highly diverse patterns of social life to arbitrary emphases profound emotional gratifications may often be achieved.

Close study of mind in evolution reveals some surprising variations in the values attached to particular social phenomena; what one period or cultural group places at the very pinnacle may be utterly scorned by another. The sociologist should be the last person to deny that such shifts in emphasis really take place, but he should also be the last person to be led astray by superficial rationalistic variations; if he properly carries out his task of discovering and analyzing the processes and plurality patterns actually existent in given cultures at given times, he will find that association and dissociation are always present but that particular zones of social activity included in them perpetually vary. Indeed, research already conducted probably makes it fairly safe to use the working hypothesis that culture case study, sufficiently thoroughgoing to survey all the factors at work in any given epoch and to discover the part each plays in the total configuration, would demonstrate that an almost perfect balance of powers obtains, and hence that every culture at any period manifests sum totals of association and dissociation respectively equivalent to those of any other culture or era. We must free ourselves from the absurd belief that one set of social influences has ever been wholly set aside in favor of another, or that this will eventually take place. The most that the past has to show is a temporary check upon one or the other, and the sociologist as sociologist has no reason whatever for expressing a preference for either. Of course, he continually expresses such preferences as a human being; it is impossible to act in any social situation without affirming one group of possibilities and thereby excluding alternatives; value-judgments are inseparable from all extra-scientific pursuits, and none of us is or can be a scientist except in a very limited field and for a relatively small proportion of the time. Nevertheless, within that field and during that time no one is or can be a scientist who grants any greater value to association than he

does to dissociation, to integration than to differentiation, to construction than to destruction.

Moreover, the fact must ever be borne in mind that these antitheses are, after all, necessary constructs of the human mind, which in its effort to understand resorts to conceptual separation of elements empirically embedded in the same phenomenal matrix. The very fact that such antitheses are set up is eloquent testimony to the dialectic process by which each pole necessarily involves and engenders the other. Speaking in terms of the present system: mixed relations are frequent; further, association is oftentimes the immediate consequence of dissociation (and *vice versa*); still further and most important, specific instances of advance or adjustment oftentimes do not go beyond the minimal degree because dissociation in the form of competition or even conflict is simultaneously active. Similarly, competitive or contraventive tendencies sometimes do not reach the stage of overt conflict because counteracting tendencies toward accordance or even amalgamation are present.

§2. DISTANCE AND DISSOCIATION

By thus pointing out the moving equilibrium frequently maintained by the ever-shifting pressures of associative and dissociative tendencies, the subject of social distance, already discussed in a previous chapter (iii, §3), once more comes up for consideration. Park and Burgess have this to say:

"The simplest and most fundamental types of behavior of individuals and of groups are represented in these contrasting tendencies to approach an object or to withdraw from it. If instead of thinking of these two tendencies as unrelated, they are thought of as conflicting responses to the same situation, where the tendency to approach is modified and complicated by a tendency to withdraw, we get the phenomenon of *social distance*. There is the tendency to approach, but not too near. There is a feeling of interest and sympathy of *A* for *B*, but only when *B* remains at a certain distance. Thus the Negro in the southern states is 'all right in his place.' The northern philanthropist is interested in the advancement of the Negro, but wants him to remain in the South. At least he does not want him for a neighbor. The southern white man likes the Negro as an individual, but he is not willing to treat him as an equal. The northern white man is willing to treat the Negro as an equal but he does not want him too near."¹

It is therefore possible to regard distance as a condition resulting from the inhibition of tendencies toward association by tendencies toward dissociation deriving from personal and/or situational factors.

¹ R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, 2nd ed., p. 440.

Equally possible, however, is a definition precisely reversing the above sequence: distance is a condition resulting from the inhibition of tendencies toward dissociation by tendencies toward association deriving from personal and/or situational factors.

For heuristic reasons, *but for heuristic reasons only*, the former conception of distance will henceforth be used wherever applicable. A further heuristic simplification which oftentimes may be desirable is the expression of distance in numerical terms, i.e., in rank order, although it should never be forgotten that distance is at least in part a psychological phenomenon to which external and quantifiable characteristics can never be more than mere indices. With this qualification, however, numerical schemas may advantageously be used where they lend conciseness and clarity. An example: if the path to be traversed in effecting the amalgamation of *A* with *B* is symbolized by 50, and if the desire of *A* thus to become associated with *B* is symbolized by 60, it is evident that if the wish of *A* were the only factor to be considered, a tendency more than sufficient to effect amalgamation is operative (assuming for the sake of simplicity that *B* is completely passive throughout). But if obstacles or other factors making for dissociation are present to a degree which may be symbolized by 20, the final result is a social distance of 10 between *A* and *B*. Such simplification is helpful, but too much importance should not be attributed to it, particularly in view of the complicating fact that *B* is never entirely passive and that in practically every instance, therefore, the distance between persons is a complex resultant of the action, reaction, re-reaction . . . *n* of both participants. Let us beware of the worship of numbers; only the socially obtuse are dazzled by the spurious exactitude they make possible. When no illusions as to their limitations exist, however, they should most certainly be used for what they are worth, and this is frequently a great deal.

Distance is of particular interest in the present context because except for complete coalescence (a form of amalgamation so rare as to be almost non-existent) all social relations may be regarded (from the static point of view) as specific social distances, sometimes but not always spatially evident, between human beings, between human beings and plurality patterns, and between plurality patterns. In order to explain the almost infinitely differentiated distances thus resulting, the sociologist must shift from the static viewpoint to the dynamic, for only in this way can he make comprehensible the persisting power of relationships and plurality patterns which when

statically considered seem in imminent danger of collapse. Social distances are but the most formal and general aspects of social relationships, and social relationships are the *results* of social processes; social distance may therefore be defined as a condition produced by a social relationship in conjunction with other social relationships. In other words, any specific social distance is a resultant of at least two relationships of differing tendencies, and inasmuch as a social relationship is after all only a relatively stable state of association or dissociation among human beings brought about and maintained by one or more social processes, it is possible to define the latter in terms of distance: any social process is a sequence of occurrences through which the distance prevailing between human beings, etc., is increased or decreased. The importance of distance as a sociological category thereby becomes apparent; it is the relatively stable equilibrium, (of motions of approach and avoidance) produced by the dynamic interplay of social processes, and although the present system lays primary emphasis on social dynamics, it is a category of rank co-ordinate with social process. In distance we have the most abstract aspects of action *pattern*.

An excellent illustration of the limits laid by convention upon variation in distance is afforded by the etiquette prevalent in "polite society." The social graces are maintained with security and success by those who possess the complicated action patterns necessary for maximum responsiveness to subtle intimations without for a moment becoming either excessively familiar or unduly reserved. To speak numerically: distance symbolized by a figure less than 5 causes the person thus overstepping the bounds of discreet intimacy to be labelled "impossible" by a particular social group, whereas distance over 20 causes the group to pronounce such verdicts as "awkward, boring, stiff, clammy, uninteresting, ill-at-ease," and so on. Hence the range possible in this particular situation is from 5 to 20. All confidence, coquetry, solicitation of assistance, mutual understanding, and sharing of tastes and opinions must remain within the narrow confines of 5 to 20. A tone of voice just a shade too familiar, a compliment just a trifle too daring or blunt, an avowal that reveals just a little too much—all these are breaches of the convention of distance which, though it seems trivial and trite, is relentlessly and automatically enforced. The stranger, the clumsy novice, the contemner of convention, the boor, and the unsophisticated or naïve person is frequently deceived by the apparent freedom, informality, and novelty of "polite

society," with the result that the law of distance is disregarded and eventual exclusion follows.

Yet, though this limitation of social intercourse undoubtedly impoverishes interhuman life unnecessarily at times, it is also indubitable that the existence of definite distance is the indispensable basis of many forms of co-operation. Many relationships entered upon for joint effort or amusement would never be undertaken if they involved complete abandonment of reserve, inasmuch as numerous persons are quite acceptable as collaborators or theatre companions who would ultimately be unbearable in more intimate capacities. The tacit understanding that association for particular purposes does not imply the cementing of bonds of fellowship or affection is all that in most instances makes such association possible. Hence processes of dissociation need not necessarily lead to complete avoidance and disjunction, as some sociologists assume; they cannot be properly understood if we do not bear in mind the fact that oftentimes their chief function is the maintenance or moderate increase of distance—in other words the inhibition or diminution of extreme associative tendencies.

§3. GENERAL PROCESSES OF DISSOCIATION

The relations listed in the *B* category of the table have been intentionally designated "relations of dissociation" rather than of antagonism, for reclusion, separation, and detachment need not involve overt or even latent enmity; the result may be aloofness but it need not be combat. The hermit who withdraws from the world or the schizoid who flees from reality into a realm of fantasy does not ordinarily do so out of hatred for mankind. Nevertheless, the plan of exposition followed in the present work makes it necessary to pay more attention here to dissociative processes accompanied by antagonism than to the more amicable variety, for the latter have already been extensively discussed in analyzing solitariness (chap. viii, §§1, 2, and 3).

But in any case little need be said concerning general processes of dissociation, because the problems related thereto have already been dealt with in connection with general processes of association (chap. xvi, §1).

The chief influences leading to the latter were classified thus:

(a) Emotionally toned urges, vague affective tendencies, and sympathetic impulses that find their most satisfactory outlet in association.

(b) Interests which, although emotionally toned in some degree, usually are consciously recognized as conducive to the enhancement of self.

(c) Objective factors (frequently in the realm of material culture) which make association virtually inevitable.

Attention was also called to the peculiar intermingling of these three typical influences often manifest by the following example: "A particular situation makes the establishment of certain personal relationships objectively desirable, self-interest also exerts pressure toward establishment of these connections, but there is no emotionally toned urge or tendency sufficiently strong to overcome minor obstacles to the association. If the affective factors alone were decisive, probably the stage of advance would never be reached, but pressure exerted by the self-enhancing and objective factors is so strong that the step is finally taken" (chap. xvi, §1).

There seems every warrant for dealing with general processes of dissociation along similar lines. We may distinguish three influences fundamental to all dissociative processes, whether competition, contravention, or conflict, and these may be classified as follows:

(a) Emotionally toned urges, vague affective tendencies and antipathetic impulses that find their most satisfactory outlet in dissociation. Examples are afforded by enmity, aversion and hatred; some general processes to which they give rise are: *maintaining exclusion, driving away* (and similar phrases using "away"), *jilting, parting company, "showing the door,"* and so on.

(b) Interests which, although emotionally toned in some degree, usually are consciously recognized as conducive to the enhancement of self. Some general processes to which they give rise are: *dismissing, deserting, accusing, extorting, giving notice, quitting a job,* and similar activities.

(c) Objective factors (frequently in the realm of material culture) which make dissociation virtually inevitable. Some general processes resulting are: *holding oneself aloof, withdrawing oneself,* etc.

As in the case of association, there are other processes still more general than those above named; they cannot be assigned to any one of the three chief categories. A few examples are: *taking leave of, proving a failure, boring, shunning others and isolating oneself* (e.g., in order to avoid dependence on others, "to live one's own life," to flee the world and contemplate), *"telling tales out of school," chasing away, frightening away,* etc.

This last group of processes in particular makes evident the necessity of again paying some attention to the way in which the three typical influences intermingle—this time, however, with reference to dissociation. Especially apt instances are afforded in the earlier discussion of the solitary and the associative personality types—the marked antithesis between self-imposed isolation for the sake of independence on the one hand and in order to avoid responsibility on the other is particularly noteworthy (chap. viii, §§2, 3, and 4).

§4. PRINCIPAL PROCESSES OF DISSOCIATION: COMPETITION, CONTRAVENTION, AND CONFLICT

The problems raised by such intermingling also play some part in the three principal processes of dissociation (competition, contravention, and conflict); these are distinguished from each other by a gradual increase of definitely antagonistic activity. Competition is the most mixed of the three; it contains so many elements of association or of symbiotic interaction that in most cases only a slight predominance of dissociation can be demonstrated. Contravention (a more precise term for "opposition"), however, manifests well-marked tendencies toward enmity and antagonism, although these may remain partially or wholly latent and are usually disguised. In the case of contravention, tendencies toward association play little part in preventing extreme antagonism. Considerations based upon cowardice, caution, shrewdness, craftiness, resentment, or situational compulsives check radical expressions of ill-will. Ill-will is present, to be sure, and is usually an active element in the behavior of one of the participants, but it may not be clearly realized by either; it merely inhibits friendly inclinations. In strong contrast to competition and contravention, conflict is the definite, overt manifestation of antagonism; some of the forms in which it appears are combat, violence, accusation, and similar inimical actions having as their common feature the effort to do harm to the person or plurality pattern opposed. The extent of the harm intended or inflicted is of course extremely variable; conflict may appease antagonistic tendencies even when its overt manifestations are relatively mild, and may then lead to sudden reversal and offers of help to the erstwhile enemy. In other words, the extent of the injuries inflicted in conflict is not in direct proportion to the discrepancy existing between the powers of the participants; when one of them is overwhelmingly superior the result may be less harmful to the inferior participant than a more evenly balanced situation. In the first instance prompt gratification of the impulse to inflict injury may result in the sudden quiescence of that same impulse, whereas a prolonged struggle engendering deep-seated hatreds may result in the virtual extermination of the weaker opponent. Conflict of course occurs in widely varying forms; it ranges from the after-school pummeling of one small boy by another to the catastrophic combat of the World War, from the open disparagement of a rival to the blood feud of the Kentucky mountaineer.

Let it be emphasized, however, that competition, contravention, and

conflict cannot be distinguished from each other by the degree of externally perceivable injury inflicted, for intense competition or underhanded contravention may do more damage than transitory conflict; their subjectively intended meanings (chap. iii, §4) alone provide a basis for discrimination.

CHAPTER XVIII

PROCESSES OF DISSOCIATION: COMPETITION

§1. COMPETITION SOCIOLOGICALLY DEFINED

Competition may be defined as the general social process comprising the dissociative tendencies inseparably connected with efforts on the part of persons or plurality patterns to attain an identical objective.

This definition is sociological; from the most general viewpoint possible it may be said that competition is not confined to human beings but is characteristic of all organisms. The fecundity of life, on the one hand, and the limitations of space and food supply, on the other, make it possible to assert that competition is grounded in the very structure of life itself. It therefore follows that human beings do not have the power to decide whether there shall be competition; it may indeed be lessened, increased, diverted, "individualized," "collectivized," controlled, or left wholly unregulated, but it cannot be abolished. Moreover, competition is not merely an economic relation but a prominent feature of interhuman behavior that is evident in every field of human activity and that may develop anywhere. If its economic manifestations are restricted by means of organization, it becomes all the more strongly evident in other zones—for example, the political. Only when the narrow economic view of competition is replaced by the broader sociological perspective is it possible to gain adequate insight into the important functions exercised by competition in every aspect of social life.¹

The necessity for stressing the sociological standpoint has recently been made very clear by the most important treatise on the subject of competition yet published in any language, *La Concorrenza*, by Emanuele Sella. This work is more than a thousand pages in length and takes account of the greater part of the literature on the subject, hence it affords an excellent conspectus of current methods of analyzing competition. Sella distinguishes four principal approaches to the problem: (1) the economic-technical, (2) the economic-political, (3) the economic-juridical, and (4) the economic-biological. A tre-

¹ Cf. C. H. Cooley, "Personal Competition," in his collected papers, *Sociological Theory and Social Research*, pp. 162 ff.

mendous amount of material is amassed for each of these main divisions, and the conclusions Sella draws all seem warranted by the available literature. There is one great and fundamental lack, however—a genuinely basic analysis uniting all four approaches, namely, the sociological method of dealing with competition as an interhuman relation *per se*. The nearest he ever comes to sociological analysis is in his discussion of economic-biological competition, but although he applies elaborate mathematical methods and uses the concept of the optimum in much the same way as Jevons, Pareto, and others, very little insight into the general social function of competition results.

Sella does make some distinctions, however, which if further developed would probably be of sociological value; unfortunately he himself does not deal with them as they deserve. These distinctions are: (1) complete and incomplete competition, (2) direct and indirect competition, (3) actual and potential competition. Distinctions which are similarly suggestive have been made by Sombart, who analyzes competition according to the means employed, viz.: (1) Competition through achievement, (2) competition through suggestion, and (3) competition through force.

Such departures from the earlier method of dealing with competition as a homogeneous entity point to an eventual penetration of sociological analysis into the jealously guarded preserves of economic theory, and the result will eventually be beneficial to both disciplines. But even at present there exists sufficient knowledge of the general subject of competition to assign it a niche in a comprehensive system of social processes; it is dissociative in tendency but much less so than either contravention or conflict. We may therefore term competition a process of dissociation of the lowest power.

The reason for the low degree of dissociation lies in the fact that, as already noted, one of the important characteristics of competition is the act of seeking or endeavoring to gain what another is endeavoring to gain at the same time; as a consequence, processes of association enter into competitive endeavor. Pursuit of a common goal does upon occasion involve sufferance, compromise, advance, or even adjustment, and such association imposes restrictions on the dissociative tendencies inseparably connected with efforts on the part of persons or plurality patterns to attain an identical objective. Nevertheless, it is precisely because of these coinciding purposes that incipient dissociation arises.

§2. COMPETITION INCLUDES BOTH RIVALRY AND STRIVING

This is largely due to the fact that such competition evokes feelings of rivalry; when two persons run side by side toward the same goal, one or both of them usually conceives a desire to test their respective powers, and to surpass the other or at least to keep abreast of him. This type of coinciding endeavor may lead to a steady increase in rivalry that passes beyond competition into conflict or even combat.

It therefore seems advisable to distinguish two forms of competition: the first, which has just been described, may be termed *rivalry*; the second is best designated by *striving*. The latter is due to the relative scarcity of a particular object or objective striven for by a number of persons or plurality patterns. The supply available is not sufficient, in the estimation of those striving to gain a share of it, completely to satisfy all the competitors. It is believed that a few will secure nothing or at most much less than the supposed optimum. Such competition may lead to the greatest exertions, but it is not primarily conditioned by mere feelings of rivalry; the really important emotional factor in striving is the fear of deprivation if the other competitor or competitors reach the goal first. Tendencies toward dissociation almost necessarily develop, but may upon occasion be checked by insight into the utility of compromise and adjustment—association may therefore play a part in striving just as in rivalry.

Striving may in turn be divided into two types: the first, which has already been discussed, is accompanied by awareness of the competitor. The second may take place even in the absence of social contact. It is the latter type of striving which Park and Burgess have in mind when they say that "competition is interaction without social contact."² They then proceed to build up on the basis of this definition an elaborate ecological analogy that sometimes comes perilously close to homology. From the standpoint here represented only confusion results by limiting the meaning of competition to unconscious striving; rivalry and conscious striving must be included.

It may therefore be said that there are two varieties of competition. The basis of the first is largely subjective; it is closely correlated with the wish for recognition and the concomitant tendency of the latter toward rivalry, and for present purposes may be termed rivalry. The second has an appreciable subjective element, especially if striving is conscious, but its objective factors are more prominent than in the

* R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, 2nd ed., p. 506.

case of rivalry; the scarcity, real or supposed, of the objects or objectives striven for is perhaps the predominant component. Unless the context makes distinction necessary, however, both rivalry and striving will hereafter be merged in the generic term competition.

§3. COMPETITION IS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH "THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE" NOR WITH ANTAGONISM

Largely as a result of connotations deriving from economic theory, the adjective "free" is often affixed to competition, and the impression is thereby produced that when there is no freedom there is no competition. This is quite erroneous, for in the biological world competition may go on in the entire absence of freedom, and in human affairs, particularly in their economic aspects, there may be *forced* competition imposed by employers and similar persons.

The references which have been repeatedly made to biology should not, however, lead to the assumption that competition and the struggle for existence are one and the same, for this is an unwarranted extension of the concept. Park and Burgess have been primarily responsible for such erroneous identification in American sociology, as the following statement shows:

"Competition, as a universal phenomenon, was first clearly conceived and adequately described by the biologists. As defined in the evolutionary formula 'the struggle for existence' the notion captured the popular imagination and became a commonplace of familiar discourse."⁸

Now the struggle for existence involves competition, to be sure, primarily in the form of conscious and unconscious striving, but sometimes in the form of rivalry as well, with the consequence that the element of conflict may eventually be introduced, and this may in some instances lead to combat. Hence competition is wholly inadequate as a synonym for "the struggle for existence," although it constitutes one aspect of that struggle.

Competition manifests in especially well-marked form a tendency common to other social processes—that of passing over into a different type of interaction. This has already been referred to in pointing out that competition may be transmuted into conflict, on the one hand, or adjustment or even amalgamation, on the other. The mere fact that others with whose interests we have little or nothing in common exert themselves to achieve an objective identical with our own need not necessarily evoke enmity; the effect upon our behavior may take widely varying forms and may, for example, afford valuable

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 504.

stimulation. Competition may have a purely objective character, so long as efforts to reach the same goal run along parallel lines, as it were, and do not involve direct comparison expressed in such phrases as "What is one's gain is another's loss." Only when this parallelism gives way to real or supposed interference is antagonism likely to develop; when it does it quickly leads to attempts to inflict positive damage upon the other person or plurality pattern, and hence to pass over into the stages of contravention or conflict.

Nevertheless, competition affords the possibility of association even when appreciable antagonism has developed. The wish to get rid of a troublesome competitor may lead to moves toward compromise that eventually issue in advance; once such association is effected, practices may develop that are classifiable as adjustment, accordance, or amalgamation. Examples are afforded by the phenomena denoted by such phrases as "log-rolling," "squeezing out" a third party, "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," "most-favored nation" treaties, customs unions that handicap the nations not included, and the like. Bentley has given us a cogent analysis of competitive amalgamation in legislation, and even goes so far as to say that "when we have reduced the legislative process to the play of group interests, then log-rolling, or give and take, appears as the very nature of the process."⁴

§4. THE FUNCTION OF COMPETITION IN THE TOTAL PROCESS OF SOCIATION

In spite of all painstaking description of empirically verifiable phenomena of competition and all tracing of interconnections with other social processes, however, the root characteristic of competition is not unearthed by such existential research. This fact renders especially evident the necessity of complementing existential description by functional analysis, if any social process is to be dealt with adequately. The function of competition is that of assigning persons or plurality patterns their appropriate places in the social system as a whole. We have already quoted Cooley to this effect (chap. vi, §2) and Ross has pointed it out as follows:

"Since we do not come into the world with our future calling and station stenciled on the forehead, we discover what we are fit for by experimenting. By a series of competitions we test the impression we make on others, rate our powers in terms of other men's powers, and determine whether or not we may aspire to the higher occupations and posts. Competition in this sense need not be conscious or contentious. From our school days on judgments are formed about us of which we are unaware, but which go to determine our careers. For exam-

⁴ A. F. Bentley, *The Process of Government*, p. 370.

ple, several men may be under consideration for the same appointment. Their entire record is scrutinized so that they are made competitors throughout their past, although at the time they were not in the least conscious of it."⁸

This function of assigning to each his social niche is not exclusively exercised by competition; tradition and inherited status have perhaps been of equal historical importance in this rôle. It is entirely possible to place persons in high or low social positions without taking any direct account of their capacities and achievements, if only the social order is sufficiently stable to make inheritance of function generally acceptable or at the very least difficult to oppose. It is also possible to provide a partial alternative to competition by establishing the rule of seniority. This is simple and certain; moreover, it leaves little room to favoritism and prejudice, although it is also attended by marked disadvantages. If either inheritance or seniority is followed in preference to competition, the system of social placement is relatively independent of the particular persons concerned; they must bow to the system. The method is quite mechanical and makes no use of "the experimental method." No value-judgment is relevant here; there is no strictly sociological reason for preferring the rule-of-thumb experimentalism so often evident in the United States to the meek acceptance of caste position which the Hindu believes due to Dharma.

To many persons the use of "experimental method" as a synonym for the competitive assignment of social function will imply a certain proportion or equivalence between achievement and place in the social order. This assumption must be avoided, for the capacities of the person admitted to competition do not ensure to him a position in which those capacities find adequate expression. Selection is by no means automatic; capacities or achievements are always evaluated by those who wish to make use of them for their own purposes, and if there seems no prospect of benefit to these persons, no social function adequate to such capacities or achievements will be assigned. In other words, there may sometimes be a pronounced discrepancy between ability and the measure of success granted through competition. There are always two sides to the experiment: first, what the person can do; and second, for whom he can do it. High ability in the former does not necessarily bring with it opportunity in the latter.

From this there results the close connection between competition and freedom—a connection that is not conceptual but is sociological. The place-assigning function of competition can be exercised to best ad-

⁸ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, rev. ed., p. 166.

vantage only when the degree of personal or institutional freedom is great. To begin with, personal freedom intensifies personal competition. Next, institutional freedom affords the possibility of easy and frequent change of social function. In general, therefore, a highly accessible, secular structure will manifest much more competition than an isolated, sacred structure, for in the former there are few traditional bonds, whereas in the latter tradition so fortifies institutional barriers that freedom may be virtually non-existent. This is tantamount to saying that where social mobility is great, freedom is also found; indeed, they are but two different aspects of the same thing. Ross has indicated the connection thus:

"The freer the individual to roam about the social field, set up in this or that calling, try for the better paid or more honorable offices and get a decision on his merits, the less often one encounters racial, religious or class discrimination, the prompter are customers or clients or patients in transferring their patronage, the more frequently the well-established will be subjected to the competition of outsiders, and the harder must they exert themselves to keep from being ousted."⁸

These and similar considerations lead Ross to conclude that the intensity of competition varies (1) with the degree of personal liberty, (2) with the rate of social change, (3) inversely as the efficiency of the selective agents. The third statement means that the more are rational methods of selection developed and utilized, the more are the sacrifices and antagonistic concomitants of competition diminished.

§5. COMPETITION AS FACT AND AS SOCIAL SYSTEM

Further distinctions among different phases of competition are necessary; the most important seems to be between competition as a fact and competition as a social system. This same type of distinction has already been made between toleration (sufferance) and tolerance (chap. xi, §§3 and 4); there are doubtless many other social processes which would be better comprehended by thus separating the actual from the normative.

Competition as an actuality, particularly economic competition, is as old as interhuman life itself. But as a normative principle, it has been dominant only in certain cultures during limited periods, and even in these cultures it has oftentimes applied only to restricted sectors of social behavior. These sectors were in many instances quite different from those in which competition is now recognized as a social principle: the rhapsodes of Ionia, the troubadours of Provence,

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

the Humanists of Renaissance Italy, the Sophists of Athens, the race-course representatives of the Blue and Green factions in Byzantium, and the knightly jousts seeking to gain the favor of some fair lady not only competed in actual fact but this competition was also elevated to the rank of a controlling norm. They *did* compete and in addition it was held that they *should* compete. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the most important historical function of competition as the explicit principle of a social system has been in the economic sector, where in many countries, especially those in which capitalism has free play, it is still ideologically dominant. The era of its greatest acceptance began during the eighteenth century after the collapse of mercantilism; it soon passed from the theoretical stage to the practical, and in the nineteenth century was responsible for the Free Trade movement in Great Britain and elsewhere, as well as for the theoretical formulations of Ricardo and John Stuart Mill. In the present context, however, there is little or no warrant for lengthy analysis of competition as an economic principle; its general interhuman function has precedence. Moreover, from the latter point of view it may be said that economic competition manifests few characteristics not found in the more general type; of these few, the one of greatest significance for the science of interhuman behavior is the present tendency of economic competition to transform competition between persons into competition between groups and abstract collectivities. Imperialism, class struggles, and other circumscribed processes bear distinct traces of its influence.

The statement has already been made that competition cannot be abolished—that it can merely be diminished, diverted, raised to the rank of a social norm, etc. It may be said that competition is well adapted to form the foundation of a social order that “plays no favorites,” largely because of its peculiar property of limiting excessive individual influence by the concomitant claims of others with similar interests and abilities. At the same time, there can be little doubt that from the standpoint of social technique competition should never be made the sole principle of social life; other norms must also be accorded conditioning influence. The scope granted competition, however, may be quite wide, for, as pointed out above, it is a social process that, although dissociative in tendency, oftentimes leads to association almost as close as that produced by directly associative processes. This fact was plainly recognized and stated by Adam Smith; he never regarded competition as an “individualistic” principle, but held that

it furnishes the indispensable basis of sound community life.⁷ Simmel has stressed this same feature thus:

"... if a competitive struggle is fought without the intermixture of conflict elements and for something the group has to give, the results will be most beneficial. For the group as a whole competition will then be a way to stimulate the creation of objective values by means of subjective motives. For the parties concerned, competition forces increased production of objective values as a means to subjective satisfactions. . . . But apart from these indirect advantages, competition has immediate sociological results that are quite as important. Inasmuch as the objects which are competed for are held by other members of the group and can be secured only by gaining their favor, the competing parties are compelled to establish extremely close relationships with them. . . . This fact constitutes the profound associative force of competition. . . . It weaves thousands of threads through the social structure and enormously increases the strength of its texture; competition produces results which could otherwise be brought about only by love and altruism. In its modern form, it is commonly termed the 'war of each against all,' but it also merits the slogan of 'one for all, and all for one.' A social system presided over by the principle of competition is not identical with a system that is purely individualistic; it may be in the interest of the group to foster competition."⁸

Let us hasten to add, however, that it should be fostered only when other social forces prevent it from degenerating into overt or covert conflict. This qualification was implicitly recognized in the era of economic liberalism, for nowhere in the relevant literature is there to be found any glorification of the struggle for existence nor any deprecation of mutual aid (as is sometimes charged by critics of the doctrine). *The question of the advantage or disadvantage of competition is after all a problem of social technique, not of ultimate social ends.* It must be decided in view of spatial and temporal limitations and the total configuration in which it occurs. For example, the more accessible and secular a given social structure (e.g., a large city) is, the more scope must be given to "automatic" regulation through competition, for the stabilizing influence of tradition is largely lacking. Hence, although it is not advisable to accord to competition the rank of a dominating social principle, it is nevertheless necessary to provide a place for it within the framework of any regulated social order, for otherwise it will break through and wreak havoc at points that are weak or difficult to inspect with sufficient frequency. Moreover, its

⁷ Cf. Howard Becker, book review of Eckstein's translation of Adam Smith, *Theory of the Moral Sentiments*, *Am. J. Soc.*, XXXIII, 4 (January, 1928). pp. 637-8.

⁸ Georg Simmel, *Soziologie*, 1st ed., pp. 284-7, as translated by N. J. Spykman, *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*, pp. 122-3.

place-assigning function provides many advantages, and should at least be complementary to other principles of placement. Competition can be objectified and its tendency to develop into conflict thereby controlled. Systems of seniority, appointment, inherited status, and so on, are, in contrast to competition, relatively uniform, equable, and safe, but they all have the marked disadvantage of hampering and lessening energy and initiative. Further, they make for excessive rigidity; vigorous and rapidly developing plurality patterns dare not rely too exclusively upon such non-competitive systems, although even in plurality patterns that expand with relative suddenness there are professions and offices in which considerations of safety carry more weight than intensification of energy through competition. Power of decision and execution, and willingness to subordinate immediate personal interests to the larger whole, must be infused by other means than competition. This is entirely possible except in times of crisis; practically all the armies and navies of the world have given the preference to promotion by seniority rather than by merit, and although elasticity and vision are often lost as a consequence, it is claimed that the gain in concerted action and reliability more than compensates for such disadvantages.

§6. COMPARISONS AFFORDED BY EXAMPLES OF COMPETITION

The sub-processes of competition listed in the table afford some highly significant comparisons, for a large number of them are also classified under contravention and still more under conflict. This makes plainly evident the tendency of competition to pass over into the more extreme forms of dissociation; as already noted, this is the dangerous aspect of competition and the chief reason why its place-assigning function is sometimes abrogated in favor of seniority, etc.

Rivalling, supplanting another suitor, developing antagonistic interests, and similar actions in many instances pass from a stage of relatively peaceful competition to conflict or even open combat. *Out-bidding* and its corollary *underbidding* is in and of itself the most distinct expression of competition in any economic relation, but so long as it is confined to the strictly economic sphere, conflict need not necessarily follow. The mere effort to *forestall* someone does not involve combat or even conflict, but the occurrences immediately following usually determine whether the final outcome is co-operation or conflict; it is almost impossible to halt it permanently in an intermediate stage.

§7. THE DHARMA PRINCIPLE

The contrast between the traditional and experimental methods of determining social function and position is most clearly evident in the various ways in which appointments and privileges are secured. Either there is a closely regulated and in most cases legally sanctioned system (primogeniture, ultimogeniture, seniority, etc.) that fixes in advance the order of succession to appointments and privileges and thus eliminates controversy, or Napoleon's maxim of *la carrière ouverte aux talents* is followed and merit alone decides.

The two methods of assigning niches in the social order afford such a striking contrast that it seems advisable to formulate a general principle that comprises the influence of tradition, inheritance, seniority, family affiliation, and other considerations directly antithetical to the mode of functional selection in which the competitive principle finds clearest expression, namely, to the experimental method. Such an antithetical principle is most strikingly evident in the religion, ethics, and philosophy of Hinduism, and may accordingly be termed the Dharma principle. Experimental competition at one extreme—Dharma at the other. As used in Hinduism, the latter term is saturated with metaphysical implications, but in adapting it for sociological uses it is perhaps permissible to give to it the following more restricted meaning: Dharma is a social principle according to which members of the social system it regulates are not assigned their functions and positions through comparison of their abilities and achievements with those of other members (as is the case in experimental competition), but on the contrary, in which functions and positions are predetermined by an established rule.

In spite of the non-metaphysical sense in which the expression is used here, it may be helpful to get some idea of the metaphysical meaning attaching to it in Hinduism. Glasenapp puts it thus:

"From the Indian point of view the whole cosmos is completely dominated by one eternal law, the Law of Dharma. In the natural world this apportions to every thing and creature its appropriate attributes and activities; in the moral world it prescribes for all creatures the functions and actions they must fulfil, and inexorably determines their destinies in agreement with the way in which these prescribed deeds are carried out."⁹

Dharma is therefore a norm or law. Its believers hold that it determines all their actions, and they accept their caste status, whatever it

⁹ Helmuth von Glasenapp, *Der Hinduismus: Religion und Gesellschaft im heutigen Indien*, p. 239.

may be, as a wholly necessary and just consequence of deeds performed in other lives. Caste of course makes competition virtually impossible, for it prevents change of social function and position and regulates the most minute details of the lives of its members.

In Europe, the feudal structure of the Middle Ages (and its present-day survivals) affords some analogy to the Dharma-determined caste system, for in the former the idea of "station in life" is somewhat similar to the idea of caste. In noting this analogy, however, attention must also be called to the fact that the station is not nearly so rigidly fixed as the caste; change of social function and position is sometimes possible. Nevertheless, both the feudal and Dharma systems tend to determine status by inheritance and similar non-competitive criteria, and we may therefore continue to use "the Dharma principle" in an inclusive sense as the greatest possible contrast to experimental competition.

But sometimes extremes meet; when competition is objectified it is because limitations deriving from the Dharma principle (in the non-metaphysical sense) are imposed upon it. An effort is made to avoid the contravention or conflict to which competition so often gives rise by subjecting it to predetermined norms: for example, the number of competitors may be restricted, certificates of training may be required, and so on. This objectification of competition is in most instances expressly held within limits that prevent too much loss of energy and stimulation; in other words, competition is channelized but not dammed up. The rules producing this effect are usually the result of institutionalization or professionalization—phenomena which will be discussed in the chapter dealing with remodelling and up-building processes.

The task of deciding the values respectively inherent in the competitive and Dharma principles falls to social philosophy. The sociologist can properly concern himself only with determination of the consequences of exclusive adherence to either principle and of varying proportions of intermixture. The social technologist or "social engineer" will of course attempt to apply the resulting knowledge in the service of one or another supreme value. Let it be re-emphasized that sociology as such has no immanent criteria for deciding which of the two is morally or ethically better; it can merely say that if one type of social system is desirable and possible, the competitive principle is best adapted to establish and maintain it, whereas if a system diametrically opposed is to be perpetuated, the Dharma principle should hold sway.

CHAPTER XIX

PROCESSES OF DISSOCIATION: CONTRAVENTION

§1. CONTRAVENTION, "OPPOSITION," AND ANTAGONISM

At first glance there seems little or no reason why the new term *contravention* should be introduced; *opposition* appears satisfactory. When the literature is surveyed, however, it soon becomes evident that the latter concept is used so loosely that it has little or no definite sociological meaning; Spykman, Ross, and others have used "*opposition*" as an inclusive term of which *competition*, *conflict*, and *combat* are mere subdivisions. If it were not for this fact, *contravention* would be superfluous, for it is only a synonym for *opposition* in the restricted (and proper) sense of the latter term. As it is, however, the possibility of confusion is so great that with the single exception of "*parliamentary opposition*," *contravention* will be used throughout.

Contravention is a principal process, co-ordinate with *competition* and *conflict*—a fact that is not recognized in Ross' chapters entitled "*The Conflict of Ages*" and "*Estrangement*," both of which really deal primarily with *contravention*. If one wishes to epitomize the characteristics which distinguish *contravention* from *conflict*, it may be said that uncertainty concerning the nature and extent of existing antagonisms is a special mark of the former. Doubt and *contravention* go hand in hand, particularly in early stages. There is doubt of the possibility, necessity, utility, or value of association with another person or plurality pattern, and there is also doubt whether *conflict* should be initiated, or in case it is threatened by the antagonist, whether it should be entered upon; to this there is added doubt as to the permissible scope of antagonism and the proper mode of its expression; over and above all this, doubts quite similar to those of the initial stages continue and develop in the later phases of *contravention*. Moreover, the doubts just mentioned, which have been implicitly assigned to the more active of the participants, also cling to the less active, or passive; here also the motives, intensity, and effect of a given *contravention* are usually obscure and correspondingly disquieting.

So far as emotions provide the occasioning factors in *contravention*,

exasperation, dislike, pique, aversion, distaste—in short, antipathies of every variety—are responsible. With regard to this emotionally toned contravention, but not for other types, Carl Linfert is right in saying: "At the source of every contravention is to be found aversion."¹

Resentment frequently plays a determining rôle; hatred may lead to conflict, but resentment, more cautious or more cowardly, generally results in mere contravention. The latter is most often found among persons whose self-esteem has been wounded, but who do not possess sufficient strength or determination to give vent to their pent-up emotions in conflict.

Contraventions sprout like the heads of the Hydra; they often arise in wholly unexpected situations and may even surprise all the participants, particularly if they are naïve or obtuse. Contraventions are far more incalculable than conflicts, and may momentarily emerge and disappear, grow to dangerous proportions, or dwindle away into absurdities and trivialities.

§2. TWO MAIN TYPES OF CONTRAVENTION: OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE

In order to discuss contravention properly, two main types must be distinguished: (1) contravention primarily conditioned by more or less objective, situational factors; and (2) contravention in which emotional, subjective tendencies are predominant.

From the strictly sociological point of view, the first type is especially interesting, for it demonstrates the tremendous power of social processes and relationships in determining interhuman behavior. Persons are often forced into contravention, in spite of their own marked disinclination and temperamental unfitness, because the situation leaves them no alternative. They are compelled to contradict, dissent, resign in protest, or become conscientious objectors. Agreement may be impossible because that which is to be agreed upon is believed to be neither good, true, useful, nor beautiful; contravention on principle therefore results, and is oftentimes genuine in spite of occasional rationalization.

The second type is of particular interest for the social psychologist but also has some sociological relevance. Some persons, either through native or acquired tendencies, are persistent negativists; unlike most of us, it is far easier for them to say "No" than "Yes." To such persons contravention is virtually habitual; colloquially speaking, they are "contrary." Macaulay has thus described such a person:

¹ Unpublished dissertation, University of Cologne.

"His hostility was not to popery or to Protestantism, to monarchical government or to republican government, to the house of Stuart or to the house of Nassau, but to whatever was, at the time, established."² Negativists of this kind frequently robe themselves in the garments of righteousness, solicitude for the underdog, or lofty principle when as a matter of fact the animus that moves them is wholly subjective; as it is sometimes put, they can't agree with themselves.

This tendency to contravention is of course not always a weakness; many persons are driven to such action because of genuine sympathy for the oppressed and hatred for the oppressor, so that the resulting contravention, conflict, or combat cannot be traced to purely negativistic traits. Further, there is often evident a certain distrust of the "powers that be" that is accompanied by ardent championing of the misunderstood, slighted, obscure, and unpopular; this attitude is at least superficially similar and is sometimes closely related to that of the "contrary" type, but it is by no means identical.

Whether or not there are basic physiological factors that induce these various forms of emotional contravention is a question that must be left open; in all probability, functional rather than organic influences play the determining part, although Vierkandt and others have attempted to ascribe it to one or several "instincts."

§3. CONTRAVENTION AND ANTAGONISM OF VARIOUS KINDS

Other factors in the causation of contravention may be distinguished: (1) antagonistic interests; (2) antagonistic convictions; (3) antagonistic temperaments; (4) antagonism which in reality does not exist but in which one or both parties believe.

Antagonism of interests is always accompanied by more or less rational comprehension of its existence, and may give rise to competition or open conflict just as readily as to mere contravention. What actually results is due to the joint action of situation and personality traits.

Antagonism of convictions oftentimes leads to combat, as the wars of religion amply attest; contravention, however, is the usual alternative when for any reason combat or conflict is to be avoided.

Antagonism of temperaments is a theme upon which much has been written; "incompatibility" is a perennial divorce-court plea, and is oftentimes founded in fact. Even though one of the persons concerned is frequently more or less "contrary," there can be little

* T. B. Macaulay, quoted in E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, rev. ed., p. 149.

doubt that this is often accentuated by the partner; a vicious circle that can be broken only by legal dissolution results. This is not confined to marital relations; practically everyone has met some person with whom others could remain on the best of terms, but who had a peculiarly irritating effect upon him. Some writers have attributed this to undue similarity of temperament, others to undue dissimilarity, but such over-simplifications of the problem afford no real insight. The social psychologist, who is not (or at any rate should not be!) wedded to particularistic theories, usually provides more adequate explanations.

Antagonism that is more or less imaginary not infrequently occurs. Someone believes himself insulted, humiliated, or covertly attacked by another, whereas an impartial observer can find no basis for the belief. In many instances the feeling of being disparaged by another is a subjective reality that flows from the temperamental antagonism just described. Here again a person outside the configuration cannot find any warrant for the taking of offense. A great deal of contravention is due to such self-deception and misunderstanding; the consequences may be more serious than if genuine affront had been given.

§4. TYPES OF CONTRAVENTION

CONDITIONED BY SPECIFIC PLURALITY PATTERNS: FATHER-SON,
AGE-YOUTH, HUSBAND-WIFE, MAJORITY-MINORITY

A great many varieties of contravention may be distinguished if differences introduced by particular plurality patterns are taken into account. Space forbids discussion of all except three that exercise especially strong influence upon social life: (1) contravention of generations; (2) contravention of the sexes; (3) parliamentary contravention. Beyond any doubt, conflict is also to be found in such zones of interhuman life, but the husband-wife, father-son, and government-opposition relationships are more frequently characterized by contravention than by conflict. The reason is probably found in the fact that such groups and pairs are primarily associative in nature, and consequently developing antagonisms are inhibited in so many ways that the outbreak of conflict is retarded. Contravention arises, accompanied by the doubt which is its essential characteristic; the morality and expediency of dissociation are doubted, and hopes of reconciliation are retained.

Yet it is possible to formulate the tragic division that frequently exists in the husband-wife and father-son dyads by the aphorisms: "The nearest are the farthest," and "Those who are united are for

that very reason disunited." Modern literature plays endless variations on this theme: Strindberg and his struggle of the sexes, Turgenev in his "Fathers and Sons," the numerous writers of the Youth Movement, and many more.

In the patriarchal culture of Europe the father-son type of contravention is especially interesting, for it expresses in clear-cut form a certain contravention between generations which is latent or active in all other cultures—even in those most widely different. The contravention in which both son and father so often find themselves is sometimes primarily due to the revolt of youth against the authority of tradition and the past as incorporated in the father. The son usually explains his antagonism by asserting that patriarchal authority stifles all power of decision and initiative in the younger generation. It is indeed true that many fathers do attempt to stipulate the profession into which the son enters, to choose his friends for him, to dictate his selection of a wife, and to retain control over him even when he has a family of his own. Some sons will tamely submit to this domination because of native or acquired supineness or the shrewd realization that conformity brings inheritance, but others of more rebellious or less time-serving traits feel themselves so hampered by patriarchal power that they revolt whatever the cost. By some writers such revolt is praised as if it were a sure token of genius, but the wastrel figures in patriarchal contravention at least as often as the aspiring soul trammelled by prosaic routine.

Even when father and son are essentially similar personality types, difference in years often leads to contravention. Schopenhauer expresses the contrasting attitudes of young and old in the following graphic way: "When I was one-and-twenty, I was greatly pleased whenever the knocker clanked, for I thought 'Ah, here it comes at last' but now that I am one-and-sixty, the same sound fills me with fright and I think, 'Oh, here it comes again.'" He puts the same antithesis in another way: "The first half of man's three score years and ten is characterized by an unsatisfied longing for happiness, whereas the second half is filled with worry lest unhappiness increase." The old, remembering their youth, may at times feel some sympathy with the young, but youth, viewing age with an uncomprehending eye, often feels only contempt for its impotence. Bourne has given some other reasons for this scorn:

"That the inertia of the older people is wisdom, and not impotence is a theory that you will never induce youth to believe for an instant. The stupidity and cruelties of their management of the world fill youth with an intolerant rage.

"Youth sees with almost a passionate despair its plans and dreams and enthusiasms, that it knows so well to be right and true and noble, brushed calmly aside, not because of any sincere searching into their practicability, but because of the timidity and laziness of the old, who sit in the saddle and ride mankind. And nothing torments youth so much as to have this inertia justified on the grounds of experience."³

Age is always confronted with a difficult task in reconciling itself to the rising flood of the new generation and the consequent narrowing of the domain it once held for its own. Resentment develops, and increases in the same degree as age feels itself mentally and physically crowded out by youth. To those among the older generation who have rich personalities, however, one thing at least remains: the possession of a wider and deeper store of memories than callow youth can claim. Nevertheless, youth is perpetually experiencing fresh emotions, new thoughts, and surprising destinies, and all too often age is not only unwilling but incapable of following the tumultuous stream and is finally left far behind, misunderstanding and misunderstood. The social recognition accorded to the old who have been in some measure successful provides a partial defense against the encroachments of youth, but it is precisely this social recognition of the elders that engenders in the young a passionate desire for similar recognition, and thus antagonisms are intensified.⁴

Each generation at a certain stage of its development necessarily makes the same mistake: the more vigorous and capable always come to believe that their own generation is called upon and competent to shape the world anew. Slogans expressing this conviction are coined: "The evangelization of the world in this generation," "New blood for new tasks," "With us dawns the new age," "A country fit for heroes to live in," "Socialism in our time," and so on. The flaming intensity of youthful enthusiasm is believed sufficient to move mountains, and caution is thought equivalent to cowardice. As time wears on, the concealing mist that seems so friendly but is so treacherous fades away, and adventurous youth finds itself lodged in cramping crevices it had no part in creating but where it must answer for things done and left undone by others.

And this certainty of disillusion leads to efforts on the part of the older generation to shield youth. It is not merely the slow pulse, hostility to innovation, and impotence of old age that determine the anxious care of the elders, but also the realization that, if someone

³ Randolph Bourne, *Youth and Life*, pp. 11-15.

⁴ Cf. on this point Vera Strasser, *Psychologie der Zusammenhänge und Beziehungen, passim*.

with kindly intent does not dampen the incautious ardor of youth, the social order will take over the task and carry it out relentlessly. Many a parent has bitterly reproached himself for his failure to discipline his child; undue solicitude and the desire to let youth "lead its own life" frequently lead to pitifully misshapen lives. Awareness of this fact induces many parents, who themselves are quite unconventional, to control their children in accordance with the dictates of the social order. The most courageous become filled with anxiety when they observe the ruthless way in which violated proprieties exact their toll, hence persons who do not fear opprobrium for themselves manifest vicarious timidity for their children. Indeed, the Bohemian by conviction is often the veriest Philistine where his children are concerned; his warnings and advice, wishes and hopes are at bottom narrow, moralistic, and conformist. In a few cases, the mother may wish her child touched with divine discontent, but the father rarely ventures any desires beyond a respected name, a good profession, and a stable family life for his offspring. Ironically enough, it is just such parental coddling that leads many children with real ability to turn aside from family-chosen paths in deep disgust; contravention is the almost inevitable result.

Moreover, youth sometimes becomes bitterly aware that the "wisdom" elders feel it so necessary to impart is nothing more than the habit of denying every generous impulse and shrewdly grasping at every petty personal advantage; what wonder that the eager and impetuous hotly challenge the rule of the gray-beards in the belief that the social order could be made wholly equitable and free if it were not for the clammy clutch of the old!

The task of the parental generation, when all such matters are taken into account, is full of contradictions, and hence is practically impossible of balanced fulfillment.

If, on the one hand, the father acts as the representative of the social order, and consequently inculcates moderation, self-restraint, and tradition, it is virtually impossible to gain the entire confidence, friendship, and comradely frankness of his son, for the latter necessarily feels that the principles imposed by the father betray the latter's enmity to all that youth holds dear. To such a father there remains only the hope that at some future time the son, taught in the hard school of experience, will realize the tremendous strength of tradition and convention and will then understand the apparently arbitrary restrictions once laid upon him. After all, such banking of the fires of youth is *easy* only for fathers who no longer remember

that "the thoughts of youth are long, long thoughts," and who are firmly persuaded that the social order is always in the right and the "giddy and irresponsible" younger generation is always in the wrong.

On the other hand, if the father is more or less contemptuous of the "law and order" and colorless sobriety of bourgeois life, he probably shares—somewhat resignedly to be sure—in the heaven-storming unconventionality of his son, and may thereby gain his full trust and affection. The great danger in such a course lies in the softening irresponsibility, overweening pride, and shallow radicalism almost inevitably developed in the son; the father has been derelict in his duty of stemming the impetuosity of his youthful charge. It might even be said that the father must *not* be the all-understanding and all-pardoning friend of his child if he is to be truly a father; remnants of reserve and restraint must remain if the parental function is to be fulfilled. Some measure of discord or even antagonism is therefore inevitable.

Nevertheless, the proper degree of tension between father and son should not lead to conflict, to say nothing of combat, but should take the special form of a vital, intense intimacy that has occasional or even frequent contravention as an inseparable component.

The peculiar forms of contravention frequently found between husband and wife are a no less perennial theme of literature than that just described. The excellent sociological treatises by Mowrer, Waller, Lichtenberger, Ogburn, Groves, Popenoe, and others make extensive comment unnecessary here.⁵

Parliamentary contravention leads us into a different sphere, and for this reason use of the term opposition to denote such contravention is perhaps permissible; it has been so thoroughly imbued with special meaning by such phrases as "His Majesty's Opposition" that it is not likely to be confused with competition, conflict, or combat. In speaking of parliamentary opposition, reference is not solely to real parliaments or bodies representative of the people, but also to groups organized along parliamentary lines, whether within or without the zone of the state. In the present context, our chief interest is the relation between majorities and minorities, inasmuch as the minority is usually forced into the rôle of opposition.

Such a minority organization is placed in a difficult position, for

⁵ E. R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization*; —, *Domestic Discord*; W. W. Waller, *The Old Love and the New: Divorce and Readjustment*; J. P. Lichtenberger, *Divorce: A Social Interpretation* (1931); W. F. Ogburn and E. R. Groves, *American Marriage and Family Relationships*; Paul Popenoe, *Modern Marriage*; etc.

it must work with the majority in the formulation of policies but is continually checked in its efforts to control that policy; the task of leading an opposing minority is consequently an art all its own. Ever-present numerical weakness leads to the use of deception, which is judged more or less "fair" when used by the minority, but with which the majority can dispense and consequently can afford to scorn. Simmel has commented as follows on the parliamentary practice of submitting to the will of the majority once a vote has been taken:

"The fundamental fact of social structure, responsible alike for the incomparable success of social endeavor and for the insoluble problems attending that endeavor, lies in the creation of a new unity out of self-contained unities, i.e., out of human personalities. It is impossible to make a painting out of other paintings; a tree cannot grow directly from other trees; independent wholes do not develop from other wholes but from derivative parts. Society alone can take a self-contained entity and make it a mere member of an all-inclusive configuration. . . . Now inasmuch as every cleavage between the components of a totality threatens the continued existence of that totality, the submission of the minority to majority decision has tremendous significance. It means that the unity of the whole dominates all the antagonisms of interest and conviction. With all its apparent simplicity, the practice of bowing to the will of the majority while at the same time maintaining minority integrity is one of the most ingenious of all social devices for securing a final harmony from the dissonance of clashing chords."⁶

§5. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE FEATURES OF CONTRAVENTION

A few words concerning the negative and positive features of contravention are now in order. First of all, there can be little doubt that the social dangers of contravention are extreme and that they lie in its disproportionately great influence and "contagious" power. Ross rightly emphasizes the fact that hostility usually has more effect upon the human mind than friendliness. An orator finds it much easier to sway his hearers against a given proposal than for it; this is the reason why the rules of formal debate usually give the advantage in order of speaking and time allotted to the affirmative side. Dislike and distrust are more easily aroused in persons previously indifferent than is approval. The tragi-comic history of gossip, that omnipotent arbiter of human destiny in primary contact groups, demonstrates the appreciable advantage possessed by those who seek to establish unfavorable opinions. With this in view, is it possible to ascribe to contravention, as in the case of competition, a positive function? Certainly. It makes co-operation possible in the absence of complete agreement among the co-operators, or, from another angle,

⁶ Georg Simmel, *Soziologie*, pp. 186-7.

it assists in the assertion of personality against powers that would otherwise wipe it out. Here again Simmel's comment is instructive:

"Contravention between elements within an association is not merely a negative factor. It is often the only means of maintaining associations which would otherwise be unendurable. The power and the right to oppose tyranny and egotism, caprice and tactlessness, make it possible to protect the integrity of personality while at the same time maintaining relations which in the absence of contravention would have to be dissolved no matter how desperate the ensuing situation. Such contravention, it need hardly be said, has nothing to do with combat. Not the least important of the functions of contravention—altogether aside from the fact that impositions tend to increase if they are accepted without protest—lies in the satisfaction, distraction, and release it sometimes affords . . . it gives us the feeling of not being wholly submerged by the situation, permits the conscious conservation of our powers, and thus introduces a certain vitality and reciprocity into relations which in the absence of this corrective would have been severed at whatever cost. . . . Contravention exercises this function, not only when it does not lead to any discernible success, but also when it remains wholly subjective during the entire course of the relationship. . . . for it thereby preserves the internal equilibrium of one or even both participants . . . and thus maintains relations which to the outsider seem in imminent danger of collapse. . . . In this capacity contravention is not only a means for the preservation of the relation but is also one of the concrete functions of which the relation actually consists."⁷

§6. SUB-PROCESSES OF CONTRAVENTION

The examples of contravention given in the table may be placed in five groups: (1) general processes of contravention; (2) forms of simple contraventive action; (3) forms of intensified contraventive action; (4) forms of secret contravention; (5) forms of tactical contravention.

(1) Under general processes of contravention are included a number of terms the meaning of which is similar to, but not identical with, contravention: *rebuffing*, *repulsing*, *working against*, *standing in another's way*, *hindering*, *protesting*, *opputing*, *adopting measures against*, *obstructing*, *restraining*, and *upsetting another's plans*.

(2) The forms of simple contraventive activity are fairly numerous. Contraventive speaking is represented by *publicly disavowing* or *denying*. Contraventive writing is exemplified by *lampooning*, *libelling* and *slandering*. *Putting the burden on another* does not mean, in the present context, a general type of social action, but designates a certain kind of parliamentary tactics. *Shifting the burden of proof to another* is a closely related process. *Hoaxing maliciously* obviously transcends the ordinary practical joke, although the two sometimes

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 252.

are not widely separated; hoaxing is not classified under conflict because it is not done openly. *Intentionally humiliating* and *wilfully snubbing or ignoring* also fall in the category of contravention. *Blaming, accusing, reproaching, disparaging, depreciating, challenging, defying, withholding,* and similar actions should be classified under contravention rather than conflict only when covert or secret behavior is denoted. The same is true of such processes as *discountenancing, disapproving, making charges against, imputing motives to,* and *defending or protecting oneself*. An extremely interesting variety of contravention is furnished by *haggling*. This must be sharply distinguished from purchasing or dealing, for in the latter instances, contravention is subordinate to more or less objective evaluation of the goods offered, whereas haggling is characterized by a lack of economic objectivity in both participants. Cunning, trickery, persistence, and greed play predominant parts in fixing the price. Haggling is a contest in which each antagonist strives to wear the other down; personal animosities may markedly influence the result. *Debating* is quite different from simple discussion, for it inevitably leads to contravention, particularly in the case of parliamentary opposition.

(3) Forms of more intense contravention are instanced by *inciting* (to pogroms, lynching riots, etc.), *hissing at, exposing, branding, fault-finding, maliciously criticizing, frustrating, rendering effort vain, spurning, and scorning*.

(4) The manifold forms of secret contravention should be investigated *in extenso*, for many of them are of great historical and contemporary importance, e.g., "*snooping, circumventing, denouncing secretly, covertly thwarting, betraying, and using secret measures to get rid of "a thorn in one's flesh."*"

(5) Forms of tactical contravention are exceedingly numerous: *disquieting, harassing, annoying, perturbing an opposing political party or candidate, maneuvering another into a minority, forcing conformity through majority power, provoking to indiscreet utterance, conducting a "whispering campaign," using trickery* (the Ems telegram, the Zinoviev letter, etc.), *dragging a red herring across the trail, filibustering, and so on.*

In addition to these five groupings there are a number of miscellaneous contraventive processes which should at least be mentioned.

Being suspicious of another and indulging in contravention because of mere *personal dislike* for which no particular reason can be assigned are two rather vague relations that are of especial interest with regard to motivation.

The wide range of contravention is indicated by the fact that *cabal*, *intrigue*, *conspiracy*, and *heresy* can all be justifiably included.

Reprisal as a form of contravention has a special meaning in the sociology of law; Max Weber has discussed this in connection with the concept of group solidarity:

"The members of one group frequently hold the other group as a whole responsible for the action of each of its members. . . . Hence in addition to the primitive blood-feud there may also be found the almost universal phenomenon of reprisal; the person and property of one member of a group is held as surety or compensation for obligations entered into by some or all of his fellow-citizens. In the Middle Ages such reprisal was especially frequent."⁸

Reciprocity may at first glance seem altogether out of place among dissociative processes, but we are here interested only in one of its aspects which is undeniably contraventive, although the process as a whole is associative. For example, a person united by the closest ties of reciprocity with other members of his own group may for that very reason feel it incumbent upon him to contravene an outside person or plurality pattern with whom he has no personal quarrel. Husbands may be reluctantly compelled to break off friendly relationships of long standing because their wives have quarrelled. The close reciprocity of the family relationship may therefore engender contravention, and the same is true of all similar bonds.

The necessity of *reserve* in even the most intimate of human relationships if contravention is to be avoided has been strikingly expressed by Simmel:

"Only those people can without danger give themselves entirely to each other who *cannot possibly* give themselves entirely, because the wealth of their souls rests in constant progressive development which follows every devotion immediately with the growth of new treasures. . . . The case is quite different, however, with those people who, so to speak, draw from their capital all their betrayals of feeling and the revelations of their inner life; in whose case there is no further source from which to derive those elements which should not be revealed, and which are not to be disjoined from the essential ego. In such cases it is highly probable that the parties to the confidence will one day face each other empty-handed; that the Dionysian free-heartedness may leave behind a poverty which—unjustly, but not on that account with less bitterness—may so react as even to charge the enjoyed devotion with deception."⁹

⁸ Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 437.

⁹ Georg Simmel, "The Sociology of Secrecy," trans. by A. W. Small, *Am. J. Soc.*, XI, 4 (January, 1906), pp. 460-1.

CHAPTER XX

PROCESSES OF DISSOCIATION: CONFLICT

§1. COMBAT AND CONFLICT

Of all the processes in which enmity is expressed, combat is the most spectacular and striking. In the form of the duel, the battle, and the trial by combat, it has had tremendous historical importance—so much that one might almost take liberties with Heraclitus and say that “combat, rather than conflict, is the father of all things.”

Now, such modification of the above aphorism indicates that a distinction is here drawn between conflict and combat; they are by no means identical. Combat is a stage of conflict which is not necessarily reached in every instance. Moreover, combat involves a certain approximate equivalence in the strength of the contending parties; great discrepancies in their respective powers may result in murder, rape, abuse, or punishment, but not in combat in the strict sense, whereas any of the above occurrences can be regarded as conflict. To choose an example from the table: when *A* openly maligns *B* it would be wholly inaccurate to refer to the process as combat, but there can be no objection to placing it in the category of conflict.

Combat is certainly the most distinct and definite form of dissociation, but from this assertion it does not follow that the condition consequent upon combat is permanent dissociation—indeed, numberless instances attest the fact that it may finally result in well-marked association. The more equivocal and latent dissociative processes, particularly contravention that never comes to the surface, may be greater barriers to future amalgamation than the most violent forms of open combat. Storms oftentimes clear the air; the slow escape of noxious gases continually contaminates it. Under certain circumstances, combat is to be preferred, for although it “ends in terror” it cannot generate “terror without end.”

Social philosophy has always been preoccupied with the attempt to evaluate combat; sociology cannot permit itself thus to be diverted from its own peculiar tasks. This renunciation offers little difficulty to those who have observed the devastation wrought by prejudices almost wholly based upon emotional partisanship, subsequently ra-

tionalized into metaphysical systems. Instead of analyzing combat, comparing its two-fold manifestations of attack and defense, and attempting to find a value-free criterion for its effects upon social life, writers on the subject immediately begin to praise or to blame. They always ask: What is the ultimate meaning of combat? What part does Destiny assign it in the scheme of things? Aggressive and belligerent persons incline to sing its praises and to regard it as the mainspring of social evolution, whereas those who are mild and sympathetic continually dwell upon the cruelty and terrible suffering caused by combat.

§2. THE DIFFICULTY OF ARRIVING AT A SOCIOLOGICAL ESTIMATE OF COMBAT

In enjoining avoidance of such emotional evaluation, however, the sociologist is not debarred from all attempts to estimate the net social consequences of combat, particularly as regards war and revolution. The criterion he seeks, however, must be so general that it transcends all ethical and aesthetic imperatives and is rooted in the field of science alone; moreover, this criterion must be of a nature that admits of verification in numerical or even quantitative terms. If it were possible to declare association superior to dissociation, and therefore to set up socialization or harmonization as the goal toward which all efforts should be directed, the criterion as such would be quite simple (although its application would not). We should need only to ask: To what extent does combat further positive sociation, i.e., association?

But as already noted, there is no discernible reason for preferring association to dissociation, and hence the only possible criterion seems to be the general rational principle in the application of which energy expended and results achieved are compared, and an excess of achievement over expenditure is recognized as a gain.

All combat is accompanied by an increased outpouring of vital resources, and in all combat there is an attempt to exterminate or to render powerless all persons and plurality patterns which hinder or are otherwise detrimental to the attainment of particular aims. Now, when an effort at extermination, destruction, or repression is engaged in, the accession of strength issuing from the will to combat and the presumable elimination of objectively harmful obstacles is counterbalanced by a diminution of strength resulting from the very activity of extermination.

Such pros and cons are more or less futile, for how is anyone to

decide what is positive and what is negative, what is harmful and what is useful? How can the diminution of energy be measured? It may well appear to many that there are after all no general criteria except simple injunctions like the Sixth Commandment and the Golden Rule—"Thou shalt not kill," and "All things therefore whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them."

Nevertheless, the difficulty of even approximate measurement should not lead to complete rejection of the rational principle, because there are numerous combats in which the sacrifice is obviously so much greater than the benefit to any of the participants that even those whose vision is obscured by patriotic passion cannot help but perceive the net disadvantage such combat brings. It seems best, however, to follow this train of thought no further; the present means of scientific verification are so meagre that unqualified condemnation or approval of combat must be held unwarranted so far as the sociologist qua sociologist is concerned. No final opinion can be expressed here; a different forum must sit in judgment.

§3. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING ESTIMATES OF COMBAT AND CONFLICT

The most that can be done in a strictly scientific work is to set forth a few general considerations that necessarily arise in any attempt to decide upon the merits of combat.

(1) Any attempt to reach a judgment concerning combat should be based upon comparison, as comprehensive and exact as possible, between energy fruitfully expended and energy lost. Up to the present, such comparison has not even been started. Most would-be scientific apologists for combat content themselves with pointing out that, in the early stages of culture, combat between small groups leads to their eventual amalgamation into larger groups, which in turn provides a basis for "higher" social development. Immediately there is re-affirmed the supposed axiom: "Combat is the source of social progress." Again, the well-attested fact that in any group engaged in combat with outer enemies internal dissension at least temporarily terminates, and that sometimes lasting inner consolidation is achieved, is frequently seized upon as warrant for the *non sequitur*: "Combat is the source of group loyalty and solidarity, the only way in which diverse elements can be welded into one people."

Assertions like these seem plausible, but no one who knows the tremendous complexity of the problem and the paucity of the knowledge we now possess would ever make them. Altogether too many

value-judgments are involved to admit of scientific answers. For example, what is social progress? Is it identical with increased cultural complexity? Is it directly correlated with the degree of group solidarity? The most that a careful sociologist can say is that combat always produces *changes* in the prevailing social structure; whether or not these changes mean progress is a question that can be answered only by social philosophers and other persons whose pronouncements cannot be scientifically verified. Many of the changes called forth by combat are regarded as fruitful only because they supposedly constitute stages in a developmental sequence, and hence seem indispensable and therefore valuable to those who regard the later stages of that sequence, particularly the one in which they find themselves, as the one "divine event toward which the whole creation moves." Persons who thus look with favor upon everything which they believe to have contributed to the marvellous moral and material elevation enjoyed by their own day and generation forget that through combat many other developmental possibilities have either been destroyed outright or so weakened that they exert no influence upon the main stream of cultural advance.

(2) Inasmuch as processes of association and dissociation are always temporally co-existent, and inasmuch as every alteration in social structure produces clashes as well as consonance of interests, conflicts are to be found wherever and whenever a plurality of human beings exists. Moreover, these conflicts manifest a tendency to develop into combats if they are not checked by other social influences.

It may therefore be said that conflict as a general category of inter-human behavior can never be abolished. The modes of its manifestation, however, continually change. Combat is not a necessary consequence of conflict; it can be controlled if men wish to control it and are willing to create organizations for that purpose. Combat between races, classes, and peoples—in short, wars of all kinds—can be supplanted by other modes of conflict. Whether or not this possibility is transformed into an actuality depends upon the extent to which the disadvantages of combat are realized and the willingness to take definite action to end such disadvantages. The disadvantageousness of combat becomes evident when its results are contrasted with those of other types of conflict, but whether or not rational consideration of loss and gain will ultimately determine the affairs of mankind is, to say the least, an open question.

(3) In order to clarify the essential problem raised by combat, let us assume for the moment that it is permissible for the sociologist

to speak in ethical terms. The sociologist turned ethicist would not demand that the interaction of persons and plurality patterns be wholly free of conflict, for even the ethicist does not consciously demand the impossible. Conflict as a general type of interhuman behavior is always and everywhere evident in some form; when one manifestation is suppressed, another arises—oftentimes in surprising shape. Entirely warranted, however, would be the ethical demand that combat, wasteful of energy and higher values, should be supplanted by less destructive varieties of conflict. But this is not a total condemnation of combat! There are certain forms of conflict, such as covert slander, abuse, and violence, which are far more destructive than combat, and when one or the other evil is inevitable, the latter is certainly the lesser.

§4. FACTORS ACCENTUATING THE BITTERNESS OF CONFLICT

In this connection one may well ask the question: Why is it that conflict usually assumes its most bitter and unrelenting forms among former companions or allies? A fairly acceptable answer would seem to be that the defection or antagonism of someone previously regarded as a devotee of the common cause weakens the self-confidence of the person or persons who remain identified with that cause, and may even engender a feeling of helplessness if the secession saps the strength available for its accomplishment. If someone with whom our relationships have never been friendly decides upon a course of action in conflict with our own, the result is generally re-inforcement and confirmation of our existing attitudes, but if someone who has enjoyed our confidence turns against us, an extremely uncomfortable dilemma arises. Either we must declare him a traitor to the common cause and admit that our confidence was misplaced, all of which tends to engender or increase our feelings of insecurity, or we must regard our own devotion to the cause excessive, which also diminishes our self-assurance. In either case, then, defection has a disquieting effect upon those who remain loyal, and they therefore become extremely bitter against the apostate. This is one of the reasons why academic dissension and scientific feuds go to such extreme lengths. Similarly, the early history of Protestantism shows that there was far more hatred of the sectarians who split off from the main Lutheran and Calvinistic bodies than of the Roman Catholic; it was often said: "It is easier to hold with the Papists than with those of the other sects." Or, as one English divine put it, "I would gladly see Anabaptists go to Hell

on the backs of Brownists, for both these schismatic sects disturb the sweet peace of our church."

Such instances show that disregard of the subjective factors correlated with objective clashes of opinion, principle, and belief vitiates sociological analysis. Objective truth rarely confronts objective untruth; both parties usually do what is right in their own eyes, and the observer is sometimes compelled to reconstruct the long chain of processes that finally culminate in a clash on some trivial issue.

There is a closely related type of conflict which is also extremely bitter; this occurs when there is more or less conscious realization that the antagonist is justified in his position and that he is likely to gain support; in such cases the person who is losing ground often makes a last desperate effort to defend a position in which he no longer fully believes. The vigor of his invective may be in direct proportion to his own insecurity.

§5. THE COSTS OF CONFLICT

Just such conflicts as these enable us to recognize that many struggles cost more than the winning of them can ever repay. Tremendous stakes are risked to win what is not worth having. Ross even asserts that "most conflicts cost more than was expected," illustrating his statement thus:

"As we review the pitiful squandering of human life, strength and resources, not only in the wars of nations but also in the struggles between labor and capital, in commercial 'wars,' in political contests, in lawsuits and in private quarrels, it becomes apparent that the impulses of anger, jealousy and greed should not bear all the blame. Even the cool and calculating enter into a disastrous conflict thinking it will be decided by a sudden thrust or a clever stroke, and fail to foresee the long drain of energy which they must endure before a victory can be won. Convinced of superiority, one fails to compute the sacrifices which may lie between superiority and triumph. It is the besetting fallacy of militarists to picture war to their people as a sharp, brief struggle between prepared forces terminating in the victory of the force which is braver, more intelligent, or better led. They refuse to recognize how normal it is that war should become an expenditure of antagonistic efforts which wears down the belligerent till both are prostrate."¹

Moreover, although the inductive observations substantiating the statement cannot be introduced because of space limitations, there is little doubt that Ross is entirely right in saying that "it is only the short decisive conflict that does not cost the victor more than the victory is worth."²

¹ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, rev. ed., p. 163.

² *Ibid.*, p. 164.

In all directly personal relationships, combat is steadily becoming rarer and rarer; other varieties of conflict are steadily supplanting it. The mere combative impulse, leading to efforts to annihilate an antagonist physically, is increasingly diverted into a conglomeration of motives in which rivalry, ambition, rapacity, pleasure in the display of ability, etc., play important parts; such diversion is effected by the growing complexity of emotional life and situational factors. Elemental urges are "sublimated," but, as in the case of all sublimation (see chap. xxvii, §6), the scientific sociologist cannot justifiably proclaim the greater desirability of either mode of expression. In any event, there is no doubt that at present the physical annihilation of the antagonist is not striven for, inasmuch as the advantages that result from merely weakening him benefit the victor far more than would his extinction.

Furthermore, the direct gratification afforded by combat must in the very nature of things lead to over-estimation of one's own strength and under-estimation of the opponent's. In most cases, however, the efforts exerted by one combatant are promptly counteracted by equivalent or stronger efforts on the part of the other. The result is frequently a balance of forces which, when long continued, leads to the exhaustion of both antagonists. When this comes about, sober reflection and abandonment of the struggle may ensue.

§6. DOES INTIMACY DIMINISH CONFLICT, AND IS CONFLICT WITHIN A GROUP ALWAYS DISASTROUS?

Ross has posed and answered two important questions which cannot be overlooked in any discussion of conflict: first, is conflict diminished when intimacy increases; and second, to what extent is a group endangered by internal conflict? His answers are as follows:

(1) "[Conflict] . . . may spring from that imaginative hostility which arises in us when we suspect an inimical idea is in another's mind. Against this feeling closer association and fuller knowledge of one another offer no security. 'Whether intimacy will improve our sentiment toward another man or not depends upon the true relation of his way of feeling and thinking to ours.' No doubt we should hate rivals and foes less could we hobnob with them and find them men like ourselves; but it is not so with the antipathy which roots in difference. There are individuals who do not improve on acquaintance. Mark Twain had the type in mind when he drawled, 'The more I think of him, the less I think of him.' This is why refinement, culture and good taste do not of necessity lessen hostility. They make a richer and finer sympathy possible, but at the same time multiply the occasions of antipathy."^a

^a *Ibid.*, p. 150.

(2) "A society . . . which is riven by a dozen . . . [conflicts] along lines running in every direction, may actually be in less danger of being torn with violence or falling to pieces than one split along just one line. For each new cleavage contributes to narrow the cross clefts, so that one might say that society is *sewn together* by its inner conflicts. It is not such a paradox after all if one remembers that every species of collective strife tends to knit together in fellowship the contenders on either side."⁴

From the first of these two conclusions, therefore, it seems possible to infer that Madame de Staël was wrong in her contention that *tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner*. This inference is justified, however, only in one type of conflict. There may be conflict as the result of lack of contact alone; this variety promptly diminishes as association increases, and here Madame de Staël is right. There is another type of conflict, however, which is rooted in basic difference of temperament or outlook, and as both parties become more and more aware of the cleft that separates them, the less are they disposed to become reconciled. Antagonisms which "grow with acquaintance," then, manifestly controvert the assertion of our learned Frenchwoman. The only way in which the general validity of her maxim can be maintained is by pointing out that persons of the wiser and more dispassionate type eventually reach a stage of development where differences that seem important to others appear small to them. But such elevated disinterestedness is extremely rare, and is impossible to maintain in *all* situations; even the "selfless philosopher" has his deep-seated likes and dislikes, and although he may achieve some rational control over them, they become manifest in one way or another and affect the attitudes of those with whom he comes in contact. No matter how detached *he* may be, he therefore engenders some impulses to contravention or even conflict in others.

The second of Ross' assertions, that relating to the consolidating function of internal conflict, may be regarded as quite valid, and the general principle it illustrates would be dealt with in the systematics of plurality patterns, if space did not forbid, under the topic of *compensatory conflict*.

§7. EXAMPLES OF CONFLICT

A few words concerning the separate processes of conflict listed in the table are now relevant.

Attack and its correlate *defense* should be analyzed at length in any thorough sociological study of the strategy and tactics of conflict.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

Inasmuch as combat is a distinct variety of conflict, such processes as *carrying on a feud*, *duelling*, *ejecting a rival*, and *foiling* should be distinguished from the following kinds of conflict: *blaming*, *accusing*, *reproaching*, *maligning*, *abhorring*, and *persecuting*.

Lynching is an act of violence, but as already noted, it cannot justifiably be termed combat. *Jealousy* may lead to combat, but quite often conflict is the result.

When one person or plurality pattern *prostitutes* another, a deep-seated conflict between the respectable elements in the social order and those adhering to the way of life made necessary by prostitution is engendered.

Mere emotional antipathy rarely leads to anything beyond contravention, but genuine *abhorrence* and pronounced *rivalry* often issue in conflict.

CHAPTER XXI

DIFFERENTIATING AND INTEGRATING PROCESSES: GENERAL ASPECTS

§1. PROCESSES WITHIN AND BETWEEN PLURALITY PATTERNS, i.e., CIRCUMSCRIBED ACTION PATTERNS

The point has now been reached in the exposition of the present system where circumscribed processes can be dealt with at length. It will be recalled that although all social processes are necessarily conditioned by plurality patterns (inasmuch as the social self is formed by influences transmitted in and through plurality patterns) certain processes are more directly dependent upon immediately operative plurality patterns than are others. The latter we termed common-human processes, the former circumscribed processes. (Refer to chap. iii, §3, fig. 1.) In all the foregoing discussion, analysis of circumscribed action patterns is centered upon dynamic aspects, and this is also the case where circumscribed processes are concerned; *action* patterns are our primary object-matter, not *action patterns*. In other words, the relatively static aspects of interhuman behavior are of secondary importance here. Only in the systematics of plurality patterns do we deal with the pair, crowd, group, state, church, station, and class. Before interhuman statics can be made understandable, interhuman dynamics must be analyzed and systematized. This does not mean that one is more important than another, but simply that the method of exposition chosen seems to make this particular sequence advisable; process should, for heuristic reasons only, be dealt with before structure.

Such principal processes as differentiation, integration, deterioration, remodelling, and upbuilding do not apply only to one or two plurality patterns such as the state or the class, but have reference to plurality patterns of every description; at any given period they may all be found in advanced or incipient operation among all sorts of social structures, although sometimes in virtually imperceptible degree. The latter qualification is necessary because the three main types of plurality patterns behave differently: (1) crowds are plurality patterns of the lowest power and consequently display the

fewest and simplest processes; institutionalization and professionalization, for example, are evident only occasionally and in embryo; (2) groups have more definite structure and therefore offer a considerable number of definite processes and relationships for analysis; (3) abstract collectivities, being the most highly developed of all plurality patterns, offer an intricate network to be unravelled by the investigator, but the extreme abstractness of such collectivities makes it inadvisable to deal with them first. It is best to begin with groups, for they are both complex and concrete enough to possess structure that can be profitably and easily analyzed. Indeed, it may be said that whenever anyone finds difficulty in grasping the essentials of systematic sociology as here presented, he can do no better than to study groups with which he is familiar, e.g., political parties, clubs, teams, partnerships and corporations, Epworth Leagues, Christian Endeavor and similar societies, Boy Scout troops, trade union locals, shop councils, chambers of commerce, fraternities, and similar bodies. He will then be able to discern the influence of the various social processes upon both personality and plurality pattern much more clearly than if transient crowds or remote and intricate abstract collectivities engaged his attention. Let there be no misunderstanding, however: the system of circumscribed processes presented in this and following chapters is sufficiently general to comprise all behavior occurring within and between plurality patterns if such behavior is active rather than passive and extends over a sufficient period of time. This of course does not mean that all the principal processes are always present—instance the fact that a sewing circle is less exposed to the danger of commercialization than is a corporation—nevertheless, the possibility that any of the principal processes may become evident cannot be dismissed, inasmuch as such processes need not have any direct relation to the special purposes of the group but are the result of interhuman behavior as such.

Moreover, the distinction between common-human and circumscribed processes must not be taken to mean that common-human processes affect separate persons only and play no part in the relations of plurality patterns; on the contrary, they are of great importance among the latter. The most abstract of all collectivities cannot escape the influence of common-human processes. Plurality patterns compete just as persons compete; sects conflict with the state or with each other; advance, adjustment, accordance, and amalgamation occur among groups as well as among persons who are relatively detached. The only reason why the common-human processes are

considered first is that they may take place, as already noted, without the direct influence of plurality patterns and that they are most clearly evident when they affect separate persons rather than several congeries of persons.

Circumscribed processes, like common-human processes, are either associative or dissociative. They cannot readily be separated from the particular plurality patterns constituting their background. Within a group or between groups there arise disparity, submission, selection, uniformation, exploitation, perversion, institutionalization, and so on, but where no direct group influence is presupposed and only separate persons are considered, such processes either are wholly absent or so greatly altered that the same terms cannot properly be used, and others such as adjustment, contravention, etc., must be substituted.

When in the course of the following exposition the internal activities of plurality patterns or the more or less external effects of one plurality pattern upon others are discussed, the processes involved are placed in the two basic categories of association and dissociation just as are all other processes. This dichotomy must not be thought to express a chronological sequence, however; on the contrary, association and dissociation are, in practically all instances, simultaneous rather than successive. The internal activity of a group (hereafter, for expository purposes, the group will often be taken as representative of all other plurality patterns) is rooted in the fundamental fact that disparity as well as uniformity develops, that superordination and subordination are correlated with stratification and selection, that individuation is accompanied by socialization. True, one section of the dichotomy often predominates over its complement; further, one social process may exercise so much influence that others dwindle into insignificance. Nevertheless, the passive processes merely become latent, and do not disappear altogether; when proper circumstances recur they immediately become manifest. The difficulty of giving sufficient weight to this fact in the present context is great, and its full significance cannot be made evident until certain complementary points are set forth in the systematics of plurality patterns; conceptual channelizing of the flowing stream of social occurrences is necessary for rational comprehension, but each separate channel must be united with every other if complete conceptual reconstruction of that stream is to be achieved. On the other hand, if the systematics of plurality patterns alone were presented and the systematics of action patterns omitted, the resulting conceptual structure would lead to the erroneous impression that plurality patterns are organisms.

Repetition may seem superfluous or even wearisome, but the perpetual recurrence of such notions as the group mind, the collective sensorium, and other examples of the group fallacy make it necessary continually to re-emphasize the fact that plurality patterns are nothing more than neuropsychic patterns; they are not self-existent entities, although they are "real" when (and because) they influence human behavior. Reification is an ever-present foe of science; we must remind ourselves that, strictly speaking, there are no processes "within" or "between" plurality patterns; such expressions are merely metaphorical abbreviations. All references to plurality patterns as such are after all references to fictions; we frame such concepts *as if* they existed independently of human beings. Further, there is no fiction that has been so powerful as that of the superpersonal society, institution, or group. The fatal facility of reification, the practice of objectifying the content of our images, presentations, and concepts *as if* they were unique entities "existing alone in a circumambient void," as Cole puts it, has become so deeply ingrained that most persons find extreme difficulty in grasping the fact that such collectivities as church and state, although they are social forces of great potency, are nothing but neuropsychic patterns. Either the over-taxed mind flees to the postulate that state and church are living organisms of a higher order, or it takes refuge in the radical nominalism that declares church and state to be nothing but empty words. The sociologist must counter both these fallacies by unweariedly pointing out that, although human beings alone are responsible for the phenomena of the social sphere, their behavior may be strongly affected by the neuropsychic patterns—institutional norms, ideologies, habits, collective representations, etc.—to which they have been and are exposed; state and church have no existence apart from the neuropsychic patterns of the human beings comprising them, yet they exert tremendous influence on interhuman behavior.

§2. DIFFERENTIATION AND INTEGRATION ARE COMPLEMENTARY AND CO-EXISTENT

The chapters on processes of association contained a relatively detailed discussion of amalgamation, particularly in its co-operative aspects, and this makes the transition to the present analysis of circumscribed processes relatively easy. All circumscribed processes fall in one of two categories, differentiation or integration. So long as none of the more recondite implications of Spencer's philosophy are read into the following phrases, it may be said that all circumscribed

processes function in reducing an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity.¹ In view of the fact that the beginning and end of such an evolutionary sequence is wholly indeterminable, however, it is perhaps best to introduce a slight qualification by using the comparative degree: more indefinite, more incoherent homogeneity passes to more definite, more coherent heterogeneity. The totality of all social processes, the process of sociation, is characterized by the fact that the relatively homogeneous is unstable, that there is a multiplication of effects, and that differentiation and integration are ceaselessly active.

Speaking in less general terms, the following derivative assertions may be made: disparities and uniformities develop; the growth of plurality patterns brings with it stratification; the resulting strata are not random and accidental, but are arranged in a graded hierarchy; the resulting subordination and superordination conform to both general and specific principles. Further: differences in native endowment, achievement, and situational factors lead to selection; "parts" are continually being separated from the whole, i.e., individuation perpetually takes place; concomitantly, the associative network within plurality patterns becomes increasingly ingrained in the neuropsychic structures of its members, so that the associative bonds which unite them come to be regarded as more or less necessary, desirable, and justifiable, a consequence which renders the term "socialization" applicable; and socialization is then elevated to the rank of an ethical principle enjoining self-abnegation for the sake of plurality patterns or "society." Accompanying all these processes is the social ascent and descent of various members of the plurality patterns involved; the ensuing domination and submission are inseparable from group life.

These circumscribed processes *within* plurality patterns of course play their parts in the total stream of social occurrences as well; that is, they also take place *between* plurality patterns. Groups and other bodies are all subject to the principle that "nothing is changeless but change"; they perpetually deteriorate and form anew.

In an earlier chapter, the conclusion was reached that all common-human processes should be analyzed in accordance with the formula

and that the result should determine their place in the total system. This same procedure must be followed in the analysis of circumscribed

¹ Herbert Spencer, *First Principles*, 5th ed., p. 396.

processes; every empirical social action should be carefully studied in accordance with the general formula. When concrete cases in sufficient number have been subjected to investigation by a common method, then and only then is it possible to make comparisons—without which no genuinely scientific sociology can be built up. Families, sects, clubs, bureaucratic bodies, trade unions, and other empirical groupings provide the material for analysis and induction; research already conducted shows that it is possible to arrange the processes revealed in a schema like that of the table of interhuman relations already presented. Domination, selection, uniformation, etc., are in evidence among groups with widely varying cultural backgrounds and purposes, although of course no two groups show exactly the same combination and proportion of such processes. One effect of this kind of analysis is to demonstrate that certain plurality patterns which to many persons seem isolated and self-sufficient are really dependent upon others and are manifestations of underlying processes previously hidden. Another effect is that the complexity of plurality patterns becomes apparent; we are able to see why earlier theorists fell prey to the allurements of the organic analogy, which, fallacious though it is, rightly emphasizes one point, namely, that plurality patterns are not mere collections of identical elements and that some hierarchical gradation is always present. Not even the most “free” of Bohemian groups consists of a structureless congeries of “individuals”; the *plurality* always has a *pattern*. It must not be supposed, however, that this pattern or order is explicit and rigid in any appreciable percentage of cases; even when there is a body of rules or laws designed to govern group behavior, it will be found that the pattern actually existing is quite different from that laid out on paper. Further, in asserting that within every group relations of domination and submission are to be found—to choose an example with extensive implications—there is no intention of asserting that a fixed domination-submission relationship must forever endure between master *A* and servant *B*; the domination-submission relationship may frequently reverse its poles, so that the one-time servant becomes the master, and *vice versa*, or so that each person in the group in some measure submits to every other. Moreover, many plurality patterns contain a kind of domination to which submission is semi-voluntary or unconscious; the actual master need not be consciously recognized as such either by himself or others.

Further, gradation and stratification cannot be readily observed except in fairly large groups, but these processes are always operative

even though the persons concerned, as in the case of domination, are not aware of the import of their behavior.

Again, a great many groups oppose certain types of selection, e.g., democratic groups oppose selection based on the dynastic principle, but the only result is to substitute one type of selection for another; the process itself is always present.

Individuation provides an apparent exception. For example, there are various orders of monks and nuns which offer rigorous resistance to the slightest tendency toward individuation, whether physical or mental, and may even develop an elaborate system for insuring complete subordination to the group; the remarkable Jesuit discipline is a familiar example. Nevertheless, all such attempts wholly to control personality in the interest of the group merely suppress tendencies toward individuation; they do not by any means wipe them out. Even when the confessional and the methodical practice of penance are used as means of combating individuation, the most that is accomplished is the subordination of the self in the religious sphere, leaving the other regions of life less closely controlled; individuation merely "awaits its hour" and eventually breaks forth with concentrated power in ways that are usually quite unpredictable. Once more, attempts to place group relations upon an altogether "business-like" and "unsentimental" basis may at first seem successful, but sooner or later traces of socialization become evident and exert some effect, even though, as is usually the case, they are wiped out as promptly as possible.

Hence we may confidently conclude that all the principal social processes are everywhere and always in operation and that no tendency ever succeeds in completely eliminating those opposed to it; the most that ever happens is the transitory predominance of one process, and even this is frequently in appearance only. There is no exclusive and final victory for any. Compensation of forces, "the balance of nature," seems to be at work in the social world just as it is elsewhere.

§3. GENERAL PROCESSES OF DIFFERENTIATION AND INTEGRATION

There are a large number of social processes, not assignable to such specific subdivisions as, for example, selection and uniformation, which are of primary importance for differentiation and integration. On the one hand, we find *dividing, separating, severing connections, emigrating, seceding*, etc.; on the other, *growing, expanding, extending, propagating*, and the like.

Such processes seem to run parallel to those of the organic level,

particularly "growing" and "dividing." Analogies with cell growth and division at once offer themselves, but as soon as we seriously consider what growth means in the science of interhuman behavior, it at once becomes plain that any such analogy is so far-fetched as to be even more useless than analogies generally are. How can a plurality pattern—which, as we have seen, does not exist in the corporeal sense—*grow*? Growth is a property of living, tangible organisms. To be sure, we sometimes speak of the growth of neuropsychic patterns, both in their unconscious and conscious aspects: habits "grow" upon us; attitudes of distrust "grow" when friendly overtures are met with suspicion; we are obsessed by a "growing" fear; ideas sometimes "grow" if left to themselves; the complex intra-personal conditions evoked by the symbols of church or state "grow" so that we become more religious or more loyal. But this development of subjective phenomena is not what we have in mind when we speak of the growth of a plurality pattern; instead, we mean increase in numerical magnitude. The sib grows to be a tribe, the tribe to be a nation. Such numerical increase is the only meaning the scientific sociologist should attach to the term growth: if he once begins to use it in metaphorical fashion he will be like the Arab who let the camel put its head in the tent; scientific sociology will be gradually displaced by the obscurantism of the organic analogy (or better, homology). Moreover, the term growth should not be used to denote the internal development of the group, i.e., the increasing complexity of its structure; other modes of expression are better and safer.

Conversely, this is also true of *dividing*, *separating*, and similar terms; all they mean is diminution in the numbers of the group, as is made evident by other general processes such as *emigrating* and *seceding*.

Another important set of general processes is made up of the intentional actions through which plurality patterns are extended, e.g., *proselyting*, *missionary endeavor*, *membership campaigns*, *lowering of restrictions*, and *education for citizenship* (Americanization, etc.). As indicated, such intentional activity may consist simply of opening groups that were previously "closed" (Max Weber), but in many cases there is no conscious intention of setting up restrictions of any kind; expansion is the guiding principle from the very beginning, as is strikingly exemplified by Paul's break with the Jerusalem church and his appeal to the whole world, Jew and Gentile, bond and free. This is *propaganda* in the strict sense of the word; the College of the Propaganda, which has charge of all the missionary

and other expansive activity of the Roman See, is an example of this use of the term. Frequently, of course, expansion of the group to include highly diverse elements brings about an essential weakening, if not a perversion, of the characteristics previously possessed by the group.

Pioneering, as it goes on in colonial lands and elsewhere, is relevant in the present context, not so much because of the connections maintained by the pioneer contingent with the group left behind, but primarily because new plurality patterns, having some traits of the old but markedly different in many respects, soon develop.

Intermediaries often play an important part in linking members with the plurality pattern, particularly when the latter is an abstract collectivity. These intermediaries may be as relatively numerous as the monks of Tibet or as relatively few as British emissaries in the native states of India, but they are usually essential in maintaining existing relations. Between the laity and the Roman Catholic Church priestly intermediaries supply connections, and in a certain sense governmental officials link citizens with the state. Sometimes such intermediaries are the products of professionalization, and hence are explicitly recognized as functional members of the group; occasionally, however, small coteries or separate persons not specifically assigned to particular group tasks eventually take them over entirely, and are finally recognized as the sole functionaries. This process of intermediation may from one point of view be regarded as differentiation, inasmuch as the structure of the plurality pattern becomes more visibly articulated; and from another it may be looked upon as integration, because new and more durable bonds are called forth.

The systematics of plurality patterns is the proper place for dealing with organizations in their static aspects, but organization as a process may properly be considered here. By this term is always designated consciously purposive activity; certain relations are regarded as essential to the attainment of a certain goal, and these are either set up within an existing plurality pattern or a new one is created for the purpose. The process of organization is therefore extremely general; it comprises the consciously purposive aspect of a number of more specific processes. Instance the fact that stratification, "ordination," uniformation, selection, and the numerous sub-processes they include may all at some time or other be instituted with definite ends in view. It is also true, of course, that such organization plays no part in the other aspects of these processes.

Members of a plurality pattern may drift into certain strata, undergo "ordination," and after a time become quite uniform with other members of their respective strata—all without any conscious intention on the part of anyone.

Two phrases that are avoided in the present system as much as possible are "the division of labor," and "the combination of labor," for they have been so loosely used in the sociology of economics that they no longer mean anything definite. The scientific sociologist gains nothing when he uses blanket phrases like "the social division of labor" to designate such phenomena as the formation of classes and the differentiation of vocations. A great deal more than division and combination of labor goes on in these and similar processes; differentiation and integration appear in zones quite remote from those directly affected by economic activity or "labor." Durkheim's brilliant treatise, *De la division de la travail social*, has created a great deal of confusion among his epigoni.

Taking everything into account, it must be said that most of the current terminology having to do with general processes of differentiation and integration is practically devoid of scientific value in and of itself; it may mean all things to all men, and it is bandied about at present by all the dilettantes who thereby hope to lend scientific prestige to their arbitrary and obscure speculations about the "group mind" and similar pseudo-scientific reifications. Consequently, the scientific sociologist must provide specific denotation for his general terms by thoroughgoing analysis of concrete action patterns. In other words, he must concentrate upon the minutiae of human behavior, and particularly upon the directly perceivable aspects of each empirically observed social action. This means that internal, neuro-psychic processes must not be centred upon to the exclusion of their overt manifestations, for it is all too easy to speculate about moods, feelings, temperaments, wishes, and what not. There can be no doubt, however, that domination is frequently accompanied by a "will to power" or wish for recognition, and that socialization is not infrequently correlated with a desire for fellowship or wish for response. Moreover, we cannot neglect such subjective factors; in spite of the fulminations of the extreme behaviorists, they must be given a place in any comprehensive explanation. Nevertheless, the sociologist as such must first focus his attention upon externally perceivable behavior.

In the table of interhuman relations a great many concrete processes

are classified under such main heads as superordination, subordination, and so on. At first glance it may seem as though insignificant and important social phenomena are indiscriminately mixed, but a great deal that seems trivial when superficially viewed can by thorough analysis be shown to be of great significance under certain circumstances.

CHAPTER XXII

DIFFERENTIATING PROCESSES: GENESIS OF DISPARITIES

§1. ALL MEN ARE NOT BORN EQUAL

The cherished dream of many writers of utopias, social reformers, and idealists has been the establishment of equality among all persons within a given group or among mankind at large. Now, equality may mean a great many things, and the first question naturally is: In what do the persons who belong to a particular plurality pattern wish to recognize themselves as equal? Historically speaking, the answer has frequently been: Equal in power. Efforts to realize this political equality have ranged all the way from filling public office by lot, as in ancient Athens, to the modern demand that "every man count as one and no man as more than one." Other answers have been along the lines of economic equality: The same amount of possessions and income for all. This too has been projected into social life; such names as Fourier, Proudhon, Tolstoi, Shaw, Tawney, and hundreds more, both ancient and modern, attest its vitality. Still another answer even more general than the foregoing has been given: Equality in the load of labor and in the enjoyment of life. Here we plainly approach the biological level; social influences could not by any stretch of the imagination wholly satisfy the demand. When once the biological problem is fairly faced, the most casual observation will serve to convince almost anyone that inequality or disparity of native endowment is a natural fact, and that it cannot be completely eliminated by human endeavor.

Nevertheless, even those sociologists most convinced of the existence of hereditary differences will freely admit that a great deal of disparity that seems firmly fixed in the biological make-up of the persons concerned really derives from situational factors and can often be traced to a configuration of social relationships established in the distant past. Even such apparently unalterable attributes as mental or physical efficiency, stature, health, and beauty may oftentimes be at least partially explained as results of situational influences. Moreover, there can be little doubt that a great many forms of inequality can be eliminated by proper social organization, al-

though it must also be admitted that new forms of disparity continually replace the old. In the last analysis, practically all types of disparity have a biological *root*. The metaphor of "root" is expressly chosen, for the actual form taken by the "tree" of disparity must be clearly distinguished from the potentialities of the "root." Tendencies toward the genesis of disparities are always present; social change perpetually alters existing modes of disparity without ever eliminating it in its most general aspects.

The historian, for example, can show that particular *kinds* of disparity have been regarded as undesirable in various times, places, and social groupings. Moreover, he can show that determined efforts have often been made to abolish one or another type; Sparta is not the only instance. But he can also show, with almost experimental precision, that plurality patterns pervaded by efforts to maintain the most rigid equality nevertheless manifest marked disparities, although the small or medium-sized group is quite frequently successful in maintaining some measure of equality in the field upon which it most determinedly concentrates. In all cases, however, this field is far from comprising the whole of social life; members of religious communities who are restrained from wearing finer clothing than their fellows, for example, sometimes seek and obtain distinction as models of piety who can out-pray and out-sing the less distinguished members of the congregation. Similar examples are afforded in profusion by the history of ascetic organizations, communistic and anarchistic sects, and military bodies. We may justifiably conclude that differentiation is an inevitable concomitant of interhuman behavior and that through its action minor differences in native endowment (*N* factors) are often magnified into major disparities.

Hand in hand with the genesis of disparities goes reflection upon those same disparities. Thinkers finally come to regard them as hindrances to social development or even as pathological components of social life, hence efforts to abolish or at least diminish disparities, particularly in the field of economic activity, may be found in almost all eras and cultures. These efforts, understandably enough, almost all begin from false premises. The single-factor fallacy, the attempt to find *one* "cause" for extremely complicated social phenomena, is ever-present; someone is always crying "Lo here!" or "Lo there!" The form of the economic order or the political constitution is frequently regarded as all-explanatory but needless to say explains nothing, inasmuch as in many important respects it is an effect rather than a cause. This error has had important historical consequences,

for it has engendered the belief that by introducing one or another kind of formal equality general social equality can be brought about, and thus has led, among other things, to universal suffrage. Disparity, however, is still with us.

§2. HUMAN BEINGS ARE EQUAL AND UNEQUAL

Complete impartiality in the study of social phenomena probably cannot be attained, but even partially prejudiced investigation of equality or inequality finally arrives at this apparently trivial but nevertheless far-reaching and practically important principle: Human beings are equal and unequal. No political or ethical system can stand if it is predicated either on absolute equality or on absolute inequality. The dogmatist who insists upon one or the other exclusive postulate inevitably vitiates every one of his conclusions. In reality, equality and inequality are mixed in ways that cannot be determined by any *a priori* speculations. Oftentimes the effort to trace the causes of inequality leads to the discovery of surprising similarities, and *vice versa*. The explorer who observes isolated tribes may at first be impressed by the tremendous differences between preliterate and civilized peoples, but very often he runs across likenesses or even identities which startle and humiliate any but the most objective observer. On the other hand, the discerning traveller is continually impressed by the wide variations in the behavior of the inhabitants in different parts of the same country. The New Englander, particularly in such regions as the backwoods of Maine, is so different from the inhabitant of New York City, and the latter in turn from the resident of New Orleans, that one may be hard put to discover common traits; similarly, the East Prussian and the Rhinelander or the Catalan and the Gibraltar Spaniard seem to present entirely antithetical characteristics.

Not until the science of interhuman behavior has advanced far beyond its present stage can it offer much direct assistance in the study of the problem of equality. Caution is advisable, for the contributions of social philosophy, political science, differential psychology, economics, and similar disciplines have been more distinguished for patent absurdity than for scientific value. Progress can be expected only from monographic study of specific social phenomena and careful comparison of these studies. Only when we know with virtually experimental exactitude the points wherein persons belonging to different social groupings are equal or similar, and those wherein they differ widely, can valid conclusions be achieved. The task is

tremendously complicated by the ceaseless alterations and mutations of the social sphere; what today seems altogether different may tomorrow be on the way to appreciable similarity if only the requisite social processes become operative. And further, what at the moment appears wholly homogeneous may undergo marked differentiation almost over night. In one phase of social development or one aspect of interhuman behavior, for example, Americans and Europeans may be quite the same, particularly when contrasted with Orientals; further, Western and Eastern Republicans or Northern and Southern Democrats may react in virtually the same way to communistic or socialistic propaganda; again, Negroes and Nordics may both have strikingly similar attitudes toward Jews—but in respects other than those mentioned or implied, tremendous differences are evident. In other cases, approximate similarity may persist over a period of years, but eventually give way to marked dissimilarity because of initial slight discrepancies that increase in a way that almost fits the exponential curve—an initial slow rise that finally sweeps upward almost vertically.

Of all the forms of dissimilarity, those that follow upon previous similarity exert some of the influences most important socially. This is illustrated by such occurrences as the following: An official formerly on an equal footing with his fellows is suddenly raised in rank because of administrative innovations, and soon changes from an unassuming nonentity to an unbearable tyrant; a factory foreman profits by his fraternal affiliations and becomes a superintendent, thereafter domineering over associates to whom he formerly deferred; fortune suddenly acquired through stock market speculation produces the phenomenon of "exclusiveness" among persons who before their sudden wealth were quite approachable.

§3. HOW DISPARITIES ARE PERPETUATED

The changing circumstances of life perpetually bring about new disparities *and* new uniformities. Those who in reality or fancy are elevated to positions generally regarded as superior usually attempt to prolong and protect their fortunate condition. There is a determined effort to institutionalize accidental advantages; the laws of inheritance are most frequently utilized to this end. Whoever becomes rich, powerful, or noble almost always seeks to render his position impregnable through legal and religious sanctions.

Take the following instance. In a tribe composed largely of freemen and without appreciable political stratification, a particularly desper-

ate combat with another tribe leads to the choice of a chieftain. He is granted far-reaching power over his followers, and hence is able so to co-ordinate their efforts that the tribe is victorious. His friends and sycophants declare the victory to have been almost altogether due to his efforts, and he therefore finds it relatively easy to gratify his desire to remain politically dominant during peace-time; he becomes a permanent chieftain. Moreover, the spoils of war that fall to his lot also make him the economically dominant person in the tribe. In spite of these contributory factors, however, there is no doubt that he owes his supremacy primarily to his tremendous physical strength, endurance, cunning, and bravery, and there are few of his subjects who feel themselves able to challenge his right to rule. Now before this chieftain dies, he has succeeded in consolidating both his political and economic power to such an extent that his son is recognized as his legitimate successor—a dynasty has been established. Sooner or later, some of the descendants of the founder fail to measure up to the level set by their ancestor, and may even be markedly inferior to many of their followers, but the dynastic principle, with all the legal and religious sanctions that eventually cluster about it, is established strongly enough to ensure homage to cowards and weaklings, for a time at least. As time passes and powerful subordinate leaders appear, however, the antithesis between the personal incapacity of the supreme ruler and the exalted social station he occupies is increasingly regarded as unjust, and some “mayor of the palace” or commander of the legions attempts to wrest the scepter from the feeble grasp of its holder. Yet with surprising frequency loyal supporters prop up the tottering throne, and the dynasty survives one crisis after another. This loyalty is at least partially engendered by the half-truth that the descendants of great men are themselves great; the belief that “divinity doth hedge a king” is hard to shake off. When any considerable proportion of the population has shaken it off, however, more and more resentment is evoked by the ignoble claimant of noble qualities, so that the dynastic fiction may in part contribute to its own undoing.

Similar developments are brought to light by the sociology of economics. Unusual personal capacities of a type acceptable to the social order lead to the acquisition of material wealth and the recognition that accompanies it. The disparity between talent and stupidity, bravery and cowardice, initiative and passivity, energy and sloth often provides the basis for the antithesis between rich and poor. As long as the rich man is actually the more capable man as well, such

differentiation may not evoke excessive umbrage, but in many instances the qualities which made the accumulation of wealth possible are counteracted to such an extent by the influence of ease and luxury that the man who has been rich for some time is obviously less worthy to hold his position than some of his subordinates. This is usually still more true of his successors; apart from strong traditions it is almost inevitable that inherited wealth should be accompanied by such evident slackening of physical and mental fiber that trust funds and other legal safeguards are necessary merely to hold what energetic ancestors have accumulated.

Nevertheless, it is entirely possible for an aristocracy to remain an aristocracy in spite of inherited wealth; the antithesis of meager biological endowment and great economic possessions need not always appear. A strong tradition of self-discipline and moderation, coupled with vigorous germ plasm, may make generations remote from the founders of the line worthy of comparison with their ancestors. When such an aristocracy of blood, tradition, and political or economic supremacy encounters "upstarts," parvenus, and newcomers, it opposes their demands with contempt, and regards attempts to assert equality as a violation not only of the conventions, but of justice. Rightly or wrongly, patricians of this stamp have always regarded the claims of plebeians as so obviously unfounded that they should not even be discussed. It is precisely this "beneath my dignity" attitude that infuriates the self-made man and spurs him to found an aristocracy of his own!

The chief sources of disparity in the past have been: First, the possession of large amounts of land; second, the accumulation of mobile wealth in the form of cattle, precious metals, jewels, etc.; and third, privileges conferred by the state upon its supporters and functionaries. In many instances the third brings with it the first and second; the same might be said, in lesser degree, of each of the others.

§4. SUB-PROCESSES OF DISPARITY

The sub-processes contained in the table may best be grouped as follows: (1) Those tending to produce disparities which are regarded as results of differential achievement; examples are *rising* or *sinking* in the social scale, *achieving distinction*, and similar processes, most of which are expressed by intransitive verbs; (2) actions such as *placing at a disadvantage*, *limiting*, and *appropriating*; and (3) various sources of disparity exemplified by *cleavage*, *assertion of claims*,

conceptions of honor or rank, wealth, luxury, formation of parties, schism, and taboo.

Rising and sinking within plurality patterns by persons or groupings of persons are processes which go on continually. Every social structure, and particularly large structures such as nations, may be envisaged as a pyramid having various strata. These strata do not remain quiescent, but continually shift, tilt, and bend. Further, the clumps of persons and small groups which make up the various strata frequently shift from one layer to another or within the same layer. Occasionally a stratum breaks into several pieces, some of which rise or sink. From time to time social movements such as revolutions and conquests have the effect of an earthquake upon the different layers; tremendous pressure reduces some to a thin, intensely hard slab, and heat fuses others into a homogeneous mass. Periods of relative quiescence attended by nothing but slow sedimentation and erosion are in evidence, but there are also many traces of epochs in which faulting, volcanic activity, and similar upheavals violently rearrange the deposits of the past.

This analogy can be most extensively applied to the relationships of social classes. Each layer in the pyramid dominates those below it, even though the upper are usually smaller than the lower; moreover, the lower the level, the more mechanical and menial the work. At this point, however, we are not interested in stratification as such, but merely in the process of re-stratification and the new types of disparity it continually creates.

Appropriation has been dealt with at length by Weber in his discussion of "closed" relationships.¹ All groups enjoying advantages or privileges of any sort tend to present a closed front to all outsiders, even though internal competition may be intense. The closed front is maintained because of the effort to preserve the monopoly enjoyed by the members of the group; prerogatives, sinecures, grants, patents, and rights are appropriated. If the group can so close its ranks that all others are completely excluded, the amount of disparity due to the appropriation thus made possible is often considerable; but as time goes on gradual or sudden breaks in the closed circle occur. This frequently comes about because the members eventually enter into relationships with outsiders through marriage, friendship, and related processes, and transfer some of their privileges, thus introducing elements into the group that frequently weaken or destroy it. When everyone has privileges, no one has privileges; the breaches in the

¹ Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, pp. 23-4.

ranks of the formerly closed circle of appropriators admits so many claimants that monopoly becomes impossible. This is strikingly exemplified in the history of landed estates, particularly when laws of entail and primogeniture are lacking. In spite of the ceaseless break-up of old appropriations, however, new ones are continually developing; trade unions, professional bodies, cliques, lodges, exclusive clubs, private schools, and similar groups often evince marked preference for the *numerus clausus*, restrictions, and even total exclusion.

Vociferous *asserting* of claims or *demanding* special favors and attentions is a means frequently used by the obtrusive social climber in order to set himself apart from "ordinary persons." The parvenu usually believes that the only reason that others do not "elbow themselves forward" is that they lack assurance or money; he is unable to conceive how anyone could possess both and still refrain from self-assertion. Obtrusiveness often passes for the height of worldly wisdom, and it is really remarkable how resourceful the average egotist is in capitalizing every situation that promises advantage to him or his group.

Cleavage, although a differentiating process, is related to conflict because it refers to the intragroup antagonism of two contingents having approximately equal powers and prerogatives. It must be mentioned as a special form of differentiation, however, for the result is more often a vertical cleft than a horizontal stratification. An instance is afforded by the hangers-on that cluster about matadors; each cluster is part of the larger group devoted to bull-fighting, but each ardently champions its favorite, and stabbing affrays are not uncommon. The factions that backed the Blue and Green chariot racers in Byzantium provide another example; it was often necessary to quell their bloody controversies by force. The same phenomenon may be observed among the fanatical followers of bicycle teams in six-day races; each team has its ardent coterie of admirers on the one hand and its hooting opponents on the other, but all the factions together represent a group or crowd peculiarly attached to this particular kind of "spectatoritis."

Conceptions of honor or rank develop among all sub-groups which seek to fortify and legalize their special privileges. Being in possession of advantages others do not have, they tend to rationalize their position by ascribing to themselves purer blood, nobler lineage, higher morality, and greater physical beauty, prowess, and courage. They develop what Zweig has termed differential and central effects, i.e., they come to feel that the group they represent is fundamentally

different from all others and that it is the *central* point about which all others revolve. Such delusions of group uniqueness and grandeur will be discussed at length in the systematics of plurality patterns; at this point we need only call attention to the differentiating effect of such notions. They enormously increase the distance between sub-groups within a larger plurality pattern such as a nation, for the assumption that one sub-group is peculiarly endowed with honor while others are not leads to deep-seated and almost ineradicable attitudes of domination, submission, etc. Max Weber has shown how greatly conceptions of honor vary in different social strata and how closely they are bound up with their respective strata.²

The accumulation of wealth gives rise to the striking antithesis between rich and poor that marks all complex cultures; this antithesis has engaged the attention of thinkers from the earliest times, and affords a tremendous range of problems for investigation. The sociologist must be especially careful to remain within his own field when considering these problems, for many of them are within the provinces of applied economics, social technology, social politics, and so on. The sociology of economics, a special branch of general sociology, also has considerable importance in this regard. In the present context, we are primarily interested in the manifold types of differentiation extreme wealth and extreme poverty make possible. *Luxury* is of particular interest because it is one of the most important ways in which differentiation becomes manifest; the wealthy man could undoubtedly purchase entirely adequate transportation for a great deal less than he spends on his fleet of cars, but his desire to differentiate himself from those on lower economic levels leads to this and other phenomena of conspicuous waste so ably analyzed by Thorstein Veblen.

Parties are, among other things, signs of differentiation within a plurality pattern. They are not necessarily signs of disorganization or deterioration, as some writers seem to think; worshippers of the two-party system would have us believe that any larger number of parties always threatens the welfare of the state. Too great emphasis cannot be laid on the fact that differentiation is not necessarily correlated with deterioration; vigorous community life, including its political aspects, necessarily involves the formation of groups among those having similar points of view, experiences, and aims. No common plans or projects could be formulated or carried out if every person in a community constituted himself a party, as it were, by

² *Ibid.*, pp. 631-5, 681, 722.

insisting upon his own exclusive opinion; groups representing different tendencies form, and eventually arrive at some sort of working compromise for the facilitation of common effort. Such groups become parties when their primary aim is the acquisition of power; volitional rather than rational agreement unites the party members. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that parties create greater disparities in plurality patterns than do other bodies, inasmuch as they try to achieve greater power in actual affairs and not merely in opinion. This is true not only of the political variety but also of parties of other types. Beyond any doubt there is always some danger that the necessary and invigorating differentiation brought about by party formation may eventually lead to disorganization and deterioration, but as noted above, this is not necessarily the case.

Schism is a process that is classified under individuation, separation, and estrangement (*De*), but is there termed dissidence and apostasy. A place is accorded it here because divisions within churches have been the occasion of profound disparities between and among peoples and nations. Not only this: the concept of schism in the sociological sense extends beyond the religious zone and may also refer to divisions within large secular plurality patterns; the split between progressive and reactionary groups in the Republican Party in 1912 is a good example of this secular schism, and another is afforded by the split in the Socialist Party in 1919, the left wing becoming Communist and the right championing a sort of non-revolutionary Socialism.

Taboo has been studied frequently and exhaustively by ethnologists and sociologists with ethnological leanings, but largely because of its relation to kinship classification, marriage groupings, and religious ceremonial. The systematic sociologist, however, is interested in it primarily because of the part it plays in generating and maintaining disparity. One group within a sib or tribe possesses tremendous power when it can forbid other groups to touch or eat certain things or to perform certain acts. In giving full weight to its great importance, however, we should not assume that taboo was instituted by persons or groups for their own ends; it is not a rational but a sub-rational institution.⁸ Indeed, the concept may justifiably be extended to include not only the relationships of preliterate peoples but also those of so-called civilized peoples. Wherever (1) exclusion from activities or associations is practiced on the ground that those excluded

⁸ Cf. Howard Becker and David K. Bruner, "Some Aspects of Taboo and Totemism," *J. Soc. Psych.*, III, 3 (February, 1932).

are in some mysterious way unworthy, or where (2) persons or things are removed from the realm of indiscriminate accessibility by symbolization, etc., we may speak of (1) negative and (2) positive *quasi-taboo*. By thus extending the concept, certain similarities between the conduct of preliterate and civilized groups become evident; what has already been said concerning honor and rank should be recalled in this connection.

CHAPTER XXIII

DIFFERENTIATING PROCESSES: DOMINATION AND SUBMISSION

§1. DOMINATION AND SUBMISSION VIEWED SOCIOLOGICALLY AND OTHERWISE

Perhaps no social process has up to the present time been so thoroughly investigated by social scientists as has domination. Not the least among the many debts sociology owes Max Weber is for his clarification of this field; his acute analysis and systematization will always remain a landmark.¹ So great an impression has his work made that some of his less critical followers have attributed such transcendent importance to the master-subject relationship that they interpret nearly all other processes as varieties or sub-varieties of domination and submission. This extremism must of course be avoided; the specifically sociological point of view—as contrasted, for example, with the economic—does *not* consist merely of observation of forms of domination, etc. On the contrary, these processes are here regarded as co-ordinate with other chief types; domination and submission therefore do not occupy the highest tier in our conceptual system, but are on the same level as other principal processes. When all due allowances are made, however, the following statement is only slightly exaggerated:

“In the life of societies no phenomenon is more persistent, recurrent, or frequent than *domination*. Not only has each social group brought adjacent social groups under its will so far as it could be dared, but each element within the group rides other elements so far as it can.”²

A proper understanding of domination aids greatly in the comprehension of world history. The ceaseless struggle to overpower others in all regions of life, the frequent masking of this struggle by ideologies or the plea of necessity, the efforts of one group to unload its burden upon others, the clash of opposing sovereignties, the ceaseless clutching which such superordinate powers as the state practice in order to wrest to themselves the sole right of physical coercion and

¹ Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Part III.

² E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, rev. ed., p. 117.

other means of domination—all this makes up the larger part of human history. Nothing but misunderstanding of the total process of sociation results if such actualities are neglected or under-estimated in favor of blindly optimistic idealism. The realistic student, far from being discouraged by the prevalence of domination, will be especially interested in tracing its influence in those zones of social activity when it is supposedly scanty or non-existent, namely, in non-political fields. How many occurrences in the history of religions, the arts, the sciences, and philosophy are explicable as attempts to dominate the inner lives of others! Not only the recognized paranoiac or megalomaniac but also numerous “normal” thinkers have given free rein to the craving for domination. Dogma grows from this root. All too often the self-appointed saviors of mankind, the liberators from old bonds and barriers, tragically contradict themselves by issuing new commandments to take the place of the old; not infrequently the last state of the “saved” is worse than the first. This tragic contradiction or paradox perpetually repeats itself, for, to all appearances, liberation is possible only when new relationships of domination are set up, inasmuch as the sheep left without a shepherd soon fall prey to their own witlessness or to the wolves that are always close at hand.

Understandably enough, this situation seems not only paradoxical but wholly damnable to many proponents of an idealistic ethic; they therefore set their hopes upon a condition of affairs in which domination is entirely absent, namely, anarchism. The idealistic mode of thinking and feeling is always the same: if something seems imperfect and therefore reprehensible, the unpleasant facts are not faced in all their necessary connections and relativity, but are immediately “absolutized” as pure evil. Once this ethical negative has been found, the idealist next conjures up its absolute opposite and proclaims it ethically positive, the one thing needful for social salvation. Obviously, the positive proclamation involves as little insight as the negative denunciation; antithetical absolutes are never found in the complex relations of real life.

Because of the emotional appeal of extremisms, much if not most public discussion is in terms of Either—Or. This has been stated as follows:

“Public discussion or, more properly speaking, debate, never fails to provide ample opportunity for slogans, battle-cries, and appeals to the ‘sovereign people.’ ‘Less government in business and more business in government’; ‘what is collectively used should be collectively owned’; ‘the menace of socialism’; ‘the

selfishness of individualism'; 'Reds'; 'standpatters'; 'the public be damned'; 'we have nothing to arbitrate'; 'turn the rascals out'; 'insidious propaganda'; 'malefactors of great wealth'; and so on, far into the night. The impassioned orators on either side present their case in terms of antitheses: 'We stand at Armageddon and we battle for the Lord'—implying, of course, that the other side is battling for Beelzebub, Baal, and Boloney. On the one hand, eternal truth and righteousness; on the other, perfidy, wickedness and deceit, if not downright naughtiness. 'Choose ye this day whom ye will serve'—you can serve the Blacks, or you can serve the Whites, but never will they serve you, and never, never is there any possibility of avoiding the horns of the dilemma by taking a middle course. No, it must be 'whole hog or none.'"¹⁰

In practice these extremisms of course never reach their goal; the pro and con of argument, the occasional successes and inevitable defeats, the periodic exhaustions and the ever-renewed struggles, all operate to produce a series of social processes that at bottom have little connection with ethical imperatives and are beyond good and evil. At the same time, it is likely that little social action would take place if it were not for the continual refurbishing of old ideals or, more rarely, the creation of new, for ideals alone are suited to the creation of those antithetical and impossible demands which seem necessary to lash the flagging energy of human beings into transitory effort. The lashing must be perpetually repeated, but memories are fortunately short and, still more fortunate, most persons are thereby spared the discouragement which comes with too vivid realization of social complexity. In short, fictions have their social as well as their scientific function.

§2. TYPES OF DOMINATION AND SUBMISSION

The task immediately before us is that of analyzing domination and submission so that their most general aspects are revealed and co-ordinated with those of other processes. It is rendered fairly easy because Weber and Ross have already made valuable contributions. We shall first discuss the three ideal types of domination which Weber has constructed on the basis of numerous culture case studies; second, we shall mention the concrete examples of domination noted by Ross—examples which do not exhaust all the historical possibilities but which seem likely to set sociologically fruitful problems; third, some attention will be paid to the chief motives of domination; and fourth, the typical means by which it is established and maintained will be mentioned.

(1) The three ideal types of domination constructed by Max

¹⁰ Howard Becker, unpublished manuscript, "Forms and Function of the State."

Weber are: (a) rational; (b) traditional; and (c) charismatic. (a) Rational domination comprises all the legal varieties. They are explicitly formulated, and these formulations, in conjunction with "the right" (*Recht*—law) of the dominating group, form the recognized basis of the given relationships of mastery and servitude.⁴ (b) Traditional domination is rooted in the "everyday belief in the sacredness of traditions that have been valid longer than anyone can remember."⁵ (c) Charismatic domination finds its source in the "extraordinary devotion to the holiness or heroism or exemplariness of a person and of the regulations which he reveals or creates."⁶

Rational domination generally makes use of a bureaucratic administrative staff, and in most instances derives its claims from explicitly formulated principles, i.e., law. Rules and norms thus being technically fixed, the dominant person has the status of a superior official; he issues his commands as the representative of an impersonal order which he himself obeys in issuing them. Further, he is not obeyed as a person, but simply as a functionary of this impersonal order, and the limits of the obedience due him are fixed by the scope of his jurisdiction. It is quite in agreement with the nature of such domination, therefore, that it manifests itself in a stable, closely regulated system of official business that may at times degenerate into mere "red tape." Groups of bureaucrats carry on this official business as functionaries of the all-inclusive abstract collectivity they presumably represent. Hence, rational domination is equivalent to administration based upon formal regulatory principles carried out by a bureaucratic system. Further discussion of such domination is reserved for the systematics of plurality patterns, particularly for the chapter on the state.

Traditional domination presupposes a social order having relatively unbroken continuity over a fairly long period. Terms such as official and bureaucrat are not used; master and servant or their equivalents prevail. Not formal regulations but persons are obeyed. Sometimes the activity of the master himself is bound by tradition, and sometimes it is quite free of traditional influence. If an administrative staff is in evidence, its powers are not restricted by jurisdictional considerations. Gerontocracy (the rule of the old men), patriarchy, and the rule of stations (*Stände*) are important historical forms of traditional domination.

Charismatic domination is established through the extraordinary

⁴ Max Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

qualities (real or supposed) of the leader. The recognition which he first receives is reinforced at times by striking coincidences or other verifications of his remarkable qualities, and is thus rendered relatively permanent. Nevertheless, he must continually arouse enthusiasm, be a "present help in time of trouble," and provide a warrant for "the hope that fails not." He has disciples, and sometimes sends forth apostles. Law is not the source of his authority; on the contrary, he proclaims new laws on the basis of revelation, oracular utterance, and inspiration.

These three ideal-typical forms of domination—rational, traditional, and charismatic—provide us with useful distinctions, but certain general yet fairly concrete examples of domination are also needed and fortunately have been provided by Ross: (1) parents over offspring; (2) old over young; (3) husband over wife; (4) men over women; (5) the fighting portion of society over the industrial; (6) the well-situated over the ill-situated; (7) the strongest among allies over the rest; (8) conquerors over conquered; (9) the masters of the state over the subjects of the state. In listing these instances it by no means follows that we assume, as Ross seems to do, that every one of them is always present in clear-cut form, but rather that concrete cases should always be studied with a view to determining whether and in what degree they are operative. Variations may be so great as to make the common elements almost unrecognizable.

Witness the fact that although the patriarchal family and the accompanying domination of old over young is widely prevalent in most of Asia, particularly in China (where the subordination of children in the service of the family is accentuated through ancestor worship), such domination is so much less marked in the modern European-American family that to a Chinese it might seem almost non-existent. In other fields a different relationship of course prevails; the prevalence of seniority in governmental service and elsewhere in Europe leads to domination of old over young, and one of the tasks of scientific sociology is to determine under just what circumstances this system is relaxed or wholly set aside. Rapidly developing industries, to cite one obvious instance, pay little attention to seniority; social mobility is high. Again, the domination of husband over wife is by no means so well established as the laws of such countries as England would lead one to conclude; legal advantages possessed by the husband may be wholly outweighed by other social conditions. Some Continental observers have even gone so far as to conclude

that in the United States the wife is generally dominant over the husband in matters affecting the children, status after divorce, etc.; this is no doubt an exaggeration, but the fact that they could arrive at such a conclusion points to the wide difference between the respective positions of husband and wife in Europe and in America. Ethnologists have long paid special attention to the status of women as part of their regular routine in studying preliterate groups; the sociologist should do the same in his investigations of historical and modern peoples. The sociology of sex should be able to throw some light upon the manner and extent of domination of father over daughter, husband over wife, son over widowed or divorced mother, and so on. Indeed, it already has thrown sufficient light to show that a general subjection of women is non-existent (however numerous specific cases may be), and that no sweeping generalizations concerning the relations of the sexes can be made; such slogans as "down-trodden woman" and "it's a man's world" are only half-truths. Similar comments might be made with regard to the domination of the fighting portion of society over the industrial; the changes which this relationship has undergone are extremely interesting and instructive, but space forbids even a bare outline here; unfortunately this is also the case with respect to the relations of the strongest of allies over the rest, conquerors over conquered, and other forms of domination.

Among the means of domination those most important are: (1) physical and technical force; (2) economic power; (3) mental superiority. (4) Favoritism and inequality before the law should also be mentioned, as well as (5) the assiduous efforts to keep the subject in ignorance often made by priestly castes and by secular rulers as well.

Physical force has perhaps been the most important means of domination, and even at the present time is probably the fundamental basis of such plurality patterns as the state. Recognition of this fact is rendered extremely difficult by the disguises and masks in which force appears. Nevertheless it is the final reason, the *ultima ratio*, in political affairs; behind legislation, administration, and adjudication stands the military system and the police force. The machine gun and the policeman's club are the final "sanctions" of the *status quo*, although a great many other means of domination contribute to its maintenance.

The motivating forces of domination must not be sought solely in the wish for recognition or for mastery; many persons are willing and eager to submit to any power that promises security or relief from responsibility. Moreover, motivation is extremely complex here as

elsewhere; interests and ideologies so condition the various biological urges that such doctrines as McDougall's "instinct of self-assertion" and "instinct of self-abasement" as sole explanations of domination and submission are ludicrously inadequate.

§3. SUB-PROCESSES EXEMPLIFYING MEANS, MANIFESTATIONS, AND SOURCES OF DOMINATION

The table of interhuman relations contains an especially large number of sub-processes of domination, but lack of space forbids comment on them. Fortunately some have received considerable attention in the literature of sociology and other social sciences, so that lack of comment does no great harm. These sub-processes may be classified as follows: (1) means of domination; (2) manifestations of domination; and (3) sources of domination. This of course is not an exclusive classification; some processes might well be placed in two or even all three divisions. In spite of this, the following arrangement seems best adapted:

(1) Among the means of domination we find *levying imposts, taxes, and duties, militarizing, terrorizing, worshipping ancestors, saints, and heroes, dictatorship, feudalism, Caesarism, jurisdiction, cult congregations, legalization, magic, slavery, and the use of spies, informers, and provocateurs.*

(2) Manifestations of domination are found in *deciding issues, commanding and obeying, acting as guardian, domineering, subduing, forcing, compelling, and coercing. Macchiavellianism*, or the systematic use of any or all means that promise successful domination, and the type of *theocracy* described by Treitschke are both forms of domination particularly suited to investigation by the sociology of politics—or by political science if it is sociologically orientated.

(3) The sources of domination include, among many others, *authority, importance, usurpation, charisma, patriarchy, patronage, subjecting or conquering, wealth, and imperialism. Prestige* is a source of domination especially promising for sociological analysis; its connections with taboo, quasi-taboo, honor, rank, hero worship and saint worship, wealth, and numerous other sub-processes are particularly interesting.

CHAPTER XXIV

DIFFERENTIATING PROCESSES: GRADATION, STRATIFICATION, AND SELECTION

§1. GRADATION AND STRATIFICATION

The fact that all large plurality patterns are stratified is probably due to the general tendency of the human being to seek association wherever he believes similarities with himself or his situation exist. The processes antecedent to and consequent upon co-operation (which have already been discussed at length) provide the immediate initial impetus to the processes of gradation and stratification. A large plurality pattern offers such great contrast to its separate members that they seem tiny atoms within the larger structure, and often think and feel themselves to be such. The only way in which these minute fragments can be effectively joined into a large co-operative structure is through the formation of more intimate and less extensive intermediate groupings. The major pattern is composed of a vast number of minor motifs, so to speak, which in repetition and variation combine to form a more or less harmonious design. The necessity for such intermediary groups and their appropriate functionaries has already been discussed in connection with general processes of differentiation and integration, and therefore need not be dealt with at length here; a few supplementary words will suffice.

Large plurality patterns are always composed of numerous smaller plurality patterns which are not merely co-ordinate but are arranged in a hierarchy of superordination and subordination, domination and submission. This is an inevitable consequence of the well-nigh universal tendency already indicated in these words: "Each layer in the pyramid dominates those below it, even though the upper are usually smaller than the lower; moreover, the lower the level, the more mechanical and menial the work." Stratification is therefore inseparably linked with the common tendency to shift irksome burdens to others. A large plurality pattern can flourish, however, only if there is relative stability or equilibration of forces among the smaller plurality patterns it includes. Consequently, the restless rise and fall of conflicting, contravening, and competing groups is avoided wherever

possible by imposing upon them rigid and constant relationships to each other and to the larger pattern; they are squeezed flat to form social strata which have a definite position within the pyramid that can be altered only with great difficulty.

In other words, *order* is imposed, and in the most general sense the process by which it is brought about may be termed "ordination." In and of itself it is a process of integration—that is to say, gradation and stratification are the differentiating aspects, and "ordination," superordination and subordination are the integrating aspects. In the present chapter we are of course most interested in gradation and stratification.

The latter processes are not simply the outcome of economic development; moreover, they are not phenomena limited to certain historical epochs, but are manifest everywhere and always. The most that can be said for the economic point of view is that the organization for the production and circulation of goods and, distribution of income prevailing at any given time effects a certain kind of stratification; and further, that so-called capitalism (or profit-motive economy) forms one sub-variety of this kind. The sociology of economics should of course devote special interest to economic stratification, but that is no reason why it should receive undue weight in general sociology. If economic stratification were wholly non-existent there would still be stratification on the basis of military, scientific, aesthetic, or other achievement. There can of course be little doubt that one variety of stratification oftentimes overlaps another, that the economic variety, for example, influences the political. It is even possible that where population is dense economic stratification is predominant. Such an hypothesis is certainly worth the effort of possible verification. Nevertheless, stratification as such is much more general and elementary than the merely economic point of view would lead us to believe.

From this assertion it does not follow that "the invisible hand," "the impartial spectator," or "the divine command" has decreed that the present stratum of the wealthy must always rest upon the present stratum of the poor, or that the menial worker must be guided and kept in subjection by the "capitalist"; on the contrary, it is asserted that changes in the relative position of the various strata are not only possible but in actuality are continually going on. The task of the systematic sociologist is to show the particular circumstances under which certain types of stratification arise, how they give place to

others, and how the process may be accelerated or retarded. Only intensive study of specific cases can yield such information.

§2. SUB-PROCESSES OF GRADATION AND STRATIFICATION

The sub-processes of gradation and stratification may be divided, as in the case of domination, into (1) means, (2) manifestations, and (3) sources.

(1) Under means may be placed *permitting to rise or sink in the social scale, rendering conspicuous or distinctive, grading, feudalizing, admitting to the nobility, granting privileges, prerogatives and certifications, assigning to a social class, limiting, and decentralizing.*

(2) Manifestations of gradation and stratification are *rising or sinking in the social scale, class struggle, advantages or disadvantages due to ancestry, and prestige* (already noted in other connections). In this same grouping we may also place *conducting affairs secretly*, a process upon which Simmel has thus commented: "Secrecy has ever been a requisite of aristocratic supremacy." A privileged stratum consciously or unconsciously veils itself in mystery in order to appear to the disadvantaged levels as greater, more powerful, and more worthy of respect than it actually is.

(3) The sources of stratification are, among others, the *development of aristocracies* and the correlated development of subordinate classes such as the proletariat; *the formation of castes and stations, feudalism and capitalism, the growth of tribes, urbanization, style, wealth and poverty, and mental and physical training.* Extended discussion of the rôle of classes in social stratification belongs in the systematics of plurality patterns; nothing can be said here except to note that Giddings' division of the population into three groups, namely: vitality classes, personality classes, and social classes, is quite unacceptable, inasmuch as it arbitrarily introduces biological criteria and ethical value-judgments. The ethical value-judgments are especially evident when we note that Giddings subdivides his social classes into the social, the non-social, the pseudo-social and the anti-social.¹ Moreover, the consciousness of kind works havoc here as elsewhere.

§3. SELECTION

Let us now turn to the process of selection. Even more necessary than in considering gradation and stratification is the distinction between biological and sociological points of view. Natural and

¹ F. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, 3rd ed., pp. 124-30.

sexual selection in the struggle for existence to which all organisms are exposed is one thing; the degree of success or failure achieved in interhuman relations is quite another. *Biological and social selection operate along wholly different lines and should never be confused.* Unfortunately confusion is very easy, because all interhuman occurrences of course take place within the realm of natural phenomena ("Man is organic to nature") and because natural selection can only be checked, diverted, and rendered less effective by social measures; that is to say, it cannot simply be abolished and its place supplied by selection determined by the implicit or explicit purposes of the particular plurality pattern concerned. Hence natural selection cannot be disregarded by the sociologist, although he cannot justifiably devote primary attention to it. The eugenist, the advocate of social politics, the social worker—in short, social technologists of every variety—are more directly interested.

The sociologist, avoiding value-judgments as he does, carries on his investigations in the light of the fact that selection is sometimes predominantly biological and sometimes predominantly social. The latter in turn sometimes works along *laissez-faire* lines and at other times is consciously directed by the representatives of the plurality pattern concerned. It is especially important to determine the counteracting, intensifying, diminishing, and other effects produced by the interaction of the different forms of selection.

Although extensive studies of social selection have not been made, it seems possible to say that in general those persons most keenly aware of the interests of the plurality pattern, and most inclined and fitted to represent such interests, are usually granted special privileges and higher rank than those less willing and capable. The special considerations which determine such selection are as numerous as are the purposes of plurality patterns. There can be little doubt that any plurality pattern which does not make use of selection handicaps itself greatly in competition with those which do make use of it. Business enterprises, trade unions, universities, churches, and states often have extremely complicated systems of selection. In thus choosing certain persons and granting them privileges commensurate with their functions, disparities between the members of the plurality pattern are set up, and they become greater the longer the system lasts. If selection is not continually counteracted by the processes of uniformation and socialization, it becomes a destructive process; in most instances, however, it is so counteracted and hence remains within the limits of differentiation.

§4. SUB-PROCESSES OF SELECTION

In discussing the sub-processes of selection we shall, as heretofore, group them under (1) means, (2) manifestations, and (3) sources.

(1) The efficacy of selection is dependent not only upon the achievements and performance of those who are selected, but also upon the degree of recognition accorded those selected by the remainder of the group. Awareness of this fact is often times evident in the choice of means for the carrying out of selection. For example, there is a deliberate effort to *idealize* and *exalt* those judged worthy of selection, for this artificial accentuation of merit frequently stimulates pride and secures greater expenditure of energy, while at the same time it renders the idealized person more acceptable to the credulous remainder—men will more readily accept a demigod than a mere human being. The arousal of ambition and its continual stimulation has long been one of the chief methods of selection. The group of those selected often practices *exclusiveness*, and usually claims to represent an *élite*; in many instances this claim is warranted, but in many others it is not.

(2) The manifestations of selection are found in the fact that certain persons are selected, elevated above others in their own imaginations or in actual fact, and are placed in positions that frequently involve great responsibility but that are seldom unpleasant. The practice of paying *homage* to those thus elevated and idealized is common. A system of *distinctions* often develops as time goes on; titles, orders, badges, uniforms, and other symbols of rank all have the function of stimulating effort to be worthy of selection, and consequently ensure achievement along socially recognized lines. In everyday life *endeavors to be recognized as a gentleman or lady* give rise to a selective process that may sometimes involve a great deal of humiliation for those who cannot qualify. The legal and economic order supposedly makes no distinction between the gentleman and the lady on one hand and *hoi polloi* on the other, but in ordinary affairs this distinction is much more important than are other varieties. Systematic sociology is in great need of a thorough study of the criteria determining affiliation with "polite society" in different contemporary cultures. Such a study requires the utmost power of discrimination; the clumsy divisions of the political or economic order are of no help. Even professional or occupational groupings do not afford a secure basis for differentiation. In some instances, acceptance as a gentleman or lady is determined by strictly individual characteristics.

Further, such acceptance may even be granted simply because it is obviously expected, although the mere assumption that one is of the select group does not always insure continued acceptance. In other cases, inclusion among the "best people" is dependent upon certain conventional modes of behavior and standards of living as well as upon birth, station, and tradition. The great fluctuations in the economic sphere that mark the present day afford unusual opportunities for studying social mobility and the particular ways in which entry into the upper levels of the social order is effected.

(3) The sources of social selection are numerous. Moreover, they are often closely linked with biological criteria. For example, *beauty* of face or form often determines selection by marriage, etc.; here we have sexual selection operating in the social sphere. Sometimes other considerations of *quality* figure in selection, and may be rooted in almost exclusively social factors. The *development of aristocracies*, already considered in connection with stratification, is also relevant to the process of selection, although in the latter primary attention is paid to the person rather than to the group. Aristocracies eventually become rigid, and may even develop the characteristics peculiar to *castes*, in which case, of course, little or no personal selection ever takes place.

CHAPTER XXV

DIFFERENTIATING PROCESSES: INDIVIDUATION, SEPARATION, AND ESTRANGEMENT

§1. INDIVIDUATION, SEPARATION, AND ESTRANGEMENT ARE SOMETIMES DESTRUCTIVE, BUT ARE NOT NECESSARILY SO

The mere fact that members of a group sometimes separate from it and lose connection with it entirely need not necessarily result in group deterioration, for in many instances such separation is really a process of purification whereby discordant elements are eliminated and the group is enabled to pursue its objectives with a minimum of distraction.

Further, the circumstance that as plurality patterns become older their members oftentimes acquire more distinct personalities is by no means a sign of deterioration. On the contrary, this type of differentiation is usually regarded as in the best interests of the plurality pattern, although some ideologies enjoin the suppression of all variates. When variates are suppressed, however, it frequently happens that the plurality pattern becomes ossified and impoverished in many ways.

On the other hand, there are numerous historical occurrences to show that estrangement and hyper-egoistic individuation may go to such extremes that the plurality pattern collapses. Thomas and Znaniecki's famous study of the Polish peasant community demonstrates this clearly; Burckhardt's brilliant analysis of the Renaissance in Italy points to the same thing; and several writers have suggested a similar state of affairs in the history of Ionia and Athens. An outline of the occurrences leading to individuation in the latter culture will serve to exemplify like process-series elsewhere, and will be especially useful as an instance of the relation of individuation and population movement, the topic of §2 of this chapter.

The Dorian invasions expelled a "mixed multitude" from European Greece, and they settled along the coastal fringe of Asia Minor under frontier conditions. The area they occupied came to be known, broadly speaking, as Ionia.

The migrants to Ionia were pastoral nomads, organized in large kinship groups called *gene*. The dire necessities of frontier life, contact with alien peoples, etc., weakened the kinship bonds of the *gene*; moreover, the in-group unification of

the *polis* or city-state in the face of common peril from the barbarian world began to replace kinship bonds with the ties of locality. In short, individuation appeared at an early date.

The middleman position of the Ionian frontiersmen, located as they were between the inland peoples of Asia Minor and the sea-faring Phoenicians, led to commercial development that made urban economy possible, thus weakening still more the fragile structure of the *gene*. The same influences sapped the strength of traditional religious belief and of the local loyalties of the city-state. Hence individuating tendencies were further strengthened.

Growth of urban economy brought about the development of detached economic attitudes. The sacred sanctions formerly attaching to the soil broke down, and private property in land became possible. The consequence was an accentuation of existing tendencies toward individuation.

Trading practices learned from the Phoenicians, as well as the necessity for getting rid of men whom the system of private property in land had expropriated, led to the colonizing movement that resulted in the creation of a vast colonial world, Greater Greece. This Expansion of Greece emphasized existing Ionian tendencies toward religious disbelief and rationalism; many Ionians developed the "intellectual bias" that is one aspect of individuation. Ionian society became atomic, unable to carry on successful collective effort. A less individuated people could probably have exerted enough disciplined collective effort to avoid defeat by the Persians, or at least to mitigate the disorganizing consequences of defeat.

As a result of a series of changes which were partially due to Ionian influence, the Athenian state reached a stage of commercial development before the Persian Wars that made it a potential rival of the great commercial cities of Ionia, especially of Miletus.

This potentiality was transformed into a greater actuality when, as the result of an intrusive factor in the form of the Persian Wars, the vicinal position of Athens suddenly shifted to the center of the Aegean world; Athens became highly accessible.

Because of this rapid mutation in the accessibility of Athens, there followed the accelerated development of metropolitan and international economy and of rationalistic and individualistic tendencies.

The accelerated development of metropolitan economy greatly increased the division of labor, the prevalence of pecuniary valuation, and the number of individuated Ionian Metics resident in Athens, all of which had a marked individuating influence on the "sacred" or stable citizens to whom the political strength of the Athenian city-state had largely been due.

The influx of Ionian Metics (merchants, philosophers, etc.) also resulting from the accelerated development of Athenian metropolitan economy subjected native Athenians to the influences of Metic individuation. In this way rationalizations were provided for the prevalent unrest generated by the sudden impact of new vanity-values and pecuniary valuation, which rationalizations in turn increased the unrest. Individuation increased in rapidity.

The Metic philosophers also influenced a group of Athenian intellectuals—historians, dramatists, and philosophers—of whom Socrates was the most striking example. The intellectuals added their influence to that of the Ionian newcomers in rapidly disseminating doctrines that still further increased the indi-

viduation prevalent among Athenians during the latter half of the fifth century. Not only were the inhabitants of the coastal regions affected, but the peasants and Eupatrids of the rural demes were also individuated in some degree.

Individuation finally reached such a peak of intensity that the character-attitudes necessary for the maintenance of a stable political structure disintegrated, and although the metropolitan economy continued to flourish, the Athenian state collapsed. Pressure from without was the immediate occasion, but the chief underlying factor was the extreme individuation of Athenian citizens.

Plato and other individuated but theoretically conservative Athenians hoped to reconstruct it on a rational basis, but in the very nature of the case their efforts met with no success, and the city-state as an effective form of political organization remained forever a thing of the past. Extreme individuation, whatever its effects in other configurations may be, therefore issued in the collapse of the political plurality pattern of Athens.¹

Again, there are many historical instances in which a plurality pattern has failed to meet the demands of its more restless, innovative members and has consequently been overthrown by violence. Nearly all revolutions exemplify this condition.²

As sociologists, our only concern is to determine just how individuation, separation, and estrangement develop, how they affect the particular plurality patterns in which they arise, and with what other processes they are correlated. There can be little doubt that even in the most thoroughly isolated and sacred structure, e.g., the most remote mountaineer village, some individuation is going on, although it may be almost imperceptible. Thomas and Znaniecki state this as follows:

"Social disorganization [here termed deterioration] is not an exceptional phenomenon limited to certain periods or certain societies; some of it is found always and everywhere, since always and everywhere there are individual cases of breaking social rules [here termed individuation], cases which exercise some disorganizing influence on group institutions and, if not counteracted, are apt to multiply and to lead to a complete decay of the latter."³

The following section on individuation and population movement shows not only how extreme individuation of certain types leads to the deterioration of plurality patterns, but also how disorganizing changes in personality, in the socius, are thereby brought about. At the same time, let it be noted that destructive processes as such are not our primary point of focus here; at this point we are chiefly

¹ Adapted from abstract of unpublished dissertation, Howard Becker, "Ionia and Athens: Studies in Secularization," University of Chicago, 1930.

² Cf. Lyford P. Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolution*, *passim*.

³ W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, 2nd ed., II, p. 1129.

concerned with individuation as a differentiating process. Reference to destructive or deteriorative processes is frequently made in the following section, but mainly for the purpose of demonstrating the power of differentiating processes. Moreover, other aspects of differentiation are analyzed—for example, the type of individuation that is involved in the production of liberated men, in the process of liberation, and this process is not destructive but differentiative and constructive, as a subsequent section on liberation (chap. xxx, §5) shows in detail.

§2. INDIVIDUATION AND POPULATION MOVEMENT⁴

It will perhaps be recalled that in discussing sub-processes of amalgamation (chap. xv, §3) some attention is paid to the characteristics of "isolated sacred structures" (e.g., peasant villages) and "accessible secular structures" (e.g., large urban centers). In addition to the material in the text, a lengthy footnote (6) describes these idealtypical social organizations in detail. (See also chap. I, §1.) They are of great importance for the understanding of many social processes, but especially for the processes of individuation correlated with population movement; as a result of such movement the members of sacred structures become individuated in various ways, and these structures themselves become secularized, thus furthering individuation. In other words, isolated, sacred plurality patterns become accessible, secular plurality patterns, and "collectivated" personalities concomitantly become individuated, as we shall see. Since some knowledge of these structures is essential for comprehension of the ramifications of individuation, it seems advisable to consider them here instead of dealing with them in the systematics of plurality patterns, where they logically belong.

Before launching upon an analysis that will show their importance, however, let it again be emphasized that both sacred structures and secular structures are nowhere existent as empirical cases; they are conscious fictions, heuristic concepts, artificial abstractions, arbitrary constructs—in short, ideal types that are never found on land or sea! (See chap. II, §2.) This insistence seems necessary because by far the greater part of the criticism directed against the use of the idealtypical method is beside the mark; instead of appraising the *instrumental, pragmatic value* of particular ideal types, an effort is made

⁴ This section is taken from an unpublished manuscript by Howard Becker. "Movement and Mobility in Relation to Social Change." A short paper on a similar theme by the same writer appears as "Prozesse der Säkularisation," *Köln. Vt. Soz.*, X, 2/3 (1932).

to find "exceptions"—as if anything other than exceptions could be found! Tönnies has stressed some of the foregoing points as follows:

"The fact must be borne continually in mind that these abstractions are artificial, and even arbitrary; all the forces of *society* [accessible secular structure] remain in close connection with their *community* [isolated sacred structure] basis, with the "historical" forms of living and acting together. . . . It is not easy to make this point of view clear, nor is the understanding of it easy. Yet insight into and mastery of its meaning will give the key by which the most important problems of human culture, of its rise and decline, may be solved. For the very existence of culture is change, and as such is the simultaneous development and dissolution of existing forms. Such change can be made conceptually evident only in the *transition* from one relative concept to another."⁶

Again, it must be borne in mind that the transition from sacred to secular will here be analyzed in terms of personality change rather than of plurality pattern change, i.e., the transition from sacred to secular is dealt with as if it occurred in one generation. As a matter of fact, such transition usually covers a much greater time-span; restricting it to one generation is an arbitrary simplification which, however, seems warranted on heuristic principles.

Further, it may be said unequivocally that the process of transition, of secularization, by means of which the sacred structure is transformed into the secular structure and "collectivated" personalities become individuated, should be spoken of only in extremely general terms. The stages to be outlined in the remainder of this section are abstract guiding lines laid down with the expectation that they will be over-stepped frequently in any concrete instance.

Another qualification is that secularization does not necessarily mean total destruction of the plurality pattern, nor does individuation always involve demoralization of the *socius*. If such destruction always ensued, this analysis would find its proper place only in the chapter on destructive processes.

Again, a qualification is introduced by the fact that there is no particular reason why population movement should be considered in connection with secularization and individuation except that such movement has been and is one of the chief ways in which human beings get genuinely new experience. Any other mode of acquiring new experience could have been included in the present context with almost equal justification; one might well ask the relation of the newspaper, the talking picture, the radio, books—in short, communi-

⁶ F. Tönnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (6th and 7th ed. [1st ed., 1887]), pp. 233-4.

cation and secondary contact in general—to the same phenomena of transition (cf. chap. ix, §10). This becomes quite apparent when the following series of questions is propounded: What is the relation of population movement to culture contact, what is the relation of culture contact to new experience, what is the relation of new experience to personality change, what is the relation of personality change to mental mobility, and what is the relation of mental mobility to secularization and individuation? How often does genuinely *new* experience result from travel, emigration, wandering, commuting? When human beings move from one point on the surface of the earth to another or shift in vicinal position, what does this mean in terms of fresh contacts, unaccustomed stimulation, *a tendency to respond more and more readily to new stimuli*? What are likely to be the social consequences if the movement has resulted in a high percentage of such fresh contacts? It is obvious that “communication” could have been substituted for “population movement” in the foregoing sequence with practically no alteration in the fundamental nature of the problem raised.

A further qualification is introduced by the nature of population movement itself. Culture case studies already made seem to show that it is impossible to deal fully with any and all cases of population movement by tearing them apart in order to get at *the* most important factor, for in addition to perpetrating the single-factor fallacy thereby, the resulting destruction of the configuration, the neglect of the logic of internal relations, and the ignoring of the *whole* problem make genuine explanation out of the question. Hence no assertions concerning the relation of population movement *per se* to personality changes resulting in secularization and individuation will be put forward; only the more general aspects of those population movements already analyzed for present purposes by the culture case study method will here be taken into account.⁶ There are many other varieties, but they are not of any particular relevance in the presence context; moreover, of the types already analyzed none is of primary importance here with the one exception of dispersion—only the briefest indication of the implications of the others will be given.

⁶ The culture case studies referred to are those included in the dissertation by Howard Becker already noted, and in several of his articles: “Pastoral Nomadism and Social Change,” *Sociology and Soc. Res.*, XV, 5 (May-June, 1931), pp. 417-27; “Conquest and Pastoral Nomadism,” *ibid.*, XV, 6 (July-August, 1931), pp. 511-26; “Unrest, Culture Contact, and Release During the Middle Ages and the Renaissance,” *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, (September, 1931); in collaboration with Leon Smelo, “A Sociological Study of Spartan Culture,” *Social Science*, 1932; and numerous unpublished studies of Gypsy, casual laborer, urban, and other population movements. See also his “Forms of Population Movement,” *Social Forces*, XI, 2 and 3 (December and March, 1931), pp. 147-60 and 351-61.

Population movements may be divided into two large groups: (1) those which if "measured" would probably show no significant correlation with individuation or with secularization; and (2) those which would probably show such a correlation.

In the first we may include: (a) nomadism of both the incursive (pastoral) and interstitial-symbiotic (e.g., Gypsy) varieties; and (b) exclusive conquest (e.g., the Dorian invasion of the Peloponnesus).

The second group of movements comprises: (a) inclusive conquest (e.g., the Germanic migrations, the First and Second Crusades, the frontier settlement of Ionia); (b) exclusive and inclusive colonization (e.g., the Greek colonizing movements); (c) dispersion, or movements of small plurality patterns and monads, in the form of immigration, flight, travel (e.g., the journeys of Ionian traders, philosophers, and historians, the peregrinations of the scholars of the Renaissance, the flocking of certain rural and "rurban" persons to modern urban centers).

The last variety of movement, dispersion, is from the present point of view the most important of all; culture case studies have demonstrated that *lasting* transition toward the accessible secular structure is more likely to follow from the movements of small plurality patterns and single human beings than from any of the varieties above mentioned. Nearly all the forms of population movement mentioned are in fact at least partial demonstrations of this; along with interstitial nomadism, exclusive and inclusive conquest, and exclusive and inclusive colonization, there is always evident some dispersion, especially in the deterioration of the groups involved after the major movement has taken place. The dispersion of Spartiates as *harmosts* abroad, for example, had a great deal to do with the deterioration of their community and state, founded and for a long time maintained by exclusive conquest. Inasmuch as dispersion is so omnipresent and important a type of movement, a mere listing of indices is hardly sufficient; further, more extended treatment is warranted in view of the fact that it exhibits a definite relation to processes of individuation, etc., more clearly than any other variety of population movement.

In order to deal properly with dispersion, it is necessary to add two ideal-typical corollaries to the main propositions of the accessible secular structure and the isolated sacred structure; these corollaries are those of the secular and the sacred stranger. The part played by one of the products of dispersion, viz., the stranger, the man habituated to abstraction, has already been dwelt upon by such writers as Simmel and Park; he may be heuristically conceived as the micro-

cosm or epitome of the secular plurality pattern and may, in this ideal-typical capacity, be termed *the secular stranger*. Conversely, there is another product of dispersion, another type of stranger who has not yet been so termed, the man habituated to nothing but the concrete and personal; he may be heuristically conceived as the microcosm or epitome of the sacred plurality pattern and may, in this ideal-typical capacity, be termed *the sacred stranger*.

These contrasting ideal types of stranger, like the social organizations they epitomize, are of course never found in real life; in empirical cases even the most extremely secular stranger always has a large number of attitudes that derive from the sacred structure, and conversely, the most extremely sacred stranger frequently has a large number of attitudes due to the influence of the secular structure, and between the empirical extremes there are a large number of persons who show few marked tendencies in either direction. Further, the empirical degree of "strangeness," whether sacred or secular, is doubly relative, i.e., it is a ratio; an extremely sacred stranger in a mildly secular structure is no more strange than is a mildly sacred stranger in an extremely secular structure, and an extremely secular stranger in a mildly sacred structure may have the same "strangeness ratio" as a mildly secular stranger in an extremely sacred structure. Here again careful distinction must be made between the ideal-typically absolute and the empirically relative.

The sacred stranger, then, is empirically no more than a person whose dispersion results in "sacred-to-secular" relative strangeness; the secular stranger is empirically no more than a person whose dispersion results in "secular-to-sacred" relative strangeness.

There are two other types of stranger or strangeness that must not be overlooked, although little attention will be paid them beyond the short analysis to follow; one may be called sacred-to-sacred strangeness; the other secular-to-secular strangeness.

It is necessary to call attention to sacred-to-sacred strangeness because the previous discussion of the sacred structure as an ideal type is likely to lead to the conclusion that we assume but one extreme empirical variety of sacred structure, and that consequently the dispersing monad with attitudes deriving from this structure would have a low ratio of strangeness in other sacred structures. No such assumption is made, however, for it would manifestly be incorrect; for example, the orthodox Jew, whose attitudes derive from a structure with an empirical minimum of indices of accessibility and secularization, certainly was a stranger in those Catholic peasant

structures of the Middle Ages which had a similar minimum. His ratio of strangeness was high in spite of sacred-to-sacred dispersion, not because of quantitative differences expressible as maximum or minimum, but because of what we are at present forced to call qualitative differences.

There are, to be sure, cases in which both quantitative and qualitative differences are practically non-existent, and in which sacred-to-sacred dispersion therefore results in an extremely low ratio of strangeness; an example is afforded by the dispersion of peasants from the isolated villages of the Hunsrück region⁷ to the similarly isolated sacred structures established in Brazil as a result of exclusive colonization by peasants from that same region. Between these German and German-Brazilian social structures there are very few qualitative differences of significance, which is attested by the fact that the Germany-Brazilian villages show only a very slight degree of social change; the dispersing persons are promptly reabsorbed in sacred plurality patterns both quantitatively and qualitatively almost exactly like those they left. In such cases sacred-to-sacred dispersion does result in a low ratio of strangeness.

It must not be forgotten, moreover, that there are certain situations in which the sacred stranger, particularly if he comes alone and is still plastic, is rapidly absorbed by a sacred structure, even when it shows wide qualitative differences from the structure that shaped his original neuropsychic patterns. An example of this is found in the absorption of Scandinavian peasants, both male and female, by the Mormon communities of Utah to which they come as proselytes; there is little if any individuation and secularization, and on this pragmatic basis we can therefore say that such peasants show a very low ratio of sacred-to-sacred strangeness.

Nevertheless, such examples are selected and not chosen at random; at the most they merely demonstrate that "sacred-to-sacred" dispersion does not always result in an appreciable ratio of sacred-to-sacred strangeness; they by no means justify the assumption that it never results in a high ratio of such strangeness—for it frequently does.

Another type, secular-to-secular strangeness, has already been mentioned and must be similarly qualified. Like the type just discussed, it seems almost a contradiction in terms, for inasmuch as strangeness in general has been described as a ratio, it may seem that, when a person with an empirical maximum of secular attitudes

⁷ Cf. Howard Becker, "Sargasso Iceberg: A Study in Cultural Lag and Institutional Disintegration," *Am. J. Soc.*, XXXIV, 3 (Nov., 1928), pp. 492-506.

comes into a plurality pattern with an empirical maximum of indices of accessibility and secularization, the ratio is so extremely low that the term "strangeness" is a misnomer. It is of course true that great metropolitan centers are very similar and are becoming more so, and that the modern cosmopolite is equally at home everywhere—but he is not very much at home anywhere! Further, he reinforces prevailing tendencies and thereby helps to increase the number of indices of accessibility, individuation, and secularization, and must therefore be considered a secular stranger with a moderately high ratio of strangeness. In other words, the secular stranger is none the less strange even when among others with similar attitudes, and his presence may help to render both their attitudes and his own more secular, for in its very nature the accessible secular structure has no ascertainable limits either to its accessibility or its secularization. Hence we may say that secular-to-secular strangeness is a term signifying very definite phenomena, and that these phenomena are of considerable contemporary importance, as Hayner's study of the hotel, Cavan's study of suicide, and Sorokin's study of "social mobility," to name only a few, have demonstrated.

There are, then, two main ideal types of dispersing person whose movements give rise to four types of strangeness: the sacred stranger whose dispersive movement takes him to a sacred structure or to a secular structure, and the secular stranger whose dispersive movement takes him to a sacred structure or to a secular structure; in relative terms, there may be sacred-to-sacred, sacred-to-secular, secular-to-sacred, or secular-to-secular dispersion, with corresponding varieties of strangeness. Empirically these merge into each other by insensible gradations, but that is no reason why they should not be ideal-typically separate. Culture case studies at present available afford more data for generalization with relation to secular-to-sacred and sacred-to-secular dispersion than for the other varieties, hence the terms secular and sacred stranger will hereafter apply, respectively, to these two types only, unless otherwise noted.

Modern dispersion undoubtedly is most often associated with movement from isolated sacred structures to centers of metropolitan economy affording our best empirical instances of accessible secular structures, i.e., modern dispersion is chiefly the dispersion of sacred strangers. It is also true, however, that in earlier periods, when transportation and communication were not so highly developed, this was not generally the case; indeed, the trend was in the reverse direction; secular strangers like the Phoenicians, Ionians, Athenians, and Vene-

tians visited isolated sacred structures as a consequence of trade or the multifarious other motives already touched upon, but there was not anything like a corresponding flow from these structures toward accessible secular structures (with the possible exception of Rome). By and large, however, it may be said that secular-to-sacred dispersion, although still of considerable importance, is nevertheless of greater historical than contemporary significance. Sacred-to-secular dispersion, on the other hand, is of greater contemporary than historical significance, especially if the meaning of "contemporary" is extended to include the period from the nineteenth century to the present. Examples of sacred-to-secular dispersion are afforded by the the following: the immigration of Polish peasants to American industrial centers, the outpouring of Galician Jews that has virtually engulfed parts of German cities since the World War, the flooding of automobile cities such as Detroit, Lansing, and Flint by rural Missourians, and the northward push of southern Negroes. Whatever the importance of these movements in "the long perspective of history," their present-day importance can scarcely be denied.

In view of these facts, sacred-to-secular dispersion will be focussed upon in the balance of this section; unless otherwise stated, the term dispersion will mean the sacred-to-secular movement of separate persons or small plurality patterns.

By thus concentrating upon one particular contemporary type of movement, an important type which has a high positive correlation with individuation and secularization, an analysis will result that comes as close as now seems possible to providing a satisfactory answer to the question: What is the connection between individuation and population movement? Why? Because the processes correlated with sacred-to-secular dispersion follow the same sequence in bringing about change in the dispersing persons as that followed by those same processes in bringing about the transition from the sacred structure to the secular structure! The process whereby the sacred stranger becomes mentally mobile and individuated is merely another aspect of that whereby the isolated sacred plurality pattern becomes accessible and secular. They are obverse and reverse; one cannot be considered without the other.

Now, in order to get at the processes of individuation as affected by dispersion, the latter phenomenon must be accounted for; it cannot be taken for granted. Dispersion is the result of definite social situations, and must be so analyzed.

There are certain social situations which are in a sense constants,

i.e., they are always evident in some degree, however slight. This may be abstractly phrased as follows: The most stable social organization, the most sacred plurality pattern to be found empirically, is but a moving equilibrium maintained by the equal action of relatively slow processes of deterioration and reconstruction, and within such structures some personalities are, relatively speaking, always undergoing a process of disorganizing individuation which may or may not be succeeded by reorganization. The relation of these processes to dispersion must now be made clear.

Ab initio, life involves activity of one sort or another, and this activity flows in definite channels, follows certain neuropsychic patterns. The patterns in which the activities of human beings are worked out are based upon the needs of the organism (N in our general formula, $P = N \times E \times B \times [N \times E]_1$)—no amount of emphasis upon culture should cause us to lose sight of this fact!—but these needs of the organism are not at first socially defined or channelized. The patterns are acquired in the process of social definition (E in our general formula); such definition of elementary cravings is the process by which the child becomes human, by which the biological individual is transformed into the sociological person. Definitions of a large number of situations likely to occur in the life of the child are consciously or unconsciously inculcated by the other members of the sacred structure, even when that structure is no more inclusive than the particularistic family; he has his needs cast into patterns by his elders who, by thus shaping him as a social personality, in a sense play God to the child without being possessed of the attributes of either omnipotence or omniscience.

The elders being thus unfortunately limited, the neuropsychic patterns they pass on sometimes do not function as they should, especially in periods of rapid social change, for these patterns are dependent for their smooth functioning and adequate correspondence to defined needs upon the smooth functioning of the social organizations which define and continually redefine the originally vague impulses resulting from the elementary needs. As already pointed out by Thomas and Znaniecki, the social organization, if it does not satisfy the impulses which it has defined, is to that extent deteriorated, and this state of affairs has as a consequence the deterioration of the personalities of those of its members whose defined cravings are unsatisfied, thwarted, or blocked. This lack of correspondence between cravings and the means of satisfying them may be due to: (1) relatively direct blocking of fundamental organic needs for food, drink.

etc.; (2) the thwarting of patterns laid down in the character-attitudes and the life-organization; (3) the lack of a particularized stimulus; (4) conflict between the defined wish and some other attitude that opposes and contradicts this wish. This last cause is frequently if not always the subjective aspect of conflicting elements within a structure that is just becoming accessible; the irreconcilable struggle between sacred and secular has started.

The inception of accessibility may be catastrophic in nature—the result of sudden inclusive conquest, for example—or it may be very gradual; in the latter case the struggle may be so slow in developing that it is at first accompanied by low tension and little emotion, but it may cumulatively increase until high tension and much emotion are generated, which in turn force action even if it promises little satisfaction. In other words, an intrusive factor disturbs equilibrium, and this brings about tension and emotion, which is externally manifest in unrest that ultimately precipitates crisis, and an attempt at betterment is made even though there is small hope of success. In popular parlance, the situation becomes intolerable and something has to be done!

Quite often dispersion is what is “done”; it is a readily available surrogate medium for actions blocked and wishes thwarted by that deterioration of the isolated sacred structure so frequently resulting from increased accessibility. Unless a pattern for such surrogate dispersion already exists, however, deterioration may be quite far-reaching before movement away from the structure is undertaken; sacred modes of behavior are not readily changed. But where such a surrogate pattern is at hand, relatively slight deterioration may issue in dispersion, in spite of the fact that the other members of the structure usually disapprove.

This disapproval is of course rooted in that emotional resistance to change which, as Boas has shown, is the correlate of fixed motor habits developed in isolation, but there are other reasons as well. For instance, no group likes to lose members if it is engaged in overt or covert conflict or competition with an out-group. Again, even if the dispersing person plans to return, he nevertheless withdraws from the sacred structure and its control, and develops interests which the group members left behind cannot approve or hope to share, all of which is not likely to elicit hearty approval of dispersion. Once more, the desire to leave the group is—nay, must be—interpreted as a sign of dissatisfaction which the satisfied members of any isolated sacred structure perforce condemn.

From the foregoing it follows that dispersion is a sign that the sacred structure is deteriorating faster than the counterbalancing process of reconstruction can maintain the moving equilibrium, and the counterpart of this is individuation of the dispersing person, the sacred stranger. When dispersion is voluntary, he rarely if ever has been untouched by individuation; he has been partially individuated, as it were, as a preparation for dispersion. The degree of individuation may be and usually is very slight; in relation to the secular structure to which he goes he is a decidedly sacred stranger, but nevertheless his character-attitudes and life-organization have begun to break down *before* leaving the sacred structure; the process of breaking away from the sacred routine has already begun, and in his own community he represents an element of unrest that if restrained from the attempt to meet crisis by dispersive action might foment insurrection, preach heresy, or commit murder, although milder evidences of deterioration are more likely. Individuation and dispersion are correlated; the isolated sacred structure must become in some measure accessible and the sacred stranger must in some degree be individuated before "voluntary" dispersion can take place.

When dispersion has taken place, the persons or small plurality patterns involved tend to become still more individuated and secular, but there are many positive and negative influences (no value-judgment implied!) that respectively further or retard this tendency, so that the rate of individuation varies widely from one empirical sacred stranger to another.

It may be accelerated by such influences as: (1) the immaturity and consequent neurological ductility of the sacred stranger in question—his neuropsychic patterns therefore have not yet been impressed deeply enough to insure mental immobility; (2) the temperamental instability of his character—his biological inheritance may have equipped him with urges not given adequate place in the social definitions of his group; (3) the isolation of the sacred stranger from his people and language after dispersion—if he not only disperses as a monad but subsequently is also forced to live a monadic life, individuation is rendered more rapid; (4) the further deterioration of his native sacred structure after his departure—if he receives news of the collapse of traditional plurality patterns, they are less likely to exert binding force upon him; and (5) the death of parents or other symbols of the social control exerted by the elders—if they die in the "home" locality, the effect may be much the same as that issuing from the collapse of traditional patterns. This list of influ-

ences furthering individuation might be indefinitely extended, but it is now long enough to show how positive influences may be responsible for varying rates of individuation.

Some negative influences retarding individuation may be: (1) the advanced age and consequent neurological rigidity of the sacred stranger in question; his neuropsychic patterns have therefore already been impressed so deeply that mental immobility is inevitable; (2) the fixity of his character due to innate inelasticity of psychophysical equipment—this may be and often is externally manifest as low intelligence; (3) the persistence of the ties of the sacred structure, often evident when the sacred strangers under observation have dispersed in the form of such plurality patterns as the particularistic marriage-group; and (4) enmity or antagonism between the sacred stranger and the inhabitants of the secondary culture area—this is often the result of high visibility and its consequent categoric contacts, as the cases of the Gypsy and the Jew show. This list also might be indefinitely extended, but a sufficient number of negative influences have been noted to show how individuation may be retarded. (It should be stated that those persons in whom negative influences are dominant are not likely to be individuated in advance of dispersion; they seldom if ever take the initiative in such movement, and are usually carried along as passive members of dispersing plurality patterns.)

When negative influences are greatly overbalanced by positive influences, the individuation of the dispersed sacred stranger goes on at a rapid rate; the aspect first apparent is usually that extreme type of individuation popularly termed demoralization. The social personality of the sacred stranger tends to break down so suddenly, and rational secular attitudes and life-organization are so slowly acquired, that he reverts in some measure to the merely biological individual. The only way in which this reversion can be prevented or checked is by a process of re-organization as a result of which new character-attitudes and life-organization, functionally integrated within the secular structure, are built up; unless the dispersed sacred stranger takes on a new rôle which vouchsafes him a number of primary contacts, etc., adequate to his socially patterned organic needs, the change brought about by dispersion is unsatisfactory, and instead of a lessening of tension and unrest there is an increase! The means taken to bridge this growing gulf frequently bring about a final breach with the attenuated sacred attitudes, with the consequence that urges not directly involved and formerly held in check by those

same attitudes successfully assert themselves, and there ensues a cyclical building-up and releasing of tension and unrest; when repeated often enough this finally issues in the almost complete loss of the majority of the traditional social patterns defining organic needs. Further, if the new contacts are merely symbiotic (as empirically they often are and as ideal-typically they must be in the secular structure), the dispersed sacred stranger is gradually stripped of the folkways and mores of the sacred structure, both by the operation of the "law of use and disuse" and by the inhibiting effect of involuntary activities working against the neuropsychic patterns acquired in that structure. The process by which this symbiotic demoralization is brought about may be outlined in greater detail as follows:

First, the character-attitudes and their correlated life-organization disintegrate because the central character-attitudes, upon which all the rest depend, are those which in their very nature can be maintained only in the sacred structure. Some reasons for this may now be given. (1) They are more or less systematized with reference to the particular configuration of that structure, and when one of them fails as a result of dispersion the others have thrown upon them a strain greater than they can bear without re-inforcement from other members of the sacred structure. (2) They are concerned with the social meanings of objects or values, and *social* meanings are meanings only when projected against a background of experience common to many persons and known as common by all of them. The *social* meanings in an environment where symbiotic relationships predominate, i.e., the secular structure, are very few, and unless a sufficient number of social bonds replace or supplement the symbiotic connections, there are not enough social meanings to maintain the character-attitudes and life-organization of the sacred stranger. (3) They are built upon a basis of sympathy (as defined by Scheler), and this basis presupposes relations closer than can be found anywhere outside of the sacred structure—least of all in the secular structure. Hence the character-attitudes disintegrate.

Second, the life-organization of the sacred stranger breaks up. This organization is the totality of intellectual methods for controlling social phenomena as they affect the social career of the person in question; it was shaped with reference to the function which he was to fill in the sacred structure, and hence was correlated with an organized body of folk-wisdom defining every situation in sacred, i.e., emotionally "unalterable," terms. Life-organization, character-attitudes, and social standards form one interacting whole; there can

be no separation among them so long as the structure in question remains isolated and sacred. The slightly individuated sacred stranger has left the little world in which his life-organization took form and shape, and his incipient individuation soon develops to a degree commensurate with the rapidly changing great world into which he has come; his life-organization goes to pieces as a consequence. Why? Because it was constructed with reference to a relatively stable structure in which all the situations that could ever confront the person were defined by the traditions of that structure, especially as represented in the elders. In totally new situations for which the sacred stranger has acquired no ready-made definitions, situations such as are found in the secular structure, the old life-organization cannot even begin to function. To make matters worse, this structure is not only new but is in constant flux as well; its perpetually renewed novelty might satisfy even Faust, who in a simpler age asked only for "trees that deck them with new verdure daily." The life-organization of the sacred stranger is no more than a set of rules for relatively constant situations, formulae for a fixed world; in order rapidly to re-organize the maze of social phenomena emerging in the secular structure in agreement with a new perception of the dynamic nature of the latter, the old rigid and static life-organization must be consciously set aside. The sacred stranger is usually quite as unable to attain to such conscious rejection as he is to reach a perception of the dynamic nature of the new world into which he has come; he is torn between the old and the new, and rarely has an adequate grasp of either. The old life-organization will not function properly, and yet he frequently cannot abandon it and seize another in time to prevent disaster; hence it is hopelessly wrecked, and the character-attitudes of the sacred stranger with it.

When character-attitudes and life-organization thus become disorganized, and when little or no reorganization or reconstruction takes place, the person with a full set of neuropsychic patterns defining all organic needs is partially reduced to the biological individual, who has no social definitions of behavior and lives wholly in the present on an organic level; that is, nothing but shreds of character-attitudes remain, and temperamental attitudes assume the major rôle. When this occurs, important results ensue; these results issue from the nature of such temperamental attitudes. These attitudes are purely egoistic in their ultimate reference (chap. x, §§4 and 5)—in fact, the whole process of demoralization, which is one aspect of individuation, is a process by which the social personality

disintegrates to a point where there emerges "the man without conscience, the woman without shame, individuals cut loose from the laws of common humanity," human beings without either *aidôs* or *nemesis*, Lucifers like that Werner von Urslingen upon whose helmet was inscribed these words: "The enemy of God, of pity, and of mercy." Less figuratively put, the extreme empirical case of the biological individual would be "feral man," the human being gone *completely* wild—of whom "primitive man" is by no means a prototype! (This extreme, however, is rarely if ever reached by those who have been social personalities, even if in merely minimal degree; it is more likely to be attained by amoral creatures who have never been human, in the strict sense of the latter term, at all.)

Here, then, is one aspect of the change effected by population movement—individuation in the form of demoralization. The dispersed sacred stranger exemplifies better than the secular the processes involved and their correlation with such movement.

A word or two, however, should here be said in excursus about the secular stranger, if only to remind ourselves that he exists. The Ionian *logopoioi* and *logographoi*, the Athenian Metics, and the wayfaring scholars of the Renaissance were also markedly individuated, mentally mobile to an extreme degree, but they still were in possession of life-organizations that in many instances enabled them to control complex configurations of social phenomena; such secular strangers were not then and are not now swallowed up in the "big booming buzzing confusion" (to take liberties with James) that so frequently overwhelms the sacred stranger. Not only this: their habits of comparison, classification, and analysis, of abstraction from the concrete and personal, give them potential control over social phenomena greater than that held by any other group, so long as they are able to avoid the Scylla of demoralizing individuation on the one hand and the Charybdis of mental immobilization by over-rigid abstractions on the other.

When such examples as those just cited recall the secular stranger to mind, the question arises: How is it that the secular stranger, although individuated, often is not demoralized, as the sacred stranger so frequently is? And further: What is the relation, if any, of the sacred to the secular personality? To supply adequate answers would take as much if not more space than has already been devoted to the sacred stranger, and inasmuch as this is only an excursus, over-brief answers must suffice.

First, the process by which secular personalities are produced is the same as that whereby the isolated sacred structure is made accessible and secular, and when the process is of the nature of slow cultural alteration instead of rapid cultural mutation, adaptation that prevents the emergence of extreme demoralization is possible. The individuated secular stranger is not merely nor always a sacred stranger who has been stripped of his old attitudes, although individuation may in some instances be furthered by the stripping process; as studies of urbanization have shown, the secular personality has worked out a set of attitudes that are quite as dependent upon the secular structure as are the attitudes of the sacred personality upon the sacred structure.

Second, the sacred personality is historically prior to the secular personality; the latter is an urban or even metropolitan product, as study of Ionia and Athens, for example, makes manifest, and urban or metropolitan economy appears comparatively late in the developmental sequence. Consequently, the relation of the sacred to the secular personality is historically that of antecedent and consequent; therefore, by examining *contemporary* sacred strangers who effect satisfactory adjustment to the accessible secular structure, whose personalities are re-organized upon a more complex level, some idea (in the form of recapitulative analogy) of the process whereby sacred personalities *historically* became secular personalities may be gained. Such insight into the historical processes, however, can be given here only along indirect lines, i.e., by way of recapitulative analogy, for after all the main point of interest in the present context is the contemporary sacred stranger and his mode of interacting with the secular structure after dispersion.

The excursus must therefore end; the sacred stranger is once more the chief object of attention.

Extreme individuation of the sacred stranger does not always follow dispersion; some of the retarding or negative influences already noted are usually present, and considerable portions of the social personality consequently resist the individuating process; in addition, new norms are frequently acquired from the stock offered by the secondary culture area (in this case the secular structure). The question may well be asked: Are the norms of this structure adequate to prevent extreme individuation if the influence of the sacred structure is entirely lacking? Let us attempt to answer it.

The general process by which the norms of the secular structure

are acquired has two aspects, differentiation and integration. We may say that the sacred stranger acquires all the norms that integrate him into the secular structure when and if he makes personality changes that are sufficiently specialized to constitute him a differentiated component in the metropolitan functional unity. Even if all these norms are acquired, however, the resulting functional integration does not involve so large a proportion of the total personality as does membership in the much simpler sacred structure; in the secular structure the correlation between differentiation and *integration in the sense of absorption of a major proportion of the capacities of the human organism* is by no means perfect nor even high.

This low correlation is first of all due to the fact that from the very nature of the secular structure there is no one central ideal, doctrine, or plurality pattern in terms of which all social attitudes are organized, as is the case in the sacred structure. Again, in spite of the vast increase in rate of population movement and communication in the modern world, there is not yet a background of experience common to and known as common by all persons (see chap. ix, §10); such a background is absolutely necessary for the development of social meanings (upon which primary character-attitudes are based). Indeed, no universally valid social meanings can arise until there is a completely unified and integrally harmonious world-society upon a completely secular foundation—something that does not seem, to say the least, an immediate probability or even possibility. We may even assert that only when some one set of culture patterns is completely dominant can there be complete integration; it may be that the present tremendous acceleration of population movement and communication will eventually bring this about, but this is mere speculation. Certainly no one culture pattern is universally accepted at present, and the future dominance of Western culture is not assured—there may be a discernible trend toward such dominance, but that is the most that can be said. In other words, extreme individuation of the sacred stranger ensues if the major attitudes deriving from the sacred structure break down, for even if all the available normative neuropsychic patterns of the secular structure are acquired, those norms do not yet offer (and indeed may never offer) the possibility of functional integration far-reaching enough to absorb any considerable proportion of the capacities of even relatively simple personalities.

Other reasons for this low correlation between differentiation and

integration may be adduced. One of them is that integration within a related whole at present takes place only on the level of the division of labor; a very small segment of the activity of the human being is geared into the functioning of the secular structure, for differentiation has progressed so far that men are integrated only in their economic capacities. Another is that the present secular world is of *necessity* extremely complex, so that one specialized activity requires a large share of the human being's total energy if mastery is to be achieved. Differentiation is specialization, and specialization within a complex division of labor is integration, but integration which necessarily is narrowly limited. The rôle played may be important, but one single rôle out of a total of thousands or more cannot constitute a social personality of the vast scope required for *complete* integration within the secular structure. Here again it is evident that the sacred stranger, if solely dependent upon the norms of his new environment, does not regain the unified personality that once was his.

Still other reasons for the low correlation already mentioned lie in the nature of the temperamental attitudes. A perfect correlation between differentiation and integration involves a complete sublimation of the temperamental attitudes; they must be completely expressed in the character-attitudes and the life-organization. This is probably quite impossible in the accessible secular structure. To begin with, only a few of the temperamental attitudes can be realized in such a narrow segment of life as finds a place within differentiated secular activity. Again, character-attitudes, being a product of social definition, can develop from temperamental attitudes only when the character-attitudes are definitely incorporated in the life of the social order. The nature of the secular structure precludes this, for, being in flux and constant change as it is, there are relatively few stable and ready-made definitions of situations, and relatively few fixed patterns for life-organization. In addition, there exists at present no group technique for developing character-attitudes on the basis of experimentation and recognition of change as of the essence of secular life. It may very well be that stable character-attitudes cannot be so developed, but certain it is that (short of a continuance of influence deriving from the sacred structure) no other alternative seems worth trying or even possible. Once more, the temperamental attitudes are stimulated so intensely by the continual presentation of new sensual values—"vanity-values," aphrodisiac values, and so on—that the

character-attitudes of the sacred stranger, only imperfectly organized for sublimation and more often than not crudely repressive, break down under the demoralizing thrust of the new values. He may succeed, however, in retaining enough grip on his life-organization to continue his differentiated function, and when he does, he presents the curious phenomenon of being differentiated and controlled in one small segment of his personality, while at the same time he is extremely individuated, i.e., demoralized, in all the rest.

Once more we see that the extreme individuation of the sacred stranger cannot be prevented when the central character-attitudes deriving from the isolated sacred structure are destroyed with relative completeness, even though there has been a high degree of success in assimilating the norms of the secular structure; *the man who is merely differentiated is a man so individuated that he is demoralized.*

From this it would seem that all sacred-to-secular dispersion inevitably involves extreme individuation, whereas this manifestly is not the case when concrete instances of such dispersion are examined. The discrepancy arises from the fact that on the one hand the accessible secular structure as an ideal type has been considered, whereas on the other an empirical structure, predominantly secular, *but with a large proportion of indices of the isolated sacred structure*, is being examined. When dispersed sacred strangers in whom the positive factors accelerating individuation greatly overbalance the negative or retarding factors do not exhibit extreme individuation, the reason is usually to be found in the fact that, over and above the norms of the empirical secular structure, *attitudes deriving from empirical sacred structures of the secondary culture area have been acquired.* Symbiotic connections have been supplemented by intimate common-human relations, social distance has decreased, sympathy in its various forms has brought about emotional interaction that facilitates the further intensification of relations of approach and association. In this way extreme individuation (demoralization) is prevented, while at the same time the releasing or energizing effect of individuation is often evident in considerable degree; the personality of the sacred stranger is reorganized on a more complex level, and what must be regarded as a successful personality change, i.e., one that meets adequately the crises arising from dispersion, has been made.

Reference will again be made to this transformation of the sacred stranger into what may be termed the liberated human being (no

value-judgment implied!), but it now seems advisable to neglect temporarily the qualifications he introduces, and consider further the interplay of the processes which in their double aspects may be designated individuation-demoralization and differentiation-integration.

In addition to the demoralized man already noted, there is another type which may be called the amoral man. Some of the most interesting cases of human beings in an advanced stage of individuation are offered by the amoral second or even third generation of dispersed sacred strangers, persons brought to the secular structure at a very early age or born there. They might be called amoral products of "vicarious dispersion." A great deal has been written on this subject, especially with relation to the children of recent immigrants to the United States, and little if anything that is empirically new can be said here. Much of the ideal-typical discussion applies to such cases, especially the references to the amoral individual, the human being who, never having acquired any character-attitudes adequate to any situation, new or old, is *wild*. The "wild boys" of the postwar years in Russia, many of the youthful Chicago gangsters studied by Thrasher, "the case of Abraham Bernstein,"⁸ and several of the Judge Baker Foundation case studies⁹ afford examples of this particular product of individuation-demoralization, the amoral man.

When less extreme cases are considered, however, even more interesting products of individuation are revealed. The marginal man, referred to by Park in connection with the Diaspora, may also be found in connection with contemporary dispersion, especially with that of the sacred stranger. For present purposes we may define the marginal man as a human being controlled in part by character-attitudes deriving from a sacred structure, and in part differentiated and individuated by the influence of a secular structure, but not assimilated to those portions of that structure (empirically speaking) in which attitudes deriving from sacred structures prevail. In other words, he is at home nowhere; he *belongs*, in the full sense, to neither the primary nor the secondary culture.

Some of the possible characteristics of such a marginal man may be noted; they are of appreciable importance. One of those most frequently manifest is continuance of the state of crisis because a satisfactory adjustment has not been found; he is in a condition of heightened self-consciousness that frequently leads to aggressive self-

⁸ D. E. Cross, *A Behavior Study of Abraham Bernstein*, Department of Public Welfare, City of Chicago, pamphlet, 1924; as well as a more revealing study (unpublished manuscript), Department of Sociology, University of Chicago.

⁹ Case studies Nos. 6, 7, 10, Series 1, Judge Baker Foundation, Boston, 1922-3.

assertion if his temperamental attitudes so incline him. If he is not so inclined, but has creative ability, he may achieve fairly adequate or even successful accordance by activity in the field of personal expression; for example, many great poets, such as Heine, Shelley, Poe, and Dante, have been in one way or another marginal men, although not always as a result of sacred strangeness. Some struggle within the personality, however, was at work, and this is of the essence of the marginal man. Again, the marginal man may achieve a partial, inadequate solution of the inner struggle by reorganizing his personality on a less consciously complex level, e.g., he may develop marked introversion, build a fantasy world of day-dreams, and perhaps eventually become so fixated in such tendencies that he shows marked neuropathic or psychopathic traits. When this extreme result does not ensue, however, he may emerge as a fixated personality type to whom eventual amalgamation would be impossible even if external barriers were removed; he is then a fixated marginal man.

Such persons often play a large part in accelerating social change because of their compensatory activity in advocating and instituting changes in the current social standards (mores); the mental mobility, the innovating individuation, of the fixated marginal man is, as it were, a permanent neophilia. There is not only inability to resist the new, but aggressive activity in furthering the new. This is frequently exemplified in the advocacy of changes in the political or economic order by fixated marginal men; the changes advocated may sometimes be "revisionist," but they are more frequently "catastrophic." Catastrophic change is also advocated, or rather expected, in the eschatological and apocalyptic sects and cults of which such marginal men, both historically and in contemporary times, are often leaders. Such advocacy of political, economic, and religious change (in the form of rapid mutation) by marginal men has often been responsible for the acceleration of existing tendencies toward social change, and has even played a part in initiating such tendencies. Numerous instances come to mind: Marx, Kropotkin, Tolstoi, the sectarian wayfarers so active before the Reformation, Robert Emmett, Wolf Tone, Lenin, Marat, and many more. Further, in so far as criticism of existing conditions tends to bring about slow alteration, marginal men have taken a leading part, for they are likely to be vigorous and unsparing critics both of in-groups and out-groups. Numerous biographical and autobiographical documents tend to bear out these

generalizations; those of Heinrich Heine¹⁰ and Ludwig Lewisohn¹¹ are recent examples.

Another type of human being arising from the interaction of individuation and differentiation-integration may be termed the segmental man, i.e., the man whose temperamental attitudes are so inadequately expressed in the highly differentiated metropolitan economy that he develops habits of dissipating the resulting tension and unrest by activities that almost exclusively involve segmental drives. These activities are usually surreptitious surrogates for the activities by which energy is consumed with the full approval of the sacred structure; they are segmental because they cannot be brought into harmony with either the character-attitudes deriving from that structure nor the norms (so largely concerned with differentiated efficiency) of the secular structure.

Some of these surrogate activities of the segmental man have been noted by Park, Burgess, Anderson, Zorbaugh, Shonle, Donovan, Mowrer, Sorokin, and others, but the term segmental was first applied to them by Kempf.

One such surrogate activity may be termed passive adventure; examples of this are: reading about sports, big-game hunting, war; "spectatoritis" and being a "fan"; gambling on sporting events by means of baseball pools or "office pari mutuels"; "playing the market on a shoestring" and similar speculation; getting "thrills" via "human flies," "the talkies," novels, and detective stories.

Another type of "surrogation" is bound up with the sex urge; instances are found in: "T.B.M." musical comedies and "burlesk"; "taxi dancing"; the libidinous French postcard, novel, short story, "unexpurgated edition," "confession" magazine, "Captain Billy's Whiz-Bang," "Art Lover's Magazine," and all the *erotica* that the little "arty" bookshops disseminate; masturbation, some kinds of homosexuality, prostitution; and so on.

Still another sort of surrogation is the vaguely expressive behavior manifest in such instances as: revivalism of various forms; devotion to cults and sects that have no goal beyond that of giving "peace," "health," or "inspiration" to their members; aimless, restless movement such as rapid change of residence and "going for a ride just to

¹⁰ Lewis Browne, with the collaboration of Elsa Wehl, *That Man Heine*.

¹¹ Nearly all the works of Lewisohn are autobiographical or pseudo-autobiographical, and they all show distinctly marginal characteristics. *Upstream*, *The Creative Life*, *The Island Within*, and *The Golden Vase* are among the number.

be going";¹² petty crime, useless shoplifting; and many other surreptitious or overt surrogate activities practiced by the segmental man.

We have now considered the demoralized man, the amoral man, the marginal man, and the segmental man, all of them products of the process of differentiation-integration within the ideal-typical secular structure, all of them individuated. Obviously none of these four types are found in unmixed form in real life; indeed, each one of them involves some aspect of the others. Further, the fact must again be recalled that all *empirical* structures, however accessible and however secular, are *composite*, i.e., they always have within them a large proportion of indices of the sacred structure, as the discussion of the liberated man has already made plain. If it were not for the composite nature of such structures, the liberated man would be an impossibility, for he is, per definition, a dispersed sacred stranger who remodels or builds up central character-attitudes and life-organization in such a way that all his attitudes, temperamental and otherwise, find adequate expression; in other words, he *reorganizes*. As we have seen, this cannot be done when relations are merely symbiotic (as they would be were the ideal-typical secular structure ever a reality).

But this is impossible, and moreover, we know that the sacred stranger sometimes does change into the liberated man (a fact which shows that individuation is not necessarily destructive). The characteristics of the liberated man clearly distinguish him from the four types previously discussed. For one thing, he often develops a personality of greater originality and energy; the work of Teggart, Francke, and others has gone a long way toward verifying the hypothesis that release, liberation of latent or potential energies, is correlated with individuation, and that such release is an indispensable adjunct of creative innovation in the form of rapid mutation.¹³

¹² Such movement is frequently labelled "geographical mobility" or "territorial mobility," and is supposed to "cause" various phenomena which would here be termed individuation, whereas on the contrary such movement is more often a consequent than an antecedent of individuation, and should never be termed "mobility."

¹³ It is of course possible to be creative in another way, i.e., in the slow alteration of established forms; rarely, however, does such alteration accomplish more than the relatively complete exhaustion of all the possibilities of those forms. For example, the great geniuses who contributed to the development of thirteenth-century Catholicism were not, on the whole, marginal or liberated men, but they brought the established forms of that faith—forms of theology, philosophy, ritual, architecture, and social policy—to a pitch of perfection, of architectonic harmony, of systematic co-ordination, that must be called creative. The

Another characteristic of the liberated man is that the flood of energy resulting from release is at least partially held within the channels of a life-organization adapted to the differentiated efficiency necessary for achievement in and according to the norms of the secular structure. From this it follows that the liberated man, unlike the marginal man, is more or less reconciled to that structure; the marginal man either withdraws from a social reality too much in conflict with his central character-attitudes, or else attempts to "shatter it to bits—and then remould it nearer to the Heart's desire!" whereas the liberated man is likely to shape his life-organization so as to use the existing facilities of the secular structure to the full, or at most to propose only modification. The marginal man is inclined to be idealistic, the liberated man to be realistic; the life-organizations of both reflect this difference in their central character-attitudes.

The fact that the liberated man is able to maintain such a life-organization is due to several influences that appear in various combinations: (1) a central core of character-attitudes deriving from the isolated sacred structure of the primary culture area has usually resisted the over-rapid individuating processes (so frequently following dispersion) because negative or retarding factors have made such resistance possible; (2) new character-attitudes not too greatly in conflict with remnants of the old may be acquired as a result of influences deriving from sacred structures within the *composite* secondary culture area (i.e., the *empirical* secular structure), and these character-attitudes then counteract demoralizing, amoralizing, marginal, and segmental tendencies, and bring about reorganization of the sacred stranger's personality; (3) new secondary character-attitudes closely correlated with the new life-organization arise on the basis of what may be called vocational interest; these attitudes are inculcated by elective associations with normative functions (chap. xxxiii, §4), such as real estate boards, trade unions, and business men's and women's clubs.

possibilities inherent in the premises of Catholicism were exhausted in the process, however, and no genuinely creative activity was thereafter possible that did not in some way contravene the work already done. No value-judgment is here implied; it may be that the rounded, exhaustive development of cultural forms as a result of slow alteration is better than the introduction of new forms as a result of rapid mutation—or it may be that it is worse! No brief is held either for rapid innovation or for slow development in harmony with tradition—*sub specie æternitatis*, as they must be viewed by the sociologist, no preference is possible.

When modified or new character-attitudes are acquired as a result of any or all of the influences just noted, they usually make possible to the erstwhile sacred stranger a conception of his rôle within the secular structure that is in agreement with the surviving remnant of attitudes deriving from the sacred structure, which conception therefore functions as an additional stabilizing force. Indeed, such thoroughgoing stabilization may result that innovating and creative tendencies, often released in the sacred stranger by dispersion, may be suppressed in the interests of differentiated efficiency or conformity to the new norms. He becomes so thoroughly reorganized that he neither continues to manifest the energies of release nor functions as an intrusive factor in releasing the energies of others in the secondary culture area. When this occurs (and it occurs with surprising frequency) the liberation of the sacred stranger has been only temporary; "liberated man" then becomes a misnomer, and "regulated man" or some similar term should be used instead. A new and virtually static equilibrium has been reached that eventually requires an external intrusive factor to reinduce mental mobility and its attendant individuation.

In a number of cases, however, a balance between liberation and reorganization is struck, the new equilibrium attained is dynamic, and the liberated man remains liberated; considered as ideal types, such persons have therefore acquired a flexibility and adaptability of schematisms for controlling social reality, combined with stability of character-attitudes and personality. In other words, they have become mentally mobile and individuated without becoming permanently disorganized; they have met the crisis of dispersion by personality reorganization on a more complex level; they have become adequately functioning members of the secular structure, but have retained the essential central character-attitudes deriving from the sacred structure. It must be said, however, that in the present period such liberated persons (so far as they approach the ideal-typical in their lack of internal discord) are not as a rule likely to be great creative geniuses in the field of personal expression, for in this field, which is that of poetry, music, drama, and the fine arts in general, art that is judged great (by most present-day critics) is usually the product of inner struggle.

The marginal man or even the segmental man is therefore more likely to achieve artistically, in the accessible secular structure of modern times at least, than is the liberated man. The latter, on the

other hand, is better fitted to undergo the exacting discipline of scientific endeavor, or even to be a "man of action" in that structure, than is the marginal man or any of the other types. The reason for this seems to be that such pursuits demand personalities that are considerably individuated, that are mentally mobile, but that are not so extremely mobile in their emotional aspects as are the personalities more adapted to the directly expressive arts. The liberated man is in a state of moving equilibrium on a combined sacred-secular basis; the other types have not effected the reconciliation between sacred and secular—a reconciliation which is difficult, at present largely dependent upon chance, and always hard to maintain. There is at present no planned production of liberated men, which is not at all surprising, for there is little real knowledge of how to produce them and little demand for their production. It should once more be noted that they are never found empirically in the "pure" form; the liberated man usually has some characteristics also found in the other types. Here again distinction must be made between the ideal-typical and the empirical.

A great deal of attention has now been paid to the phenomenon of sacred-to-secular dispersion, which is only one variety of dispersion, and dispersion is in turn only one variety of population movement. Nevertheless, it is felt that the attention has been warranted, for something has been done to show how the processes correlated with sacred-to-secular dispersion follow the same sequence in bringing about change in the dispersing persons as that followed by those same processes in bringing about the transition from the isolated sacred structure to the accessible secular structure.

Moreover, when the fact is recalled that, as already stated, "communication" could have been substituted for "population movement" in the foregoing sequence with practically no alteration in the fundamental nature of the problem raised, the whole technological field of social change is linked to the analysis just given. *Certain inventions may be more effective than population movement in producing individuation.*

Last of all, let it be emphasized that the comparatively exhaustive treatment given the communication-population movement factor in this section should not lead the reader to conclude that it is overwhelmingly more important than other factors. A similar analysis might be set forth for at least three or four more; the examples given in the following section show this plainly.

§3. EXAMPLES OF INDIVIDUATION, ETC.

The sub-processes of individuation, separation, and estrangement listed in the table throw some light on the general problem. As in previous instances, they are grouped under (1) means, (2) manifestations, and (3) sources.

(1) Sometimes a group cuts the Gordian knot and halts disorganization by getting rid of its obnoxious members through *refusing shelter* or *exposing* them. A specific example is furnished by *cashiering*, a practice found in military organizations. It frequently involves the ceremony of stripping the disgraced officer of his epaulets and other insignia and breaking his sword. The *boycott* is of some importance as a means of individuation; the sociologist does not restrict it to its narrow economic meaning, but uses it to designate the exclusion of a person from a group by refusing to accord him any attention or respect; the phrase of the English schoolboy, "sending to Coventry," is an exact synonym. The process of boycotting does not belong among the common-human dissociative processes because the person boycotted and those who boycott him always are keenly aware that they are representatives of a particular plurality pattern. The "scab," for example, has little opportunity to lose sight of his particular group affiliations, and the "peaceful picketers," who at the very least load him with abuse, are certainly aware of his group relationships as well as of their own. Closely related to boycotting are *excommunicating* and *outlawing*. Certain organizational tactics, not aimed at exclusion but at control by separating groups which in combination would be too strong, are *regulating* and *localizing*.

(2) The manifestations of individuation are numerous, for its purposes and directions are manifold. *Flight* most clearly expresses the desire for separation, and of course has a great many sub-varieties which cannot be mentioned here. *Dissidence* and *apostasy*,¹⁴ already mentioned in connection with schism, are plainly processes of estrangement, and will be noted again when destructive processes are discussed.

Bohemian behavior is linked with tendencies toward extreme individuation in spite of the group relationships peculiar to this mode of life.¹⁵ *Living one's own life* is here given a meaning slightly different from Bohemianism; it denotes the effort to combine recogni-

¹⁴ Alfred Meusel, "Die Abtrünnigen," *Köln. Vt. Soz.*, III, 2/3 (1923), pp. 152 ff.

¹⁵ Paul Honigsheim, "Die Bohème," *Köln. Vt. Soz.*, III, 1 (1923), pp. 60 ff.; W. W. Waller, *The Old Love and the New: Divorce and Readjustment*, chap. iv.

tion of group demands with the expression of personality, and *may* take the form of activity in the service of the group. The *laissez-faire principle*, as interpreted by the early English Liberals, tends toward individuation, for it favors the limitation of group control in order that members, particularly the more active, may have the fullest freedom possible. *Specializing* obviously makes for individuation. As population density increases and plurality patterns become more complex, their members take over more and more specialized functions; greater achievement is often rendered possible thereby, but it brings with it the danger that relationships with the larger whole will gradually become so tenuous that they control such specialized persons little if at all. It will be recalled that the analysis of differentiation-integration in the previous section deals with this aspect of individuation at some length. The sociology of sex is especially interested in the process of *inversion*; the homosexual person gradually loses contact with members of the opposite sex, and some of his or her peculiarities are explicable on this ground alone.

(3) The sources of individuation, separation, and estrangement are also numerous. The *representation of special interests* is important, for it involves a certain separation from other elements in the plurality pattern. *Liberalism* may go to extremes, resulting in *individualism* of various types. The *formation of sects* is of course separation, if not estrangement, from the parent church; in the systematics of plurality patterns reference will again be made to it. *Colonization* is also a process of separation, particularly from the standpoint of the mother country; how effective it may be in individuation the previous section attempted to show. The *strike* and the *lockout* should not be regarded merely as modes of action in the interest of a particular group, but also as separation from a more inclusive group with which co-operation is the rule rather than the exception. *Dispersion* and other forms of population movement carry with them, as we have seen, a fairly high probability of individuation and estrangement, and the various "stranger" personality types such movement produces are not often characterized by marked tendencies toward integrative behavior.

Among the sources of individuation we must also include motives and personal idiosyncrasies. The *aesthete* is almost always given to markedly individuated behavior; the perpetual splitting-up of various schools of painting, music, and other aesthetic activities is too well known a process to need recounting here. *Asceticism* often involves abstinence from the ordinary intimacies of everyday life as

well as from sexual and familial relationships. St. Simeon Stylites on top of his pillar is a familiar although somewhat extreme example. *Chastity* is practically synonymous with the avoidance of extra-marital intercourse; in some rare instances, intercourse within the marriage bond may either be avoided altogether or limited to strictly reproductive purposes. Occasionally genuine or spurious *originality* provides the initial impetus for separation from a group. *Unpopularity* at times compels the severing of accustomed connections; politicians, officials, and similar public persons who become unpopular almost always lose a number of erstwhile "friends"; "when the water reaches the upper deck, follow the rats" is the epitome of a certain type of political wisdom.

CHAPTER XXVI

INTEGRATING PROCESSES: UNIFORMATION

§1. UNIFORMATION FROM THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

All through the foregoing discussion of differentiating processes, the careful reader could not but be conscious of its one-sidedness; integration is a necessary complement of differentiation. We cannot comprehend the full sociological implication of the genesis of disparities unless we also take uniformation into account; similarly, individuation and stratification involve ordination; and selection points to socialization.

Integration, like differentiation, goes on continually, but from this it does not follow that they always balance each other: sometimes centripetal forces predominate and bring about uniformation and the development of extremely large plurality patterns; at other times centrifugal forces lead to the rapid proliferation of small sub-groups such as dyads, triads, and tetrads, and even to the splitting off of numerous monads. In other words, the sum total of social processes may at a given time issue in marked integration, whereas at another time it results in far-reaching differentiation.

This is illustrated by the development of political plurality patterns, i.e., states. For centuries, small states have been giving ground both literally and figuratively to larger, so that at the end of the nineteenth century the world seemed destined, within a few more decades, to political organization under the sway of four or five centers of domination. During and after the World War, however, counteracting tendencies became evident, and the present resurgence of nationalism apparently postpones extensive integration for many years.

Let us now turn our attention to integration. The most vivid picture of its action is vouchsafed by tracing the course of social development throughout the centuries.

Everywhere there spring up embryonic interhuman groupings and cultural products in great profusion; as they develop and diffuse they come in contact with competing achievements. In the dissociative processes that follow, many of the less vigorous elements are sup-

pressed, modified, or completely eliminated; others manage to survive, expand, and absorb the usable fragments of the weaker contingent. Gradually well-knit culture complexes arise, and these struggle for room to expand further or even for complete supremacy, just as did the elements of which they were originally composed.

We cannot too often remind ourselves that some things survive and that many more perish. We live, so to speak, in a great cemetery of buried and half-forgotten cultures, and may in a certain sense rejoice in the knowledge that we have survived to play our part in the great epic that encompasses the defeats and victories of the past and the collapses and conquests of the future. The surviving cast and their properties are the product of ceaseless integrating processes and the absorption of all divergent trends by the main drama.

Sociologists may well consider the facts to which Ross calls our attention: Many culture traits spread rapidly and soon reach far beyond the political limits of the area in which they arose, whereas others remain confined within narrow barriers or are wholly wiped out. The game of chess and the alphabet are in a fair way to conquer the world; the abacus and the horn bow of the Mongol are almost extinct. Many culture traits spread over the whole world in a few years and are everywhere taken as matters of course or are welcomed as if they had long been expected, whereas others must be either imposed upon reluctant peoples by force or inculcated by intensive propaganda.¹

Emphasis should also be laid on the fact that the more complex non-material culture traits, which appeal to a relatively small group, are rarely if ever rapidly or generally diffused. The more rarefied values can never be popular; only when they are brought down to the level of the average man and thereby robbed of their distinctive qualities can they be spread widely. In their original forms they are usually too ethereal, too intangible, for general appreciation. The culture traits which spread most rapidly are those providing creature comforts, as Ross points out:

"... drinks, foods, narcotics, materials, tools, implements, methods of production, and means of enjoyment make their way rapidly among peoples and races; while superior sex morals, forms of the family, upbringing of children, relations between parents and children, status of social classes, treatment of the weak, relief of the poor, types of recreation, and political institutions make their way slowly or not at all."²

¹ Cf. E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, rev. ed., pp. 510-15.

² *Ibid.*, p. 504.

Two types of uniformation may be distinguished: (1) voluntary imitation (in the sense of correspondence and repetition); and (2) social compulsion. In the latter type the authoritative representatives of the group formulate the results of their experience into binding rules which are then impressed or imposed upon the other members, in the belief that such rules are conducive to the welfare of all.

§2. EXAMPLES OF UNIFORMATION

The sub-processes of uniformation are next in order. *Diffusion* has already been noted; in spite of all the work of cultural anthropologists,³ we know very little about its strictly sociological aspects, although such knowledge is badly needed, not only for the guidance of the colonial administrator but also for the student of international politics and economics. Processes of *distribution* may seem out of place in the present context, but when distribution is relatively equal, or when it takes the form of mutual sharing, it tends to level out previously existing differences.

The general processes of *identification*, *compensation*, and *co-ordination* have special importance in the science of interhuman behavior. When someone identifies *A* with *B*, or himself with either or both, it means that differences are disregarded and marked trends toward uniformation are generated.⁴ Compensation must not be understood in the Adlerian sense; here it simply means a process of give-and-take that tends to eliminate gross disparities. Co-ordination denotes the process or processes that place human beings on social planes co-ordinate with those occupied by other human beings; it might be termed levelling or equalization if these terms were not loaded with value-judgments. As it is, it seems best to avoid them, for they are likely to be confused with the process of *self-abasement* (in the sense of descending to another's level), which is quite different in many respects. To be sure, when one descends to the level of another, a certain levelling or equalizing effect is produced, but this is by no means the same as co-ordination, for the latter may be effected by rising to another's level, by raising others to one's own, and so on.

The perplexing problem of *democratizing* has a tremendous number of sociological as well as political implications, but for fear that

³ Perhaps the most valuable work has been done by the "functional school" of Malinowski and others. A first-class treatise is that of G. H. Lane-Fox Pitt-Rivers, *The Clash of Culture and the Contact of Races*.

⁴ Cf. T. D. Eliot, "The Use of Psychoanalytic Classification in the Analysis of Social Behavior: Identification," *J. Abn. and Soc. Psych.* XXII, 1 (April-June, 1927), pp. 67-81.

the charge of "academic kleptomania" may be incurred, it seems best to refrain from the discussion of a topic traditionally reserved for the political scientist. When a specialized sociology of politics or a sociologically orientated political science develops, we may be able to gain some insight into the possibilities, consequences, limits, and driving forces of democracy; until then, generalizations are dangerous.

Standardization, discussed at length in the chapter on "ordination," etc. (xxvii, §3) might with almost equal justification be dealt with here. This is apparent when it is recalled that Ross, among others, uses "standards" as an equivalent of Sumner's "mores."

Pardoning and *granting amnesty* are linked with uniformation, because the erstwhile criminal or political prisoner is thereby in some measure re-instated among his fellows as if he had never been guilty of any offense. The *bringing into style* of any sort of culture trait naturally aids in its diffusion, and diffusion means that what was once rare becomes common—a form of uniformation that is responsible, in part at least, for the continual changes in style evident in the modern world. *Proletarianization* will be dealt with at some length among the destructive processes; at this point only its egalitarian and levelling aspects need to be called to mind. *Anonymity* is definitely correlated with uniformation, inasmuch as the person who acts anonymously submerges his own private interests and desires in the particular group which takes upon itself the favorable or unfavorable consequences of his behavior. In certain extreme cases every one of the members of a particular group may be held responsible: for example, the small clusters of sceptics and social critics who clustered about Bayle and Voltaire, the French Encyclopedists, the Pre-Raphaelites, and similar groups were held accountable for the anonymous works of their various members. The anonymity of urban life is somewhat different from that just mentioned, but it too tends toward uniformation; when human beings are herded in droves by subway guards, befuddled by the same headlines, shouted at by the same loud speakers, exhorted to keep kissable or free from dandruff by the same advertisements, and fed with the same "intellectual" fodder by the book clubs, resemblances that are more than superficial are produced. *Co-education* contributes to uniformation, for it diminishes to a considerable extent the culturally acquired differences between male and female, as any educator familiar with both European and American systems will testify. An *ideology* that is shared by all the members of a group, as well as the *collective representations*

that nearly always develop, lend so entirely superpersonal an aspect to many group manifestations that some writers talk about the "group mind" as if there were a sort of collective sensorium entirely independent of the separate members of the group. This is of course a thoroughly exploded notion, but the fact that it was ever held indicates the remarkable pressure toward uniformation exercised by group ideology and collective representations. The political, economic, and related opinions held by average conservative members of any large national plurality pattern, for example, are so uniform that the belief in a superpersonal mind in which all the members share easily arises. Closely related to this is the power of *public opinion*; at certain times it too seems superpersonal by reason of the tremendous drag toward uniformity that it exerts. Indeed, the concept of *public* in general seems in such close correspondence with the concept of uniformation that special studies for the purpose of discovering the precise degree of correlation existing are badly needed.

§3. THE SOCIATIVE FUNCTION OF UNIFORMATION

The sociologist of course cannot make any pronouncements about the *final* value of uniformation; its *functional* value in the maintenance of the particular plurality pattern in which it operates is his sole interest. Moreover, the sociologist always proceeds on the basis of the fiction that the plurality pattern concerned should be preserved, so that when he uses such words as "dangerous," "pathological," and "destructive," he means only that the processes in question tend to break down the plurality pattern under consideration. From the point of view of ethics or social philosophy, it may be a very good thing that this comes about, and conversely, it may be very unfortunate, but with this the sociologist as such has no concern. A criminal gang, a fanatical sect, and a predatory state are plurality patterns, and whatever makes their maintenance or development difficult we here term "obstructive," "harmful," "disruptive," or "troublesome"—but from the functional standpoint, not from the final.

Now, the task of determining the functional utility (positive or negative) of uniformation cannot be accomplished until the level upon which uniformation takes place is known. If wise leadership, for example, is made impossible by the drift of public opinion or an ossified ideology, the flood of uniformation must be said to have reached too high a social level and therefore to be harmful.

These remarks should not lead to the assumption that uniformation always leads to flatly egalitarian results; on the contrary, it is

sometimes correlated with superordination and subordination. Nevertheless, it is really remarkable how quickly and thoroughly social eccentricity or deviation is usually overcome by the levelling action of uniformation. The omnipresent "average man" represents an inert mass against which the feeble blows of variates, gifted or otherwise, generally beat in vain. This of course is not always to be regretted; the brilliant but aberrant leader, "the striking personality," the person who is "so interesting," or the eccentric dilettante is not always right, as some restive and gullible souls seem to believe. There is such a thing as common sense; it is "sense" because it is "common." Oftentimes general social disorganization would result if the ecstatic spasms of innovators were not counteracted by the phlegmatic indifference of the conventional, unimaginative many. Those wedded to prosaic routine have their function just as do those who are maddened by monotony and therefore seek change at any cost. But, precisely because of this stabilizing function, uniformation may at times be very dangerous, inasmuch as plurality patterns ossified by excessive uniformation break instead of bending; a modicum of social change is necessary if complete isolation from all culture contact is not possible. Moreover, plurality patterns which are too uniform may be greatly handicapped in competing with more adaptable social structures.

CHAPTER XXVII

INTEGRATING PROCESSES: ORDINATION, SUPERORDINATION, AND SUBORDINATION

§1. THE INTERCONNECTION OF ORDINATION, SUPERORDINATION, AND SUBORDINATION

Every human being is enclosed in a network of group affiliations which may almost wholly determine his conduct. It is sometimes possible voluntarily to relinquish one or another of these affiliations, but such relinquishment almost always involves the establishment of new bonds. There are persons who abandon family, profession, class, nation, and even race, so far as is humanly possible; they are commonly referred to as "asocial" types who are "outcasts from society" (meaning thereby bourgeois society) and are classed as homeless men or women. Such persons, however, are never asocial in the sense of being utterly uninfluenced by associations with others; even if they become hermits or similar monads the effects of association persist, as we have seen in the chapter on solitariness and associativeness. By and large, it may be said that the most that can be done is to exchange one type of association for another. The asocial themselves form plurality patterns, as numerous studies of hobos, Gypsies, remittance men, and beachcombers testify. They avoid networks of social relations which they dislike, to which they are inadequate, or which too greatly limit their freedom, and seek out others that more closely correspond to their own attitudes. The most favorable outcome possible is that the new associations impose fewer restrictions of the type to which objection is taken. In most instances, however, even such relative freedom costs a great deal more than the inexperienced rebel foresees, and in the end he often realizes that his pseudo-liberty is purchased at too great a price. Why? Because he has jumped out of the frying pan into the fire; the old restrictions, irksome though they may be, are often mildness itself in contrast with the new restrictions imposed in other zones of life. Escape from galling marital bonds, for example, often leads to economic dependence that is even more trying. This of course is not a preachment to the effect that everyone should meekly accept his fate; it may sometimes be

far better to suffer the privations that go with freedom, perhaps illusory but the outcome of conscious choice, than to vegetate in the comfort of conventional bonds.

But after all, the sociologist is not directly interested in such pros and cons; for him the fact is sufficient that human beings are almost always occupants of some niche in the social order, and are bound to others in definite although widely varying ways. In other words, they are subject to "ordination"; this term is far more general than superordination or subordination, for it simply denotes the fact that persons are ordered, arranged, disposed, placed, located, or established in definite positions within a social system, *and it does not imply anything whatever about relative status*. This does not mean, however, that ordination is ever unaccompanied by superordination and subordination; whenever persons join or otherwise enter into a plurality pattern they almost invariably take their places in an implicit or explicit hierarchy, and must consciously or unconsciously accept the fact that there are ranks above and below them. It is precisely because of this latter circumstance that the concept of ordination is necessary. Superordination alone and subordination alone are virtually non-existent; any new group relationship almost always involves *both*, although in varying degree. The metaphor of a ladder provides a good illustration; at any given moment we all stand somewhere on the social ladder, and must accept the consequences of this ordination; we cannot all be on the same rung. Those immediately above and below us are in most instances the means by which we are geared into the general functioning of the plurality pattern and limited in our range of self-expression. A great deal of purely subjective discomfort or even suffering is due to the pressure thus exerted from both directions. A foreman, for example, may be quite out of sympathy with the speeding-up program upon which his superintendent insists, because it will be harmful to the workmen's health, but he is compelled to drive his subordinates in order to hold his position. The men in turn may "go over the head" of the foreman in a protest to the superintendent, who may make a scapegoat of the foreman if the men's resistance is so great that the program cannot be carried out. The humiliation suffered by the latter may be extreme, but he is caught between the upper and nether millstones and there is little that can be done about it without imperilling his economic security. Occasionally, however, such persons are filled with "ambition" by repeated humiliations, and exert every effort to climb higher in executive rank, in the hope that they will have fewer su-

periors and more subordinates and thus become more "independent." The fact is overlooked that those on the uppermost rungs of the ladder are oftentimes more heavily loaded with responsibility than those below them; pressure still persists. (As is almost inevitable when considering ordination, etc., the above remarks are also highly relevant to the previous discussion of domination and submission, but at this point we are chiefly interested in the consolidating effect upon the plurality pattern that hierarchical structure exercises.)

§2. SUB-PROCESSES OF ORDINATION, SUPERORDINATION, AND SUBORDINATION

The number of examples listed in the table is large, and space forbids comment on the general processes of ordination; they will merely be listed: *diffusing, federating, incorporating, classifying, co-opting, legitimating, granting license, limiting, naturalizing, providing with norms, becoming a member, rehabilitating, self-administrating, self-managing, treating in utilitarian fashion, subduing, subjecting, and centralizing.*

More attention can be paid to those sub-processes related to superordination and subordination. *Recognition* has thus been commented upon by Small:

"[A] . . . German word frequently in proletarian use is *Anerkennung*. It loses some of its force when we render it 'recognition,' because in America the latter term has narrow political associations. The root of the matter is the desire not to be socially discounted in accordance with any fictitious scale, but to be taken at full value. . . . It means assertion of right to have feelings respected and opinions weighed and judgments considered on their merits, instead of having them summarily quashed at the dictation of other men's interests."¹

This obviously involves a rise in the social scale, and hence recognition may be regarded as a form of superordination, although certain characteristics justify its being placed under socialization as well.

Pardoning and *granting amnesty* have already been mentioned in connection with uniformation, but they also imply re-instatement in citizenship, and hence involve re-subordination to certain types of state authority. *Hiring or employing* is in practically every instance bound up with subordination. *Discipline* might be dealt with at great length with reference to its effects upon personality and upon plurality patterns in which it is widely prevalent, but in the present context we can merely point out that it involves subordination to superior officers, officials, etc. *Inspecting* is one of the chief means which offi-

¹ A. W. Small, *General Sociology*, p. 459.

cers and others use to maintain control over their subordinates, and it is at the same time quite useful in heightening the efficiency of the latter, thus rendering them more useful to the plurality pattern. *Mutualizing* is a process which is cultivated by members of trade unions, co-operative societies, and similar bodies; it is the application of the principle of mutual aid, and is supposed to eliminate relations of domination and submission wherever practiced. It is mentioned here because, although it does not eliminate superordination and subordination, but at the most conceals such relationships, it nevertheless is frequently effective in rendering them less irksome.

The *whipping boy* represents a peculiar type of subordination; Small describes it thus:

"... the custom [was] long familiar in royal and noble families of having in the castle a scapegoat in the person of a boy of plebian birth and of equal age with the heir of the lordly house. The mission of the humbler boy was to endure corporal punishment in place of the privileged scion. The latter was held to be too good to suffer bodily for his own misdeeds, but was capable of committing rascalities enough to keep the skin of the human foil frequently smarting."^a

Small notes the analogy to the *scapegoat*; both terms may be used in a metaphorical sense to denote the practice of making a certain person or persons responsible for all unpleasant or damaging occurrences, even though wholly impersonal influences or other persons should bear the blame. The desire for revenge remains unappeased until someone has been made to suffer, although the most absurd rationalizations are necessary to justify his punishment. This process is quite frequent, and is apparently due to group efforts at integration; occurrences that threaten the unity of the group because of antagonisms they engender are cancelled by punishing that member of the group who is least likely to injure it by his resentment. Needless to say, whipping boys, scapegoats, and similar persons are usually if not always subordinate, and their subordination is continually increased, if that be possible, as time goes on.

Totemism is extremely important among preliterates as a system of ordination, superordination, and subordination; Goldenweiser has this to say about it:

"Totemism is one of the most widespread institutions of primitive society. It is found in North America in several wide-flung areas; as our knowledge of South America increases, totemism there seems to be almost equally common; it is encountered in Africa throughout the enormous area south of the Sahara

^a *Ibid.*, p. 460.

and north of the desert of Kalahari; in India we again discover it in numerous tribes, here in a crude, or perhaps, moribund form; in Australia totemism is practically universal, and it is found, in function or at least in traces, in several of the island clusters of Melanesia.

"An institution so general in primitive society, and in it alone, is evidently tied to it by bonds far from casual. An understanding of totemism seems imperative if primitive life and thought are to be understood.

"In his presidential address before Section H, Anthropology, of the *British Association for the Advancement of Science*, A. C. Haddon referred to totemism in the following terms: 'Totemism, as Dr. Frazer and I understand it in its fully developed condition, implies the division of a people into several totem kins (or, as they are usually termed, totem clans), each of which has one or sometimes more than one totem. The totem is usually a species of animal, sometimes a species of plant, occasionally a natural object or phenomenon, very rarely a manufactured object. . . . It is essentially connected with the matriarchal stage of culture (mother-right), though it passes over into the patriarchal stage (father-right). The totems are regarded as kinsfolk and protectors of the kinsmen, who respect them and abstain from killing and eating them. There is thus a recognition of mutual rights and obligations between the members of the kin and their totem. The totem is the crest or symbol of the kin.'

"Without endorsing this now somewhat antiquated statement, we may let it stand as a fairly accurate description of a common enough content of a totemic complex."³

Such a system is obviously much more effective in determining social organization than any single principle operating in modern society, and it therefore merits the closest attention of the sociologist.

Reciprocity is a concept which Oppenheimer has taken over from Lacombe and adapted for sociological purposes. It denotes a more or less tacit agreement among members of a group that some are entitled to standards and planes of living higher than those of others. Without such reciprocal agreement, says Oppenheimer, it is practically impossible to maintain any considerable degree of unity in large groups. Reciprocity therefore is a process of ordination that has well-marked superordinate and subordinate features.⁴

The *formation of corporations, trusts, mergers, etc.*, in industry, commerce, and finance involves the ordination and subordination of previously independent firms in a larger superordinate body, the interests of which are paramount. A great deal has been written about the legislative and financial aspects of this process, but sociologists have apparently paid no attention to it as a *sociological* process.

³ A. E. Goldenweiser, "Totemism," in *The Making of Man*, V. F. Calverton, ed. (1931). Cf. Howard Becker and David K. Bruner, "Some Aspects of Taboo and Totemism," *J. Soc. Psych.* III (February, 1932).

⁴ Franz Oppenheimer, *System der Soziologie*, I, pp. 259, 311, 1102, *et passim*. See also II and III, *passim*.

§3. SOCIAL STANDARDS

Among the other processes of ordination, superordination, and subordination the inconspicuous verb "standardizing" appears, but for all its lack of prominence it denotes one of the most important types of integrative process, as the following quotation shows:

"The doing or abstaining from something is believed to involve human welfare, so the group makes it binding upon all. The . . . conduct society thus puts its influence behind may be called *standard*. Standards are, perhaps, the most important social products. They are invisible and intangible, yet the quality of a society is more revealed in its standards than in anything else. The characterizing differences between medieval society and modern society, between Chinese society and American society, between aristocratic society and democratic society, may be read in the standards which these societies respectively uphold."⁵

This is not an over-estimate; a very large proportion of all interhuman behavior becomes more easily explicable when it is realized that almost all important action patterns are strongly influenced by examples, models, and norms; such standards bring about relative regularity, uniformity, and interdependence in activities that would otherwise be chaotic. (We have already noted that "standardizing" might with almost equal justification be listed under processes of uniformation [*Da*].) The sociologist who clearly comprehends the effect of standards possesses a valuable tool; indeed, we may even agree with such statements as the following: "Let the sociologist but know the standards of a people and he can infer the chief features of their social history."⁶

The term "standards," as Ross says, is in some respects a substitute for Sumner's *mores*. Such substitution seems desirable: first, because *mos*, the singular of *mores*, is quite unfamiliar and difficult to use; second, because both singular and plural forms have the disadvantage of requiring considerable explanation when introduced in non-technical discussion, whereas *standard* is readily intelligible. There is one danger in using *standard*, however, inasmuch as it implies conscious, rational principles or knowledge. Hence let it be emphasized that, as used here, the influence of standards does not mean the influence exercised by rational comprehension of prevailing conceptions of duty, rules of behavior, customs, or conventions alone. Such comprehension does undoubtedly sway conduct in many respects and must be included in any definition of *standard*, but even more im-

⁵ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, rev. ed., p. 406.

⁶ *Ibid.*

portant are personal or impersonal examples, models, and norms the effects of which evoke little or no conscious reflection. As Wellington put it: "Habit is not merely second nature; it is ten times nature." In other words, unconsciously accepted standards often-times influence behavior far more than do principles issuing from or accepted after rational deliberation. Indeed, many if not most principles are merely rationalizations of conduct which would be carried out in agreement with standards in the entire absence of explicitly formulated rules or maxims. Yet, although standards are probably most effective when the persons they influence are unconscious of that influence, there are many definitely phrased standards that command wide-spread obedience.

We must first of all distinguish the personal creators of standards from the standards themselves. This is extremely difficult, for standards may be created by quasi-impersonal agencies; they may not be attributable to any one person or group. A further difficulty is presented by the fact that persons may be both standards and creators of standards—how may we distinguish between the standards established by Jesus and the standard which he as a person represents? This is of course an extreme instance, but the same difficulty crops up again and again. The distinction, however, is not factitious, for there may also be other types of standard; a usable classification is: (1) persons; (2) objects (particularly economic goods); (3) modes of behavior.

To return for the moment to the agents that function in the creation of standards: we distinguished personal and impersonal varieties.

The first type is exemplified by persons who attempt to reform their contemporaries and posterity and who therefore set up standards. Such persons are founders of religions like Jesus, Buddha, Mohammed, and others; prophets like Amos, Isaiah, or Micah; saints like Francis of Assisi or Bernard of Clairvaux; apostles like Peter or Paul; reformers like Luther or Calvin; revivalists like Jonathan Edwards, the Wesleys, or Moody and Sankey. Occasionally philosophers and ethicists whose doctrines have directly practical implications—Schopenhauer and Emerson are examples—set up standards that are widely adopted; poets, novelists, journalists, and other writers may also function in this capacity.

As already noted, standards may also be created by impersonal agents; indeed, it is probable that the majority of standards cannot be attributed to any definite person or persons, but are the anonymous products of social interaction. Impersonal standards are usually more vague and fluid than are personal, but they are even more effective in

controlling behavior and opinion, inasmuch as they are passed on by tradition, come to be taken for granted, and are so thoroughly ingrained that action in agreement with them seems wholly voluntary and "natural" to most persons. Small and medium-sized groups are especially prone to symbolize their ideals in such standards. Each loyal member believes firmly in the utter perfection of the standards of his group, while at the same time he despises or misunderstands standards of groups differing but slightly from his own. College fraternities sometimes offer striking examples of this tendency. The impersonality of some standards is manifested in the use of the word "one" (see chap. xxxiii, §4): one dresses in a certain way, one has the opinions proper to a gentleman, one does not associate with obtrusive persons. Notions of honor, deep-seated aversions, and prejudices are impressed upon group members by the supreme standards.

Let us now turn our attention to the standards themselves; it will be recalled that they may be (1) persons, (2) objects, or (3) modes of behavior.

(1) Persons may be the embodiment of the standards they create and thus function as standards themselves; this point has already been dwelt upon. Persons may also embody a traditional ideal in such a way that they become that ideal, as it were, during their period of influence; Lord Chesterfield is an example. Persons may also be semi-imaginary and yet function as personal standards; the group projects certain desirable attributes upon a particular historical or contemporary personality, and thus creates a person in the image of its ideal who then reacts upon group standards: George Washington as the personification of truth-telling provides an obvious instance. Personal standards which combine the variations just noted with certain impersonal features may be found operative among fraternities, athletic teams, military bodies, militant trade unions, coteries of Bohemians, professional organizations, business clubs such as Rotary or Kiwanis, etc. All these groups have very definite ideas of the personality traits which should be possessed by loyal group members, and at any given time there is usually one person or a small inner circle that epitomizes the standard—a sort of walking image of the ideal.

(2) Standards may also be provided by objects, particularly by economic goods. The sacrosanct "American standard of living" primarily involves possession of certain material things such as radio, automobile, clothing of a particular style, and so on. These standards contribute to creature comfort, but they cannot be explained

on that ground only; neither can aesthetic or hygienic preferences alone be invoked to account for them. They are socially conditioned to the extent that those who do not conform are thought of either as "high-hat," "highbrow," financially handicapped, or a little queer. The pressure thus engendered is often intensified by astute salesmen or advertising men who ring all the changes possible on the theme.

(3) Rules of behavior, however, provide the most clear-cut examples of standards, and in many respects are strikingly similar to the taboos of preliterates. In any society there soon develops a code of etiquette and propriety, which of course varies as between social strata, but which nevertheless forms a more or less coherent system of social control. The prescribed behavior frequently lies in zones with which law or religion as such has little to do; much of it is of everyday character (but sometimes standards apply to relatively rare forms of behavior). In most instances such standards are wholly external. Persons conform regardless of their private opinions in order to avoid ostracism or censure. But to say that these standards are external does not mean that the inner lives of those conforming to them are not affected; the man who acquires the habit of dressing exactly as his associates think proper thereby almost inevitably acquires attitudes that determine his opinions in the most important affairs of life. Such considerations make plain how closely standards are related to uniformation as well as to ordination, superordination, and subordination; indeed, there are very few social processes, whether common-human or circumscribed, in which standards do not play an extremely important part.

So much for the modes in which standards may be expressed; let us now note the content they may have. In general, it may be said that their content is furnished in part by considerations of utility and expediency, and in part by non-rational factors. Ross thus describes the way in which external circumstances may determine standards:

"Newcomers to the range country become willing to hang horse thieves after experiencing the helplessness of being afoot in vast spaces. Hospitality becomes a sacred duty in a sparsely settled region because it is appreciated by both hosts and guests. Fearful of becoming fat, soft and effeminate, the Britons stationed in the tropics develop the standard that tennis or golf must be played in the late afternoon even when, as at Jiddah on the Red Sea, the golf course has to be laid out over the sand dunes. Among men of the sea, as a means of bringing home responsibility to captains, there has grown up the hard rule that the captain who loses his ship must go down with it or live an outcast."

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 510.

Sumner has noted the influence of economic and technical changes upon the content of standards:

"It is evident that the notion of obscenity is very modern. It is due to the modern development of the arts of life and the mode of life under steam and machinery. The cheapening and popularization of luxury have made houses larger, plumbing cheaper, and all the apparatus of careful living more accessible to all classes. The consequence is that all the operations and necessities of life can be carried on with greater privacy and more observation of conventional order and decorum. Then the usages and notions grow more strict and refined. It is only in poverty that exposures and collisions occur which violate decency and involve obscenity. Therefore the standards and codes of all classes have risen, and the care about dressing, bathing, and private functions, for the sexes and children, has been intensified."⁸

Changes in standards are especially evident when they are embodied in persons or in organized systems of behavior. The history of Western Europe shows a constant succession of standards; the ascetic is replaced by the knight, the knight by the officer, the officer by the financier. These are changes covering long historical periods; shorter cycles are also interesting and important, as the following description, written in the spring of 1931, shows:

"Everyone remembers, perhaps with a certain sense of pain, the baggy trousers, the collegiate semi-bohemianism, the tumble-down Fords, the gin-and-necking-party tradition of several years ago. That order is now renounced in all but certain tidewater and Midwestern institutions. The change is a welcome relief to both spectators and participants. But at the Big Three, the newer note is one of utmost conservatism in dress and public deportment. The Yale or Princeton student who wishes to make a mark dresses like a young banker on the Exchange—smartly, expensively, unostentatiously. He jumps into black suits and stiff collars on the slightest provocation."⁹

Another type of change is that undergone by standards when they have been developed by upper classes and are taken over by lower. They are oftentimes so altered in the process that they are almost unrecognizable, as for example when the "gentleman" becomes the "gent." A related type of change occurs when persons from the upper classes are forced into the lower as a result of economic reverses: in Germany during and after the inflation of 1922-3, for instance, there was a large number of middle class and even upper class persons who lost everything. They were thereby forced into the ranks of the proletariat, and some of them, feeling that they could never regain their former position, made efforts, sometimes tragi-

⁸ W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 451.

⁹ William Harlan Hale, "A Dirge for College Liberalism," *The New Republic*, LXVI, p. 858.

comic, sometimes heroic, to abandon their former standards and take over those of the proletariat.

§4. THE SOCIATIVE FUNCTION OF STANDARDS

The foregoing discussion naturally raises the question of the value of standards, and as in similar cases the sociologist replies that he can speak of value only when its implications are functional and not final. In many instances he will declare that even from a standpoint wholly within or immanent to a particular plurality pattern, certain of its standards are useless or harmful, just as he will point out that others are decided aids in preserving its unity and advantageous position with regard to other plurality patterns. Even if the sociologist steps outside his proper sphere and judges standards in terms of final value, he cannot denounce them altogether. Merely to label something a "taboo" or an "outworn tradition" is not a legitimate method of arriving at sound judgments. He must ask, for example, whether disobedience to a given standard will create more values than it destroys, whether freedom from restraint will bring with it more beauty, kindliness, and justice, or more violence, inhumanity, and ugliness. In other words, the functions of standards cannot be ignored even when final values are considered. Specific content is important only when it determines function.

CHAPTER XXVIII

INTEGRATING PROCESSES: SOCIALIZATION

§1. THE POWER OF SOCIALIZATION

The development of the we-feeling in associates, their growth in capacity and will to act together, and the establishment of ethical sanctions for this harmonious interaction have already been termed the socializing process. This process is extremely important; it is highly doubtful whether uniformation, ordination, superordination, subordination, and all their manifold sub-processes would in the long run be sufficient effectively to integrate a plurality pattern in the absence of genuine socialization. Further, the success of domination is sooner or later threatened if those who are compelled to submit do not acquire a belief in the moral justification of such domination, and do not more or less voluntarily participate in the consolidation of the plurality pattern in which they occupy the rank of subjects. The brutal fact of domination is replaced by the ethical injunction to submit: "the powers that be are ordained of God."

The concept of "ought" contributes tremendously to the integration of any plurality pattern, although it does not necessarily furnish the primary impetus toward integration. Feelings of sympathy, notions of interest, and external necessities are primary requisites; but given these, the we-feeling, brotherhood, and fellowship soon provide sanctions for the amalgamation or integration that is already under way. Co-operative enterprises facilitate socialization, but when once the latter is effected it may in turn greatly facilitate such enterprises. The circular effect thus produced oftentimes leads to the utmost degree of integration. (The discussion of the common-human process of amalgamation [chap. xv] is also relevant here.)

Nevertheless, the emotional components essential to socialization cannot be arbitrarily called forth by *any* type of organization. In many instances, artificial efforts to engender socialization are the very reasons why it does not develop; "good-will campaigns" sponsored by house-organs in factories, as well as some kinds of community organization and neighborhood revivification, afford instances. This of course does not mean that external factors are ineffective;

they frequently support and accelerate socializing tendencies. Among many preliterates, common ceremonial and periodically recurring joint activities bring about a degree of socialization that would otherwise be unattainable. Partaking of food together, festivals and games, dwelling under the same roof in men's and women's houses, mutual aid in fishing and hunting, and comradely help in battle all contribute greatly to socialization. In more complex cultures, explicitly formulated codes play no inconsiderable part in conditioning attitudes that make for socialized behavior. Religious principles, legal injunctions, and proverbial morality all help to impress the conviction that "we are all members one of another." As a result, the ceaseless friction and dissociation inseparable from interhuman behavior is at least partly mitigated by humanitarian beliefs that forbid using human beings as means to one's own selfish ends rather than as ends in themselves.

Historical investigation will show the devious paths that have been followed by the socializing process; counteracting tendencies have been so strong that its victories have almost always been indirect. What we now call social ethics is not the matter-of-fact, self-evident set of axioms many persons assume it to be, but is a highly composite product of intermingling streams of social and intellectual history. In some countries (but by no means in all) social ethics has largely replaced the older ethical and religious principles enjoining devotion to those of one's own group but saying relatively little about duties to those of other classes or cultures. This is in large measure the result of the network of communication that has been spun about the earth within the last few centuries; increasing knowledge of other peoples and the concomitant growth of objectivity, as well as the increasing number of secondary as opposed to primary contacts, have made it impossible longer to regard the relations of rich and poor, oppressor and oppressed, learned and ignorant, as strictly personal matters. Social ethics does not attempt to deal with persons apart from the class to which they belong, and regards the relations of classes as the primary ethical problem. Social ethics points out that patriarchal benevolence and private charity are destined to failure because the fundamental issue of social justice is thereby ignored.

Hence, discussion of this aspect of socialization involves discussion of class relations, and must be reserved for the systematics of plurality patterns. Indeed, some writers have taken the class aspect of socialization as the whole, and understand by socialization only programs for lessening the gap between classes, particularly between

the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, or for the practical realization of socialism. This is obviously too narrow a meaning; as we understand it here, socialization means the process by which ethically sanctioned intragroup and intergroup bonds are established.

§2. EXAMPLES OF SOCIALIZING PROCESSES

A few sub-processes of socialization should now be noted. *Establishing a home* has already been listed under the category of amalgamation. By "home" is not meant a merely transient dwelling-place, but rather a domicile that, so to speak, strikes roots in the soil. The establishment of such a home is closely linked with socialization; *patriotism* in the sense of love of native land (not of chauvinism) frequently grows out of the love of home, and is a further stage in socialization. *Humanizing* is a modern socializing process that is virtually inseparable from social ethics. *Mutualizing* is included here as well as in the sub-processes of ordination, etc., because its emphasis upon mutual aid is a socializing influence. *Sacrificing* oneself for a fellow-member cements group bonds so closely that an increase in socialization is the almost certain outcome. *Sharing mutually* or *distributing equally* among comrades is at once the proof and the means of intimate union. Other means of socialization should be more thoroughly investigated by students of social ethics and social politics; historical studies are perhaps the first step. For example, the medieval principle of *caritas* (which still influences Roman Catholic almsgiving), and philanthropy as it was enjoined by such moral philosophers as Lord Shaftesbury, would reward study. Modern movements of course should not be neglected: we may list *social amelioration* in the broadest sense, *welfare work*, *organized charity*, *workers' education*, *adult education*, *folk schools* (Denmark), *socialism*, *communism*, and similar *collectivistic systems*, and *the cultivation of values peculiar to a folk or people* (*Volkstum*).

CHAPTER XXIX

DESTRUCTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE PROCESSES: GENERAL ASPECTS

§1. SOCIOLOGICAL MEANING OF DESTRUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION

No greater error could be made than to assume that the introduction of the terms destruction and construction means the abandonment of the basic method of the present system and the substitution of a new dichotomy. On the contrary, the fundamental division into processes of integration and differentiation, which are but the circumscribed varieties of association and dissociation, is retained. (See chap. iii, §3, fig. 1, "Ramifications of Term 'Social Relations.'") Different terms are used only because they point to certain results of other processes. Our analysis of processes within and between plurality patterns (i.e., of circumscribed processes—chap. xxi, §1) would not be complete if we were content merely to show that the genesis of disparities, domination, submission, stratification, selection, and individuation on the one hand, and uniformation, ordination, superordination, subordination, and socialization on the other, continually interact. The sociologist must also make plain the fact that processes of dissociation may lead to the destruction of plurality patterns, and that processes of association may bring about the remodeling or upbuilding of deteriorated or partially destroyed social structures.

The only justification for doubting the usefulness of these divisions of our system seems to be the fact that they are not mutually exclusive. The constructive (remodelling and upbuilding) processes are subdivided into institutionalization, professionalization, and liberation, in addition to the general processes of social reconstruction as such. Now, it may well be asked whether the processes of integration already outlined may not contribute as much to the reconstruction of a deteriorated plurality pattern as do such processes as institutionalization and professionalization. Conversely, a logical question would be whether institutionalization and professionalization do not function as effectively in the integration of plurality patterns as do such processes as ordination and socialization. These queries are not only justified—they must also be answered in the affirmative. For example,

when a newly established state develops definite auxiliary institutions, it is much more closely integrated as a consequence; and when sharply defined professions come into being the processes of ordination, superordination, and subordination concomitantly appear and cement social bonds more firmly. Further, a group that is being slowly destroyed by the apathy and indifference of its members may be so revived by the principles of social ethics that this process of socialization must unquestionably be regarded as constructive.

Such considerations as these make it necessary to emphasize the fact that processes of integration cannot be wholly set apart from processes of construction. The latter are simply regarded as those special types of integration that produce new plurality patterns from old. Of course, all integrating processes are in some measure adapted to this end, and we merely select those which experience shows to be particularly adapted to the construction of new plurality patterns (which in most cases are more complex). Institutionalization and professionalization might be included with unification, etc., under the general head of integrative processes, but in view of the fact that they are frequently the most active agents in bringing forth complex plurality patterns from relatively simple structures, it seems best to place them under the head of constructive processes. Not only do they contribute to the increasing complexity of interhuman life (which we term "progress"), but in addition, institutionalization and professionalization are frequently the means by which deteriorating social structures are propped up and preserved long after they have outlived their usefulness.

Not all constructive processes, however, thus overlap with integrative processes that merely reconstitute, maintain, or consolidate existing structures. Liberation and genuine social reconstruction cannot be legitimately classified as other than strictly constructive processes, which means that this rubric would have to be retained even if it were judged desirable to place institutionalization and professionalization under the category of integration. Hence in spite of partial overlapping there is every warrant for distinguishing between integrative and constructive processes.

Where processes of destruction on the one hand and differentiation on the other are concerned, warrant for distinguishing between them is even more plainly manifest; for example, considerable emphasis has already been laid on the fact that detachment, isolation, and solitariness are not necessarily destructive. Nevertheless, it is clear that destructive processes are either processes of extreme differentia-

tion which are not sufficiently counteracted by integration (witness certain phenomena discussed in the section on individuation and population movement—chap. xxv, §2), or they are processes of integration so extreme that the vitalizing effects of differentiation are wholly checked. In either case, the plurality pattern thus exposed to unbalanced forces is completely or partially destroyed.

Destructive processes which represent one-sided differentiation or integration are: (1) exploitation, a type of relatively unhampered domination that endangers plurality patterns in which it is active; (2) favoritism and bribery, manifestations of excessive individuation; (3) formalism and ossification, instances of over-accentuated uniformity; (4) commercialization, an example of "pathological" selection; and (5) radicalization, a late stage of hyper-individuation or perfervid socialization. (Here we might also include amoralization, demoralization, segmentation, and margination—specific personality changes produced in and through extreme individuation—but these have been dwelt upon in the section on individuation and population movement. Moreover, their destructive action is not so well marked as their differentiative.)

Let it be noted that use of such words as "excessive," "dangerous," or "pathological" does not mean the introduction of sociologically extraneous value-judgments; they are used merely to avoid cumbrous circumlocutions. To quote from a previous statement covering this same point:

... the sociologist always proceeds on the basis of the fiction that the plurality pattern concerned should be preserved, so that when he uses such words as "dangerous," "pathological," and "destructive" he means only that the processes in question tend to break down the plurality pattern under consideration. From the point of view of ethics or social philosophy, it may be a very good thing that this comes about, and conversely, it may be very unfortunate, but with this the sociologist as such has no concern. A criminal gang, a fanatical sect, or a predatory state are plurality patterns, and whatever makes their maintenance or development difficult we here term "obstructive," "harmful," "disruptive" or "troublesome"—*but* from the functional standpoint, not from the final (chap. xxvi, §3).

From this it is also plain that our primary interest, here as elsewhere, is not in the static aspect of plurality patterns but in the dynamic. It should also be plain that at this point the dynamic trends in which we are particularly interested are those associated with deterioration and reconstruction of plurality patterns, and in addition, with increase in their abstractness—as, for example, when a group is transformed into an abstract collectivity by means of institutionaliza-

tion and professionalization. At the risk of wearisome repetition, it seems necessary once more to point out that such increase in abstractness is not here viewed as "progress" in the customary sense of the latter term. The more abstract structures are not necessarily on a higher moral or ethical plane than are the more concrete varieties; a state is not "better" than a family merely because it is more abstract; a church is not necessarily infused with loftier religious principles for the mere reason that it is more abstract than the simple groupings of the first disciples. The sociologist has no way of determining the final values embodied in any plurality patterns, much less the relative position of these values; he must relinquish to the social philosopher the task of making such decisions. *This is in no sense a derogation of social philosophy, but merely a necessary division of labor.*

How little the concepts of destruction and construction have to do with ethical categories is also made plain by the fact that behavior judged morally bad need not necessarily destroy plurality patterns, and that conduct called praiseworthy may not contribute to their upbuilding. The sociologist cannot solve his problems simply by tabulating vices and virtues and then labelling the former destructive and the latter constructive; deterioration, reconstruction, and like phenomena are the results of *social* processes that have no direct relation to morals, ethics, or religion.

§2. DETERIORATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

These distinctions and qualifications made, certain concepts already mentioned but not discussed may now be considered. There are two of them, denoting respectively the most general aspects of destruction and construction.

Deterioration is the first; it points to a diminution of the unity, strength, and efficacy of a plurality pattern which when extreme leads to its total collapse. The characteristic signs of deterioration, and the respects in which it may be said that a plurality pattern deteriorates, will be noted below.

Reconstruction is the second; it denotes the development of a plurality pattern to a greater degree of complexity, differentiation, and superpersonal efficacy. Speaking in extremely general terms, it may be said that occasionally crowds go through a process of reconstruction that constitutes them groups, and that these in turn may undergo a similar process that shapes them into abstract collectivities. For example, a crowd of striking workmen may gradually fall into a definite

group pattern and become a union, a band of warriors and their entourage may become a state, a congregation of worshippers may become a church, a partnership may become a firm that outlives its founders, a group of students and their teachers may become an Academy or Lyceum, and so on. These three stages of crowd, group, and abstract collectivity are of course only the most general ideal-typical distinctions between plurality patterns; a collection of actual cases will seldom show any such clear-cut forms. Within each of the three main types there is a tremendous number of possibilities of reconstruction; in the present chapter it seems advisable to concentrate on the processes of reconstruction found among abstract collectivities, although some mention will be made of others.

If a rigid plan of exposition were followed in the present treatise, deterioration and reconstruction could not be considered until destructive and constructive processes had been dealt with in detail, but it seems advisable to discuss the general aspects of the problem before analyzing minutiae. The reader is merely asked to recall, when he finishes the chapter on liberation, that, as presented in the table, deterioration and reconstruction are next in order.

Reconstruction has already been defined as a remodelling process which results in "the development of a plurality pattern to a greater degree of complexity, differentiation, and superpersonal efficacy." To these criteria we may add: a greater degree of permanence, cohesion of members, and abstractness. Reconstruction, as already noted, is not here viewed as "progress" in the customary sense of that term; the more abstract structures are not necessarily on a higher moral or ethical plane than are the more concrete varieties.

But what is deterioration? It should not be equated with decadence; the latter term properly relates only to biological phenomena. Deterioration is strictly sociological; it denotes the process characterized by diminution in the unity, strength, and efficacy of the plurality pattern within which it occurs. In other words, it is a process of dissolution, of dissociation, as a result of which (1) groups previously subordinate to a plurality pattern assert their independence; or, when more advanced, (2) the component groups break up into crowds; or, when still more extreme, (3) the members of the plurality pattern become wholly isolated from each other. Deterioration begins when within a plurality pattern there is manifest more contradiction than agreement, more dissension than harmony, and more pulling at cross-purposes than co-operation.

Natural, extra-human factors, such as harmful change in climate

or exhaustion of soil fertility, may of course be responsible for deterioration, and it may also be induced by the invasion of human beings overwhelmingly powerful in numbers or technology. In its most characteristic forms, however, deterioration is brought about by internal rather than external destructive processes. This is especially true of the various processes of destruction discussed in the following chapters; they all prepare the ground for deterioration. But there are certain more general processes which provide some of the first indications of deterioration; these should now receive some comment, and general processes of reconstruction will also be noted.

§3. GENERAL PROCESSES OF DETERIORATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

Dissidence and apostasy have already received some attention as processes of individuation, but in the present context their more extreme forms only are relevant; when they exceed a certain limit determined by the configuration of the social structure involved, their disruptive effect is rapid. At the same time we must not lose sight of the fact that in many instances they eventually issue in reconstruction; dissenters and apostates often are vigorous builders of new plurality patterns more complex than the old.

Successful *demagogy* also leads to deterioration of social structures in which it is present; *mobocracy*, "the rule of the rabble," is an almost invariable accompaniment. *Excesses* of all sorts often usher in trends culminating in collapse. Hand in hand with such manifestations, *pauperization* and *proletarianization* often appear, bringing with them the complementary phenomena of *pleonexia*, that insatiable craving for wealth so vigorously denounced and so assiduously nourished by the Spartiates, and the conspicuous waste, vicarious expenditure, and pecuniary emulation to which Veblen has called the attention of the modern reader. Overt *class struggles* and *communism* are, in certain respects, symptoms of deterioration in any plurality pattern where they occur, although the precise extent and seriousness of such symptoms can be determined only by the sociology of economics—general sociology cannot study them exhaustively.

Some notice has already been paid to the more or less paradoxical fact that the same forces which destroy an old plurality pattern not infrequently culminate in its reconstruction. Dissidence and apostasy have already occupied our attention in this regard. *Revolution* will be mentioned, but in connection with liberation, a special process of construction, it should also be granted a place among the more general occurrences classifiable as reconstruction. *Activism* in the form made

famous by Sorel, as well as that identified with Eucken, deserves notice. The historical event known as the Renaissance shows how old forms may be so infused with new life that they are in all essentials regenerated; this points to a sociological process, not limited to any one historical period, which may be termed *renascence*.¹ Occasionally mere reforms and non-revolutionary social movements suffice to reconstruct plurality patterns, although this is much less frequent than is commonly supposed. The tremendous panorama conjured up in the mind's eye by such significant words as *colonization*, *imperialism*, *cosmopolitanism*, *modernism*, and *pacifism* cannot even be sketched here; its scope is too vast and our knowledge of details is paltry. General sociology can venture upon analysis of the problems thus raised only when the multifarious elementary enigmas for which we as yet possess no solutions have been at least partially deciphered. Let us turn to specific processes of destruction and construction; they offer less sweeping perspectives but more trustworthy data.

¹ Cf. Howard Becker, "Unrest, Culture Contact, and Release During the Middle Ages and the Renaissance," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly* (September, 1931).

CHAPTER XXX

DESTRUCTIVE PROCESSES: PRINCIPAL TYPES

§1. THE PRINCIPAL DESTRUCTIVE PROCESSES

In considering the principal processes grouped under the category of destruction, it is necessary first of all to point out why they are especially adapted to destroy plurality patterns. Exploitation is not only a circumscribed but also a common-human process closely related to many forms of contravention and conflict. Similarly, actions involving favoritism and bribery may sometimes be regarded as common-human processes affecting persons as persons rather than as members of particular plurality patterns. Formalism and ossification, to be sure, have relatively few common-human aspects, but at first glance it cannot readily be seen why they should be classed as destructive; many families, office organizations, and even commercial enterprises are formalized and ossified in considerable degree without thereby being destroyed; moreover, these processes do not seem to apply to the whole range of plurality patterns. Commercialization, radicalization, and perversion, however, are plainly operative in practically all forms of plurality patterns; many more examples than can be provided for some of the other destructive processes attest this fact.

Now, it must be plainly stated that in so far as exploitation, favoritism, bribery, formalism, and ossification are common-human processes, they do not concern us here; further, even as circumscribed processes they cannot be justifiably classed as destructive when they are not *frequently* destructive. They threaten the existence of plurality patterns only when they are extremely prevalent. Consequently, instead of labelling exploitation a destructive process, we might more properly state the case thus: destruction resulting from *excessive* exploitation. The same might be said of most of the other processes.

Again, the precise point at which such processes imperil the continuance of plurality patterns cannot be theoretically determined, because the intensity of the specific process and the structure of the plurality pattern concerned must be taken into account. The most that can be said is that continual increase in the relative amount of

exploitative and other destructive processes sooner or later leads to the collapse of plurality patterns.

The question may also be raised as to whether the group of processes included in the category of destruction have been properly chosen, i.e., whether they are better adapted than all others to undermine the various types of the group or such abstract collectivities as the state, and whether other processes might not be placed in the list as substitutes or supplements. Not until crowds, groups, and abstract collectivities have been discussed at length in the systematics of plurality patterns will it be possible adequately to justify the processes chosen, for it is necessary to have a thorough knowledge of the organization and functioning of any social structure before arriving at conclusions concerning those processes most dangerous to its continued existence. Even at this point, however, it may be said that groups and abstract collectivities (disregarding crowds for the time) cannot long endure if one contingent within the plurality pattern exploits the remainder, i.e., uses them merely as means to attain its own ends. True enough, it cannot be said that slave-holding peoples have failed to maintain themselves solely because of slavery, but careful study will show that as slavery becomes more prevalent within a given plurality pattern, inner growth is checked and deterioration is accelerated. Once more, there is no doubt whatever that a state, the administration of which is corrupted by favoritism and bribery, may last for some time, but one or more severe crises will soon show how completely these destructive processes have undermined it. The same might be said of ossification.

With the explicit warning that the following metaphor is metaphor only, it may be said that exploitation, favoritism and bribery, formalism and ossification, commercialization, radicalization, and perversion are the most prevalent "diseases" of the plurality pattern, and that they accordingly draw the interest of the sociologist just as cancer, tuberculosis, syphilis, diabetes, cardiac ailments, and so forth, interest the pathologist. Although neither pathologist nor sociologist is directly concerned with the cure of individual cases, the marked prevalence of the varieties listed above leads to theoretical concentration upon them. Further, although the pathologist may concentrate upon diseases that are interesting because rare, that fact does not warrant the inclusion of his specialty, however fascinating, in a course on general pathology; similarly, analysis of unusual plurality patterns reveals many unusual destructive processes, but they cannot justifiably be included in a treatise on general sociology.

For the very reason that the foregoing analogy leads us to think of more or less catastrophic social processes, however, this question arises: Why are such tremendous upheavals as war and revolution left out of the list of destructive processes? The answer is: first, that no analogy can be made "to go on all fours"; and second, that these occurrences are much too complex and must be resolved into their elements. They are sudden explosions which have been made possible only by the long-continued operation of the specific destructive processes listed in the table, and they cannot be understood if the sociologist commits the vulgar fallacy of ignoring necessary antecedents. Vitally necessary to sociological comprehension of war and revolution is adequate analysis of the obscure, gradual, but none the less effective social processes which eventually lead to such conditions that catastrophic disruption of plurality patterns thus affected is the inevitable sequel.

Two more points: first, there are certain activities which rapidly destroy the mental and physical health of human beings, but which may nevertheless affect the plurality patterns of which they are members little if at all, for, as already stated at length, plurality patterns are not organisms in any sense. Second and conversely, plurality patterns react to many destructive processes with great sensitiveness, whereas their members may thereby be little if at all endangered in mental or physical health. There are many wholly formalized and ossified pedants, many perpetual ultra-radicals, and many entirely commercialized persons who nevertheless live to a green old age, but any plurality pattern afflicted with an unduly large proportion of such members is soon confronted by serious difficulties.

§2. EXPLOITATION

It is to be hoped that the lengthy task of clearing the road of possible misinterpretations has been measurably successful. At any rate, we must now concentrate upon each of the chief destructive processes in turn.

Exploitation is the first to be considered. The definition of exploitation advanced by Ross is very useful, although somewhat too general: "to use others as means to one's own ends."¹

Its extreme generality is shown by his classification of the chief kinds of exploitation: (1) egotic; (2) religious; (3) sexual; and (4) economic. The first type is exemplified by the satisfaction some persons derive from the humiliation and oppression of others; for ex-

¹ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, rev. ed., p. 131.

ample, the Roman patrician rejoiced in the abject supplications of his clients, and such absolute monarchs as Louis XIV basked in the cringing adulation of their courtiers. Obviously this cannot be regarded primarily as exploitation; it is simply a manifestation of domination, even though there is a connection between the servility of the submissive and exploitation. The same over-generality is evident in religious and sexual exploitation as defined by Ross. In the present system the only acceptable definition is the one he gives for the economic variety: "making others work for you or taking for your use the fruits of their unrequited toil."²

Moreover, nothing but confusion can result if the means of exploitation are not distinguished from the ends. As soon as this distinction is introduced it becomes apparent that the four-fold classification given above does not really discriminate among four kinds of exploitation; it merely indicates means and ends. Let us first consider ends: one may make others work for him or take for his own use the fruits of their unrequited toil to the end or ends (1) that his vanity may be gratified; (2) that his particular deity may be glorified; (3) that his lust may be appeased; and above all, (4) that his store of material goods may be increased. (Note the close connection between exploitation and commercialization indicated by the fourth end.) *Second, when the means of exploitation are considered, these four heads, along with others, provide a convenient classification. A person may find others willing or force them to work for him or to yield him the fruits of their unrequited toil through the means of (1) their docility and dependence; (2) their religious faith; (3) their infatuation or love; or (4) their economic position.*

Partial agreement with Ross is therefore possible, inasmuch as we do not regard exploitation solely from the point of view which holds it to be nothing more than the unfair utilization of economic advantage, i.e., the skimming of surplus value or the "unearned increment." As we have seen, there may be religious, sexual, and personal starting-points of exploitation: a gullible church member may be exploited by a clergyman; an infatuated rich man by a mistress; and a trusting friend by a companion who seeks money or position rather than friendship. In other words, the *basis* for exploitation may be afforded by other than strictly economic factors. Exploitation itself, however, must always be defined as "making others *work* for you or taking for your own use the fruits of their unrequited *toil*." In contradistinction to Ross, we maintain that when conquerors force the worship

² *Ibid.*, p. 132.

of their gods upon the conquered, or when a man overpowers a woman for sexual purposes (rape), conflict in the form of violence, or domination and submission, rather than exploitation, are the processes primarily involved.

In the above definition of exploitation, it will be noted that work and toil are italicized. Now, this definition is entirely valid so long as the italicized words are not given too narrow an interpretation but on the contrary are given the very general meaning of "bearing the burdens consequent upon existence itself." Whenever one person forces another to do things for him which he should do for himself, exploitation is present. All modes of shifting responsibility, all parasitism, all leisure purchased at the cost of others falls in this category. Hence, it is possible to agree with Ross when he says: "In any sentimental personal relation the one who cares less can exploit the one who cares more." The concepts of work and toil must be extended far enough so that exploitation is not dealt with merely as a relationship between employer and employee. Marx, Engels, and their followers have given us some excellent descriptions and analyses of exploitation in the industrial world, but they have also spread the erroneous impression that exploitation never has other than an economic basis. This we emphatically deny, as the foregoing discussion indicates. Exploitation is not simply the result of a particular economic system, nor even of economic activity as such; it issues from many sources and is found wherever human beings associate. Always and everywhere are to be found persons who use others as tools without adequately compensating them in any way; such exploitation is not peculiar to the factory or the shop. It is possible to exploit one's wife, child, friend, or parent. Whenever we find those who readily submit to our dictation or who freely offer to serve us, a temptation to exploit them for our own purposes usually arises. In other words, most persons are inclined to exploit; almost everyone feels himself unduly burdened in some respect and tries to place part of his load upon the shoulders of others. Strong inner or outer checks must be operative if this inclination is to be withstood. The history of mankind, from the earliest days to the present, is entirely pervaded by the process of shifting burdens; the stronger (physically, mentally, or otherwise) manage to lighten their loads by piling the greater part of them upon the weaker.

This is true of common-human as well as of circumscribed relationships. For example, there are very few pairs in which one of the partners does not induce the other to carry out or refrain from some activity, although neither partner may be aware of the pressure exer-

cised to effect this result. The personal preference or advantage of the more active partner is almost always the source of the pressure. Further, even in such intimate relationships as those of parent and child, the more emotionally responsive and therefore emotionally dependent of the two is exploited by the cooler, more selfish partner.

Exploitation being thus frequent in relationships involving sympathetic bonds which might be presumed to bar it entirely, it is obvious that the danger of its entry is much greater where purely commercial or compulsory co-operation exists. In such instances, the checks upon the tendency to exploit are fewer and the disparities greater; the industrious are exploited by the shiftless, the responsible by the irresponsible, the straightforward by the deceitful.

From these and similar instances it becomes apparent that exploitation can scarcely be overcome in any way other than the establishment of parity in all essential respects—a condition that to say the least is “difficult” to effect. “Impossible” may not be too strong a word. The smallest disparity affords an opportunity for exploitation, and once this is perceived by the stronger person or plurality pattern, the temptation to utilize it is rarely withstood.

But is it not the function of law, with its majestic principle of *suum cuique* (to each his own), to prevent exploitation of every kind? Certainly. The sway of justice can mean nothing other than the barring of all activities that involve the unrequited use of others for selfish ends. Nevertheless, law can deal only with the grosser forms of exploitation; further, so many new forms are continually arising that the old and illegal is merely abandoned for the new and not yet illegal. Again, law is so closely bound up with the structure of the state and its subordinate plurality patterns that it must function in supporting the *status quo* even when the latter is characterized by much exploitation. Indeed, exploitation may be so interwoven with the social order that law is invoked to facilitate it.

Closely connected with the foregoing is the fact that exploitation may be at least partially disguised; those who practice exploitation assert its necessity, legality, indispensability, or benefit to all concerned. Every effort is made to conceal its real nature. In their colonies and mandates, Europeans often lay stress upon their rôles as “liberators” and “emissaries of a higher culture,” but usually their interest is purely commercial; they take advantage of the ignorance of the natives to extract from them goods and services worth many times what they pay. This of course is not confined to colonial lands; the more intelligent elements in the population often exploit the stupid

or mentally inert, and precisely because of their intelligence they realize the necessity of disguising their exploitation, particularly in places where they are too weak to do it openly. Disguised exploitation is especially prevalent in the field of modern business; when the shrewd merchant profits by the ignorance of those with whom he deals, his deception is usually clothed in irreproachable business garb; the exploited are made to feel, if possible, that they have received full value or that a favor has been done them. Social and national oppression and persecution, which are sometimes practiced for the purpose of exploitation, are almost always invested with the austere robes of moral necessity, or at the very least of political inevitability.

These and similar instances show that exploitation is not peculiar to that economic system commonly termed "capitalistic." The most that can be said of capitalism in relation to exploitation is that the relationships of entrepreneur and employee which it establishes *facilitate* exploitation; they do not render it inescapable. In any given case it is necessary to determine whether or not exploitation actually exists, what form it takes, whether or not it is disguised, and what means of disguise are used. Capitalistic exploitation can take place only where there is a real difference in the socially effective power possessed by the two parties to the labor contract—a difference of such a nature that the worker is forced by his economic necessities to submit to adverse conditions whereas the employer is free to reject or discharge workers with no disadvantage to himself. A survey of the historical data will show that this type of discrepancy in power was markedly evident during the nineteenth century, and in many countries where trade unions and similar organizations are weak it is still existent. There are some countries, however, where collective bargaining has given the employees the upper hand, and they utilize this advantage either at the expense of the employer or, as is more frequently the case, in combination with him at the expense of the consumer or the community at large.

All in all, it may be said that inasmuch as self-centered persons the whole world over exploit others whenever the opportunity offers, there are very few workers who are exempt from the temptation. A socialistic system may in actual practice evidence just as much exploitation as the present capitalistic régime.

This is not to say that differences in the ability to exploit do not exist. The tendency is to be found among all social classes, but some do not have the same talent for exploitation as do others. In those rare instances when the lower strata of the population become domi-

nant and therefore have the opportunity to exploit others, they are usually more forthright, awkward, and given to violent measures. In other words, they cannot disguise exploitation so easily as can those to whom it has become second nature through long training. The gentleman exploits gracefully, unobtrusively, but none the less relentlessly; the commoner newly come to power cannot refrain from brusque and offensive tactics. This is easily understandable; those who have long endured oppression and who therefore have been perpetually on the defensive may be expected to over-compensate by extreme aggression when the pressure is theirs to apply. In some instances, however, defensive attitudes are carried over, and as a consequence opportunities for exploitation are not fully utilized; it is often necessary to feel oneself superior before it is possible to squeeze the last drop from an underling. Moreover, mental mastery of the situation, a grasp of the chain of cause and effect, and a cool estimate of opposing forces are all necessary, and they come only from practice. Again, the deception peculiar to those fighting a losing battle is quite different from that practiced by those habituated to victory; hence, if the former underdog suddenly succeeds in getting uppermost, his subsequent maneuvers are usually vitiated by his persisting defensive attitudes. That is to say, his efforts to exploit will be less successful than if he were accustomed to utilize others for his own selfish purposes.

No error is more egregious, therefore, than the assumption that the comparative failure of the lower classes to practice extensive exploitation in those instances when they have had the opportunity to do so was due to their loftier idealism rather than to their comparative inability. Most persons and plurality patterns are on very much the same level so far as their moral qualities are concerned. Selfless, sympathetic, and helpful human beings are never in the majority anywhere, and are to be found in the higher as well as the lower strata. The misuse of power is a characteristic common to all social classes.

At the same time, it should be pointed out that those who struggle up the social ladder oftentimes retain memories of their poverty and suffering that influence their later motives in two different ways. First, the desire for revenge or for the unhampered gratification of selfish interests sometimes dominates behavior. Second, there can be no doubt but that the memory of past privations engenders in many persons the wish to make life easier for those who would otherwise be forced to endure similar hardships. Closely related to this is the indubitable fact that many workers cherish a profound longing to aid

in the creation of a classless social order free of all exploitation. But here value-judgments begin to intrude. Let us go no further than to say that those who hope to lessen or abolish exploitation should not trust too much to the good will of classes newly risen to power. Even though Ross may be over-pessimistic in saying that the will to exploit is directly proportional to the power to do so, it is advisable to reckon with the kernel of truth his statement contains.

This is shown by the ruthlessness of exploitation when practiced by plurality patterns. So long as they are not closely bound up with such structures, separate persons may be extremely desirous of exploiting others and yet be inhibited by opposing elements in their own personalities. Plurality patterns, however, may be said to be ready and willing to exploit in the degree that they are self-conscious and strong. As solidarity increases, the determination to utilize other plurality patterns, with or without their consent, also increases. This is partially due to the feelings of difference (differential affects—chap. xli, §§3 and 4) to which such solidarity gives rise. All exploitation is more direct, uncompromising, and persistent between the unlike than between the like. When feelings of essential similarity either do not arise or are stifled, scruples against exploitation are not to be found.

Hope for the lessening of exploitation can therefore be grounded only upon abolition of objective opportunities to exploit. Slavery, serfdom, villenage, absolute monarchy, and monopoly of the necessities of life have disappeared only as the power upon which they were based was shattered. But if ideologies fundamentally opposed to all forms of exploitation do not arise upon the ruins of the old power, there almost necessarily springs up a new citadel of exploitation, sometimes with a new occupant, sometimes with the old. Up to date the chief result has been the adoption of more and more complicated disguises; exploitation becomes difficult to trace and to explain, but is never wiped out. From this we may conclude that disguised exploitation has survived open exploitation in the past, survives it in the present, and will probably survive it in the future.

Mention of disguised exploitation at once leads to the question as to why disguise is so vitally necessary. One answer is that as soon as the exploited members of a plurality pattern realize the extent to which they are exploited, the existence of the plurality pattern is at once endangered. The exploited no longer identify their interests with the *status quo*, and consequently fail to exert themselves in its behalf. If thoroughly disillusioned, they may even engage in passive resist-

ance or actively seek to replace the old social order with a new one "closer to the heart's desire."

A few varieties of exploitation which Ross regards as typical may be adduced here: (1) offspring by parents—exemplified by child labor in industry, agriculture, and elsewhere; (2) women by men—illustrated by the arduous tasks imposed upon women in primitive cultures; (3) poor by rich—instanced by peonage and other forms of debt and wage slavery; (4) industrious by leisured—witness the fact that in almost all "co-operative" groups the real labor devolves upon a minority; (5) ignorant by intelligent—numerous cases are afforded by relations of European traders and preliterate; (6) unorganized by organized—the steady expropriation of Roman freemen by Roman senators interested in the *latifundia*, and the plundering of modern city dwellers by administrative cliques provide examples; (7) laity by priests—Brahman rapacity, Greek Orthodox cunning, Roman Catholic pressure in South America and elsewhere, Anglican, Lutheran and other Protestant prelacy—all attest this fact; (8) conquered by conquerors—history furnishes so many illustrations, from Sparta to Versailles, that comment is superfluous; (9) governed by rulers—the clutch of absolute monarchy, the crushing weight of imperialism, municipal misrule, and other forms of political exploitation provide instances.

In addition to this list of different types of exploitation, Ross has a series of so-called "laws" of exploitation: (1) The social elements differ in original disposition to exploit; (2) exploitation is more open, ruthless, and stubborn between the unlike than between the like; (3) an element is ready and whole-hearted in exploitation in the degree that it constitutes a self-conscious group; (4) exploiters never tire of exploitation; (5) foreign domination is likely to suppress intra-social exploitation; (6) outside control menaces the continuance of an exploitation; (7) masked exploitation outlasts open exploitation; (8) the favorite mask of an exploitation is a counter-service or return which falls far short of being an equivalent; (9) opportunities for masked exploitation multiply as social relations become involved and social interdependence more extended; (10) whatever equalizes social elements in respect to intelligence, courage, organization, discipline, or situation narrows the power of the one to exploit the other.

Needless to say, neither the list of types nor that of "laws" can be accepted as a series of completely proved hypotheses; on the contrary, far more problems are raised than are solved thereby. At the most, each separate statement may be considered a working hypothe-

sis needing verification, refutation, or qualification. The last word on exploitation has not yet been written; in fact, we are just beginning to realize how far-reaching and complex a phenomenon it is and how little we really know about it. Numerous monographic studies of specific types of exploitation are vitally necessary if our generalizations are to rank as more than stimulating suggestions.

§3. SOME EXAMPLES OF EXPLOITATION

The sub-processes given in the table merely provide a few illustrations of the principal process; many other possibilities exist, and some of them have already been noted.

Making a Cinderella of someone is a concrete bit of exploitation that occurs where contacts are primary; the family and similar intimate groups furnish fertile soil. *Duping* is not necessarily identical with exploitation, but the former is often preliminary to the latter. "*Sponging on*" relatives or friends is a form of parasitism that may also be exploitative. *Accumulation of wealth* has already been noted as a prolific source of exploitation. *Proletarianization* is also classified under uniformation and deterioration; its connection with exploitation is obviously bound up with all the problems discussed by socialists, communists, and apologists for capitalism, and there can be little doubt that it is a destructive process.

§4. FAVORITISM AND BRIBERY; FORMALISM AND OSSIFICATION

The preservation of an existing plurality pattern is primarily dependent upon the successful ordination of its members in agreement with the purposes of the plurality pattern and the objective means best adapted to achieve those purposes. Inasmuch as the group is compelled to struggle for its existence and to develop its competitive powers, it is necessary for every one of its specialized niches to be occupied by a person adequate to the post, and for every transaction between group functionaries and other persons to be for the best interests of the group. These basic requirements are nullified when friends, relatives, or those with special favors to offer are given preference. Such protection and privilege disrupts group relationships; similar disruption is produced by attempts to influence group functionaries by offering them various personal advantages in order to influence their official behavior. Favoritism on the one hand, bribery on the other—for what have they not been responsible!

Political history provides hundreds of examples showing how the granting of special privileges by dynasties, etc., has not only done

great damage to the economic life of the state, but has even led to the overthrow of the dynasty itself. But we need not restrict our observations to political history; not only states of every kind but also a multifarious array of other patterns in which concentration of power prevails are exposed to the same danger and collapse in the same way.

Bribery goes hand in hand with corruption, i.e., with the deliberate, direct subordination of public interest to private gain. Even the incipient protection and patronage engendered by *nepotism*, i.e., the unwarranted advancement of young relatives, greatly weakens the group or abstract collectivity. This type of favoritism is sometimes expressed in the phrase *influential connections*. There can be little doubt that no plurality pattern can function at its maximum efficiency if its leading positions are filled by incompetents whose sole recommendation is the "*pull*" of relatives.

In view of the destructive forces unleashed by favoritism and bribery, it may seem that the severest possible penalties should be imposed upon those who use public office for private benefit. At the same time, the over-impatient reformer must face the fact that the complete negation of private interest conjures up an evil perhaps as great: apathy, indifference. Too much trust should not be placed in the power of moral maxims. If every possibility of private advantage is eliminated and virtue is expected to provide its own reward in the consciousness of moral impeccability, the frequent result will be "less sin and less service." The average man is not linked to the existing social order by explicit moral codes only, but also by the correspondence of his private advantage to group welfare. If the Catonian moralist meets with too much success in his efforts to eliminate private interests from public life, he will find that a general official slackness ensues. Persons who were once useful public servants, in spite or because of occasional perquisites, remain in office but devote energy formerly applied in behalf of the public *and* themselves to "making side-money" for themselves only. This is not all: those more active in their own behalf (and often in behalf of the public as well) feel that they cannot live on glory, and hence abandon the service of the state for industry, commerce, and finance. They do this not only in the comparative certainty of being better paid, but also because private interests can be more freely pursued.

And so it is that efforts to veer away from the Scylla of favoritism expose the plurality pattern to the Charybdis of indifferentism; one danger is as grave as the other. But altogether apart from the difficulty of abolishing all traces of patronage, all plurality patterns are

threatened by ossification as they grow older, and indifferentism is only a specific form of ossification.

Hand in hand with this goes formalism; all groups and abstract collectivities that are permeated with tradition and have remained unchanged for a long period tend to lose the power of concentrating on essentials. Their functional utility in the life of the larger plurality pattern is lost sight of, and they are regarded as ends in themselves.

Social institutions (particularly in the precise meaning of the term, i.e., auxiliary or derivative social structures) rapidly become old; if they have existed for one or two generations without changing, in a world that is in constant flux, they soon lose the close connection with general social life that is so necessary if they are to function properly. The functionaries of derivative social institutions are peculiarly liable to a sort of mental immobility; consciousness of cultural lag only leads them to cling still more desperately to the rules and regulations passed on to them by tradition, and to seek salvation in the fulfillment of formal requirements that are almost entirely empty of content. The resulting ossification of the plurality pattern is manifested by phrase-worship and fulsome praise of the ideal of mere *correctness*.

Sedulous preservation of antiquated rules and disproportionate emphasis upon the trivial or irrelevant is occasionally the outcome of the stupidity and inertia of mediocre minds. They appear on the surface to fulfill their tasks conscientiously, but they are content to busy themselves with superficial details rather than eager to penetrate to essential matters. When they have literally followed the regulations laid down for them they believe they have done enough; they never trouble to check up on the effects of their actions. Ossification makes rapid progress; change is thought to be positively immoral as well as useless.

This is not to say that the fear of change sometimes expressed by responsible and well-informed persons is wholly unjustified. The remodelling of the complex apparatus of a plurality pattern is not at all easy; alteration at one point usually makes necessary numerous unforeseen modifications. To use the machine analogy: the various gears in the mechanism of a plurality pattern mesh closely, and a shift in any one makes a shift in others necessary if binding, friction, or stripping of gears are to be avoided. Sometimes the whole functioning of the mechanism is irreparably deranged because of an apparently insignificant change. The principle of *quieta non movere*, "let sleeping dogs lie," is quite understandable from this point of view;

men prefer to place their trust in the *vis medicatrix naturae*, to believe in the wisdom of "letting nature take its course," and therefore scorn the vendor of panaceas who proclaims his power to change the course of evolution along the lines of his fanciful schemes.

There is of course a tremendous difference between the wise man who perceives that it is sometimes better to do nothing than vainly to struggle for the unattainable, and the rigid conservative who defends everything that is old merely because it is old. The rabid radical confuses the cautious and intelligent opponent of over-rapid change with the reactionary. He is not willing to admit the truth of the contention that the remodelling of social apparatus requires in those who undertake it a great deal of elasticity, adaptability, and realistic insight. Whether and in what degree change is possible are decisions which should be left to those sufficiently informed to have opinions worthy of respect. To be sufficiently informed, a man should first of all be an expert in the particular field, and second, should be capable of transcending that field, of placing the processes and interests it encompasses in their proper perspective. The *mere* expert is of all persons most futile, for he lacks the vitally necessary sense of proportion. Those who vigorously struggle against institutional programs are often of great service, for most persons, unless compelled to reflection by the attacks of those who hate with revolutionary passion the institution concerned, think through the task ahead of them only when they first begin. Oftentimes the weaknesses pointed out by such antagonists can be repaired and the institution preserved.

Ossification can best be counteracted or warded off by granting a large place to youth in the functioning of the plurality pattern, for rigidity is in large measure a phenomenon of age, not only in the sense that it befalls plurality patterns loaded with ancient traditions more readily than those less freighted with the heritage of the past, but also in the literal sense of the physiological age of their members. "The rule of the old men" has been a baneful influence in the Western world, particularly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; gerontocracy and the havoc it works are not confined to preliterate. But youth in and of itself is not sufficient; talent and energy must be added if the last state of affairs is not to be worse than the first. Moreover, freedom for initiative must be granted; a spirited horse that is hobbled and haltered can win no races. In conjunction with all this, the spirit of genuine criticism and exactitude should be cultivated; the old must be carefully compared with its newer rivals;

decisions should be rendered on the basis of merit, not because of love of novelty or antiquity.

§5. RADICALIZATION

When the influence of youth, talent, initiative, and criticism is so extreme that the plurality pattern involved threatens to fall apart, we have a process the exact opposite of ossification; it may be termed radicalization. It is a destructive process, because in its most characteristic forms a fanatical belief in some one-sided principle dominates behavior, and every effort is strained toward the realization of this principle in total disregard of qualifying facts or tendencies.

Formalism and ossification are the illnesses that go with age, whereas radicalization is *par excellence* the disease of youth. When it takes possession, emotional exaltation and determination are believed capable of moving mountains. Evangelistic tactics are used; enthusiasm and unshakable conviction are thought of primary importance—doubt is damnable and knowledge unnecessary. Boredom or craving for sensation often plays a large part; new goals seem desirable merely because they are new, and the prolonged exertion required to reach them (if they can ever be reached) is blithely ignored. There is great contempt for cool calculation; promises are readily made and as readily forgotten; comparisons of the respective merits of old and new are seldom fairly made; and abolition of disagreeable conditions is believed more than sufficient to bring a new cosmos out of chaos.

Radicalization always leads to disillusionment. Disregard of the positive values which the existing order always incorporates, no matter how formalized it may be, and presumptuous underestimation of that experience, born of hard necessity, which is deposited in existing institutions, no matter how ossified they may be, sooner or later wreak their revenge. Such unbalanced attitudes can never issue in social harmony; the plurality patterns that grow out of radicalization soon collapse amid mutual recrimination and reproach. After all, the course of human affairs is not to be changed by mere faith, however intense. Ability, perseverance, objectivity, matter-of-fact concentration, and broad knowledge unswayed by rhetoric are the final arbiters.

The struggle of new against old and of old against new provides a rich field for sociological investigation. When new principles or practices opposed to the old order arise, the latter usually reacts in one of three different ways: the issue is evaded, a compromise is effected, or the new is suppressed. Rarely if ever does the old yield

to the new without a struggle; even though it faces the prospect with many qualms, its inherent inertia forces resistance. The new carries on its assault by arousing great hopes and expectations; it seeks to sway human desires by pointing to far-away fields that promise rich rewards. To this glamorous appeal the old order opposes its prestige; it points to present and past performance and speaks contemptuously of the "mere promises" of the would-be innovators. These in turn proclaim themselves as apostles of freedom, or seek to win prestige of their own by startling originality; the fascination which the mysterious and novel exercise upon many persons is utilized. As a counter-move, the guardians of the *status quo* call attention to their own dependability, solidity, and genuineness; they heap scorn upon "new-fangled" styles of thought and action and ridicule those who are beguiled by "fads." There can be little doubt that such scorn and ridicule are often warranted; on the other hand, the complacent acceptance of convention practiced by the *laudatores temporis acti*, by the proponents of "the good old days," is no less absurd.

A striking contrast between the formalism of traditional groups and the radicalism of a new movement is afforded by the old-line student "corporations" and the Youth Movement organizations found in German universities. A similar contrast is evident in schools of art; the perpetual secession of new "-isms" from conservative bodies that in an earlier day were thought extremely revolutionary is a familiar phenomenon.

§6. EXAMPLES OF FORMALISM AND OSSIFICATION AND OF RADICALIZATION

Sub-processes given in the table may now be noted.

Cameralism has been described at length in an excellent treatise by Small, but largely from the viewpoint of the sociology of politics and economics rather than of general sociology.⁸ For example, he says little of one of the most striking characteristics of cameralism, the absorption in detail, in "red tape," the formalized and ossified routine into which it soon lapses and which has given rise to the resigned remark that kingdoms may fall and states may pass away, but the bureaucrat is the same, world without end. . . . *Mechanization* is the first step toward ossification; activities once spontaneous, vital, and developing are subjected to rigid rules that soon render them mechanical. *Petty politics* soon drags the loftiest plans down to the level of the mediocre, and in the perpetual jockeying for trivial advantages

* A. W. Small, *The Cameralists*.

that results, major aims are treated in a wholly formal way. They become "ideals" which everybody mouths but nobody really serves.

Striking, practicing sabotage, and like actions are not necessarily bound up with radicalization, but in a great many instances the latter process is involved. Hiller's and Geiger's treatises⁴ give excellent analyses of the way in which one is associated with the other. *Rioting* and *mutiny* are also linked with radicalization in numerous cases; they are but the overt manifestations of a process of *revolutionizing* through which human beings are so emotionally stirred that a complete break with the existing order seems the indispensable prerequisite of "progress." *Chauvinism* and similar types of extreme nationalism represent another form of radicalization; salvation from real or imagined disadvantages is sought through assaults upon other peoples or states. It may at times be associated with enmity toward the existing order in one's own state, as evidenced by the Hitlerite movement in present-day Germany.

§7. COMMERCIALIZATION

Anyone at all familiar with economic activities as they are actually practiced feels almost overwhelmed by the mass of material and the multitude of problems connected with the study of commercialization as a destructive process. This feeling is justified, for, with the exception of its most general aspects, commercialization provides a substantial proportion of the object-matter of the sociology of economics, a special branch of general sociology. All the problems of so-called capitalism and socialism, and most of the basic questions of social politics, are closely related to commercialization. Volumes could obviously be written on these subjects; to many persons they are the supreme social problems of our time. From the standpoint of the present treatise, however, with its extremely general and at the same time fundamental type of analysis, the whole of the sociology of economics shrinks to one small section of a comprehensive system. This is a merit, not a defect; economic activity is not a simple process, as many orthodox economists assume, but is extremely complicated and cannot be adequately dealt with unless it is resolved into a number of much more general processes, some of them partially explicable as results of biological influences, others almost wholly dependent upon sociological factors.

By commercialization is meant the increasing subjection of inter-human relations to efforts at obtaining a greater degree of control over

⁴E. T. Hiller, *The Strike*; Theodor Geiger, *Die Masse und ihre Aktion*.

economic goods, i.e., over goods which, all things considered, are *relatively* scarce. At first glance, it may seem as though commercialization as thus described is a common-human rather than a circumscribed process, but closer investigation will show that genuine economic activity, and the subjection of interhuman relations to material considerations that frequently accompanies it, are possible only within the framework of a plurality pattern—unless one wishes to indulge in fanciful speculations about Robinson Crusoe.

The above statements must not be misconstrued; efforts to gain control over economic goods are necessary, and in normal plurality patterns have the rank of differentiating processes. Only the undue subjection of other interhuman relations to economic endeavor may be regarded as conducive to the destruction of the plurality pattern involved. When greed chokes off sympathy, fellow-feeling, and joy in work, and so sways those it controls that their attitudes and actions, both with regard to intimates and larger social circles, are distorted, we may speak of commercialization. In other words, it is simply the predominance of acquisitive tendencies to the relatively complete exclusion of mitigating motives.

Here again caution must be enjoined: production and exchange may, in many simple or even complex cultures, afford relatively legitimate and regular means of self-expression. The destructive tendencies of commercialization become markedly evident only when it invades extra-economic fields, i.e., when common-human relations such as love, comradeship, and marriage, or when activities such as education, art, and science, are subjected to considerations of material gain.

Some writers, notably Ross, speak of de-commercialization; they believe that it is possible to show a decline of "the profit motive" in the course of social development, and point to the cessation of bride purchase, of fees for divine favor, and of the bribery of officials as examples. It does not seem possible to agree with this in any thoroughgoing way; so-called de-commercialization is sometimes a mere shift in the sphere occupied by commercialization, and sometimes the result of perfected disguise.

§8. PERVERSION

If the broadest meaning possible were to be given the term "perversion," it might serve as a concept inclusive of all other destructive processes, for exploitation, radicalization, etc., owe their destructive power to their ability to alter the functioning of plurality patterns in such a way that they no longer serve their primary purposes; such

alteration might be termed perversion if it were not for the narrower meaning assigned it here. It seems best to distinguish between the conscious or unconscious effects of other social processes, and perversion in the strict sense; in the latter case only the conscious substitution of goals other than those proper to particular plurality patterns and their derivative institutions and functionaries is denoted. This should not be confused with the changes brought about by unforeseen consequences of apparently trivial actions; such consequences may entirely divert the plurality pattern from its original goal, but genuine perversion does not take place, inasmuch as only the intentional substitution of other goals falls under the latter head.

The objection may be raised that more or less objective perversion forced by situational necessities should also be included, but this belongs in such categories as the genesis of disparities, stratification, uniformation, ordination, and so on. Clearly recognizing that in empirical reality unmixed perversion is rarely if ever found, we still have every warrant for setting up an ideal-typical form in which conscious volition is the determining criterion.

But the further objection may be raised that the content of plurality patterns is perpetually changing while the old form persists—how then is it possible to speak of destruction? The possibility is afforded by the fact that a plurality pattern derives its significance or meaning from its conceptual core and the purposes for which it strives. Beyond any doubt, an association may endure for centuries in exactly the same external form; many legal forms of association demonstrate this fact. When, however, its subjectively intended meaning, i.e., the original intentions of the persons who first belonged to it, has been supplanted by entirely new objectives, the plurality pattern in the sociological sense has been destroyed, for wholly different types of human relationships make up its structure. For example, when a religious order originally dedicated to the contemplative adoration of God becomes an aggressive order devoted to furthering the political interests of the church, without change in name, legal form, or ossified tradition, it must be said that the process of perversion (no value-judgment implied) has destroyed the old plurality pattern, and that other processes have remodelled it to such an extent that it must be termed new.

§9. EXAMPLES OF PERVERSION

A few sub-processes of perversion listed in the table may now be noted: Members who become *renegade* often seek to pervert the pur-

poses of the plurality pattern they have left or intend to leave; ecclesiastical and political history affords numerous instances. Closely related to this is the behavior of *reactionary* members who, not daring to show their antagonism to a newly reorganized plurality pattern, secretly attempt to force it into old channels and thereby to destroy the meaning of the new structure. Perversion may also result when members *represent special interests* (a sub-process already discussed in other connections). Political parties may thereby become devices for economic distortion, and academic bodies supposedly devoted to intellectual affairs may deteriorate into conglomerations of "schools," election cliques, and jockeying coteries of blatant self-advertisers. The sceptical attitude toward social purposes of all kinds, which results from insight into the forms of perversion just noted and others not listed, itself engenders, in many instances, the special type of perversion termed *nihilism*. Persons who are nihilistic put no faith in the genuineness of the devotion of others to common aims, and hence use the plurality pattern for their own ends. *Dilettantism* is a similar process; members who do not take a given plurality pattern seriously, or who lack the power to devote themselves to it, often play with it instead. Oriental tyrants, despots, and many absolute monarchs of the Occident used the states they ruled as playthings; in the same way, wealthy and influential persons sometimes use associations devoted to art, science, or charity for the gratification of passing whims or as social reflections of their "personalities." There is here no conscious intention to destroy, but there is a conscious substitution of goal that results in destruction; hence, perversion is the proper term to apply. There may of course be conscious *misuse* of associations such as those just named for the definite purpose of destroying them. The processes used to produce this effect are usually disguised, and occasionally what seems to be dilettantism is really misuse.

§10. ANTICIPATION AND SIMULATION

Such sub-processes as dilettantism and misuse lead us to consider at length two closely related varieties which Ross has termed anticipation and simulation. He groups them along with several others under the head of "sociological principles," but there is no good reason for separating them from other social processes. Moreover, although they are extremely important they do not rank as principal social processes, and are here included with other sub-processes under the category of perversion.

Anticipation may be defined as the externally modified behavior of

persons dependent upon others which is undertaken in the hope of evoking favorable responses from those others. In addition to this direct definition the following statement may be useful:

"Any established and known policy, whether of government, of a corporate body, or of an individual, which affects people favorably or unfavorably according to their present conduct, will come to be anticipated, and will result in modifying behavior. Favorable action will call forth more of the conduct, condition, or type of character favored, while adverse action will tend to repress it."⁸

Simulation may be defined as the hypocritical endeavor of persons, who in any respect are socially inadequate, to achieve social recognition otherwise denied to them by conforming to an approved social type. Stated with a strong infiltration of value-judgment, it is "the tendency of the unworthy to simulate every type or trait which has won social approval, in order to steal prestige from it."⁹

In both anticipation and simulation we have to do with relations of the spurious type discussed in an earlier chapter (iii, §8). They were there considered from the common-human standpoint, but they here recur in the group of circumscribed processes because of their tendency to pervert and consequently to destroy plurality patterns.

There is another common-human relation to which anticipation and simulation are quite similar, namely, adjustment through mimicry. This has already been defined as "a process of adjustment to situation or environment by means of which possible enemies are to be deceived concerning the genuine nature of the adjuster; the effort is to appear as a person or social type who cannot or should not be persecuted, ostracized or otherwise disadvantaged" (chap. xiii, §3). The resemblance of this common-human process to the circumscribed processes now under discussion is obvious, but in the latter the tendency toward perversion is so strongly emphasized that there is every justification for dealing with them separately.

Let us now consider anticipation in detail. First of all, it must be distinguished from precaution; there are a great many measures, designed to avert harmful social processes, which are poles removed from any kind of perversion. On the contrary, precaution is one of the chief means of social teleosis, of planned action in the interests of the plurality pattern. The legislator, the statesman, the executive, the educator, and like functionaries must foresee the consequences of their actions, and must manage affairs so that harmful by-products are restricted to the irreducible minimum. The greater the ability of

⁸ E. A. Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 531.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 545.

the social technologist to foresee all the ramifications of the measures he initiates, the greater is his willingness to face the fact that some bad is always mixed with the good, the greater is his readiness to take necessary precautions, and the greater is his success. As current events abundantly demonstrate, the pitiful inadequacy of the crude ordering-and-forbidding method is largely due to narrow concentration upon one causal sequence and ignoring of all the rest; its exponents do not seem to know that every social action is like the throwing of a stone in the water—ripples do not spread along the desired path alone, but in every direction (cf. chap. xlii, §1). The first step toward social wisdom is the abandonment of the ordering-and-forbidding technique and its replacement by the precautionary method.

Now, genuine anticipation is nothing other than behavior designed to render such precaution unavailing. Subordinates whose only care is the saving of their own skins anxiously attempt to anticipate precautions of their superiors which may render their positions precarious. Such schemers always "keep an ear to the ground," always try to find out "which way the wind blows," and then to comport themselves accordingly. As a result of this anticipation, precautions planned by their superiors may be made quite unavailing. For example, a foreman announces his intention of discharging the first person to spoil a piece of work, foreseeing that a certain careless and undesirable employee is almost certain to be eliminated as a result; the latter suspects the foreman's real purpose and secretly alters the adjustment of another worker's machine so that work is spoiled, thus forcing the foreman's hand and at least temporarily saving himself. Such anticipation is frequently evident in revolutionary periods; persons themselves suspected of reactionary plans, and hence in danger of execution, seek to forestall their fate by denouncing loyal members of the revolutionary régime with the double hope of temporarily saving themselves and eventually sapping the strength of the revolutionists. The *agent provocateur* also practices anticipation; foreseeing that a strike will ultimately take place and knowing that union leaders are planning for it, he goads them into calling it prematurely, thereby making failure almost certain.

The only defense against anticipation is counter-anticipation: foremen must take account of the fact that inferior workmen will strive to lay blame on others; revolutionary leaders must learn to suspect those who are over-zealous in denunciation; labor leaders must beware of the seemingly impetuous comrade who precipitates struggle in the interest of those who pay him. Similarly, statesmen, educators, and

others must not only foresee the objective difficulties their plans are likely to encounter, but must also forestall those who plan to thwart their purposes.

The task is rendered doubly difficult because much anticipation is only partially intentional; although we have set up conscious intention as a criterion of perversion and hence of its sub-process anticipation, it cannot be denied that the empirical reality differs vastly from the ideal type and that the social technologist must deal with the former. Moreover, it is possible to overdo counter-anticipation; it may be exceedingly harmful, particularly when directed not only against those immediately concerned but against others as well. Instance the fact that a judge may be inclined to be lenient so far as a particular criminal is concerned, but, because he fears that others might be "encouraged" by such leniency, the sentence is made severe in order to "set an example." Another illustration is afforded by the opposition to public clinics for the treatment of venereal diseases—opposition based on the fear that immorality will be encouraged. A similar example may be found in the once common outcry against the care of illegitimate children and their mothers; the persons most vehemently vocal about the iniquity of "officially sanctioning sin" were often quite considerate of individual cases, but in their efforts to "anticipate anticipation" for the sake of morality they stifled humanitarian impulses. A like instance is provided by those who oppose organized charity because of its supposed tendency to pauperize its clients; in the belief that they are warding off possible anticipation by refusing to contribute, they permit a great many persons to become pauperized by indiscriminate giving. In these and similar instances the merits of particular cases and the possibilities of special treatment are wholly neglected in the effort to anticipate the supposedly general type; the notion of "let your fate be a warning to others" is uppermost. No one familiar with modern methods in penology and social work upholds such antiquated forms of counter-anticipation, but they still play a large part.

Simulation, like anticipation, is a circumscribed process, but it too is closely similar to the common-human process of adjustment through mimicry, inasmuch as those who practice simulation mimic persons whose social position is favorable in order to acquire some of their influence. Parasitism, which has already been mentioned in connection with favoritism and deterioration, is closely linked with simulation: the religious hypocrite, the obsequious courtier, the impressively respectable salesman of shoddy goods, and like exponents of spurious

relations, belong in this group. The destructive nature of such behavior is evident; no plurality pattern can long survive if its inner strength is sapped by simulation. The fact that simulation is intentional justifies us in classifying it as perversion. The simulator consciously deceives others as to the ends he really has in view; Tartuffe took great pains to seem pious although he really aimed at the destruction of his host's family and fortune in order that he might aggrandize himself. A series of "maxims as to simulation" are given by Ross:

"1. The better the reputation the more eager is the simulation. Counterfeits cast no discredit on the genuine. 'Hypocrisy is a sort of homage that vice pays to virtue.'

"2. From the humbler classes proceed impostors in quest of gain; from the higher classes impostors in quest of respectability, dignity, reputation, honors, or public office.

"3. Frauds known and tolerated discredit the genuine, and if they are allowed to multiply will ruin whatever they have attached themselves to.

"4. The unmasking and casting out of hypocrites is a temporary embarrassment to the thing simulated, but an ultimate benefit.

"5. Endowments attract parasites as honey attracts flies; so that only great precautions in the way of visitation, investigation and publicity can prevent an endowment from becoming a nest of corruption.

"6. The more that honest labor is despised the more will men seek to live by means of simulation. Making work respectable lessens the resort to acquisitive mimicry.

"7. Services that, being *spiritual*, are not subject to test *should be underpaid*. Clergymen, missionaries, revivalists, writers of devotional literature, poets, prophets, agitators, leaders, inspirers and public men should receive rather less than their ability might command in other lines in order that these precious ministrations be not adulterated."

These "maxims" of course cannot be set forth as final conclusions; they must be regarded here as nothing more than working hypotheses in need of verification or refutation. Practically all of them must be split up into less comprehensive units before they can fulfill their function of guiding research. From the point of view of the present system, monographic study of separate sub-processes is vitally necessary, not only for anticipation and simulation but for all the other kinds of perversion here discussed.

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 549-50.

CHAPTER XXXI

CONSTRUCTIVE PROCESSES: PRINCIPAL TYPES

§1. THE PRINCIPAL CONSTRUCTIVE PROCESSES

The attention given to so-called vices in the foregoing discussion of destructive processes makes it necessary to insist that vices as such are not the sole agents in the destruction of plurality patterns, and moreover, that virtues, merely because they are virtues, are not necessarily constructive forces in groups and abstract collectivities. The character of a social structure is not identical with the character of the human beings who constitute it. Moral and ethical traits, no matter how widely distributed among the members of a group, cannot be predicated of the group itself. To speak in terms of value-judgment: plurality patterns represent a lower level in the hierarchy of values than do human beings; the bond that holds social structures together is not necessarily the same as the moral ties uniting separate persons with each other, and still less is it equivalent to those values responsible for what we term "noble personality." Further, there can be no greater mistake than to assume that plurality patterns comprising morally good persons are inherently more stable than those made up of the morally despicable, or the converse. Stability or its opposite is a result of the way in which plurality patterns are built; it is high time that we appreciated the fact that social architecture is entirely different from ethics and that it has a theory and practice all its own. This has been strikingly put:

"There are structures so badly constructed that they would fail even if manned by saints; while there are others so shrewdly put together that they would succeed even if manned by sinners."¹

History is full of examples attesting this, and Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees* should by this time have pointed them out to everyone. Organizations created by shrewd and far-sighted leaders carry the sources of their persistence within their structure and show great resistance to destructive forces, whether these issue from the ill-will, the stupidity, or the inertia of human beings.

Those who wish to ensure the unfailing transmission to posterity of

¹ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, 1st ed., p. 256.

social qualities that are judged desirable cannot rest content with the mere inculcation of habits that make for such qualities. It is also necessary to construct the plurality patterns in which these habits are to find expression in such a way that their members are able to strive toward the proper goals with the means best adapted to their attainment. A plurality pattern which is so organized that it derives full benefit from stabilizing traditions and that nevertheless is sufficiently flexible to meet changed conditions successfully possesses forces that are in a sense independent of the volitions of its members, just as a machine may be said to act in agreement with the plans of its designer rather than with the fluctuating moods of its operator. If on the other hand a plurality pattern is poorly constructed, or if the social processes occurring within it are not suited to its structure, its members can do relatively little to create healthy social life within its limits. Good intentions are of no avail; the plurality pattern must itself be sound or must be changed in such a way that its original soundness can be preserved. When due significance is attributed to the structure of plurality patterns, a great many "pathological" conditions become more easily understandable; instead of attempts to trace malfunctioning to particular personalities, chance occurrences, or external factors such as climate, it is often advisable to concentrate upon faulty structure and often possible to show that malfunctioning is primarily due to the latter. Many forms of family, state, church, and other plurality patterns will be seen to make malfunctioning almost inevitable; if they are to be preserved or if their members are to be socially adequate, remodelling and upbuilding processes must lend them new forms. This has been expressed in relation to mental health as follows:

"We have been discussing the healthy mind almost entirely from the negative point of view, i.e., as a mind which presents no definite symptoms of the sort ordinarily associated with one of the recognized mental disorders. Such concentration of effort is necessary because the presence of vast and pressing problems of mental ill health calls for the development of programs primarily designed along negative lines. At the same time, the whole report would present a warped and distorted picture of the promise of mental hygiene if it were to close without pointing out once more that mental health is not merely the absence of ill-health nor mere efficiency and contentment, but that it implies a degree of well-being in which the person is not preoccupied with unsatisfied tensions, does not manifest gross forms of socially inadequate or objectionable behavior, and maintains himself intellectually and emotionally in all environments and situations that do not bring about crises too intense or frequent to be beyond the adaptive power of human beings and that are not so rigid and over-authoritative that personality is inevitably warped. In other words, attention must again be called to the fact

that *successful adaptation to life implies a successful and well-adapted social order, and that positive mental health is but the personal aspect of a society in which personal and social values are in right relation to each other and are attainable by everyone within the limits of his inborn capacities.* The ultimate goal is a social order in which mental and social harmony is not only desirable but possible for all human beings, children or adults, male or female, without distinction of race, color, or creed."²

Three principal categories within which remodelling and upbuilding processes may be placed are: (1) institutionalization, a more or less external modification of structure; (2) professionalization, also predominantly external; and (3) liberation, a primarily internal type of process. These are considered in subsequent sections.

§2. INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Institutionalization is essential to the upbuilding of plurality patterns; they may be said to become more complex and abstract in the same degree as they become institutionalized. It is by no means easy, however, to say what an institution is; many current definitions either beg the question or evade it. Cooley's statement is an example of question-begging:

"An institution is simply a definite and established phase of the public mind, not different in its ultimate nature from public opinion, though often seeming, on account of its permanence, and the visible customs and symbols in which it is clothed, to have a somewhat distinct and independent existence."³

This simply shifts the difficulty of explanation from "institution" to "public mind" and "public opinion," both of which are notoriously vague and ambiguous concepts. Moreover, there are many institutions which are difficult if not impossible to explain as outcomes of "public mind" of any kind; the connection assumed by Cooley arises largely from specifically American conditions or, more exactly, American conceptions of social conditions. In many past and present cultures, it is much easier to explain so-called "public mind" as an outcome of social institutions rather than the reverse. Sumner is a bit more definite:

"An institution consists of a concept (idea, notion, doctrine, interest) and a structure. The structure is a framework, or apparatus, or perhaps only a number of functionaries set to co-operate in prescribed ways at a certain conjuncture.

² Howard Becker, "Closing Considerations," *Report of the Sub-Committee on Mental Health*, White House Conference on Child Health and Protection, 1930. Italics not in original. Cf. —, "The Meaning of Mental Health," *The Survey*, Aug. 15, 1931, and —, "A Practical Mental Health Program," *Psyche*, Oct., 1931.

³ C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, p. 313.

The structure holds the concept and furnishes instrumentalities for bringing it into the world of facts and action in a way to serve the interests of men in society."⁴

Now, the implicit assumption underlying this formulation is undoubtedly correct, namely, that an institution is a component part of the total structure of a plurality pattern, and that the specific social function of the institution determines its own structure. Nevertheless, the definition is unacceptable because the term "concept" postulates an altogether too clear-cut and rational basis for institutions; modern social psychology has demonstrated beyond cavil the non-rational or even unconscious characteristics of many if not most institutions. If, however, we take "concept" to mean only the function or purpose which the *investigator* ascribes to the institution as a result of careful analysis of the behavior of its members, the above definition provides a good point of departure. In studying any given institution, it is necessary (1) to determine its underlying "concept," i.e., its function or purpose, and (2) to discover by what means this "concept" is realized in the sphere of social action. Of course, the investigator must usually learn a great deal about the structure of the institution before he can draw any valid conclusions concerning its function.

From the point of view of the present system, an institution may be defined as a network of relatively continuous or permanent inter-human processes and relationships initiating and maintaining connections between persons and groups within a plurality pattern for the purpose of preserving the latter or otherwise serving its interests.

Institutions may be either *crescive* (Sumner) or *enacted*. When they are *crescive* they develop out of customs (folkways, usages, conventions, common habits, etc.) and standards (mores, *Sitten*, codes of honor, rules of propriety, etc.). Such customs and standards are much less specifically directed toward the service of the plurality pattern than is the institution which develops from them. When institutions are enacted, they are products of relatively rational invention and intention attributable to one or more functionaries of the plurality pattern they serve; laws in the broadest sense of the term may be regarded as the clearest examples of enacted institutions.

A custom or standard becomes an institution when it is vouchsafed a greater degree of permanence, binding force, and union with the plurality pattern. Such institutionalization takes place when the erstwhile custom or standard fulfills a determinable function within the plurality pattern. Inasmuch as any custom or standard is from one

⁴ W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, pp. 53-4.

point of view a network of human relationships, it is easy to see how the assumption of determinable function and the relative permanence thereby guaranteed shape it into an institution as above defined. Crescive institutions are, metaphorically speaking, "organic" outgrowths of customs and standards, and are usually more deeply rooted than enacted institutions. The latter are likely to endure only if they correspond to general social needs and the level of development attained by the plurality pattern—in other words, enacted institutions must function as if they were direct outgrowths of customs or standards, as if they merely made existing usages more explicit and definite. Any institution must form an integral part of the structure and life-process of the plurality pattern within which it functions, otherwise it is only a sham that does not contribute to the upbuilding of the plurality pattern. No matter how sweeping the legal fiat, institutions cannot be arbitrarily created; the greater number of enactments are still-births. It should also be noted that there are many customs that persist for a long time without taking over any determinable function that contributes to the upbuilding of the plurality pattern; the connection is relatively fortuitous and external. The use of force for the purpose of establishing enacted institutions is frequently fruitless, as the history of conquest shows. Only the most formal types of institution can be called into being by force, and for decades and centuries force is necessary to maintain them, whereas the more intimate relationships of the conquered group remain almost untouched by the enactments of the conqueror (if the latter is so foolish as to attempt their regulation). British India affords a striking example of this; the really vital activities of Indian life go on in virtual independence of British rule, and efforts to alter those activities invariably provoke determined and successful resistance.

It is also advisable to discriminate between regulative and operative institutions (following Ross' example). When they are regulative, a great deal of emphasis is placed on the norms which they incorporate; they are social moulds or channels within which the behavior of human beings "should" be confined, and in so far as they are effective, really *is* confined. Examples are furnished by marriage as an institution regulating the relationships of man and wife, the family as an institution regulating the relationships of parents and children, and property as an institution regulating control over economic goods. Further illustrations are afforded by ancestor-worship in China, the caste system in India, the blood-feud in Arabia, the duel among certain German students, and so on. Needless to say, not all customs

become regulative institutions; they are often characteristic but not necessarily obligatory, as is shown by the donning and doffing of straw hats on certain dates, attendance at Spanish bull-fights, announcement of engagements, and wearing of mourning. When institutions are primarily operative, they are expected to render a definite service to the plurality pattern *in their institutional capacities*; normative guidance of personal behavior is quite secondary. Specific activities carried out in a socially acceptable form and with relatively constant social support characterize operative institutions. Social settlements, legal aid societies, immigrant protective leagues, and like organizations fall under this head.

The factor of coercion must be considered in relation to regulative and operative institutions, for it provides a further means of distinguishing between them. Regulative institutions do not always make use of *legal* coercion, but they emphasize norms so strongly that social coercion in the interests of the plurality pattern is always present; operative institutions also serve the plurality pattern, but their coercive function is subordinated to considerations of welfare, mutual aid, co-operation, etc.

Both regulative and operative institutions may be distinguished from mere customs by virtue of the fact that institutions tend to function for the purpose of preserving or otherwise serving the interests of the plurality pattern within which they are found, whereas customs may have no demonstrable connection with its interests. Hence it is possible for a network of relationships to be an operative or even regulative institution from the point of view of a particular plurality pattern because it serves the latter's interests, whereas, from the standpoint of another plurality pattern, it may be only a custom. For example, the theatre is an institution that furthers the aesthetic interests of that large body of persons making up the aesthetic plurality pattern or patterns within a given country, but so far as the political plurality pattern or state of that country is concerned, the theatre is only a place where a custom is practiced, for it does not serve the ends of the state. Similarly, the duel is not an institution from the standpoint of the state, but in earlier periods it was an operative institution in many circles, and among the officers of Continental armies it was a regulative institution with an elaborate set of norms, regulations, and restrictions. Again, the smoking of tobacco was an operative and sometimes a regulative institution among certain American Indian tribes, whereas in the modern world it is only a custom.

Such distinctions between custom and institution are of course more or less arbitrary; customs frequently develop into institutions; moreover, institutions often become relatively independent plurality patterns. A sharp line separating one from the other cannot be empirically drawn, but so long as the above distinctions are granted no more than ideal-typical validity they may be heuristically valuable. A common basis for all three is provided by the fact that they all represent configurations of interhuman processes and relationships; the concept of relation comprises them all.

If the number of persons whose interests are served by particular customs is large, and if these persons are influential and active, institutionalization sooner or later takes place. The customs then become so closely interwoven with social life that they may eventually be regarded as its characteristic, regular, and even necessary components. This tendency is often accelerated by introducing more plan and system into the social order. Certain persons become functionaries of the developing institution, and may be granted special privileges as a consequence. The custom has thereby been incorporated in a stable social structure insuring relative continuity; interruptions and accidents are eliminated so far as possible, and institutionalization is complete.

Emphasis must be laid on the fact that the total structure of social life is so complicated and interdependent that the distinction between institution and plurality pattern is very difficult to make, especially when the plurality pattern is an abstract collectivity. It is easy enough to say that the distinguishing characteristic of an institution is its subordination to the purposes of a larger structure comprising numerous institutions, but in actual practice the line is hard to draw. Many social structures that from the standpoint of a larger and more complex plurality pattern may justifiably be regarded as institutions, and hence as mere parts of an all-encompassing whole, may also be viewed as independent plurality patterns when taken in isolation. For example, the family is an institution of the state, nevertheless it is not only older and more deeply rooted biologically, but is also a relatively independent collectivity, able to perpetuate itself without state aid. In other words, a plurality pattern may have institutional functions within a larger structure and at the same time exist in its own right. All institutions that function efficiently tend to become more or less independent plurality patterns serving their own ends as well as the interests of larger bodies such as the state or the church; at present, industry and the press, among others, manifest

this tendency. In spite of empirical difficulties in making distinctions, however, it seems advisable to retain the concepts of custom, institution, and plurality pattern as ideal-typical constructs; without their aid social phenomena would present only "a big booming buzzing confusion." Institutionalization is a constructive process, but like all processes of integration it is accompanied by complementary processes of differentiation. The danger of formalization and perversion is always present. A vital, plastic custom may become rigid and lifeless after institutionalization; an ornament, an amusement, or a recreation may become a regulative institution that is a scourge and a burden. The functionaries of the institution begin to play the master; blessings turn to curses. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that those who for any reason desire to render a plurality pattern more stable are well advised to institutionalize the customs that seem best adapted to cement social connections.

§3. EXAMPLES OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION

The material illustrative of the process of institutionalization is abundant, but only a very small proportion of its sub-processes can be noted here, and little or no comment is possible.

Institutionalization may be effected by *creating offices, establishing endowments or foundations, abrogating or setting aside customs opposed to institutional ends, recognizing seniority "rights," centralizing, decentralizing, defining and restricting powers, and conserving elements or tendencies useful to the plurality pattern*. The means by which institutionalization may be effected are exemplified by *appointment, christening, granting of titles, paying stipends or salaries, creating a police force, and putting community functions under national or municipal control*. Customs such as the *blood-feud* become tribal institutions that endure until other institutions displace them. In earlier periods, *ceremonial* was a very important means of institutionalization, as Spencer's discussion of ceremonial institutions plainly shows (in spite of its shortcomings in the light of present research). Standards are of course essential to most if not all upbuilding of plurality patterns; institutionalization and *standardization* are in many respects complementary. Many institutions adopt *symbols* in order to make it possible to conceive of them as self-existent entities. The influence of *taboo* has already been discussed in connection with domination and submission, but it is also an important means of institutionalization. Other sub-processes give some indication of the mental aspects of these remodelling and upbuilding processes. For ex-

ample, *dogmatizing* and *legalizing* are means of impressing the idea of the institution upon the mind of its members, thus lending it stability. The *inauguration of political methods of control* makes quasi-states of many plurality patterns that previously were more or less non-institutional. *Patriarchy* and *gerontocracy* institutionalize parental and filial connections along authoritarian lines. *Tradition* may be used as a basis upon which to erect institutional structures, but almost wholly rational bases are sometimes utilized. Regulative institutions may at times rest content with *enforcement of rules* and thus leave the inner lives of their members unaffected, but by *providing ritual, sacrificing*, and otherwise stressing features that make more than a merely external appeal, the church and similar bodies secure far-reaching regulation.

§4. PROFESSIONALIZATION AND ITS SUB-PROCESSES

Professionalization is closely related to institutionalization; the term denotes the growth and consolidation of professions that directly or indirectly serve the purpose of establishing greater solidarity within the plurality pattern encompassing them. Professions do not develop to any significant degree within groups as such; only abstract collectivities possess a sufficient degree of impersonality and permanence to permit real professionalization. Many writers speak of professionalization as if it were a form of the division of labor, but this is inaccurate, for the division of labor covers a much narrower range than does professionalization. Instance the fact that a group may have a fairly complex division of labor without possessing, as a group, *permanent* professions of any kind. By the same token, the peculiar set of intellectual and emotional characteristics commonly called "the professional mentality" is lacking; abstract collectivities are almost solely responsible for its appearance. The general meaning of professionalization indicated above includes three subsidiary aspects: (1) the process by which particular kinds of labor are consolidated into professions within a plurality pattern; (2) the development of a specific professional mentality which may counteract the destructive effects of commercialization; and (3) an over-emphasis on professional values at the cost of universal social and human values.

The first aspect of professionalization is tantamount to the processes of integration and concomitant differentiation responsible for much of the upbuilding of plurality patterns. The second makes clear that professionalization may be equivalent to the development of inner forces that prevent or repair destruction. The third lays stress upon

the fact that although extensive professionalization may be directly useful to a plurality pattern, it may also be indirectly harmful, since it endangers the personalities of the members involved.

Plurality patterns, particularly the state, often further by means of special social sanctions those professions supposedly beneficial to all concerned. During the Middle Ages and for some time thereafter such sanctions took the form of privilege and preferment; even at the present time certain professions are granted legal prerogatives, and others are also accorded social prestige that carries with it many material advantages. Clergymen, for instance, are usually given reduced rates on railroads, and educators are sometimes granted substantial discounts on merchandise. Further, the requirements for training in and admission to professions are often designed to select persons specially fitted to become members of an exclusive professional guild or class.

Although there can be very little doubt that crassly commercial or mercenary tendencies may be counteracted by proper professional spirit, it is also true that professionalization may generate attitudes that make for narrowness, contempt for the laity, and callous indifference. The professional man feels himself secure, and as a consequence sometimes loses capacity for fellow-feeling and understanding of universal human values. In other words, professionalization may be destructive as well as constructive when the specialization that accompanies it leads to ossification. An excess of professional spirit is almost always linked with extreme formalism, and this, as we have seen, is a destructive process.

The chief modern means of inducing erstwhile independent persons to serve the purposes of a plurality pattern is by *paying stipends or salaries*; the great danger is that they will thereby become mere tools, that they will be *instrumentalized*. New professions are continually developing; it is now possible to utilize all sorts of mental and physical advantages and even distortions and abnormalities by becoming a "professional" of one or another variety.

§5. LIBERATION AND ITS SUB-PROCESSES

By thus calling attention to the ossifying tendencies of professionalization, the question of liberation is raised—indeed, we speak of the "liberal professions." Someone may say, however, that liberation is not a sociological but an ethical concept, and hence cannot justifiably be dealt with here. It must be granted that liberation as tra-

ditionally interpreted is predominantly ethical in meaning, but a sociological interpretation of the term is entirely possible. It is nothing more than a process of abolishing associative restrictions, breaking bonds, severing ties, eliminating dependences, that are felt to hinder the fruitful development of oneself or of others. One of our fundamental processes, dissociation, is once more plainly manifest, but it is now operative within plurality patterns and is *preparatory* to the emergence of a more firmly consolidated type of collectivity. Liberation has some points in common with individuation, but inasmuch as the latter tends to disrupt plurality patterns without engendering new ones, it must be distinguished from the former. The discussion of liberation in the section on individuation and population movement (chap. xxv, §2) should be recalled in this connection. Social life passes from liberation to liberation. The larger and more firmly integrated the plurality pattern, the more it depends upon organization and regulation, and the more it attempts to compel conformity. The existing standards, laws, administration, police and military organizations, economic order, and morality are all supported by those members who in one or another respect are average, but these conformity-securing devices are secretly or openly disregarded by a great many persons and groups who deviate from the mass. Such deviates are perpetually endeavoring to resist the pressure of certain plurality patterns and to abolish the restrictions they feel to be hampering. The degree of success they achieve is wholly dependent upon the social power they possess; minorities are usually too weak to reach their ends, although at times even strong majorities fail. If the rebellious contingent seizes the right moment and remodels the dominating plurality pattern or patterns, liberation (in the subjective sense) has taken place. To the outside observer the leap may be from the frying pan into the fire, but so long as those who remodel the plurality patterns feel that liberation is thereby accomplished, the sociologist must classify the process in that category. Here again we see that the subjectively intended and not the objectively valid meaning (cf. chap. iii, §4) must determine our classification of social actions.

From the point of view of social philosophy or the philosophy of history, is it possible to arrange all the subjective acts of liberation history records in a great, steadily advancing series that may be clearly recognized as objective liberation, that progresses toward ever greater freedom? The question may well be asked—but the scientific

sociologist will not attempt to answer it. Indeed, he is likely to counter with the sceptical query, "What is freedom?"

Perhaps the most interesting chapter in the intellectual history of mankind is that which recounts the attempts men have made to free themselves and their fellows by constructing utopias in which, as they believe, all their hopes and ideals are to be fulfilled. In fact, from one point of view the two poles between which all social thought must oscillate are provided by the utopia on the one hand and the "topia" on the other. The first is non-existent, an "assurance of things hoped for, a conviction of things not seen," a mental picture of a perfect order, an ideological system ardently defended against all compromise. The second is existent in the here and now, the sum total of all the past and present provisions and arrangements in the social order that are recognized as authoritative and useful, the *status quo*. Utopia and topia are always in deadly combat; ideal perfection continually clashes with real imperfection—perhaps imperfect because real. And, just as the topia must always and everywhere be present if any ordered social life is to exist, so must the utopia be similarly immortal, for one is the necessary complement of the other. Few of us are willing or able to dispense with the vision of a more perfect world; we gain courage to struggle in the here and now by envisaging the nowhere and never. Some of us look forward for that vision, some look back, but almost no one wishes to banish it from view. Even though, with Heine, we know the ideal world for the dream it is, still we wait for the time when

Aus alten Märchen winkt es
Hervor mit weisser Hand;
Da singt es und da klingt es
Von einem Zauberland. . . .

The processes by which liberation is effected are often linked with sudden shifts in the power possessed by various strata in the social order; the tempo may be so rapid that the term *revolution* is applicable. Liberation is not solely a question of power nor of processes circumscribed by plurality patterns based upon power (such as the state and quasi-state). *Liberalism*, for example, attempted to apply its program of progressive liberation from onerous and socially unjustifiable restrictions to all spheres of social life, and not to the political alone; the goal was *humanization* (in the sense of an ennobling humanitarianism [*Menschlichkeit*]). *Anarchism* attempts to approach the ideal of absolute non-coercion as nearly as possible. The abroga-

tion of legal compulsion in particular is regarded as the immediate objective. Efforts at liberation are not by any means confined to self-liberation. Freedom for other persons or for lofty symbols believed to be degraded or profaned is often the supreme end of lovers of liberty. The idea of the *crusade* in the most general sense is engendered; a hammer of force is wielded in the hope of shattering social structures that perpetuate domination and submission. Byron's campaign for Greek freedom is one of the most striking examples, but a great many others are available.

From the purely sociological point of view, is it possible to appraise these various forms of liberation, to rank them in a general hierarchy of values? We have already seen that it is possible to identify liberation as a subjective phenomenon, but that objective identification is impossible without introducing non-sociological value-judgments. Even supposing that such value-judgments were sociologically permissible, it would still be necessary to determine which of the different objective forms of liberation were ethically or aesthetically superior, and this would necessitate the introduction of a fresh set of non-sociological criteria. Nevertheless, some sociologists have been bold enough to make the attempt; Ross, for example, finds the key by which to evaluate liberation in the principle of balance, of social equilibrium.

Now, it must be admitted that to many persons the establishment of equilibrium among the countless warring forces of social life seems an objective and necessary goal, and Ross can count upon a large measure of agreement. In spite of general approbation, however (in which the sociologist in his non-sociological capacities may join), there is no doubt that such a goal is political or legal rather than strictly sociological. It is perhaps possible to regard an act of liberation as objectively successful when it is responsible for a new equilibrium of social forces—but *why should equilibrium have supreme value?* One answer is as follows:

"Each class or profession is quite sure that, if only society would submit to its guidance, all would be well. Yet the truth is that no one element is wise enough to be followed blindly in all matters; not owing to its lack of ability, but to the *bias* to which it is subject by reason of its *esprit de corps* or its distinctive work and manner of life. In spite of itself its judgment becomes warped by its special psychology. When, however, the guidance of society is shared among the various qualified elements, their special habits of thought neutralize one another and the resultant is, on the whole, reasonable."⁸

* E. A. Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 573.

From this Ross deduces his "principle of balance": "In the guidance of society each social element should share according to the intelligence and public spirit of its members *and none should dominate.*"^a

This may all be true, but the value-judgments implicit in such statements make of them maxims of practical politics rather than conclusions of scientific sociology. Moreover, it is extremely doubtful, even from the point of view of practical politics, whether this principle of "checks and balances," well exemplified by the mutually obstructive functioning of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the United States government, can be regarded as the alpha and omega of political wisdom. Outside the political field the principle is still more doubtful, for in spite of qualifications it presupposes relative equality of intelligence and social usefulness that recent studies in differential psychology will hardly justify.

Let it again be repeated, therefore, that the sociologist as such cannot furnish criteria for the final evaluation of social phenomena; in the present instance the most that can be said is that empirical observation shows that the interaction of association and dissociation frequently calls into being a tendency toward equilibrium, but that the same forces that evoked it often shatter such equilibrium as soon as formed. Science does not speak in the imperative but in the declarative mood.

This concludes the systematics of action patterns. The reader should be reminded that, if a strict sequence were followed, the processes of deterioration and reconstruction would have to be discussed before concluding, but that for various reasons they have already been considered in the chapter on general aspects of destruction and construction (xxviii, §2). We now turn to the systematics of plurality patterns.

^a *Ibid.*, p. 585.

PART THREE

SYSTEMATICS OF PLURALITY PATTERNS

CHAPTER XXXII

THE NATURE OF PLURALITY PATTERNS

§1. METHOD FOLLOWED IN THE SYSTEMATICS OF PLURALITY PATTERNS

In the portion of the present work that has just been concluded, the attempt is made to analyze, causally and functionally, a large number of action patterns; the portion now beginning undertakes a similar task with regard to a wide range of plurality patterns. This latter part, however, is impossible of successful execution without the former, inasmuch as plurality patterns can be understood only when the action patterns (social processes and relationships) dominant in them have first been determined. Social processes and process-series are especially important, but relationships cannot be disregarded, for after all they are the end-products of social processes; a plurality of existing relationships so interwoven that a discernible pattern is formed may be termed a plurality pattern.

Plurality patterns can have no elements other than social relationships, for there are no others that can possibly enter into them. Such patterns are neuropsychic patterns (1) sometimes although not always present as images in consciousness, and (2) always manifest as verbal and other mutually understood gestures corresponding to certain relatively permanent states of social distance, subjective and/or objective. In their capacities as churches, states, classes, economic orders, artistic and scientific organizations, and so on, plurality patterns may and do comprise a great deal more than mere constellations describable in terms of relative social distance, but the sociologist is interested only in such constellations and the ways in which they are constituted by social processes of approach and avoidance, by association and dissociation. As we shall later see, he makes no attempt to place them in a hierarchy of values; a predatory gang and an altruistic brotherhood stand on the same *sociological* level. (In saying this, we do *not* assume that they are on the same final, ethical level, nor do we cast any aspersions on the efforts of social philosophers and others to establish a hierarchy of values in terms of which plurality patterns may be judged; we merely accept the limitations of science.)

The diagram here given (fig. 2) may make some of the above points more clear. The small shaded hexagons represent single human beings; they are grouped in dyads (pairs), triads, tetrads, pentads, hextads, etc. The type of constellation dominant in the diagram,




FIG. 2.—THE STRUCTURE OF PLURALITY PATTERNS

however, is that of the hextad, the group of six, and hence it is this type that gives rise to the pattern, the six-pointed star. It will be noted that this star appears in two forms, one small, the other large. The smaller is internal to the shaded hexagons, the human beings; the larger is external; but the smaller is, as it were, the introjection of the larger, whereas the larger is the projection of the smaller—they

are obverse and reverse, and one necessarily involves the other. The smaller is the neuropsychic pattern internally viewed; the larger is the neuropsychic pattern externally manifested. On the one hand are the images, feelings, etc., constituting the subjective aspects of the plurality pattern, and on the other are the verbal and other gestures constituting its objective aspects. (There are several other features of this diagram, but in the present context those we have noted are sufficient.)

This diagram may be misunderstood by some persons, and in order to avoid imputations of "naturalism" (a danger which has already been incurred by using metaphors cast in terms of atoms, molecules, crystals, and streams of energy—chap ii, §§4 and 5), it must again be stated that we do not regard "mechanistic" sociologies with favor; the behavior of human beings, in the last analysis, is something qualitative (chap. iii, §2). The diagram just given is a mere visualizing device, not a philosophic confession of faith. Further, it has nothing to do with Simmel's "social geometry" nor with his distinction between "form" and "content" of social behavior.

In the systematics of plurality patterns the task is therefore that of determining what kinds of social processes and their consequent relationships predominate in the various types of social structure. Accordingly, a schema of analysis applicable to all plurality patterns, specific or typical, must be used. The questions to be answered by the use of such a schema are:

What processes so predominate in the plurality pattern under consideration that its characteristic social traits thereby result?

To what extent are these processes of approach? Of avoidance?

How does it happen that the particular plurality pattern gives scope to the particular processes characteristic of it?

What symbols and standards correspond to these processes, and hence to the basic social nature of the plurality pattern?

How is the latter related to other plurality patterns?

By what processes are the relationships between such patterns built up?

Other questions calling attention to the composition of the plurality pattern, and consequently to its relation with what we may for brevity's sake call its components or elements, cannot be neglected.

For example, is it a combination of simpler plurality patterns?

Or is it a mere uncondensed, amorphous pattern, i.e., one that issues immediately and solely from the accumulation of recurrent inter-human relations and includes no simpler plurality patterns?

What are the possibilities of action vouchsafed the persons incorporated in the plurality patterns?

What temperamental attitudes or other parts of the native endowments (*N*) of the members are realized, repressed, or given no opportunity to develop?

In what situations are persons repeatedly placed because of membership in a particular pattern?

This last group of questions points to the fact that the discovery of the specific social processes responsible for the origin and maintenance of given plurality patterns is the task actually involved in the analysis of the latter. Inasmuch as every social process is a result of the joint action of attitude and situation, it is plain that there is a close connection between the behavior of the members of any given plurality pattern and the conditions imposed by the special characteristics of that pattern.

The chapters on crowds and groups contain numerous specific analyses designed to reveal the particular processes operative, but abstract collectivities are also dealt with in the same way, for otherwise they cannot be made intelligible.

The type of analysis practiced in the systematics of plurality patterns therefore involves the resolution of apparently homogeneous entities such as church and state into dynamic sequences of social actions, just as in the systematics of action patterns the apparently integral socius is resolved into an intersecting network of processes and relationships.

The procedure to be followed is therefore clear: such plurality patterns as mobs, choral societies, lodges, families, political parties, corporations, communistic sects, the Roman Empire, the Lutheran Church, and so on, are to be analyzed for the purpose of extracting those social processes most frequently recurrent in them and consequently most strongly conditioning each of the series of occurrences characteristic of the various patterns. The processes extracted must then be analyzed by the method set forth in the systematics of action patterns.

Causal analysis thus completed, it must then be complemented by functional analysis, i.e., by determining the part played by the given plurality pattern in the total process of sociation, and by classifying it accordingly.

§2. FRAME OF REFERENCE OF THE SYSTEMATICS OF PLURALITY PATTERNS

The task of functional analysis means that a system of classification must be built up that is based on certain fundamental concepts

of the present system, especially on that of *social distance* (chaps. ix, §4; xvii, §2) as manifested in different types of plurality pattern.

Consequently, the first requisite of such a frame of reference is that it incorporate the most general types of plurality pattern possible to distinguish. Above all else, these general types must be differentiated in agreement with criteria entirely distinct from the customary classification in which the *purpose* to be served by the social structure in question is the differentiating factor. As we have already seen, purpose is not the primary focus of strictly sociological investigation; the essential nature of the science of interhuman behavior lies in the fact that it does not base its distinctions upon purposes deriving from human volitions, as do the special sociologies (chaps. i, §3; xlvii, §3) of law, economics, politics, religion, etc., but rather upon differences in the prevailing interhuman relations. The prison, the sanitarium, the factory, the theatre, or the office interest the sociologist primarily from this point of view; purposes are secondary. The rubrics used in classification must therefore be framed otherwise than is customary or advisable in other social sciences. Even in those rubrics where a complete list of the plurality patterns subsumed under them is not given, especial attention will be paid to those types which provide the possibility of discussing a wide range of interhuman behavior.

In case criticism is evoked by the triple classification (already given in chap. iv, §4) of (1) crowds, (2) groups, and (3) abstract collectivities, it must not be forgotten that such criticism must take into account the fact that the division proposed is in strict agreement with the fundamental principles of systematic sociology as here represented, and that criticism, to be of any real value, must be directed toward fundamentals.

When once these are firmly grasped it is evident that only divisions based on differences in interhuman distance are relevant. To be sure, "differences in interhuman distances" perhaps over-simplifies the case; it might be better to say "plurality patterns characterized by extreme closeness of sociation, patterns woven of less intimate relationships, and patterns of the least degree of concreteness." The first statement is too simple because plurality patterns are usually so complex that one degree or type of distance will not adequately account for any of them; this inadequacy arises from the fact that the distance between the single human beings within the given plurality pattern is not the decisive point, but on the contrary, *the differentiating factor is the distance which in the neuropsychic organizations of members sepa-*

rates the plurality pattern from tangible human beings. In other words, the three chief types of plurality pattern are distinguished by their different degrees of abstractness.

Where crowds are concerned, no matter whether they are of the concrete or the abstract varieties, the social processes operative are so directly connected with the relationships arising from them that they immediately influence the behavior of the human beings who are constituted a crowd by such relationships, i.e., they produce crowd behavior, and such behavior closely corresponds to the temperamental attitudes, transformed in greater or less degree by social conditioning, dominating the participants. That is to say, the crowd is the least abstract, the closest to the human being, of all plurality patterns.

In contrast to crowds, groups (plurality patterns of the second power) are relatively independent of the mutable interaction of personal relationships by reason of the fact that they are so organized that they are able to impose a consistent type of behavior, in a certain sense impersonal, upon their members. Groups thus achieve a fairly high degree of abstractness.

The plurality patterns possessing the highest sociative power are abstract collectivities; these largely derive their power from ideologies imposed upon or adopted by their constituents, and these ideologies impart to the collectivities a superpersonal character which is therefore at the greatest possible extreme from concrete human beings. In the diagram (fig. 2) this ideological factor is symbolized by the dotted lines encompassing all the small hexagons and lending to them the appearance of an entity composed of three larger hexagons—that is, of an abstract collectivity composed of three groups which in turn are made up of dyads, triads, etc., and several monads. A still more powerful ideology—symbolized by the dot-and-dash lines—has the effect of producing a still greater superpersonal and supergroup character—symbolized by the all-inclusive large hexagon. For example, three craft unions, each a distinct abstract collectivity with its appropriate craft ideology, may be welded into a fighting unit of great power by the introduction of Marxian ideology, with its emphasis upon “one for all and all for one.” (Needless to say, such ideologies are also neuropsychic patterns, hence there is a certain inaccuracy in the diagram, for they should therefore be evident within the small hexagons. But after all, no analogy will go on all fours! It may be well to refer to the discussion of ideological plurality patterns [chap. xxxiii, §6] at this point.) Abstract collectivities, as a result of ideological influence, are regarded emotionally and intellectually as bear-

ers of enduring values which do not pass away with the human beings who cherish them. In brief, abstract collectivities are the most abstract forms of plurality patterns possible.

Generally speaking, it may be said that the three chief types of social structure just described are differentiated according to their duration and their degree of abstractness. Lest we be misunderstood, a word or two regarding the sense in which these terms are used is in order.

Duration does *not* mean that all crowds are necessarily short-lived, all groups long-lived, and all abstract collectivities quasi-eternal. There are groups which collapse more rapidly than *abstract* crowds (chaps. xxxv; xxvii), for the latter may under certain circumstances last a long time. Moreover, there have been states, churches, and other abstract collectivities that were veritable May-flies—one day, and they vanished. Nothing more is meant than that *concrete* crowds are by nature transitory, especially when they evoke strong emotions and form rapidly, and hence have a *tendency* either to disappear or to change into other patterns of relationships. Groups, on the contrary, are usually pervaded by an organization that offers the probability of comparatively long duration. Superpersonal plurality patterns, i.e., abstract collectivities, are on the contrary usually products of and participants in a course of development that extends over very long periods.

The word abstract is ambiguous, but in the present context it means only "great distance from the concrete human being." It is used in this sense in the systematics of action patterns: "The abstract collectivities seem, to those who think, feel, or desire them, to be superpersonal structures that are virtually independent of mere human beings" (chap. iv, §4). The way in which such abstraction becomes possible, the basis upon which it rests, and the effects which it exercises are discussed in the chapter dealing with abstract collectivities in general.

§3. PLURALITY PATTERNS AS UNITIES

Two difficulties inherent in this triple classification of plurality patterns must now be reckoned with:

(1) The degree in which they are emotionally and intellectually regarded as unities varies greatly. The plurality pattern is frequently extremely easy to conceive or even perceive as a unity; a relevant instance is afforded by a company of soldiers at drill. This, to be sure, is not an organism, but only a network of interhuman relationships

woven for a specific utilitarian purpose. The resulting web is nevertheless so close and so completely dominant over the volitions of the separate participants that for many purposes (although not for all) the company may be dealt with almost as if it possessed the unity of an organism. In contrast to this there are plurality patterns which are virtually invisible and without determinable limits. The neuropsychic bases (images, habits, etc.) of their unity are very tenuous; it is extremely difficult to think of or feel them as entities. The passive participants who are often called "members" of such tenuous plurality patterns often have not the slightest feeling or notion of their membership. The question then is: Are we really dealing with a plurality pattern? May it not be a mere series of social processes of which nothing more than sequential unity can be predicated? The line is difficult to draw and perpetually shifting.

(2) The triple classification should not be taken to mean that empirical patterns always and exclusively belong to only one of the three categories, for the available empirical specimens are quite frequently intermediate, and the term intermediate pattern will frequently be used to denote those examples which evidence characteristics of two or all three of the ideal types. (For the distinction between ideal-typical and empirical, see chap. ii, §2.) Moreover, many plurality patterns develop from crowds to groups and even to abstract collectivities: an accidentally assembled multitude may at times give rise to an organized group, and states (which are abstract collectivities) have as a matter of historical record developed from group-like aggregations. Not all plurality patterns, however, are intermediate or transitional: empirical concrete crowds may be found which are virtually identical with the crowd as an ideal type—the mob is an instance; there are groups which are remarkably similar to the ideal-typical group; and there is certainly no dearth of abstract collectivities closely approximating the abstract collectivity as a construct—the various ecclesiastical organizations at the height of their development are excellent examples.

Another point worth noting is that when development can be traced from the crowd to the group and thence to the abstract collectivity, the characteristics distinctive of the early stages can frequently be found in the later. It is an interesting and important task, for example, to trace in empirical groups the survival of crowd phenomena that have not been wholly eliminated. From the psycho-sociological angle, this is especially evident when the temperamental attitudes released

in the crowd remain manifest and offer obstacles to the increased planfulness and rationality of group behavior.

The foregoing considerations make it quite plain that in working out a theory of the group, for instance, we must be less concerned with delimiting once and for all the total range covered by every conceivable group than with determining the essentially group-like traits found in empirical plurality patterns of all kinds. Each empirical group is therefore to be carefully analyzed for the purpose of ascertaining how and in what degree it corresponds to the ideal-typical group set up as a standard of analysis; in addition to this, it should be inspected to see whether, as is often the case, vestiges of crowd characteristics still cling to it; and further, whether the similarly frequent tendency to become an abstract collectivity is discernible. These various stages are well exemplified by kinship or quasi-kinship groups such as totemic tribes, etc.; group characteristics usually predominate, but close investigation frequently reveals the less abstract traits of the relatively undifferentiated crowd, as Durkheim has shown, and there is also revealed in the activities of almost every vigorous tribe the tendency to become a state, if, indeed, that tendency is not already realized in some degree.

The upshot of these considerations seems to be that the precise degree of unity attributable to any empirical plurality pattern can be determined only after detailed analysis. Those interested in the related problem of "part" and "whole" are referred to the discussion of society and plurality patterns (chap. iv).

CHAPTER XXXIII

A SYSTEMATIC CLASSIFICATION OF PLURALITY PATTERNS

§1. CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES: GENERAL

A comprehensive conceptual schema is necessary if the multiplicity and diversity of plurality patterns is to be arranged in an intelligible system. Those who hold that the first duty of any science is that of bringing order and clearly articulated structure into the maze of empirical phenomena will also maintain, in all probability, that the investigator must not let himself be led astray by the temptations of his evaluating intellectual pride, that he must not deliver himself of pronouncements and value-judgments (if at all) before he has a clear view of the field. This much agreed upon, the present effort to work out categories and concepts may also find recognition. These intellectual tools must be forged in strictly sociological shapes; they must be adapted to dissect and recombine the phenomena of sociation. To be sure, the fact that the concept of pattern or structure is common to many fields of inquiry makes it also necessary to use in the systematics of plurality patterns certain purely formal concepts that play a large part in other sciences as well, e.g., whole and part, totality and generality, genus and species. Those categories, however, which merely express external accumulation and aggregation caused solely by processes of physical motion will seldom if ever be used. The strictly numerical has little to do with sociology except when numbers are indices or symbols of certain internal qualities. This indicative function is evident, for example, in the distinction between small, medium-sized, and large groups, for here the numerical differences are correlated with certain qualitative differences that are sociologically important. On the other hand, the concept of "multitude," although it has numerical implications, has little or no indicative value for sociology, although it may be of some use to the social psychologist. Such forms of the multitude as the subway crush or the sidewalk jam, for example, are not plurality patterns. Again, the closely related if not identical concept of throng (aggregate, agglomerate, conglomerate) does not point to genuinely interhuman relations, for mere numerical

magnitude as such is implied, whereas social relations, as we have seen, can never be entirely devoid of psychical components. A throng of persons going along the street who suddenly put up their umbrellas in response to the common stimulus of a shower act simultaneously but not concertedly or jointly; they do not constitute in any sociological sense a crowd or other plurality pattern, for no real relations exist.

There is, however, a fairly large number of categories which, inasmuch as they have their origin in the definitely social zone, are quite usable. They fall into two main classes: the strictly formal and the partially formal. The former indicate nothing specific in human behavior; the latter always have reference to more or less specific forms but do not refer to special purposes or ends as do categories bearing on content alone. The transition between the strictly and partially formal is indefinite: concepts such as union, institute, or group can be used in a very vague, general, and strictly formal way; however, they can also be given a narrower, more precise meaning, as is the case, for example, with the usage of the category group in the present system. Many American sociologists use the latter term to designate everything from the throng to the church, with the consequence that it is wholly formal and empty; it seems advisable to rescue it and restore its specific meaning.

Not that strictly formal concepts are unnecessary! On the contrary, we have great need of them precisely at this point of exposition; categories containing final formulations of the results of sociation are highly relevant. In addition to the concept of plurality pattern, the categories of social space and social sphere are necessary, and, like plurality pattern, both are characterized by the extreme indefiniteness of their limits and scope.

The concept of social space, however, is the more comprehensive of the two; it comprises what is commonly called "the social world," and has thus been defined by Sorokin:

"... social and geometrical space are quite different things. . . . In order to define social space positively, let us remind ourselves that geometrical space is usually thought of as a kind of 'universe' within which physical phenomena are located. The location in this universe is obtained through definition of the position of a thing in relation to other things chosen as 'the points of reference.' . . .

"In a similar way we may say that *social space is a kind of universe composed of the human population of the earth*. As far as there are no human beings, or there is only one human creature, there is no human social space or universe. . . . Accordingly, to find the position of a man or a social phenomenon in social

space means to define his or its relations to other men or other social phenomena chosen as the 'points of reference.' . . .

"An indication of a man's relation to other men gives something, but very little. . . . In place of it, social practice has already invented another method, which is more satisfactory and simple, and which reminds one somewhat of the system of co-ordinates used for the location of a thing in geometrical space. This method consists in: (1) the indication of a man's relations to specific groups, (2) the relation of these groups to each other within a population, and (3) the relation of this population to other populations included in the human universe. . . . Paraphrasing the old proverb, one may say: 'Tell me to what social groups you belong and what function you perform within each of those groups, and I will tell you what is your social position in the human universe, and who you are as a *socius*.' . . .

"To sum up: (1) social space is the universe of the human population; (2) man's social position is the totality of his relations toward all groups of a population, and, within each of them, toward its members; (3) location of a man's position in this social universe is obtained by ascertaining these relations; (4) the totality of such groups and the totality of the positions within each of them compose a system of social co-ordinates which permits us to define the social position of any man."¹

In spite of the extreme importance of social space, however, it is not in itself an object of sociological research; its proper place is among the indirect causes of social occurrences. Geometrical space is also of great importance to the sociologist, but is similarly indirect in its effect; its significance will receive due attention in the discussion of locality patterns (a term denoting, among other things, the so-called "natural areas" of the ecologists) to be given later. The concept of vicinal position, which combines certain aspects of both social and geometrical space, is also valuable, and has already been used with great success by Ratzel, Semple, and others. It has been called "ecological position," but there seems little reason for abandoning the older, more comprehensive, and yet less ambiguous term. Geometrical space finds a place in our general formula ($P = N \times E \times B \times [N \times E]_1$) along with other components of "the physical basis of society" under factor *B*, whereas social space may be included under *E* and *E*₁, and vicinal position under all three.

The concept of social sphere (*sozialer Kreis*) has already been used by Simmel; we speak (or used to speak) of "woman's sphere," meaning thereby a certain range of social actions and relationships beyond which she did not go. Included under this concept is the notion of social circle; we refer to "her circle of acquaintances, so well suited to woman's sphere." (Needless to say, these examples should not lead to the conclusion that the concept of social sphere is wholly feminine in

¹ Pitirim Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, pp. 4-6.

its application!) It denotes a region or zone of greater or lesser dimensions within the social universe—"greater or lesser dimensions" of course being measured in terms of social space. The social sphere, like social space in general, belongs among the indirect causes of social phenomena, and hence is not in itself an object of sociological interest for its own sake.

Certain other concepts of a general nature are quite common in scientific and popular parlance, and they are frequently used in a variable and uncertain way. The sociologist must endeavor to delimit them as sharply as possible, and in any event to use them unambiguously in the systematics of plurality patterns. Most of these terms have already been mentioned; they are: crowd, group (including: sub-group, union, combination, association), and abstract collectivity (including: corporate body, etc.). Inasmuch as crowd, group, and abstract collectivity are the three chief varieties of plurality pattern, their conceptual clarification must later receive special attention.

Among the corporate bodies may be placed the establishments and institutes. They receive their existence and form as the result of volitions external to themselves; in their cases human purpose and rational choice become more evident than in many if not most groups and abstract collectivities. In analyzing such corporate bodies, it is of less sociological use to lay bare the social processes involved than it is to make plain the human volitions which they manifest and embody. Because of the purposive or telic character of institutes, etc., it follows that they must usually be assigned a place in one or another of the various special sociologies (chap. xlvii, §3). Nevertheless, they project into certain portions of general, interhuman life, and therefore link general with special sociology.

Let it be noted that the concept of institute differs fundamentally from that of institution. An institution, as has already been pointed out in the systematics of action patterns (chap. xxxi, §2), is a network of certain interhuman relationships that is auxiliary to a more inclusive plurality pattern. Institutions may find their objective, symbolizable manifestations in establishments or institutes. For example, the scientific plurality pattern, which is an institution in some countries because it is forced into or voluntarily assumes the position of an auxiliary of the state, may be visibly embodied in a research institute for means of chemical warfare, or for population maintenance, or for the success of the Five-Year Plan.

A concept marginal to both statistics and sociology is that of

population. Whoever is inclined to study the problems raised by the quantitative proportions of natural phenomena to human beings and of human beings to each other would certainly feel the lack of such a concept if it were omitted from our schema. For our researches, however, population is only an auxiliary concept that properly has its chief place in neighboring sciences, namely, in statistics and its concomitant disciplines, such as sociography and demography.

The concept of the social type, exemplified by "the typical Babbitt," stands in a peculiar and yet close connection with that of plurality pattern. Human types and interhuman plurality patterns are frequently confused. In the case of the type, a special kind of abstraction has taken place; out of certain coinciding characteristics of many persons there gradually arises the mental image of a single person. This is what makes all the difference: whereas on the one hand the type is thought of as just one person, on the other the plurality pattern is thought of as a collective unity or entity. To take other examples: there is the type of the idler (or what amounts to the same thing, idlers), the conspirator, the parasite, the bureaucrat. Since the image or other representation of the type can be won only when a plural number of human beings resembling each other in specific ways is thought of, and since the plurality pattern also presupposes a plural number of human beings, the difference between type and plurality pattern is frequently obscured or neglected. The idlers, however, will rarely form an organized group or a state; conspirators, to be sure, will often be of sociological interest because of the special type of amalgamation manifested by the conspiratorial band; the inmates of asylums, etc., often have many features typical of the establishment or institute to which they are attached; and the bureaucracy stamps the bureaucrat, while in turn the type of person who becomes a bureaucrat stamps the bureaucracy. The systematics of plurality patterns must usually construct valid types in order to explain its object-matter; this is still more true of the systematics of action patterns. Why? Because all our analyses of interhuman behavior are directed toward discovery of the typical; human beings who carry out typical social actions are our chief interest.

The results of these considerations may be formulated thus: social types are not the primary concern of the systematics of plurality patterns, but in order to understand social structures of any kind the human type corresponding to the particular pattern in question must almost always be described.

§2. CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES: LESS GENERAL

There are certain sociological categories which contain judgments concerning the qualitative aspects of plurality patterns; more or less specific ideas concerning superior or inferior value or status exert a strong influence. The writers who use them are not always conscious of this influence, and at times they are not inclined to admit it, although it can easily be deduced from the use they make of the categories. Such writers desire to have their value-judgments and censorious opinions taken for the objective results of disinterested study.

It is not possible once and for all to assign particular terms to the value-judgment class, for frequently they are used to express such judgments in one place and in another are quite devoid of extra-scientific connotations. For present purposes, however, it is well to call attention to the possibility of their misuse.

The most important of all these concepts are those chosen by Tönnies as the fundamental categories of his system: community and society (both in a narrow, special sense—see chap. 1, §1). Tönnies himself has repeatedly requested his over-enthusiastic followers to refrain from the practice of proclaiming the superiority of community over society; he himself tries to use them without introducing value-judgments. In view of the persistence with which they are misused, however, it seems best to abandon them altogether and substitute, as we have already done in earlier chapters (xv, §3; xxv, §2), the phrases "isolated sacred structure" and "accessible secular structure." The categories themselves are of great value, and it would be a pity if sociologists refrained from using them because of the words now used; substitution is by far the lesser evil.

Another category with qualitative character, although not with explicit emphasis on value, is that of guild or fellowship (*Genossenschaft*). This concept does not denote quite the same thing in the different social sciences; it is used here in the entirely general sense of a unification which, although created through human volition in accordance with definite telic and rational purposes, at the same time brings about a closer personal association of the human beings concerned. This intimate association may be regarded either as a by-product or as the chief end of the fellowship.

League, compact, or covenant, as exemplified by "The Solemn League and Covenant" of the Scottish Presbyterians against Charles I and by similar confederations, is a category with similarly qualitative character.

In sociological usage, the concept of organism rarely occurs without an explicit or implicit emphasis on value. When a plurality pattern is called an organism, as for example in Barth's "mental organism,"² it is usually with the implication that in such an organism the connection of "whole" and "part" is more meaningful and of more lofty dignity than in other plurality patterns; the latter are accordingly slighted by calling them "mere mechanisms." In the present system the word organism is not used at all because it almost inevitably evokes confusion or disguised value-judgment. The concept of *organization*, on the contrary, cannot be dispensed with. In the systematics of action patterns this concept denoted the process of creating order and of dividing and integrating functions (chap. xv, §2). Here, in the systematics of plurality patterns, common usage will be followed to a certain extent, since the term organization will occasionally be used to denote, not only an action pattern, but also a plurality pattern in which functions are divided and which acts in harmony with this division of function. An organization, in other words, is a plurality pattern which is organized. Inasmuch as it is always objectionable to use the same term to denote a process and the result of that process, however, organization will here be used with great care and as seldom as possible. Above all else, it must be divorced from all notions of ultimate value.

Such terms as *élite*, *garde*, etc., are used to designate a higher quality of membership than is found in the rank and file. They always imply selection and social circulation upward ("social mobility toward the top").

Frequently it is important (1) *not* to emphasize a specific person, or (2) to place an indefinite totality in contrast to the separate person. The former purpose is served primarily by the pronoun "one" ("one does not do such things here"); the latter end is achieved by the use of such words as *people*, *everybody*, or the pronoun "they" ("people say—everybody says—they say she's no better than she should be"). A seemingly endless array of problems is raised when we think of the implications of those indefinite and yet profound words, "one" and "they."

A concept originating in the language of the theatre clearly marks the difference between totality and separate person: "ensemble." It designates the co-operation of a number of human beings, and this co-operation involves concerted movement.

It is often necessary to indicate that a smaller plurality pattern is

²Paul Barth, *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie*, 4th ed., pp. 105-36.

a component of a larger; for example, the word *stratum* is used in this sense. The term evokes the image of a vertically arranged structure, perhaps in the form of a pyramid or cone—in fact, the earlier discussion of stratification (chap. xxiv, §1) used the pyramid analogy. The several parts of the pyramid are of particular interest to the sociologist with regard to their vertical positions—their higher or lower levels. The fact that these levels are relative each to the other or others is especially responsible for our interest.

In addition, the tip of the pyramid, the leading or dominating *stratum*, attracts attention; in many instances it primarily characterizes or conditions the rest of the pyramid. To designate such a *stratum* the terms representative group, committee, directorate, board, etc., may be used.

§3. CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES: NUMERICAL

Finally, attention should be called to those terms which, although not strictly formal and hence not wholly empty of content, nevertheless verge on the strictly formal categories noted in §1 of this chapter. These magnitudes, which stress the merely numerical and quantitative, are not included among the strictly formal categories only because the terms designating them imply human or animal relations, or at the very least, vital processes. One may speak of a mass of stones, for example, just as one speaks of a mass of organisms, but the notion of a swarm of stones is certainly incongruous. Mass is strictly formal, whereas swarm is marginal, for it has some measure of content. Other marginal terms with numerical implications are flock, band, pack, and herd. There is of course a use of mass which is not formal, but has considerable content; however, it always occurs in the plural—"the masses." It denotes certain strata of the population, and is sometimes derogatory in its implications. We shall find a place for "the masses" in our discussion of the abstract crowd; it should not be confused with the strictly formal concept of mass. From what has already been said, it should be obvious that we do not use the term crowd in a formal sense; it always designates a specific kind of human association and not a mere numerical aggregate.

It is difficult to assign the proper place to the concepts of majority and minority. They are primarily expressions of a purely numerical relation, and they therefore belong among the other colorless terms here discussed. The social relationships between majority and minority, however, play an extremely important part in many plurality patterns, as the discussion of parliamentary opposition and of positive

and negative features of contravention in an earlier chapter shows (xix, §§4 and 5). The circumstance that these two categories taken in conjunction denote a proportion and not a mere summation makes them sociologically important. Majority and minority are not primarily or usually plurality patterns, but in certain situations they may become groups, and hence should receive attention for this reason as well.

§4. PLURALITY PATTERNS MAY BE PLACED IN SEVERAL DICHOTOMOUS CLASSIFICATIONS

The foregoing survey, which includes both the most general and the merely auxiliary concepts of the systematics of plurality patterns, has opened the way to the classification of these structures themselves. We have already referred several times to the triple classification which is preferred here: crowds, groups, and abstract collectivities. Before dealing extensively with this, however, it seems advisable to mention a few dichotomies which are important for many researches. Plurality patterns may be placed in several of these dichotomies; they may be classified as: (1) amorphous or organized; (2) transitory or relatively permanent; (3) bio-social or strictly social; (4) regulated or elective; (5) positive or negative.

(1) The amorphous plurality pattern must be distinguished from the organized. When a network of relationships between human beings and human groups has formed, it does not necessarily stiffen into a rigid structure immediately. Indeed, the network of relationships may and often does remain loose or unorganized; we then speak of an amorphous plurality pattern. Such patterns are usually if not always of the uncondensed variety; i.e., they issue immediately and solely from recurrent interhuman relations and include no simpler plurality patterns. Harms has termed them pliable structures (*Gefüge*), but we shall continue to use the adjective "amorphous," remembering that it also implies "uncondensed" as above defined. Such amorphous, uncondensed plurality patterns are partially crowds, partially types intermediate to crowds and groups, and are often transitional.

A plurality pattern is organized, on the other hand, when functions through which the purposes of the pattern (or, more properly but more wordily, "the purposes held in common by the members of the plurality pattern in their capacities as members of that pattern") are to be achieved are divided among its members, who may carry out those functions as separate persons or as groups of persons.

(2) The fact that the degree of temporal duration is a very essen-

tial characteristic of all plurality patterns should cause no surprise, for after all time is the most potent transformer of all things. What a difference, for example, is evident in the tenuous ties of a transient meeting and the bonds uniting a long series of generations in a church that many of its members conceive to be eternal! All superpersonal plurality patterns acquire their superpersonal characteristics as a result of their long duration; that which is dependent upon the course taken by the life of one or even several human beings cannot become superpersonal.

To be sure, the transition from temporary to lasting plurality patterns is not sharply marked. Whether or not a particular plurality pattern is to be regarded as temporary or lasting, moreover, also depends upon the length of time used as a standard. The difference between the two, however, is always important. When concrete crowds are discussed below, it will be seen that differences of duration, although not the only differentiating features, are the most frequent.

Special attention should be paid to a special variety of plurality pattern that in every instance is extremely transitory but rapidly recurrent; as a result of this recurrence, duration is constructed by a process of typification and abstraction. That is to say, the human mind constructs duration where it does not actually exist. At regular intervals situations arise which are virtually identical with or at least very similar to those earlier in the series, and the human behavior they engender is correspondingly similar. Everyday life frequently brings about such groupings: a common meal-time, for example, produces transitory but recurrent plurality patterns. More festive occasions may also give rise to similar groupings and their cyclical rhythm of contacts, processes, relationships, and plurality patterns. Dinners and banquets on stated occasions sponsored by such clubs as Rotary or Kiwanis provide examples. Further instances are afforded by the afternoon tea, the coffee-house mornings of Doctor Johnson's time, the annual employees' picnic, the Saturday night dance, and the Hallowe'en masquerade. In studying all such periodic occurrences it is essential to regard them as plurality patterns, and not as institutions, establishments, or processes, for they are networks of social relationships which regularly recur in a definite and predictable way.

(3) Quite as important as any of the foregoing, if not more so, is the distinction between bio-social and strictly social plurality patterns. (We might term them, respectively, "natural" and "artificial," if erroneous connotations were not thereby introduced.) In the former,

the close connection between biology and sociology becomes manifest, and cannot be ignored, as many "cultural sociologists" would like to have us do. The content and scope of our thinking would be greatly limited if sociology were restricted to the observation of plurality patterns constructed by human beings with more or less definite ends in view; a tremendous number of social actions are the result of vague urges that man has in common with other animals. Social life cannot be divorced from the general conditions of all life on earth; to repeat, "Man is organic to nature." The bio-social plurality patterns, as the compound adjective indicates, are not products of interhuman life alone; above and beyond this they have a physical basis.³ This basis is studied by the biological sciences primarily, but the social sciences, and particularly sociology, must give due heed to the results of such study. Examples of bio-social plurality patterns are afforded by the various forms of the family and its subordinate groups, and by larger kinship units such as the sib.

Let it be emphasized that "bio-social" does not mean "completely explicable by biology"; on the contrary, all such plurality patterns have a great number of social factors that condition them in vitally important ways. Mother and child, for example, are a predominantly biological group,⁴ but even this relationship is conditioned in numerous ways by the historical course followed by a series of social processes. This is still more true of the forms of human marriage, of the relations of father and child, and of the interconnections of siblings. The line between the bio-social and the strictly social cannot be sharply drawn, just as in the case of the natural and the social (cf. chap. ii, §1).

In spite of the difficulty of drawing the line, however, the distinction is none the less valid, and is of primary importance in the analysis of groups, as will later be seen. Even abstract collectivities, which at first glance may seem strictly social, must be analyzed with the object of discovering whether or not they have remote but basic biological sources; we shall later distinguish between bio-social and strictly social collectivities.

Among the bio-social plurality patterns we include: marital groups, families, parent-children groups, sibling groups, generation groups (especially children, youth, and the elders), the mother group, the men's house group and the women's house group (e.g., Polynesia), "the

³ Cf. Carl Kelsey, *The Physical Basis of Society*, 2nd ed., *passim*.

⁴ Cf. Robert Briffault, *The Mothers*, *passim*.

male sex," "the female sex," the sib or similar kinship group (clan, gentes, etc.), the totemic tribe, the race, etc. Further, even such strictly biological plurality patterns as symbiotic groups have a proper place in this classification, for purposes of analogy at least.

It was originally intended to devote two chapters to a detailed analysis of the bio-social plurality patterns; these would have rounded out the present system. The family and the folk ("the people"), in particular, should be discussed at length. This, however, would have necessitated a lengthy analysis of the connection of sociology with biology, and space is not available. Moreover, the voluminous literature covering these subjects should be surveyed, especially since much of it is quite recent. For these and other reasons, we have decided to omit the analysis of the bio-social plurality patterns, and to deal with them later in a separate treatise.⁵

(4) All strictly social plurality patterns are either regulated, elective, or mixtures of the two. Abstract collectivities, in particular, show a tendency toward mixture; regulated and elective features exist side by side. Regulated structures are created by an authoritative power in conformity with a norm, and thus derive their existence from an abstract collectivity or from the arbitrary act of a ruler. Elective structures, on the contrary, originate and maintain themselves without any initiative or support from "formal" sources external to themselves; they exist solely because of the "informal" desires of their participants—the state and the church, for example, have nothing to do with creating them. Nevertheless, it is evident that such authorities more or less directly influence elective plurality patterns; from time to time they prescribe limiting conditions and formal regulations. The essential elements of the behavior fundamentally responsible for such plurality patterns, however, does not in any way derive from super-ordinate sources; in particular, they are not "creations of legal authority." They are termed elective because of the relatively voluntary or elective decisions (these are not "free" decisions; cf. chap. xli, §1) leading to membership in them; the connotations of elective make it well adapted to contrast with regulated, as Goethe's great novel, *Elective Affiliations* (*Die Wahlverwandschaften*), so strongly emphasizes. Elective affiliations are in marked contrast to the ties imposed by kinship and by social and political sanctions.

(5) It is possible to characterize certain plurality patterns by concentrating on their negative aspects. The persons composing such negative structures act as if they were primarily conditioned by the

⁵ Leopold von Wiese is now (winter of 1931) gathering material for his forthcoming *Biosociologie*.

fact that they do *not* belong to a particular organization. For example, every college has its body of non-fraternity men or "barbs" in contrast to the fraternity men or "Greeks"; the former are a mere negative contrast to the latter in most instances. Such negative bodies are usually amorphous; organization is rare. Other examples are afforded by renegades, apostates, backsliders, and cads. It must be borne in mind that such essentially negative structures are seldom characterized by strongly marked patterning; they are in most cases mere uncondensed, amorphous accumulations of interhuman relations, and hence the term plurality pattern should be applied to them only when carefully qualified.

§5. LOCALITY PATTERNS ("NATURAL" AREAS, ETC.)

The connection between the social and the natural, as these terms are defined in the present system (chap. ii, §1), is especially manifest in what may be called locality patterns, i.e., plurality patterns primarily conditioned by locality. Like the bio-social plurality patterns already discussed, locality patterns might be designated by a hyphenated word indicating their special connection with the realm of nature, but instead of involving organic connotations the word should imply geographical location, vicinal position, time-cost distance, and similar factors. Hence the term "spatial-social plurality pattern" might be used, although for every practical purpose locality pattern is sufficiently indicative.

The notion of "natural" area has been extensively exploited by the sociologists of the Chicago school, but in this case "natural" connotes an elaborate biological analogy that makes use of ecological concepts such as dominance, invasion, and succession. As long as the merely analogical character of these concepts is kept in mind, there is no harm and much help to be had from their use, but in some cases at least they have proved quite as confusing as the old organic analogy, with its social cells, social connective tissue, and what not, and it therefore seems best to avoid them wherever possible. We shall merely call attention to the definition of "natural" areas for the purpose of emphasizing their spatial-social traits and hence their similarity to locality patterns:

"Plant ecologists have been accustomed to use the expression 'natural area' to refer to well-defined *spatial* units having their own peculiar characteristics. In human ecology the term 'natural area' is just as applicable to groupings according to selective and cultural characteristics. Land values are an important index to the *boundaries* of these local areas. *Streets, rivers, railroad proper-*

*ties, street-car lines, and other distinctive marks or barriers tend to serve as dividing lines between the natural areas within the city.*⁹

With all due recognition of the spatial factor (included under *B* in our general formula), however, it must be emphasized that sociology cannot make the interconnections of space and human behavior its *chief* problem of research, for it would then become nothing more than anthropo-geography. Indeed, the current enthusiasm for the concept of mobility among the less critical sociologists has led to a state of affairs in which sociology becomes virtually identical with an exceedingly superficial kind of anthropo-geography. At the same time, there can be no doubt that the interconnections of space and human behavior are of great sociological importance and that by studying them we can do much to clarify our knowledge of certain interhuman action patterns and plurality patterns. We must, however, take spatial facts simply as given, and must then use them for what they are worth without tracing them into the territory occupied by the geographer—"jack of all trades, master of none." Relations of neighborhood or of strangeness are obviously conditioned by spatial proximity or by remoteness, and just as obviously, the psychical factors involved cannot be wholly explained in spatial terms, although it is true that the intensity of contact is often directly proportional to the distance spanned. We may in general agree with Günther's statement, applying it to all spatial phenomena and not to boundaries alone: "The boundary is just as much a spatial datum with sociological effects as it is a sociological datum that takes a spatial form."⁷

The chief types of sociologically important locality patterns are: village, city, and region. There are also various derivative types that offer a wide range of problems—for example, the country estate or manor, the castle and its surrounding dwellings, the street, the province, the quarter (e.g., the ghetto, the suburb, the business district, and the area of second settlement). The different types of city are also important: there are residence cities, industrial cities, trading cities, seaports, summer resorts, and special forms such as the army post, the fortress city, the frontier or border city, and so on. Further, it should be recalled that the concepts of "isolated sacred structure" and "accessible secular structure" (chaps. xv, §3; xxv, §2) have many locality pattern components, particularly when vicinal isolation and vicinal accessibility are considered.

⁹ Louis Wirth, "A Bibliography of the Urban Community," in symposium, *The City*, Park and Burgess, editors, p. 188. Italics ours.

⁷ A. Günther "Soziologie des Grenzvolkes," *Jahrbuch für Soziologie*, III, p. 204.

§6. IDEOLOGICAL PLURALITY PATTERNS

A lively debate might be started on the question as to whether or not a realistic sociology should pay any attention to the presence of quasi-social plurality patterns based upon religious, mystical, or utopian fantasies. It does not seem advisable to include them among the actual object-matter of sociological investigation, but neither does it seem advisable entirely to ignore them; moreover, many abstract collectivities owe a large portion of their minor features and even of their basic structure to the influence of ideologies. This fact has been symbolized by the dotted and the dot-and-dash lines in the diagram already presented (chap. xxxi, §1, fig. 2), and will later be pointed out in detail. The church and the state are outstanding examples of this ideological influence. Quite often no clear line can be drawn between such abstract collectivities, so often shot through with dreams and visions, and strictly ideological plurality patterns. On the other hand, it is perhaps doubtful whether such notions as those of "the heavenly hosts" and "the legions of the damned" have any place in a sociological system focussing on the human beings of ordinary, mundane experience. Social, as the term is here used, can mean nothing more than *interhuman*. But even when we insist on this definition, the case for the consideration of such mythical collectivities can be defended, inasmuch as even visions and hallucinations that envisage angels, devils, and the whole pantheon of gods and demigods can be based only upon analogy with interhuman relations—that is to say, they can never be more than anthropomorphisms. By examining such imaginative creations a great deal can often be learned about the ideas of social relations cherished by their creators.

Products of religious fantasy are not the only ones eligible for inclusion among the ideological plurality patterns; all wholly imponderable networks of social relations, all nebulous figments devoid of the slightest distinct contour, belong, under certain circumstances, in this category. The human imagination has a strong tendency to construct ideal systems in the form of social plurality patterns and thus, in a sense, to give them substance. The mind organizes the available neuropsychic material, and in the process more or less clearly makes use of the model ready to hand in the surrounding social world. Systems of thought in which human beings form the central core grow into ideological plurality patterns, and an interesting result ensues: inasmuch as the social plurality patterns to which we ascribe reality exist only as neuropsychic structures (which have no independent

external existence), there is only a difference in degree, not in kind, between social and ideological plurality patterns. Indeed, we might even propound the paradox (a bit exaggerated, it must be confessed) that the "existing" state and church are ideological plurality patterns—but on the other hand, even Campanella's "City of the Sun" was a state! *The difference lies solely in the degree of effectiveness.* Mussolini's state has great influence upon the lives of millions; it is a social and, because of its effectiveness, *real* plurality pattern. Campanella's dream remained a dream; it did not directly issue in any regulations conditioning the behavior of human beings. (The essential meaning of a social plurality pattern, to be sure, is often more strongly evident in its ideological forerunner or counterpart than in the real, socially effective structure.)

Among the ideological plurality patterns may be reckoned the Hereafter, the Elysian fields, Valhalla, Heaven and Hell, the City of God or the Kingdom of God, the millennial kingdom and similar eschatologies, the heavenly hosts, the legions of the damned, and the communion of saints (it will be noted that many of these are locality patterns!). Further, all the communistic and other extra-religious utopias, even the Marxian "state of the future" (*Zukunftsstaat*), may be included.

§7. THE CHIEF CLASSIFICATION OF PLURALITY PATTERNS SHOULD HAVE THREE MAIN DIVISIONS

For the purposes of the present system, plurality patterns should be divided into three groups rather than two, for all simple dichotomies are easily transformed into ethical antitheses. These are often brilliantly conceived and expressed, but when our eyes are dazzled by brilliance a view of what really happens is difficult to obtain. The following statement from a previous chapter (iv, §2) may be quoted on this point:

"Real sociologists attempt to understand life, yea, even the social life of human beings, and *this is not* dualistic-antithetical. The simple Either-Or gratifies will and emotion; because we crave validity for our supposedly apodeictic propositions, we drag them into contexts where they are entirely out of place. The world is not dualistic, but manifold, and it continually mingles its elements in a complicated process of change; here it unites, there it divides."

Whenever it is necessary to speak dualistically, as in an earlier section dealing with bio-social—strictly social, positive—negative, regulated—elective, and similar classifications, it is advisable to avoid the

danger of antithesis by using a number of such dualistic divisions and complementing them by triple divisions.

Consequently we choose a triple division for the basis of the systematics of plurality patterns: (1) crowds, (2) groups, (3) abstract collectivities. Other reasons for this classification have already been set forth (chaps. iv, §4; xxxii, §2).

§8. VARIOUS TYPES OF THE CROWD AND THE GROUP

At the present stage of exposition it is not possible to make plain the reasons for dividing the different kinds of crowd into abstract and concrete varieties; we merely mention it in advance. A great many other classifications already set forth in the literature dealing with the crowd will also be used in conjunction therewith.

It is also possible to place the different kinds of groups in several double and triple classifications; some examples follow:

(1) A division of primary importance is that based on the number of human beings involved. We may distinguish: (a) dyads or pairs; (b) triads; (c) medium-sized groups (from the tetrad to an indefinite limit); and (d) larger groups. In one of the succeeding chapters the dyad and triad are analyzed under the general head of *A* groups, and the medium-sized and large varieties under *B* groups. It would be a great mistake to assume that large groups are our only concern, that sociology is interested only in statistical aggregates; on the contrary, attention is focussed on the dyad just as much as on the huge group. Certain characteristics of the dyad can be found in no other plurality pattern; similarly, the triad has its own peculiar features. Medium-sized groups, i.e., from four persons up, cannot be sharply limited at the upper margin because this margin is dependent upon the particular situation of which the group is a part. Nevertheless, the medium-sized group has many unique traits that distinguish it from the large group.

Following the example offered by the general division of plurality patterns, groups may again be divided into (*z*) bio-social and (*y*) strictly social types.

Again as in the case of the general division, all groups, but especially the strictly social kind, may be classified either as (*a*) regulated, or (*β*) elective, or a mixture of both.

The contrast between amorphous and organized plurality patterns cannot be applied to the group, for the genuine group is always organized. Typical amorphous plurality patterns are sometimes crowds, sometimes varieties transitional between crowds and groups.

The definition of the group already given (chap. xxxi, §2) made plain the fact that relatively long duration is one of its chief characteristics. Concrete crowds, on the other hand, usually are relatively transitory phenomena. This difference in duration, however, is more valuable as a means of distinguishing between crowds and groups than between the different kinds of groups themselves. Still, it is not altogether useless, for duration is everywhere present but is always relative; consequently it is not a contradiction in terms to speak of relatively short-lived as contrasted with relatively long-lived groups, although it must be admitted that the explanatory value of the distinction is small.

§9. VARIOUS TYPES OF THE ABSTRACT COLLECTIVITY

It is characteristic of abstract collectivities that divisions based upon the number of human beings comprised in them have little or no meaning; the number of persons in a superpersonal structure is not a chief distinguishing trait. It is also true, however, that although basic distinctions cannot be made by the use of numerical criteria, yet in the case of many collectivities a special subdivision taking account of numbers is not superfluous or erroneous, even though it may not be essential.

The distinction between bio-social and strictly social plurality patterns crops up here as elsewhere; the influence of biological forces does not cease even at the high level of abstraction reached by the abstract collectivities. At the same time, it must be said that the mental factor (rationalizations, ideologies, etc.) dominant in them conceals or seems to weaken the power of the corporeal.

Should there be any attempt to distinguish between regulated and elective collectivities? In later chapters a great deal of stress is laid on the fact that regulative or normative influences are most powerfully at work in abstract collectivities. If conditions require, it is of course usually possible to change the denomination or even the religion to which one "belongs," and it is similarly possible to change one's political allegiance. But this does not mean that there has been any escape from the state or the church as such! Again, it is today almost impossible to avoid the influences of the economic order or of civilization—they are far too general in their scope. The case is otherwise with regard to certain special forms of collectivity; not everyone is or need be subject to the influence of the sanitarium, the monastery, the theatre, the press. Everything considered, it is perhaps best to make use of the distinction between regulated and elective only when

considering derivative or secondary abstract collectivities—a type shortly to be discussed.

Is it possible for an abstract collectivity to be nothing more than an amorphous plurality pattern? The contrasting type is organized—that is to say, functionally differentiated. In spite of the fact that organization is an important characteristic of highly developed abstract collectivities, there are to be found almost completely amorphous (i.e., unorganized, uncondensed, pliable) types. States, churches, business enterprises, armies, and similar collectivities are closely organized, but classes, stations, spheres of culture, and the educational and financial plurality patterns are not constructed along the lines of functional differentiation, i.e., they possess no well-marked division of labor. It is therefore necessary to make the same distinction between amorphous and organized abstract collectivities as was made with reference to plurality patterns in general.

As already indicated (chap. xxxii, §2), there is no such thing as a transitory or temporary abstract collectivity; relatively long duration is an indispensable characteristic of every type.

The most essential of all classifications, however, is based on a feature found only among abstract collectivities; certain kinds are on a lower level of abstraction and exist only for the carrying out of various functions determined by certain other kinds which are more abstract and self-contained. The former we call derivative or secondary collectivities (they may also be termed institutions—see chap. xxxi, §2); the latter, basic or primary.

There is also a large number of abstract collectivities which have some characteristics of the establishment or institute and some of the group in addition to the traits peculiarly their own. Now, every collectivity goes through a developmental process in which it passes through the preliminary stages of the crowd and the group—the phylogenetic analogy is fitting. States, for example, develop from groups. But, just as we do not call the human being a fish merely because he has gill clefts in the embryonic stage, in the same way we do not call the state a crowd or a group merely because it passes through these stages as it develops into an abstract collectivity.

In the following tabular classification of abstract collectivities those of the basic or primary type are first listed. The transitional medium between these bio-social and strictly social plurality patterns, on the one hand, and the merely biological aggregates, on the other, is furnished by the various races. The primary abstract collectivities under *A* are bio-social; those under *B* to *G* are strictly social:

CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT COLLECTIVITIES

(Table 3)

I. PRIMARY ABSTRACT COLLECTIVITIES.

- A. 1. The family in the broadest sense, i.e., as inclusive of the sib (clan, gentes, etc.), the totemic tribe, and other kinship groupings.
- 2. The folk ("the people").
- 3. Humanity.
- B. The state.
- C. The church in the broadest sense, i.e., as inclusive of the relatively undifferentiated supernaturalistic congregation of the preliterate, the ecclesia, the sect, the denomination, the cult, etc.
- D. The station.
- E. The class.
- F. The economic order.
- G. The abstract collectivities of mental life:
 - 1. The arts.
 - 2. The sciences.

II. SECONDARY ABSTRACT COLLECTIVITIES (some of the more important).

- A. The army and the navy (functional to the state).
- B. Industry and technics (functional to the economic order).
- C. Other economic collectivities such as agriculture, mining, etc.
- D. The political party (functional to the state primarily, but also to all other primary collectivities).
- E. The school (functional to the family, folk, state, church, arts and sciences).
- F. Parish (functional to folk and state as well as to the church).
- G. Cultural sphere (*Kulturkreis*—functional to folk and humanity).
- H. Vocational or professional structures (functional to station, folk, and state).

III. MARGINAL PLURALITY PATTERNS (these have some traits of the abstract collectivity and some of the institute or establishment).

- A. The judiciary, the administration, the bureaucracy.
- B. The "money power."
- C. Sport.
- D. The press.
- E. The theatre.
- F. "Civilization."

IV. MIXED PLURALITY PATTERNS (there is a large number of these; even in their most highly developed forms they manifest a mixture of group and abstract collectivity characteristics, and are functional to the genuine abstract collectivities).

- A. Academies, universities, faculties (these cannot be adequately dealt with as mere sub-varieties of the school).
- B. Economic enterprises (e.g., factories).
- C. Penal institutions of all kinds.
- D. Monasteries.
- E. Religious orders (e.g., Jesuits, Benedictines, Carthusians).
- F. Sanitaria and hospitals.

This list is not intended to be exhaustive, with the possible exception of category I. The secondary, marginal, and mixed abstract collectivities might have many more added to their number, as later chapters will show.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE CROWD: GENERAL ASPECTS

§1. THE CONCEPT OF CROWD AND ITS SUB-VARIETIES

The distinction between (1) the active, effective and (2) the latent crowd is extremely important for present purposes. The process by which a crowd becomes active, as for example at political demonstrations, conventions, lynching episodes, and patriotic celebrations, is of great interest to the social psychologist and has been frequently studied. The investigation of the criminal actions of crowds, the struggles inseparable from "peaceful" picketing, revolutions, counter-revolutions, *coups d'état*, etc., have demonstrated the power of such "effective" crowds. When these crowds (which usually spring suddenly into existence and as quickly disappear) are observed closely, it will be noted that the processes involved are quite different from those implied by such phrases as "the inert crowd against which genius beats in vain," "the patient masses," "the toiling crowd," and so on. In the former, the active crowd, the distinguishing trait is that of externally perceivable activity; whereas in the latter the basic criterion seems to be something that remains hidden under the surface and comes to fruition only indirectly, hence for it we use the term latent crowd.

This distinction is by no means new, but up to date there has been no attempt to penetrate more deeply into the connection between the two sets of phenomena. It is sometimes said that the active crowd is conceived psychologically, the latent crowd sociologically. This is far from satisfactory, for to begin with, although the active crowd has in fact received much attention from psychologists, it should also be observed with the object of determining the traits that set it off from other plurality patterns—i.e., it should be studied sociologically as well. Conversely, the latent crowd, supposedly the object of sociological investigation only, can and should be subjected to psychological analysis by studying the psychical processes within its members. The real problem, however, is this: What is the connection, if any, between the existence of the latent crowd and the presence of the active crowd?

Friedrich von Wieser has proposed another set of terms: he distinguishes between pathologically excited and calmly led or guided

crowds—a distinction that has to do primarily with the active type. Since Sighele and LeBon, observers of the active crowd have paid most attention to the high emotional tension of its members—tension that sometimes passes over into “ecstatic” or “orgiastic” behavior and the violent actions so often accompanying it. Indeed, the crowd in general has frequently been described in terms of these phenomena alone, and consequently the idea has arisen that it cannot behave in any other way. Wieser, however, calls attention to the fact that with proper leadership the crowd may act calmly and rationally, and, if we are properly to analyze crowd phenomena, it is quite necessary to come to some decision as to the significance of this distinction. Some basis for decision is apparently afforded by the fact that Wieser does not speak of a “calm crowd” but a “calmly *led* crowd,” for this goes to show that, so far as the leaderless, active crowd is concerned, no objection can be taken to LeBon’s characterization of it as “dominated by emotion.” But what of the led or guided crowd? The decisive factor here is the point at which the line between crowd and group is drawn. Since Wieser does not clearly distinguish between the two, he confuses the characteristics of the crowd with those of the group.

Even from the standpoint of the present system, however, there are led crowds which have not reached the stage where they can be designated as groups. Quite frequently the emergence of a dominant leader calms or even pacifies an excited crowd. On the other hand, such a leader frequently arouses for the first time the maximum fury or other emotional expression of which “his” crowd is capable. Further, leaderless crowds do not necessarily express themselves in wild or violent action. A crowd of revolutionary fighters prepared to face all the consequences of their act may and often do manifest a sort of controlled, resigned dignity. A crowd of fanatical religionists who have gathered in one of their holy places in order to receive the necessary inspiration for some cruel sacrifice may give the impression of lofty composure. In both these cases, the persons concerned are not mere multitudes or throngs, but neither do they form groups—they are crowds. There is no doubt that in the older socio-psychological literature the wildly agitated crowd was made almost the sole object of what was therefore inevitably biased investigation. Moreover, it is by no means certain that the modern sociologist should follow the practice, very common in earlier writers, of calling this agitation of the crowd “pathological”; it seems advisable to avoid such value-judgments.

One point, however, seems quite correct: active crowds are always dominated by emotion; it is part of their very nature. Such emotion

is not always manifested in loud, wild, uncontrolled behavior, but even when a crowd is externally quiet there is always a strong inclination toward violence of one or another kind, and this may suddenly become manifest. If a leader succeeds in pacifying a crowd, and also in quieting the emotional agitation of its members, this process is either a phenomenon complementary to transformation of the crowd into a group, or directly preliminary to its dissolution. In the light of the foregoing, then, the distinction proposed by Wieser does not seem acceptable.

A third distinction to which some attention must be paid is that between so-called (1) primitive or natural, and (2) artificial crowds. It is frequently assumed that the social spheres which these two terms are intended to designate coincide with that of the active crowd on the one hand and the latent crowd on the other; the sole difference is thought to be that other characteristics are stressed. Part and parcel of this assumption, in most cases, is the belief that the natural crowd permits the "primitive instincts" of the "human animal" to express themselves just as they are supposed to do in the active, effective crowd, and that the latent crowd is equivalent to the artificial variety supposedly resulting from the social relations of civilized life.

Sighele and LeBon are perhaps primarily responsible for this rather naïve belief, but Vierkandt, Freud, and Vleugels have also advanced the theory that in the active crowd "primitive instincts" are released, that the irrationality of the crowd is an atavism, a regression to the pre-civilized period of human history. A candid examination of the facts, however, will reveal that neither the present-day megalopolitan rabble nor the modern revolutionary crowd can be called "primitive." Natural and primitive should not be equated without further justification. Moreover, it is extremely doubtful whether the latent and the artificial crowds can be regarded as identical. Again, although a bit too strongly expressed, it might even be said that active, effective crowds are no more natural and no more primitive than are artificial crowds. Hence, the distinction between natural and artificial is also to be avoided.

Another dichotomy—in high favor at present, but nevertheless of more apparent than real explanatory value when indiscriminately used—is frequently applied to the crowd: static and dynamic crowds are distinguished. Sombart, for example, uses "dynamic" to designate the crowd referred to by Wieser as "pathologically agitated," and "static" as an equivalent for "calmly led or guided." He writes:

"Finally, it makes an essential difference whether men are united in a calm or excited state of mind. In studying the psychological crowd, a state of excitement is usually assumed, and consequently only strikes, panics, and revolts are analyzed. The psychological crowd may also arise, however, when mental states are completely calm and emotionless: this occurs, for example, in a parliament, commission, or jury when the members form common resolutions. We may therefore call the excited condition the dynamic crowd and the calm the static crowd." This statement is adduced to show how arbitrarily applicable and consequently valueless the terms static and dynamic become when carelessly defined. Why should a crowd fleeing in panic from a burning theatre be more "dynamic" than a parliament? *Dynamis* is certainly not the same as agitation and over-hasty action.

We can agree with Sombart, however, when he rejects Tillich's distinction between (1) mechanical and (2) "organic" or mystic crowd, for this antithesis has in several cases been the point of departure for many quite disastrously subjective, erroneous doctrines.

In the literature of the last decade, a favorite subject has been the so-called "proletarian crowd" or the "revolutionary crowd." True it is that the connection between crowd and revolution is of great interest, but it is also true that conceptual clarification is extremely difficult. Politics and social politics expect from sociology a precise methodological statement of these problems, just as psychology would welcome a clear conceptual formulation of the relation of crowd and public in place of the vague and variable usage of journalism.

Park's distinction between "the crowd that dances" and "the crowd that acts" should also be mentioned; these two concepts are of great value in some types of analysis. The former crowd is of the orgiastic type; it may be religious, or merely expressive, but in either form it is characterized by a sort of "introverted" behavior that is self-satisfying, i.e., no crowd purpose develops. The latter is of the mob type; it may be political, or merely vengeful, but in either form it is characterized by a sort of "extraverted" behavior that always has a goal beyond itself; i.e., there either is a crowd purpose at the beginning or such a purpose soon develops.

"The crowd that dances" is exemplified in the Dancing Mania of the Middle Ages, the Flagellant epidemic, the spring or other seasonal festivals of many preliterate groups, the Methodist "enthusiasm," the Edwards revivals in New England, the Great Revival of 1800, with its "barks" and "jerks," Armistice celebrations after the World War, and similar collective behavior.

"The crowd that acts" is exemplified in the Bastille mob and similar revolutionary crowds, "lynching bees," strikers' riots, protest demonstrations, etc.

Park points out that the ecstatic, orgiastic phenomena peculiar to "the crowd that dances" may be closely associated with "activation" of the autonomic or sympathetic nervous system rather than with the central or somatic, and that the latter may be closely associated with the less expressive and more directly purposive behavior of "the crowd that acts." He also points out that all these distinctions have only ideal-typical validity, and that in empirical manifestations they are always more or less mixed.

A flood of light is thrown on the sociative function of the concrete crowd by Park's hypothesis (which has a large body of attested evidence to support it) that the crowd often plays a large part in the genesis of more abstract social structures and even of abstract collectivities, that it is a sort of societal "fountain of youth." Some of his diagrams¹ show the implications of his hypothesis quite plainly; for example:




FIG. 3.—GENETIC CONNECTIONS OF THE CONCRETE CROWD

In presenting these three diagrams, we do not intend to trace their ramifications or to defend some of their more doubtful implica-

¹ Given in his lectures on "The Crowd and the Public," University of Chicago.

tions; the only purpose is to show that there is *some* genetic connection between the various forms of the concrete crowd and other types of plurality patterns. This point is referred to again in the discussion of the sociative function of abstract crowds (chap. xxxvii, §6). Throughout the balance of our analysis of concrete crowds, "the crowd that acts" rather than "the crowd that dances" is the focus of attention.

The foregoing discussion has perhaps been somewhat tedious, but it has been more than a mere terminological analysis; some of the problems inherent in the *concept* of the crowd have been confronted. Attempts at a strict definition of the crowd are rare. Geiger's excellent book centers primarily on its revolutionary aspects. Hence he defines the crowd as "a social structure made up of persons with destructive and revolutionary tendencies."² Another definition, more comprehensive and more in accordance with the viewpoint of systematic sociology, is that given by Vleugels, but it is valid only for the concrete, active crowd: "A crowd is a transitory plurality pattern made up of a number of persons in spatial conjunction and with similar inclinations; each person participates in this plurality pattern with only those parts of his personality which contribute to the inclinations or tendencies common to all persons in the crowd; and these parts of the personality of each, reinforced as they are by similarly expressed parts of the personalities of the others, dominate each person while the crowd lasts." Several points should here be noted: (1) Vleugels regards spatial conjunction as necessary—his crowd is always a congregate; (2) he emphasizes the presence of similar inclinations among all members of the crowd; and (3) he defines the crowd as a transitory plurality pattern.

This all seems quite correct so far as the active crowd is concerned, but it only serves to make even more pressing the necessity of analyzing the latent crowd *and* the connection between the two. Can human beings form crowds even though they are not in spatial conjunction? Can the crowd ever be a lasting rather than a transitory plurality pattern?

§2. THE CROWD AS A PLURALITY PATTERN; THE MULTITUDE AND THE CROWD

From the standpoint of the present system as a whole, there are many other questions to be answered. For example, is the crowd a

² Theodor Geiger, *Die Masse und ihre Aktion*, p. 37.

plurality pattern at all? Is it not perhaps based on a mere summation of relationships or series of processes to which unity cannot be attributed? If the crowd is a plurality pattern, what social processes predominate in it? What missing element prevents the crowd from being called a group? Similarly, what prevents it from being called an abstract collectivity? In the systematics of action patterns the crowd is termed a plurality pattern, although no reasons for this are given, and, anticipating the systematics of plurality patterns, it is called an amorphous (i.e., uncondensed or loose-textured) structure in which the connection with a number of concrete human beings is plainly recognizable. This is not a definition; it is only a hint of the difference between crowds on the one hand and groups and abstract collectivities on the other. At the point where the three chief types of interhuman structures are briefly distinguished, the following sentence occurs: "Groups possess relatively long duration in relation to crowds, for the more or less symbolic nature of the conscious elements in the neuro-psychic patterns generated in groups give to such plurality patterns a measure of autonomy, as it were; the persons who 'belong' to them seem less necessary to their existence than in the case of crowds" (chap. iv, §4). In this quotation only the active, effective crowd, not the latent type, is referred to; it will be noted that this preliminary delimitation indicates, in agreement with Vleugels, the uncondensed or loose texture and transitory nature of the former. Further, the influence of the physical presence of the persons involved, the "closeness to nature" of the crowd, is suggested.

We distinguish, as already stated (chap. xxxiii, §1), between the multitude and the crowd. The former is not a plurality pattern; it is only a summation of persons who remain a *plurality* without a *pattern* even though some relations exist between them, for there are lacking those similar inclinations or tendencies immediately connected with genuinely reciprocal relations among participants. The people making up a multitude are very often subject to the same impression, the same stimulus, but there is not a sufficient network or texture of relations which would constitute this multitude a *plurality pattern*. When all these people open umbrellas, or applaud, or sing the national anthem, they of course are all acting alike—"like response to like stimulus"—but their similar actions are not the *result* of spatial conjunction, even though the intensity and mode of the action and its particular form of expression may be influenced by such conjunction. A multitude of human beings moves through the streets during a carnival; to a spectator looking out of a window this mul-

titude may appear visually and spatially as a unity, as a long, snake-like organism. But the mere fact that hundreds of single human beings, i.e., a plurality, do the same thing, does not constitute them a plurality *pattern*! The separate persons are in spatial conjunction and they are similarly motivated, but they do not interact appreciably; sociation is at a minimum. The process by which a multitude becomes a crowd has been well illustrated by Vleugels:

"When we observe a multitude scurrying to and fro among the paraphernalia of an amusement park, it is not only the happy appearance of the people which tells us that they came in order to have a 'good time'; this common intention in a certain sense unites the multitude, makes out of the many a unity. Nevertheless the sociologist would not speak of a 'unity' in such cases. Everybody follows his own taste and inclination in gratifying his private desires for amusement. The separate persons still function too much as 'personalities' to be regarded as members of a superindividual unity. Yet this can all be changed in an instant as the result of a sudden interruption—for example, the sudden closing of the park because it has been declared a public nuisance. The intentions which brought the multitude to the park cannot be carried out; dissatisfaction becomes general, vociferous imprecations make themselves heard; a 'crowd' begins to form. At the moment when everyone concentrates his attention upon the action of breaking or at least demonstrating against a prohibition (which no one may understand), there occurs a mutual influence of the different persons as the result of sounds, expressions, and gestures."⁸

What is pointed out here is the fact that the essential nature of the crowd lies in unity of action, common volition, and striving toward the same goal, coupled with the idea or feeling (usually only vaguely present) that the separate person has ceased to be separate, in the sense of having his own independent goal, and that instead he has become a molecule in a larger structure. In the theatre, many a spectator applauds like the others when the curtain falls, but he does it as a personal demonstration of approval. This is altogether changed if he claps his hands, without maintaining his own special personal judgment of what has taken place on the stage, as a result of being carried away by the noisy rhythm of overwhelming general applause. Being in a crowd always means being "carried away," i.e., the submergence of part of one's "I-consciousness" in "we-consciousness."

The sociologist, moreover, must be able to observe the crowd as an acting unity, as a crowd that *does* something, before he can be sure of his diagnosis. The multitude may at the most be a visual unity for the onlooker or an auditory unity for the listener: an example of the first would be the carnival merry-makers already mentioned;

⁸ W. Vleugels, "Zur Diskussion über die Massentheorie LeBons," *Köln. Vt. Soz.* VI, 2, pp. 168 ff.

of the second, the Chicago Pit or the New York Stock Exchange. The crowd, however, is a volitional unity of which one can say that it has done or is doing something: examples would be the crowd that stormed the Bastille, the crowd that cried "Crucify him," the crowd that worked Mark Antony's will. In the case of the multitude the appearance of unity is the accidental result of the similar individual action of many persons, but in that of the crowd it is a volitional and emotional result of interaction; the distinction may be roughly expressed as the difference between simultaneous and concerted action.

As in all social phenomena, *the transition between multitude and crowd is gradual*. There is frequently room for much difference of opinion as to whether at a particular moment a number of human beings is still a multitude or has become a crowd.

§3. LEADERLESS AND LED CROWDS

In its earlier stages a crowd is usually leaderless, and consequently it is at first poorly unified; its members are not at all clear as to the goal of its action. The unity which always characterizes the crowd exists primarily as a unity of emotion which urges to action. There develops a state of high tension, which perhaps lasts for only a few seconds, and during which the observer may not be able to say whether any action will follow or if it does what course it will take. Then a few persons, or perhaps only one, starts a certain action. Those so beginning are at first only quasi-leaders; whether they become real leaders is decided in the next few seconds, for a mere beginning, even if it is imitated, is not enough to constitute leadership. Frequently a relatively small contingent of the crowd seize the leadership, after general crowd action has begun, in and through giving to this action a more effective, enduring trend. Volitional unity and the dominance of crowd action do not come about until leadership has become dominant; striving toward a goal begins with and through leadership. A distinction must always be made, therefore, between leaderless and led crowds; each case must be studied to determine whether any leadership existed, and if so when and with what it began.

The leader or leaders may also be able to bring about the disintegration of the incipient crowd, as Vleugels has pointed out: "The process of crowd formation can be accelerated, slowed up, or completely checked by external influences. There are many instances in which an opportune joke has 'saved the situation' by effecting a reversal of mood and, as a further consequence, has dissolved the

incipient crowd.”⁴ As a matter of fact, crowd leadership can bring about more intense, effective crowd action, dissolve a crowd into a multitude, or eventually convert a crowd into a group. The last of these possibilities is realized when the leader develops a plan of organization, a division of function, a clearly delimited, plainly recognizable goal of action, and then successfully imposes upon the former crowd a more disciplined, careful, consistent mode of behavior. Nevertheless, the mere circumstance that the crowd may have a leader (and indeed almost always has one in the more advanced stages of its existence) does not yet constitute it a group. The relation of leader and led does not necessarily imply organization, for it is quite possible for there to be only *one* function in the crowd, that of the leader, and hence no real division of function, inasmuch as those being led do not yet feel themselves to be responsible for definite, differentiated tasks. The crowd members, in other words, do not complement each other.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

CHAPTER XXXV

THE CROWD: INTERCONNECTIONS OF CONCRETE AND ABSTRACT TYPES

§1. THE CONCRETE CROWD

In most of the foregoing it is evident that we have been discussing what has already been characterized as the active, effective crowd, as the crowd "in the psychological sense." (As already stated, the use of the term "psychological" will be avoided.) Henceforth this active, effective crowd will be called the perceivable or concrete crowd. It seems advisable to stress this attribute because in the classification of plurality patterns used in the present system the relative degree of abstraction (in the sense of an increasing diminution of external perceivability) is the guiding criterion. The crowd is more perceivable than the group. It may be objected that two persons who form a definite pair are at least as perceivable as a concrete crowd. This kind of perceivability, however, is not in question; the relevant point is whether the social processes and the relationships arising therefrom, *not* the human beings involved, manifest varying degrees of perceivability. The processes evident in the crowd, obviously, are more perceivable if only because of the shorter duration usual to such processes. Moreover, they manifest a more rapid tempo and a more accentuated rhythm.

§2. THE ABSTRACT CROWD

Another question must now be considered: In addition to the concrete crowd just noted, should another variety be recognized? Anticipating conclusions, let it be said that in the present system the abstract crowd is recognized in contrast to the concrete.

The abstract crowd is an uncondensed or amorphous plurality pattern having indefinite duration that nevertheless is always longer than that possessed by the concrete crowd; abstract crowds sometimes last for generations. Their existence therefore cannot be clearly reduced to one short, psychologically consistent process with a measurable rate. On the contrary, proper understanding of the abstract crowd necessitates penetration into more profound interconnections of social

life—interconnections which may never be exactly stated in numerical terms.

Just as the led concrete crowd is the transition between the leaderless crowd and the group, the abstract or latent crowd is the transition between the concrete crowd and the abstract collectivity. The abstract crowd cannot be called such a collectivity, however, in view of the fact that it is not sufficiently rationalized, sufficiently equipped with ideologies, sufficiently supported by tradition; on the other hand, it is too vaguely defined, too unorganized, and too difficult of inclusion within the limits of formal terminology to be called a group. The ideal type of the crowd is to the group as chaos to cosmos; seething, undifferentiated forces are characteristic of the former, and in addition recognizable standards and a definite ideology serving as rational superstructure are entirely lacking. The chief wishes of human beings in crowds are undefined and uncertain; the unconscious and the autonomic often play the principal parts.

The term abstract crowd denotes primarily the following amorphous, uncondensed plurality patterns: (1) the crowd in the sense of the masses, the people, the common folk; (2) the crowd as the residue left after the rise of the élite; and (3) the crowd as the intangible obstacle opposing the efforts of separate persons.

We can justify our application of the term crowd to these loose-textured plurality patterns only if there is something essential in the concept of crowd which is common to both the concrete and the abstract varieties. We must give satisfactory reasons for continuing to use the concept as inclusive of the abstract transitional structures leading to the abstract collectivity.

Doubt might well be expressed as to whether it would not be better to use another and perhaps entirely new term. In our simple preliminary classification of plurality patterns (chap. iv, §4) the abstract crowd found no place, and when in agreement with this brief formulation reference is made to the crowd, there occurs to mind only the perceivable crowd, for it is in terms of this attribute that the crowd has previously been defined. In other words, we think only of the concrete crowd, that crowd which is least abstract ("least" is here equivalent to "of shortest duration"). A low intensity of sociation may well be and often is correlated with a momentarily strong feeling of affiliation with the other persons composing the crowd, and during the period when the concrete crowd is in action, human beings are as a rule emotionally united in greater degree than in the average group.

Lack of, or reluctance to coin, another term is not responsible for

our retention of the word crowd and our consequent maintenance of a conceptual bond between the concrete and the abstract crowds; the term is retained because that conceptual bond has an empirical basis. The abstract and the concrete crowds are in close interaction; there would be no concrete crowd if the abstract were not already present, and the abstract is perpetually rebuilt and renewed by the concrete.

The recurrence of certain similar situations, particularly in large cities, perpetually calls forth mobs (a type of concrete crowd) that in the absence of such situations apparently are not in existence. Such mob-formation is possible only because of certain pre-existing social relations between persons and plurality patterns that generate a persisting abstract crowd of a type to be described later. Only because of the prior presence of this abstract crowd is there a tendency to form mobs whenever the occasion offers. If, however, such occasions, such external possibilities of acting as a perceivable, concrete mob, no longer eventuate because, for example, of an improved police force, there is also a gradual deterioration of the relatively abstract, amorphous, intangible plurality pattern which is the precondition and source of acute mob behavior.

Once again it becomes evident that the boundaries between plurality patterns are vague. The abstract crowd finally issues in more definite forms of sociation. The proletariat, for example, is a class, and as such is an abstract collectivity. A thorough study of the concept of class leads to the conclusion that a social class is a collectivity of extremely nebulous contours and is closely similar to the abstract crowd. An abstract collectivity, however, has a higher degree of power with which to impose conformity upon the single human being; the latter is "ordained" in the collectivity, a fact most apparent in the state and the church. Membership in a class may in many cases be felt with great intensity but, objectively considered, it is usually much more easily escaped or changed than is affiliation with a given religious or political plurality pattern. It is also true, however, that to belong to the proletariat means closer association with one's fellow-members, one's "comrades," than does membership in "the masses," the crowd of "common people." In the latter case the terms masses and crowd denote a type of affiliation which is irrational, unconscious, and indefinite—a marked contrast to "class-consciousness."

But are not such crowds as "the masses" mere agglomerations of relations rather than definite plurality patterns? A good deal of space has already been devoted to pointing out that plurality patterns are not objective substances but only neuropsychic patterns in the minds

of human beings. They are, to speak in somewhat incorrect but useful analogy, *subjective* substances only. If we think and feel a plurality of social relations to be a pattern or unity, then it appears to us as real—therefore it is real in its effects. Now, the abstract crowd may be thought of as just such a unitary network of relations, as just such a plurality pattern. The crowd made up of the lower strata of the people (the so-called masses), or the crowd of persons afflicted with “spectatoritis,” or the body of newspaper readers referred to as the public—the list might be extended indefinitely—are all vaguely thought of or felt as unities by many persons, and are consequently types of abstract crowds. The very fact that plurality patterns are not identical with particular persons, but are only complexes of interhuman relations in which members may be replaced by others without producing any appreciable change in the interactive configuration, forces us to pay attention to abstract crowds, for these plurality patterns play an essential part in the plans, hopes, and desires of business men, artists, reformers, demagogues, journalists, etc. The members of such plurality patterns are the real “human material” which furnishes the credulity, patience, inertia, and passive acceptance of the *fait accompli* necessary to “public enterprises” of all sorts.

§3. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN CONCRETE AND ABSTRACT CROWDS ILLUSTRATED AND ANALYZED

The abstract crowd is related to the concrete as the molten interior of the earth is to the lava of the active volcano. From time to time, in complete dependence upon situational factors, the visibly manifest and active crowd issues from the abstract crowd in short-lived and acute form.

As noted above, these two types are reciprocally related; consequently, temporal and causal priority can be assigned to neither. It is possible, however, ideal-typically to isolate first one and then the other sequence, i.e., the course from abstract to concrete and then from concrete to abstract can be followed. Let us begin with an example of the first:

A young man who previously had not thought a great deal about social conditions made one of the crowd who in the summer of 1927 stormed and burned the Supreme Court building in Vienna; he and his fellows at first had things all their own way, but were later repulsed by the police. He returned to the familiar circle of his friends, slightly wounded and still trembling with rage and the lust of battle. He was no longer a member of the concrete crowd, but the memory

of the event did not die. Consequently he succumbed to the crowd, as it were, a second time—not to the first wild, howling crowd that set the building afire, but to the second, namely, the latent, resentful, suspicious crowd that waits for another opportunity to make its power known. As time passes memories may lose in vividness and passions once aroused may give way to a utilitarian striving after conformity and comfort, but a sufficient neuropsychic basis remains to keep him a part of the crowd called forth on that one day of violence, a crowd potentially capable of resurrection when a similar situation recurs. In the interim, however, it is also possible that opposing neuropsychic patterns may have developed within him—habits, attitudes, and beliefs that prevent him from acting as wildly and thoughtlessly as he then did. The feeling of being “one of a crowd” perhaps no longer overwhelms him after he has reached maturity; it is even possible that long-continued affiliation with the “common crowd,” “the masses,” the perpetually subordinate, may inhibit rather than further a second participation in an active crowd. But no matter what he does or does not do, his behavior is essentially influenced by the connection between his participation in the first concrete crowd, his consequent membership in the abstract crowd, and the new situations he encounters.

Cinema habitués manifest *definite* crowd characteristics even when they are not sitting in front of the “silver screen,” characteristics that arise from accumulated impressions. This is also true of the inveterate newspaper reader, the night club patron, and the vaudeville devotee. By the foregoing we do not mean the social type of the cinema habitué, i.e., we do not mean the picture which we form of such persons as ideal types. What is meant is that there is a subtle cohesion, a mutual understanding between the persons involved in one or another of these abstract crowds, even though this cohesion and understanding may have little social influence. The repetition of impressions deriving from concrete crowds results in a nebulous “we-consciousness” that characterizes members of the abstract crowd.

This extremely indefinite, obscure feeling cannot be understood if it is regarded only as the outcome of emotions stirred by the concrete crowd but thereafter repressed. It is primarily a vague apprehension of the bonds uniting those who share a common lot. In both the concrete and the abstract crowds there is a similar feeling of the *dependence* of the self upon social powers and the same *associative* desire to be absorbed in a large body of one's fellows (cf. chap. viii, §4).

The difference between abstract and concrete lies in the contrast

between sudden, short-lived surges of emotion on the one hand, and a dull, subdued, hazy, persistent mood on the other.

The fact must not be lost sight of, however, that the action of the concrete crowd would not take place so suddenly and would not manifest such cyclical regularity—that is to say, it would not manifest all the recognized characteristics of crowd behavior—if such actions were not at bottom revelations of the existence of abstract crowds. The Vienna mob had its origin in a feeling that dominated a large number of human beings and bound them into a latent unity, a feeling arising from a violated sense of justice. In other words, there already existed an abstract crowd whose members were urged to action by a common resentment. Another case may be adduced: on August 7, 1926, the newspapers carried an account under a Paris date-line which ran about as follows:

"In spite of the energetic intervention of the police, thanks to whose efforts there had been no assaults on strangers in Paris for more than a week, a new and extremely deplorable affair occurred today. In a Parisian suburb, Neuilly, where this forenoon a large garage caught fire, a large omnibus almost entirely occupied by foreigners was stopped by the police; instructions were given to follow a different route because it was feared that the fire might spread. The crowd apparently believed that the strangers had come to see the fire, was immediately aroused, and manifested its displeasure in no uncertain way. Not only were the usual epithets vociferously shouted—before the police could prevent it a veritable hail of stones struck the occupants of the omnibus, many of whom were injured. The police had to resort to force before the strangers could escape."

This description of the action of a concrete crowd is sociologically interesting in several aspects, but only one question will be raised here: Was an abstract crowd already present? Beyond a doubt; it was constituted by the tacit and perhaps unconscious unity of all those offended by the advantage taken by foreigners possessed of undepreciated currency. The concrete crowd was based on the unorganized, abstract crowd of haters of the stranger.

An illustration combining several of the features noted in those just adduced may now be given; it shows how an abstract crowd may generate a multitude when the proper occasion arises, how this multitude may become a concrete crowd through the influence of a powerful leader, how incipient dissolution of the concrete crowd may be prevented through appeal to the vague feelings and memories upon which the abstract crowd is based, how the abstract crowd is reinforced by emergence of the concrete crowd even though the latter quickly disappears, and how the reinforced abstract crowd becomes

a violent concrete crowd when another emotionally charged situation provides the occasion. The illustration is an eye-witness account of the 1927 Sacco-Vanzetti demonstrations in Paris, written only a few hours after they took place:

"The nearest Metro stations belched and hiccupped until at three o'clock a conglomerate mass of six or eight thousand had piled up before the three gallows-like platforms and their background of sickle-and-hammer red flags. Hawkers hovered on the edges of the mass, exchanged bits of red ribbon, crumple red flowers, postcard pictures of Jean Jaurès, for any fistful of copper and nickel centime-pieces they could claw. Other bits of loose change rattled into the cash-cans jingled for the 'Defense Fund.' And anyway, somebody had to pay for the signs. The name of 'Gouverneur Fullier' caused a great outlay in sleazy cloth and streaky paint; 'Capitalisme' ran a poor second. The yells and singing (commentaries on the signs) were for all the world like certain puerile attempts to arouse that dear old college spirit: 'Sac-co, Van-zetti, lib-er-ay, Sac-co, Van-zetti, lib-er-ay'—one half expected the hushahush of a 'locomotive' and the final 'Ray!' Filling in the din as a sort of acoustic continuum, in various keys and versions, *The Internationale* dipped and soared.

"At last the cash-cans tambourined no more; hoarse-voiced hawkers were elbow-nudged into remonstrant and muttering silence. The red flags swayed and parted, the gallows-platform quivered, a spine-chilling voice projected from a deep, thick torso stiffened the clumpy throng—made it firmly gelid instead of uncertainly fluid. The orator followed a whole series who had previously failed to rivet on themselves the wandering attention of the multitude; he alone, with the voice and figure of a Mirabeau, could unify them into a crowd. In content the speech was a succession of rubber-stamp phrases, catchwords, clichés worn greasily smooth by passage as current coin ever since Marx left the British Museum Library with his manuscript. But with that posture, those gestures, that worker's blue cap! The class war, Thayer, Fuller, Sacco and Vanzetti, champagne at a hundred francs per bottle, the canaille of the American Legion, Fuller the cur of capitalism, American Fascisti, the class war, 'and you are sons of the Commune!'

"The spine-chilling voice vibrated into silence, the crowd became viscous, fluid; it began to dissolve into a multitude. Uncertain tricklings at the edges, restive babbings in the center. 'Sac-co, Van-zetti, lib-er-ay, Sac-co, Van-zet' — Again the blue cap and the mighty torso jutted above the crowd. 'Comrades, comrades! Remember—the police massed at the edge of the city! Remember—cuirassiers and their sabres! Remember—infantry! Remember—women here with us! A bagarre cannot help our comrades in Charlestown now! Order, silence when we reach the line of the fortifications! *You are sons of the Commune!*'

"The process of dissolution into a mere multitude was checked; the crowd was again dominant. The trickles at the edges became streams, swept together into a *single* current, the aimless shouting ceased, the march was on. . . . Some singing, some 'college-yelling' there still was, but on the whole a sort of subdued drone or rumble mixed with an occasional loud '*A bas le Fullier*' took the place of the previous buzzing din.

"Fifty yards from the street forking which marked the edge of the city, a line of brass-helmeted cavalrymen and an irregular splotch of dark-blue police,

with a lighter flock of infantry sky-gray a bit farther on, formed a narrow defile through which the crowd must pass. A hush . . . 'not a drum was heard, not a funeral note.' . . . The cavalrymen seemed rather good-humored, although occasionally a grimmer jaw-set was evident; the police alert, quietly watchful; the infantry here and there a bit shamefaced. The sons of the Commune looked their 'guardians' directly in the face; many grins, but no sneers, no jeers—a hand reached out and patted a cavalry horse on his snuffing nose. . . .

"The crowd filtered off through 'buses and the Metro and went home to wait for the news.

"A special edition of *L'Humanité* at 6:20 Tuesday morning announced the unbelievable—they were dead! Devilishly done to death by a Yankee machine, the refinement of cruelty and *standardisation*. The nerves of a people attuned to the forthright, thumping guillotine quivered agonizingly at the thought of the mysterious, unseen force that coursed through the hapless anarchists. The more ignorant had never heard of electrocution before; they believed that 'the chair' was devised expressly for torture of Sacco and Vanzetti.

"All day the tension grew; in the suburban factories and the gewgaw workshops knots and clusters formed and broke up continually; the workers were frenetic, wildly indignant. The smaller radical sheets and *L'Humanité* carried the announcement of a 'monster demonstration' to be held Tuesday evening on the main boulevards, and especially on the Rue Sébastopol in front of the American Embassy. They counselled order, 'Sunday clothes,' restraint. At noon a proclamation was issued by the Government, forbidding the procession, signed by Sarraut, the arch-foe of Communism. . . . The procession took place.

"No one can say how the numerous battles really started; no single eye-witness could observe a whole city; versions vary according to politics. Anyone who saw the order maintained at the Sunday meeting would find it hard to believe that the riots of Tuesday night were all initiated by the workers, as the chief of police maintains. Rather does it seem that attempts to clear the streets were made at several points; the multitude would not or could not move quickly enough, blows were exchanged, and then everybody on both sides 'went mob.' The outbreak seemed to occur everywhere; there was no focal point, although cafés in and near Montmartre, where certain Americans flock to guzzle champagne and search for *filles de joie*, bore the real brunt of the attacks.

"Let us give the typical French worker with a flair for rhetoric the word. Wrong-headed and mistaken in his interpretation of 'judicial asininity' though he be, he is worth listening to, for he and his comrades have already shown their power. *His version of events is the most important, for it is charged with the emotions of 1789, of 1848, of the Commune.* He is in the mood for barricades, and even his ingrained chauvinism combines strangely with his revolutionary internationalism to make a dangerous mixture at the end of the sputtering.

"'M'sieu,' you can see how it was, can you not? Here is an immense throng sorrowing for dead comrades.

"The counsel of the organizations has been respected. Order, quiet. The crowd is calm, dignified, filled with noble indignation held in restraint by sorrow. . . .

"There are the police in compact squares. The crowd streams past them in silence, surrounds them, submerges them. The crowd feels itself master of the boulevards and tries to provoke no one.

"Then suddenly, whistles shrill, clubs are brandished, the police charge. . . .

"Charge on the Place de la République, charge in Rue de Lancry, charge in Boulevard Sébastopol, charge, charge everywhere.

"Women, children, men are beaten, trampled to the ground with an unspeakable savagery. Arrests, bludgeonings, shots; blood flows.

"The cafés close; the terraces are swept clean of chairs; the boulevards thereby become wider. . . .

"Barricades appear in sketchy outline. The swarms of workers strike back, counter-attack. Massed in side-streets not readily to be swept clean by mounted cuirassiers, the crowd clamors its wrath, howls its anger at American capitalism and those dogs of Legionnaires. . . .

"In a sudden burst of inspiration cries resound everywhere; "To Montmartre! To Montmartre, capital of the dollar in search of amusement! The dogs shall not dance there, they shall not make holiday when the world sorrows!"

"Columns of demonstrators march past jazz, the Charleston, champagne, *poules de luxe*, and apers of Fuller.

"The merry-makers pretend to laugh behind the plate glass; they provoke. . . .

"The windows crash. . . . "Sacco, Vanzetti, amnesty!"

"The Internationale of pleasure seekers make their acquaintance of the true Paris, the Paris of the sons of the Commune, on the very spot where they raised their last barricades.

"The police soon arrive and intervene for the hangmen of Boston. They clear the streets. Midnight.

"The vassals of the dollar, the rulers of the French Republic, chained to the chariot of the debt, have merited well of the vultures of Wall Street!"¹

Here it is plain that the abstract crowd derives from composite sources: the revolutionary traditions of the Parisian worker, resentment at the benefit accruing to American tourists because of the inflation, an outraged sense of justice, hatred of the United States because of the war debt, envy of the prosperous, sympathy for the oppressed, and so on. Further, there can be little doubt that influence deriving from an abstract collectivity, the proletariat, were also at work—a fact that emphasizes the lack of sharp divisions between abstract crowds and abstract collectivities (on this point see chap. xxxvii, §1). The multitude that "went mob," the violent concrete crowd, found the occasion for its manifestation in the emotional crisis that attended the execution of Sacco and Vanzetti. One type of crowd is a necessary complement of the other; unless the occurrence of concrete crowds continually reinforces the neuropsychic patterns upon which the abstract crowd is based, the latter would soon cease to provide the preconditions necessary to the emergence of concrete crowds; and as just indicated, concrete crowds cannot arise when there is no abstract basis of any kind.

The illustrations given are perhaps sufficient to show the inter-

¹From an unpublished manuscript by Howard Becker, "They Go Mob."

connections of the abstract and the concrete crowd. In spite of the extreme indefiniteness of these plurality patterns, the terms applied to them often make them seem more indefinite than they actually are. Especially frequent is the confusion between multitude, crowd, and group.

We are now in a position to establish a causal connection, not merely between the abstract crowd and the abstract collectivity, as in the previous section, but also between the concrete crowd, actual crowd events, and the abstract collectivity. The sequence is as follows: (1) experience as a participant in the action of the concrete crowd; (2) repetition or imagined re-living of this experience; (3) the survival of memories and other neuropsychic patterns establishing a bond with other members of the erstwhile concrete crowd, which survival constitutes them members of an abstract crowd; (4) the cultivation of a consciousness of unity by the construction of an appropriate ideology, of a system of rationalizations providing an "intellectual foundation" for the idea of unity or solidarity; (5) development of the idea of a superpersonal, unifying entity (abstract collectivity).

From all the foregoing it is perhaps clear that the concrete crowd is here conceived as an uncondensed, amorphous, pliable plurality pattern, generated in and through a unitary sequence of *collective* activities engaged in for a short period by a multitude if appropriate affects, more or less dominating all the participants, are released by the situation.

By an abstract crowd we understand an organized and vague but nevertheless lasting plurality pattern based on similar neuropsychic patterns (especially upon hazy notions of common participation in experience or social destiny) present in an indefinite number of persons.

Both plurality patterns have been and will continue to be called crowds, (1) because in both there is involved an indefinite plurality and an unorganized, emotionally conditioned solidarity, and (2) because they stand in a reciprocal relation which makes the existence of each dependent upon the other.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE CROWD: CONCRETE

§1. ANALYSIS OF CONCRETE CROWDS

The stages of formation, action, and disintegration of the concrete crowd are in such close temporal sequence that the first step in analysis is the same as that followed for social processes in general, namely, the application of the basic formula: $P = A \times S$ (the abbreviated form of $P = N \times E \times B \times [N \times E]_1$). It should be noted, however, that in the case of the concrete crowd P does not denote a single process but a whole series or cycle of processes, although this series, like the single process, may be explained as a result of the attitudes of the persons involved (A) and the given situation (S).

The observer who attempts to explain crowd behavior simply as an outcome of the attitudes of the participants, taking no account of the situation, makes just as great an error as he who regards only the situation. For example, a violent rush into forbidden territory by a mob is not to be explained solely by the circumstance that the police had all too rigorously blocked off an area through which the normal flow of traffic necessarily travelled, as in the Vienna and Paris affairs; an equally important factor may be (and in the cases mentioned was) a prior tense and revolutionary mood pervading the intruding mob.

The factor A is usually composite. In the analysis of social processes, in which more than one person must always participate, it is advisable and perhaps necessary to concentrate upon a suitable person as the most important of those involved; his attitudes are then denoted by A , leaving the other persons in the process to be included in the situation as A_1 . In the analysis of crowds it is also well to concentrate upon a small number of persons, perhaps only one; his or their attitudes are denoted by A , leaving all the other persons to be included among the situational factors as A_1 . When doubt arises as to who should be recognized as the most important person in the process, or when a decision threatens to bring out an arbitrary interpretation of the occurrence, the difficulty can be obviated by repeating the analysis with the attitudes of different persons as factor A , so that by interchanging the phenomena designated by letters of the formula there results a many-

sided picture varying in agreement with the attitudes chosen as the central point of the process.

Another important point is that in crowd phenomena we usually are not dealing with the actions of only one crowd, but with a collision of this crowd with groups, separate persons, or other crowds. This means that in such cases it is necessary to let factor *A* first represent the generic attitude of the whole crowd as an acting unity, and after this analysis is completed, to let factor *A* represent the various "subdivisions" (cliques, powerful leaders, etc.) of this crowd.

The analysis of factor *A* proceeds, as in the social process, by first taking account of the specific, particular aspects (temperamental attitudes, special abilities, and other *N* factors) of the acting person or persons, and of the experiences (*E*) previously undergone by them.

The analysis of factor *E* is also similar to the corresponding analysis in the study of the social process.

There need be only a brief reminder of the fact that in analyzing the attitudes of the most important persons—for example, the leader or leaders—or of the minor participants who are reckoned among the situational factors, discovery of the fundamental wishes involved cannot be neglected, for they are perhaps the chief conditioning factors. These wishes are frequently more obscure in crowd than in group phenomena, and in the former it is often extremely difficult to differentiate among the various types—response, recognition, new experience, security. This is no reason, however, for failing to confront the problems raised.

In spite of similarity so far-reaching that the same formulas can often be used, as just indicated, there is nevertheless an essential difference between analysis of social processes and analysis of plurality patterns such as the concrete crowd.

Generally speaking, there are two equally necessary approaches to the study of social processes: (1) analysis in terms of attitude and situation; and (2) analysis of the function of the single process in what may be called the total process of interhuman life, i.e., of sociation.

When plurality patterns are dealt with, there emerges between analysis of behavior and analysis of function another approach; this may be called scrutiny of the plurality pattern as a totality and as an influence producing changes in its participants. Situation and attitudes change under the dominating influence of crowd phenomena. It is not sufficient to inquire: (1) into the influence upon the crowd's behavior of the situation existing at the beginning of the process; and (2) into the influence of the similarly prior attitudes of the persons concerned;

it is also necessary—indeed, above all else—to inquire (3) into the alterative influence of crowd formation and crowd action upon attitudes and situation. The factor A (attitudes of the chief participants) must therefore be expressed as a quotient of the crowd (C) and the changed situation (S), i.e., as $A = \frac{C}{S}$.

If, on the other hand, we are confronted by an unusual case, in which (1) the crowd action and the altered attitudes of the participants have been adequately determined but (2) the change in the situation is still causally unexplained, the knowledge of the crowd action and the attitudes of the persons already possessed would lead to the following conclusion concerning the change in the situation: $S = \frac{C}{A}$.

Every social process of course exerts such an alterative influence. (Mathematically stated, the formulas $A = \frac{P}{S}$ and $S = \frac{P}{A}$ must be valid if $P = A \times S$.) The difference between the influence exerted by a plurality pattern and by a single process, however, is usually considerable, although it is one of degree rather than of kind. In some instances a single interhuman process or occurrence may of course decide the whole tenor of a person's later life, yet it is also true that in the totality of social life a process exerts a vastly weaker influence upon that totality and receives from it a much fainter impress than does a plurality pattern.

§2. DO CROWDS HAVE OBJECTIVE CHARACTER?

Now that we have come this far, the interesting question arises as to whether objective character can be attributed to a crowd, that is, whether, detached from its members, it can be regarded as a phenomenon *sui generis* that exists before or prior to those participating in it. Theodor Geiger states the case as follows:

"Sociological study of the crowd must not only postulate a concept of the crowd as a particular kind of social structure with objective character, but it must also be limited to such a concept. . . . The fact that a social structure [the same as our term plurality pattern] in its objective being is relatively independent of its members is shown by the comparatively slight influence exercised by the coming and going of the members upon the nature of the structure—in any event, such coming and going need not always have determining influence. . . . It is not the members alone who make up the structure; something else must be added. . . . The struggle for survival carried on by the group is not the same as the struggle for survival carried on by its separate members.

It is not the task of the sociologist to explain the structure and its manifestations by pointing to the behavior of the members, for that is the psychologist's approach; the sociologist regards the 'group' as the cause of the behavior of the members of the structure. The group therefore is primary; the collective attitudes of the members are secondary.¹

It is indeed a pity that the tendency (fostered by the "universalists") to regard the plurality pattern as something which is "given" prior to the human beings involved has led Geiger into exaggeration and vagueness which could have been avoided if only the "simultaneity," that is to say, the interdependence of members and plurality pattern, and consequently the relativity of the plurality pattern, had been recognized.²

§3. THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS IN THE PROBLEM OF THE "OBJECTIVE CROWD"

Above all else, it is necessary to insist that there is no realistic sociological explanation of the phenomena of the plurality pattern other than explanation based upon analysis of the behavior involved and of the sociative function of such behavior. Everything else is metaphysics or speculation which, although of significance in its own special field, is out of place here. Moreover, behavior is far from being object-matter for psychology alone; sociology and all the other social sciences also have a legitimate interest in it (chap. iii, §6). Further, behavior may be scientifically analyzed in several widely different ways. For example, the psychologist *as such* attempts to infer data of consciousness, psychical processes, from behavior, whereas the sociologist sees in it the patterns of interhuman life.

The two concepts, behavior and interhuman, of course must not be restricted in their application to separate human beings alone. Geiger says: "Vierkandt has emphasized the fact that a group may not only be regarded as a structure composed of interhuman relations, but that there may also be immediate relations between the members on the one hand and the group (i.e., the 'we' of the group) on the other."³ Barring certain speculative implications, this is true enough, and it should be recalled that in the present system "interhuman" does not mean "between separate persons" only, but rather: (1) between single human beings; (2) between single human beings and plurality patterns (which of course are not separable from human beings); and (3)

¹ Theodor Geiger, *Die Masse und ihre Aktion*, pp. 6 ff.

² These points have been advanced by W. Vleugels, "Zur Diskussion über die Massentheorie LeBons," *Köln. Vt. Soz.*, VI, 2, pp. 168 ff., esp. p. 177.

³ Theodor Geiger, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

between one plurality pattern and another. Further, we may speak of the behavior of plurality patterns as well as of that of single human beings.

The general sociological study of behavior may in the present systematics of plurality patterns be subdivided as follows:

- I. Behavior of single human beings and their groupings within a given (*G*) plurality pattern:
 - A. In relation to each other.
 - B. In relation to *G*.
- II. Behavior of the plurality pattern *G* as a whole:
 - A. Toward outside persons and groups.
 - B. Toward its members.
- III. Behavior of the external social world toward the plurality pattern *G*:
 - A. Behavior of other plurality patterns toward *G*.
 - B. Behavior of non-members of *G* toward *G*.

It must be granted that exact pronouncements concerning the behavior of the plurality pattern as a whole—subdivision II—are rarely possible without extending the scope of the investigation to include subdivision I. (To take an abstract collectivity as an example: when something definite is to be said about the behavior of the Catholic Church it is frequently necessary to investigate the behavior of some of the popes and sometimes even of the bishops, etc.)

§4. PERSONALITY, EMPIRICAL PLURALITY PATTERNS, AND THE "OBJECTIVE CROWD"

It makes a great deal of difference whether (1) the object of investigation is a particular empirical plurality pattern of which a detailed case study is available, or whether (2) an ideal-typical plurality pattern, a product of generalization and abstraction, is being analyzed. Let us consider the first.

Empirical plurality patterns, whether crowds, groups, or abstract collectivities, are always strongly influenced by particular personalities, even when such divergent varieties as the West Branch Sewing Circle in Oshkosh, the Standard Oil Company, the German Empire, or the French Republic are considered. When William II abdicated, the German Empire underwent a fundamental change; and France in the postwar period has been strongly influenced by Clemenceau, Poincaré, and Briand.

Every empirical plurality pattern undergoes remodelling at the hands of more or less leading personalities who establish norms or standards. Histories of particular clubs, police reports of mob action,

church histories, and accounts of industrial development almost always contain the names of certain persons, living or dead, who played an essential rôle. A great majority, the rank and file, of course remain anonymous; there is no doubt that Mrs. Arlington may be lost to the Greenhill Woman's Club because she lost her temper and that Mrs. Johnstone may take her place without producing any fundamental change. It is therefore necessary to remember that although there are always a few almost indispensable persons (only one of whom may be absolutely essential) in empirical plurality patterns, the other members, even when they are numerically overwhelming, are without any particular significance. Even where such insignificant members are concerned, however, we dare not forget that in spite of the fact that particular persons (Mr. Clarke, Mr. Hepburn, Miss Binns, Mrs. Dowe) may be unessential, what might be called the abstractly personal aspect of the human being as such, the self, the locus of sociation, is the very core of the plurality pattern, as we insisted in an earlier chapter (v). As a totality, all the Clarkes, Hepburns, Binns and Doves, with their fundamental tendencies (*N*) and their experiences (*E*) are extremely important in the plurality pattern. Many peculiarities and special capacities of the different persons may never enter into the network of relations or may be counteracted or compensated for by the unusual traits of others, but it is never a matter of entire indifference whether a committee is formed of Messrs. *A, B, C, D, E, F*, or of Messrs. *V, W, X, Y, Z*.

In spite of the manifold objections (only a few of which have been given above) which may be taken to Geiger's discussion of the crowd, with one statement we can heartily agree: "It is not the members alone who make up the structure; something else must be added." The grounds for agreement will, it is hoped, become clear when the group is dealt with in the next chapter. The committee made up of Messrs. *A, B, C, D, E, F* is characterized not only by the particular traits of these persons, but also by the fact that it is a committee, a group. Only as much of the personalities of the members can be expressed as is permitted by the nature of a committee. This is true not only for the average, virtually anonymous members, but also for the leaders. A plurality pattern can never be a mere projection or reflection of a particular person; at the most it will manifest some of his features, as it were, but these will be accompanied by a great many others which bear him no resemblance whatever. The France of Napoleon and the German Empire created by Bismarck were not merely Napoleonic or Bismarckian in character, but were, first and foremost, *states*.

§5. PERSONALITY, IDEAL-TYPICAL PLURALITY PATTERNS, AND THE
"OBJECTIVE CROWD"

How do these considerations affect theoretically constructed, ideal-typical plurality patterns such as the concrete crowd, the group, the state, the church, and their similarly ideal-typical sub-varieties? Valid generalizations about plurality patterns can be made only after close observation of many empirical, "real" plurality patterns. These are then compared in order that features common to all may be determined and used in the construction of general or ideal-typical patterns.

This procedure is of course too time-consuming and circuitous to be frequently used. Generalizations are usually based upon insights that owe less to discursive thinking and strictly comparative method than to phenomenological knowledge of the general type of plurality pattern—a kind of knowledge that is exact and specific, being based upon detailed although perhaps unconscious observations formerly made but no longer capable of being recalled. This "envisagement of essentials" (*Wesensschau*) is the point of departure for generalizations about plurality patterns far more frequently than is pure induction. *The phenomenological method of arriving at conclusions in sociology is here expressly recognized*, and is in no way to be confused with mere speculation, for its ultimate source, just as in the case of induction, is observation. To be sure, it is highly desirable that this "envisagement of essentials" be verified by systematic comparison of directly observable processes, and one of the functions of systematic sociology is to subject it to such comparison.

In this gradual progression from the single, empirical plurality pattern to the general, ideal-typical plurality pattern, the personal element inhering in the empirical becomes less and less prominent. When we wish conceptually to comprehend the crowd or group as such, we cannot concentrate our attention on the unique traits of the agitator Bill H. or the organizer Charles R. The empirical person disappears, but the person as an example of one or another social type, or as a typical locus of human sociation, i.e., as a typical socius, still remains important. In the transition from the empirical to the general plurality pattern, no transition from the personal to the impersonal-objective is involved. The transition is only from the specifically personal to the generally personal (always with the qualification that non-psychological structural regularities, objective factors, are mixed with the subjective phenomena, a qualification already implied when the dependence of the personal upon the non-personal is noted in dis-

cussing the empirical plurality pattern in the previous section [see also chaps. iii, §7; v, §2]).

From the standpoint of sociology as a science aiming at "formal" analysis of plurality patterns, the personal element can be dealt with only in the sense of completely unbiographical, general human traits. Indeed, the desideratum is to discover the regularities or "laws" of interaction imposing limitations on personal idiosyncrasies. The systematic sociologist, in contrast to the historian, attempts to determine in the states created by Bismarck or Napoleon the abstractly political and not the Bismarckian or Napoleonic, in the church of Gregory VII the ecclesiastical and not the Gregorian, and in Mrs. Miller's bridge club what pertains to the nature of clubs in general, the "clubistic," and not the "bridgistic" or the "Milleristic."

It would therefore be possible to recognize Geiger's statement as to the necessity of determining the "objective character" of the plurality pattern *if* this "objectivity" were not interpreted as "an existence independent of the behavior of the members of the plurality pattern," an interpretation of which Geiger is unfortunately guilty. In order to avoid this fundamental error, it seems best entirely to dispense with the concept of objective character. Its place is in metaphysics.

The bearing of the above considerations upon the concrete crowd must now be appraised. Beyond a doubt every action of empirical crowds is very strongly influenced by the particular personalities of their members. Consequently, we ascribe to the determination of this "personal equation" importance equal to the determination of the situation ($P = A \times S$). Comparison of the actions of present-day empirical crowds with previous crowd phenomena, however, makes it evident that worker *A* and apprentice *B* and artist *C* and all other persons dominated by crowd occurrences experience a virtually identical influence upon their separate personalities. Certain aspects of their natures otherwise more or less in evidence become latent, whereas others assert themselves with unexpected power, so that as a matter of fact worker *A* and his companions, in their capacity as members of the crowd, manifest a type of behavior markedly different from that primarily conditioned by their "everyday" attitudes; moreover, this behavior evidences almost the same tendency in all those involved. This influence of the crowd may perhaps be called the "crowd mind" if to do so seems helpful and if the dangers of the ambiguous expression are kept in view. This "crowd mind" or "crowd spirit" existed prior to its specific manifestations in worker *A*, inasmuch as it could

have been observed centuries before worker A was born, but it had no existence prior to the first persons who composed a crowd.

§6. THE BEHAVIOR OF CONCRETE CROWDS

The influence of the crowd upon its members—or in other words, their behavior as a concrete crowd—has frequently been described by social psychologists. Although the part played by Tarde and Sighele in observing the nature of the concrete crowd now makes LeBon's famous description seem less original than was formerly assumed, he nevertheless put the results of their observations in a form which concentrates on essentials and is still valid in its more general aspects. The common error of translating the French word *foule* by "folk," "people," or "proletariat" must of course be avoided. The concrete crowd is the only type dealt with by LeBon; he completely neglects the abstract crowd, to say nothing of the abstract collectivity. In fact, he seems entirely to misunderstand the latter—witness the introduction to his most important book, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*. He there calls the present "the era of crowds," by which he could mean only abstract crowds. Vleugels has thus summarized LeBon's characterization of the crowd:

"Three things characterize the crowd. First, there is the feeling of irresistible power arising from the simple fact of great numbers; this leads the members of the crowd to give vent to instincts which they would otherwise have restrained. The second is psychic contagion; this causes crowd members to yield themselves to almost any feeling or action. Third, last, and closely connected with the foregoing is the extraordinarily intensified suggestibility which distinguishes the 'crowd man' from the isolated person. These three characteristics, under which all the specific phenomena manifested by the crowd as a totality may be classified, are in conjunction responsible for the submergence of the conscious personality by the unconscious in the mind of the participant in crowd action—that is to say, they are responsible for the submergence of his powers of criticism. This is the reason for the low intellectual level which all observers of the crowd have noted, but also for the fact that because of the emotions and the actions to which they lead, the crowd may be better or worse than the isolated person; everything depends upon the *kind* of suggestion to which it is subject."⁴

So far as the direct observations upon which the present chapter is based provide grounds for conclusions, the above characteristics seem to have been correctly described and analyzed by LeBon. This, however, is still to be proved; the crowd theories of LeBon, Tarde, and Sighele are still mere hypotheses, supported by much evidence, but not

⁴ W. Vleugels, "Wesen und Eigenschaften der Masse," *Köln. Vt. Soz.*, II, 1, pp. 71 ff.

entirely acceptable until verified by a more exact method than has heretofore been used. In short, such theories merely set problems and indicate possible solutions. In agreement with the method underlying the system here set forth, the greatest possible number of occurrences showing crowd characteristics should first be collected and exactly analyzed with the following questions in mind: Is the feeling of power dominating crowd members a result of the great number of persons involved or of something else? Do contagion and suggestibility play the decisive rôles assigned to them by LeBon, and is the critical capacity of the persons involved as completely excluded as he seems to think? A sufficient number of inductions is still lacking; about all we have at present, with the possible exception of theories of the criminal crowd, are highly elaborated, tempting speculations with a large measure of probability—but objections such as those raised by Wieser should make us wary of premature conclusions. The crowd, more than almost any other plurality pattern, offers great opportunities for social-psychological research carried out by a large number of co-operating investigators; the inductions and experiments necessary far exceed the capacities of any single individual.

As a first step, more exact answers than we now have should be provided for the following questions:

(1) Is crowd activity possible only when there exists a prior state of excitement or stimulation? Or is the state of excitement and loss of critical capacity (often observed, and perhaps accurately characterized by LeBon) the result of an already existing concrete crowd? (A usable hypothesis would seem to be that the connection between them is reciprocal.)

(2) In what situations is crowd formation and crowd action the only possibility, and when does this possibility become inevitability? Under what circumstances is there little or no likelihood of the transformation of a multitude into a concrete crowd?

The following hypothesis seems capable of proof, and is recommended as a research lead: In spite of its organization the group is dominated by central and differential affects (emotions, etc., involving "*we are the central point about which all else revolves*" and "*we are different from all others*") that leave little scope for even relatively free reflection. It is therefore highly probable, to say the least, that the members of the concrete crowd are so much more completely dominated by strong central and differential affects that they can recognize only their intensely and self-consciously assertive "crowd selves" on the one hand, and on the other the force which

resists them and consequently must be annihilated, come what may. Alternatives are either disregarded or are viewed only as possible hindrances or helps to the crowd action.

All persons whose minds are not thoroughly schooled and disciplined feel the inner checks of thought, ethos, and suspended value-judgment as arbitrary restrictions upon their temperamental attitudes, i.e., upon their relatively "natural" selves (N factors in the general formula). They derive a great deal of pleasure in throwing off such checks and giving free rein to their segmental cravings. This, however, is possible only in the rare moments when they can abandon themselves, as it were, to the concrete crowd. The crowd is the liberator of the temperamental attitudes—not, to be sure, of all such attitudes, but only of those which fit the situation. When they so fit, and when the vague cravings of the separate members and the ends striven for by the crowd are complementary, there follows that emancipation of temperamental attitudes which, as noted above, leads to pleasurable and intense emotional states. Relinquishment of the higher mental powers through self-abandonment to the crowd and its action is subjectively more than compensated for by the orgiastic release afforded the temperamental attitudes.

There are a few persons, however, who have never externally or internally succumbed to the crowd; the situation affects them in a precisely opposite way. They are aware that the crowd demands of them a sacrifice of which their natures are incapable, namely, not only the *sacrificium intellectus* (in the deepest sense of that phrase), but also renunciation of the higher, more differentiated emotions. When confronted by a crowd situation they are seized with disgust and revulsion; an inner voice seems at once to make itself heard: "Resist and save your soul." Such persons do not have the craving of the crowd-minded, viz., to strip off and offer up the highly differentiated components of their selves; on the contrary, they are obsessed by an intense desire to retain their independence. Inasmuch as it is usually quite hopeless to oppose the crowd, there remains to them only flight and that condition of solitariness (chap. viii, §§2, 3) in which nothing is more repugnant than the crowd. In *this* sense the injunction of Horace is relevant: *Odi profanum vulgus et arceo!*

In contrast to the above, there may be observed in many persons a continual restless effort to find opportunities for self-abandonment in a crowd. They are ever on the scent of street disturbances, fires, and accidents, and they enjoy "get-togethers," "smokers," and "reunions" immensely; associativeness is dominant.

Some observers have called this lust for crowd abandonment an atavism, a regression to the "animal stage." Where such urges are dominant, say these writers, "animality" is uppermost. The process of genuine crowd action, however, seems to be a peculiarity of human beings; it is not really paralleled by the behavior of any of the other animals. A milling herd, for example, is *not* a crowd, in spite of popular assumptions to the contrary.

Similarly, there are theories to the effect that crowd phenomena constitute a revival of the type of human nature found among the uncivilized; the "primitive" is said to be resurrected when civilized men indulge in crowd behavior. These theories are thoroughly objectionable, for to say nothing of the fact that the psychology of the "primitive" is a highly speculative subject, modern concrete crowds, in spite of their release of temperamental attitudes, often manifest a measure of artificial elaboration which certainly does not imply the primitive in the phylogenetic sense. To be more explicit: compensatory behavior is frequently evident in the crowd, and such behavior is primarily the result of civilized conditions of life. Indeed, it may be asserted with considerable assurance that the behavior of crowds in preliterate cultures (about as close as we can ever get to the "primitive") is much more naïve and simple than the behavior of contemporary megalopolitan mobs, for the latter frequently manifest quirks, perversities, obliquities, devious twists, altogether foreign to the more direct and simple preliterate crowds. This assertion is of course intended to be merely suggestive; it is not offered as a result of extended research nor as an anticipation of future conclusions based upon inductive studies.

Is it possible to speak of a sociative function fulfilled by the concrete crowd? Yes. These short-lived plurality patterns are always striking revelations of moods, resentments, wounded feelings, vacillations, and disappointed expectations of numerically important social strata. They are, so to speak, volcanic eruptions of the social world which may and should serve as signs and portents. Even though chance or the senseless and unreasonable frequently play baneful rôles in such processes, they are always connected in some way with abstract crowds to which the closest attention should be paid, for in the brief manifestations of the concrete crowds the existence and vitality of abstract crowds become apparent. Moreover, as the over-brief presentation of Park's hypothesis (chap. xxxiv, §1) did something to show, the concrete crowd sometimes provides a source of new social structures; it may be a societal "fountain of youth."

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE CROWD: ABSTRACT

§1. THE NATURE OF ABSTRACT CROWDS

The concrete crowd offers most problems to the social psychologist, whereas the abstract crowd offers most to the sociologist. As already stated, the abstract crowd is not an abstract collectivity, for the latter requires a superpersonal, dominating ideology (i.e., a highly abstract, symbolic, neuropsychic pattern), and its history can be written; the abstract crowd, on the contrary, has its being only in vague feeling and prescience (i.e., neuropsychic patterns that are poorly integrated and have not reached the higher levels of consciousness), and consequently is a mentally formless, history-less maze—metaphorically speaking, a nebula. The fact that all plurality patterns exist only in the realm of neuropsychic patterns has several times been noted, as well as the fact that whatever differences exist between them are of gradually increasing or diminishing degree rather than of kind, and that they consequently are not separable. When we think of a crowd, chaos is connoted, but an abstract collectivity implies order. If we take as an example the most important variety of abstract crowd, the so-called “common crowd,” “vulgar crowd,” “crowd of common people,” or “the masses,” we find that the transitional stages leading to the concept of proletariat, an abstract collectivity, are very gradual and indistinct. It is frequently a matter of great doubt as to whether a particular phenomenon of social life should be regarded as an action of the abstract “crowd of common people” or of that of the lowest class, i.e., the proletariat. This has already been noted in the discussion of the Sacco-Vanzetti demonstrations (chap. xxxv, §3). In historical investigations, in studies of social development, in descriptions of the ideology of social strata, and in fact at all points where it is necessary to denote a relatively homogeneous unit, a unit that slowly grows or apparently performs conscious acts, the concept of proletariat, of class, is to be preferred; but where a formless collective force is being dealt with, a force that like the Earth-Spirit in *Faust* is a stranger to reason and that obscurely influences social life almost as do natural forces, it is advisable to speak of the “common crowd,” “the masses.”

The concept of "the masses" must be sharply distinguished from the concept of folk. The folk constitute an abstract collectivity; the masses form only an abstract crowd. The folk are centuries old and are, as it were, eternal; the masses are always young, new, and mutable.

Is it possible to parallel the contrast between crowd and abstract collectivity with Tönnies' contrast between the "sacred structure" and the "secular structure"? (See chaps. xv, §3; xxv, §2.) To use his psychological terms, are the masses dominated by arbitrary will (*Kürwille*), by rational decision in the light of conscious choice, and the folk by essential will (*Wesenwille*), by non-rational acceptance of standards? Not at all! In the abstract crowd there is no effective will of any kind except in those cases when a sudden transformation into the concrete crowd is about to take place. Further, the members of the abstract crowd frequently have not yet become conscious of its existence, and do not become conscious of it (if ever) until the thinker or the poet reveals it.

Yet it is also true that between the abstract crowd mentioned, i.e., the masses, and the plurality pattern known as the folk the transition is gradual and indefinite. Many events and many personal peculiarities can be explained as the result of affiliation with the folk, and many more, little if at all different, as the result of relations with the "common crowd."

In any event, folk and other bio-social collectivities could be more readily denoted by the term "sacred structure" than could the masses, for the latter form a mere abstract crowd that is not based upon blood kinship, does not have a biological basis (cf. chap. xv, §3, footnote 6); instead, it is always the result of social relations, and is consequently united only in and through shared experience and a common lot.

The institutions of public life, the law above all others, derive no support from the abstract crowd, for it is too amorphous, too uncondensed, too unorganized. Generally speaking, judicial decision, political action, education, aesthetic instruction, technics, etc., rarely if ever take any account of the abstract crowd, inasmuch as it is altogether too formless for such purposes and, being latent, calls no attention to its existence. Only the actions of concrete crowds, i.e., the aberrant manifestations of abstract crowds, are the means by which the law is challenged and forced to take a definite stand. But are these actions of concrete crowds the sole means by which the existence of abstract crowds under the surface of directly perceivable events

is disclosed? Would it not be remarkable if abstract crowds, apparently quiescent and generally obscure, should never become manifest in other than turbulent and explosive fashion?

The abstract crowd has other channels of expression; customs and standards, for example, may under certain circumstances be vehicles for the disclosure of its trends. Of course, the abstract crowd is by no means the only repository of standards; indeed, in comparison to the folk or the locality pattern it is of minor importance. Contemporary life, however, is greatly influenced by abstract crowds, and the lower megalopolitan masses, in particular, are frequently more subject to crowd influence than they are to the surviving effects of the village and the old kinship groupings.

Hence it may be said that abstract crowds become manifest in ways other than violent "cloudbursts" of concrete crowds. The latter are possible only because they are precipitations of slow-gathering "social clouds," of tense situations; abstract crowds may exert influence in ways entirely different—ways, moreover, that are susceptible of empirical observation, although so obscure that they are hidden to the superficial or untrained eye. The human being acquires countless impulses, cravings, objectives, hopes, and fears from his relations with the crowd in which he continually lives; just as affiliation with folk and family molds human beings, so also does membership in abstract crowds.

§2. "POLITE SOCIETY" AS AN ABSTRACT CROWD

The plural at the end of the last paragraph indicates that there is more than one kind of abstract crowd; indeed, new ones form every day. To think of the masses as the only variety is quite erroneous. The masses, it will be recalled, were regarded as the crowd counterpart of the proletariat, of the lower class; similarly, there is a crowd counterpart of the upper class. This counterpart is an abstract crowd of a peculiar kind, namely, a social stratum with clearly marked crowd characteristics. During and after the German Revolution, for example, there was to be observed a solidarity of what might be called the "upper crowd,"—a solidarity difficult to define but none the less effective. It therefore seems advisable to distinguish the upper crowd from the upper class, i.e., from the plutocracy, the bourgeoisie, the House of Have, the well-to-do, and similar terms for the upper class as an abstract collectivity. The upper crowd is identical with that amorphous plurality pattern commonly called "polite society," by which is meant a combination of approved manners and

opinions, correct and pleasing modes of address, assured demeanor, proper reserve, and good taste. Polite society seems to show all the distinguishing characteristics of an abstract crowd; moreover, these characteristics are complementary to those of the lower crowd, the masses. The criteria of membership in one or the other of these collectivities are in some respects direct opposites. If we are not content to use the colorless designation "social sphere," but seek more precisely to classify the concept of polite society in the systematics of plurality patterns, it seems necessary to label it an abstract crowd. The only obvious objections are the connotations commonly linked with the term crowd; it usually evokes such associations as rabble, gang, "dregs of society," or "noisy, unbridled pack," and consequently seems inapplicable to a social stratum that makes refinement, discipline, and reserve a criterion of membership. Those who have closely followed the definitions and analyses of the present system, however, will have acquired a concept of the abstract crowd that is much more general and free from value-judgments, hence it may be safely used.

§3. THE PUBLIC AS AN ABSTRACT CROWD

Although the abstract crowd called polite society is a counterpart of the abstract collectively known as the upper class, and although the abstract crowd termed the masses is a counterpart of the abstract collectivity called the proletariat or the lower class, nevertheless there are other abstract crowds which have no connection with class or folk. One of these, for instance, is the plurality pattern known as the public.

On the surface it may seem that the public cannot be called a plurality pattern. The assertion might be made, for example, that the public is merely a subjective phenomenon resulting from a particular way of regarding a large number of human beings. The actor, musician, or novelist is eager to build up a public, i.e., a body of admirers, and the bureaucrat is bent on impressing the public, i.e., the persons with whom he comes in official contact, with his own transcendent importance. These, however, are more or less one-sided social relations consisting almost entirely in specialized attitudes toward a large and shifting *multitude*, and this is the reason why some writers claim that the public is not a plurality pattern, for a multitude is not.

Such reasons, however, are too few and biased to be accepted. The public can be just such a plurality pattern as, for example, the upper

crowd, i.e., it can be an abstract crowd. No one, of course, lives his life solely as a member of the public, but in assigning human beings to membership in other plurality patterns such as the concrete crowd or the state, we do not imply that their whole lives are absorbed therein. Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that plurality *patterns* are not composed of living human beings but of interhuman relations. The public is a relatively unitary network of relations within which first one and then another human being is partially incorporated; their "membership" is usually limited to subordinate portions of their personalities—only a small and insignificant sector of the socius is involved.

The concept of the public makes very apparent the necessity of distinguishing the form in which it concretely appears from the abstract, lasting form. The public, in its concrete, immediate, perceivable form, is rarely if ever a concrete crowd; it is merely a multitude—which nevertheless shows to an unusual degree the general tendency of the multitude to become a concrete crowd! The public attending a dramatic presentation is normally—indeed, almost always—a multitude, but there are numerous cases in which just such multitudes have become concrete crowds as a result of politically, morally, or religiously offensive dramas.

More interesting, from the present point of view, is the latent, lasting, abstract crowd-form of the public. It is a configuration of ideas which cannot be thought of in detachment from contemporary public life, precisely because this configuration is so diffuse that it seems to find associations everywhere. Each of us in manifold ways enters daily into the mysterious and yet trivial "public sphere"; each of us, in many of his relations, "becomes" public.

This public is usually lacking in creative power; it is a passive something which nevertheless manifests all the malice of a creature that by obstinate resistance, indifference, or "contrariness" can wipe out the work of an active social force. The public must be present in order that the active force just mentioned (which may be a group, ideology, etc.) may have something upon which to act, but the public behaves in a relatively passive way, inasmuch as it merely responds to stimuli and does not in itself initiate anything. In other words, the public may be thought of as a plastic, easily molded "substance" which nevertheless decides the success or failure of efforts upon it. This is true not only of that public to which artistic achievements are offered, but also of the public which, for example, is expected to obey a sumptuary law.

§4. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ABSTRACT CROWDS IN GENERAL AND OF "THE MASSES"

Unfortunately, space forbids further discussion of the manifold varieties of abstract crowds; before concluding, however, some attention must be paid to certain points of view which may be used in the study of every kind of abstract crowd, and particularly of the masses. We shall briefly discuss the abstract crowd as:

A bond uniting those who share the same or similar experiences and a common lot;

A barrier to effective action of mind or reason upon human beings;
Human material for the use of leading personalities;

A residue left by the rise of the *élite*;

A source of societal rejuvenation.

In speaking of the abstract crowd as a bond uniting those who share the same or similar experiences and a common lot, a negative point must first of all be noted: it is not a willed bond. It is passive, not active, and thus is in marked contrast to the concrete crowd. The bond of shared experience is subjectively manifested by the fact that each member of the abstract crowd obscurely feels that he is linked with it in an indefinite way not due to his own initiative. Its objective aspects are manifested by the fact that the crowd is an unorganized plurality pattern, the members of which are inclined to act in similar fashion in certain situations. The abstract crowd is based on similar conditions of life and similar ways of living.

This is especially true of the abstract crowd *par excellence*, the masses, the "lower crowd." What are some of the characteristics of its members?

They feel themselves to be hampered and oppressed. This is primarily due to economic causes; the struggle for bare necessities, for daily bread, for what more fortunate persons take for granted, stamps upon them this fundamental trait. The feeling that they are excluded from the enjoyment of most of the real or supposed pleasures of life frequently makes the masses petty, jealous, and suspicious. They feel that they are exploited, although they usually are without any comprehensive grasp of the interconnections of the economic order. (The important interhuman relation of exploitation cannot again be analyzed; this has been done in a previous chapter [xxx, §2].) It should be recalled that exploitation has been defined as that situation in which "someone makes others work for him or takes for his own

use the fruits of their unrequited toil." The persons submerged in the masses frequently are harassed by the feeling that exploitation is their destiny, although this feeling is not present from the very beginning. Originally most of the poor (who are not yet in the masses and hence do not form an abstract crowd) believe that their social condition is immutable, objectively fitting, and in agreement with God's plans for them. Only by minute degrees does there arise the stage of "common-people-consciousness," of "masses-consciousness." This, to be sure, is the stage of transition to a genuine, aggressive, and self-conscious sense of being proletarian, i.e., to "class-consciousness" in the Marxian sense, but the transition may never be effected. In any event, it is exceedingly gradual and slow. "Masses-consciousness" is a vague crowd feeling unaccompanied by any powerful volition, a half-way house in which a great many persons live their whole lives. For example, small shop-keepers and others who seem to be economically independent often fall in the category of the masses. Indeed, some members of the politically organized proletariat remain in this transitional stage. It is characteristic of almost all members of the masses that they habitually speak of social matters in a complaining and mildly embittered way, and expect others so to speak; unemotional, objective discussion evokes little or no response from them.

As the consciousness of belonging to the masses grows, the desire for the maintenance of the existing social and economic order diminishes. *Relative* lack of property has a great deal to do (in Europe at least) with inclination toward a collectivistic form of social organization—a form that the genuine proletarian rounds out to a system imbued with all the values of a religion, but which the member of the masses regards with suspicion because he fears that the new social order will bring no favorable change in his material situation.

Members of the masses are frequently capable of a great deal of sympathy, especially when they see others in need of economic or physical aid, for they can imagine only too vividly how easily they themselves might be in similar distress.

Now, how does this far-reaching "abstract crowd of common people" affect those who belong to it but who endeavor to acquire or retain some distinctly personal traits? Two types are generated: on the one hand the brazen "go-getter," the social climber, the vigorous, unscrupulous, unabashed upstart; and on the other the inhibited, timid soul, utterly lacking in self-confidence, who does not feel that he has

any "claims on society" and who does not dare to lessen the social distance between himself and his superiors.

The masses are too much involved in the struggle for a bare material existence to rise to a more elevated conception of life. The higher mental and spiritual values necessarily seem questionable and alien to them; the fine arts, for example, are regarded as frivolous and insincere, or at the most as mere private diversions.

§5. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITE SOCIETY

But what about polite society? Members of this abstract crowd have understanding and fellow-feeling only for those like themselves; a deep chasm separates them from everyone else. To the limited extent at present possible, they cultivate in themselves a consciousness of mastery; "service" is obtained by scattering largess in the form of tips.

They look at life as a game that must be skilfully played. This is possible only when certain persons need not engage in coarse, monotonous toil; they exercise their bodies, but do so through sport and not through the daily grind of manual labor. Material needs being adequately provided for, glittering trivialities that serve to conceal the disturbing aspects of life can be taken seriously—assiduously cultivated so that one feels at ease in the world of flirtation and small talk, adroitly directs attention to the stylish embellishments of one's person and dwelling, and chatters glibly about art, philosophy, and the newest mode in drama.

Polite society is pitiless toward those who break its unwritten laws; blunders are never forgiven. It dominates its members through a veritable swarm of trivial conventions relating to commonplaces as well as to the larger problems of life. Such trivialities, externally manifest in "good manners," unite the members of polite society into a sort of inner circle that has nothing to do with the boundaries of profession or folk. Not to accept tips, not to seem to take advice from a servant, not to carry packages—these prohibitions and many more are for polite society veritable commandments to whose power of compulsion the laws of the state, so much revered by jurists, do not even remotely compare.

To be sure, polite society, although an abstract crowd, is rarely revealed as a concrete crowd; this is a marked contrast to the masses as an abstract crowd, for its members often seem to long for the moment when they can engage in concrete crowd action. Why is this? Well, polite society can gain its ends in other ways; crowd action is

not necessary. Moreover, the latent hostile emotions of its members are not in such high tension, inasmuch as there is less strain upon them. Nevertheless, the relentlessness with which polite society rejects those not stamped with its hall-mark, even to those lacking only in some minor point of etiquette or good form, is highly indicative of a certain obscure hostility.

Here again the question arises as to the type of personality generated by such an abstract crowd. By and large, the type may be said to be that of the gentleman, the lady, the "white-collared man," and the well-known "refined" person. Under the régime of polite society the person acquires a certain combination of attitudes which when genuine is a blend of assurance and modesty, together with an unobtrusive and reserved demeanor—behavior that does not "get on one's nerves." These attitudes may be second nature, genuine and charming. Frequently, however, they are superficial—mere pose. Ever present is the danger of snobbishness and coldness toward all "outsiders."

Both kinds of abstract crowd, upper and lower, are without profound insight, engrossed in material things, for they are *crowds*. All arguments which successfully appeal to crowds must be shallow and coarse; the crowd has no humor and no feeling for the tragic. It blindly sacrifices men whose true value it is unable to appreciate.

§6. MIND AND CROWD

We have already stated that the crowd is a barrier to the effective action of mind or reason (§4); to crowds of every kind the things of the mind are alien. The victories of the mind over material things as revealed in the works of the great leaders of humanity—the founders of religions, prophets, moralists, mystics, poets, and thinkers, whom for the sake of brevity we shall call "the sublimated" (no value-judgment implied), do not attain their full effect because of two barriers: first, groups and abstract collectivities; second, crowds. The former hinder the sublimated by means of the power which the traditional norms give them; their old ideology attempts to stifle the new. The hindrance offered by abstract crowds is of another kind; it is simply that of dull inertia—they do not wish to leave the mire in which they have so long wallowed. They do not want to be more devoted to the things of the mind, but rather to remain close to the material. Their spirits are sometimes *slightly* willing, but their flesh is weak. The crowd is first and foremost flesh; it forces the sublimated to choose between compromise or annihilation, and even though the latter desire no compromise, the success of their doctrines and teach-

ings makes it inevitable, for success means gradual adulteration and dilution to suit the crowd.

This inertia enables us to recognize one of the functions of the abstract crowd, which is that of bringing the sublime down to the level of the human-all-too-human. The sublimated always make impossible demands upon human nature; they want to force the varied, colorful drama of human life into a strange, one-sided scheme. The crowd resists this; their cravings and desires teach them that human beings cannot be entirely holy, cannot live in complete detachment from the world, cannot live altogether in the mind or spirit, cannot be altogether sublimated. In a certain sense, the crowd is quite as justified in its position as the sublimated are in theirs. The crowd defends the animal aspects of life; it fosters the earthly, the clinging to mortality; it champions the biceps, the backbone, and the belly against the brain.

Nevertheless, the crowd is not merely the antagonist of the sublimated; in a sense it furnishes material upon and with which the latter desire to work, for they wish to reach and influence human beings—either they sway the crowd or they remain ineffective. The crowd drags ideas down to its own level, but at the same time it is the only agency by which they are diffused. To speak metaphorically, the crowd is the indispensable chorus not only for the sublimated but for all types of political and social leaders.

Another heading under which the crowd may be treated is that of "a residue left by the rise of the *élite*," or more succinctly, "residuum of the *élite*." Theodor Geiger has greatly aided crowd analysis by coining the latter phrase; it denotes the profound contrast between a small number of *élite* and a numerous "residuum." Many of the manifestations of the crowd may be explained by the fact that genuine crowd members do not in any sense belong to the *élite*. Their compensatory traits in particular are explained by the fact that they are a residuum. Because the grapes cannot be reached, the crowd says they are sour. They are all too conscious of being mere crowd members; the very existence of an *élite* humiliates the crowd, and it rejoices in the opportunity to change from latent to active form if it can thereby tear down the social structure for which the *élite* are responsible. The crowd hates the man whose superiority and independence it recognizes; even in the time of Socrates the raging mob rejoiced in annihilating those who dared to call its judgments in question, and we have more than one historical example to show that the sublimated who devote their whole lives to raising mankind from

the depths often are compelled to gaze into the fiery, hate-filled eyes of men who shout, "Away with him and give us Barabbas!"

In spite of all this, it seems justifiable again to apply to the crowd a metaphor which it may not at first glance seem to deserve, namely, the societal "fountain of youth." (See chap. xxxiv, §1, for former use of this figure.) It must be admitted that the metaphor does not denote all that is meant; better phrases would be "the source of social rejuvenation" or "the reservoir of interhuman energy." This is the sociative function of the crowd. All the sublimated draw upon it, make use of it in their achievements; they know too much of the abysses of life, of its irreconcilable contradictions and insurmountable difficulties, to remain entirely resolute and rosy-cheeked themselves. The great one-sidedness of their natures makes them pathological, in the sense that they are not completely adapted to life as it is lived—perhaps it is this very fact that makes their sublimation necessary. The members of the crowd, however, "stay normal"; they remain frivolous, devoted to trivialities; they abandon themselves gladly to every dominant power and do not ask too many questions about meaning and inner truth.

But should the *sociologist* decide which is better: sublimation, or submergence in the crowd?

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE GROUP: GENERAL ASPECTS

§1. THE CONCEPT OF GROUP IN GENERAL

In the present system the group is the second of the three principal types of social or interhuman plurality pattern; therefore (1) it must have the characteristics of a plurality pattern, and (2) it must be distinguishable from the other two types. The frequent error of confusing the concepts of crowd and group, and similarly, of group and abstract collectivity, must be avoided. Nothing has had more disastrous theoretical consequences, for example, than LeBon's designation of sects, castes, and classes as "homogeneous crowds"; further, it would be a great mistake to apply the term group to a modern, highly developed state.

Even when groups are observed without any theoretical prepossessions—that is, just as they appear to the hurried glance of the practical man—it is nevertheless easily noticeable that many of them are fundamentally characterized by the particular kind of interhuman relations they manifest. To take a few random examples: most persons would probably define the nature of such groups as fellowships or guilds, Bohemian coteries, and ensembles, in agreement with the way in which human beings are united in them. Of course, it is also true that there are a great many other groups which the sociologically untrained person would not define primarily by the way in which they unite human beings, but rather in agreement with the purposes of these groups. This would probably be the case, for example, with non-sociological definitions of political parties, factories, and stock exchanges. A third series of groups would, for other than sociological purposes, be defined partly as networks of relationships and partly with reference to their purposes. Examples of this third class are found in armies, harems, and university faculties; definitions of these for practical rather than theoretical uses would almost certainly combine both points of view.

Further, the demands of practical life sometimes lead to emphasis upon the purpose of the group, whereas at other times its interhuman features are stressed. Instance a boarding-house or pension: some-

times attention is fastened upon its function of providing transient or semi-transient guests with a particular kind of subsistence; at other times, upon the peculiar interhuman relationships which are developed in and through this particular way of living together.

Often a definition is determined by the viewpoint of the observer. Witness the fact that a circus, a horse-race, or a prize-fight may be regarded with reference to their purpose of providing amusement, and also as types of public gathering in which the showmen and the public interact in a particular way.

Observation unguided by sociological principles must therefore be admitted to evidence some interest in the relationships prevailing in group life, but although such relationships are not entirely neglected, they are not *always* in the foreground. For the purposes of the present system, therefore, such unguided observation is quite useless, because we are interested in applying the *same* method of observation to all groups, and indeed, to all plurality patterns. We are interested primarily in the association or dissociation of human beings, and not in the purpose for which such sociation takes place. This is also true of the other examples we have cited: in analyzing political parties, factories, stock exchanges, etc., the systematic sociologist is chiefly concerned with the social processes that are responsible for these networks of social relationships.

Consequently an attempt at a sociological definition of the group as such must cover a great deal of ground and have very little content: therefore, *those interhuman plurality patterns are termed groups which are of such relatively long duration and relative solidarity that the persons therein affiliated come to be regarded as a relatively homogeneous unit.*¹ By thus emphasizing duration and solidarity, the group is distinguished from the concrete and the abstract crowd, and by emphasizing the affiliative homogeneity of definite, empirical human beings, it is distinguished from the abstract collectivity. This should not be interpreted as a contradiction of the point already stressed, namely, that members are not elements of the group as totalities but that the group is merely a combination, and to some extent an intensification, of relationships between them. The statement that human beings affiliated in the group may be regarded as a

¹ If it were not far too general, confusing as it does the crowd and the group, Small's definition (which was one point of departure for that given above) might be used: "The term 'group' serves as a convenient sociological designation for any number of people, larger or smaller, between whom such relations are discovered that they must be thought of together" (A. W. Small, *General Sociology*, p. 495).

relatively homogeneous unit is therefore to be interpreted as follows: the relationships existing between members of a group are especially numerous, intense, and recurrent.

§2. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GROUP; THE PROBLEM OF THE GROUP MIND

The characteristics of the group as an ideal type are: (1) relatively long duration and relative continuity; (2) organization based on division of function among members; (3) neuropsychic patterns, symbolic of the group, present in its members; (4) the growth of traditions and customs as the group grows older; (5) interaction with other plurality patterns.

The first point distinguishes the group from the crowd, as already noted. Point 2 is chiefly characteristic of medium-sized and large groups, for the smaller groups, and especially the pair or dyad, have only a rudimentary division of function. In connection with point 3, it should be noted that the neuropsychic patterns symbolizing the group to its members need not necessarily be uniform—indeed, considerable difference as between member and member may be found. Point 4 lays emphasis on the influence of the past upon the present structure and functions of the group. Point 5 calls attention to the fact that no group is completely self-determining and self-sufficient, but that on the contrary it cannot withdraw from the total sociative process and is more or less determined from without.

Next, we are confronted by this difficult question: Should the existence of a "group mind" be adduced as a distinguishing characteristic of a typical group? Certainly the literature is full of theories about the group mind, but the evident prejudice in favor of this hypothesis—which so often leads to mysticism—should cause us to examine it very carefully before committing ourselves. There can be no doubt that the members of a group have more or less clear ideas regarding it and that they emotionally participate in its activities—in other words, their neuropsychic patterns are well integrated about the group symbol or symbols. Moreover, many of these neuropsychic patterns are in certain aspects identical or at least similar in the majority of group members. Again, there may be distinguished among the ideas and emotions actually present in the persons concerned certain ones which, according to group standards, they *ought* to hold. The end or purpose of the group, perhaps specified in the written code if any exists, or perhaps unformulated, prescribes for group members a definite way of thinking and feeling (although this of

course differs greatly in intensity or extent among the various members). There is certainly something which can be called the group idea, the group thought. How this idea is embodied or, as it were, reflected in the separate neuropsychic organizations of those concerned, the degree to which they yield themselves to it, and to what extent it diverges from the neuropsychic patterns *actually* present in them is another question. Three things must be distinguished: (1) the large aggregate of representations, images, or other neuropsychic patterns, often widely *different*, actually held by each of the different members; (2) the commonly shared neuropsychic patterns, i.e., those which are in approximate agreement among the majority or among the more influential members—these common representations, etc., form a small nucleus (sometimes very small) within the larger neuropsychic aggregate mentioned above; (3) the idea of the group as such, which as a rule is the principal content of the representations in the nucleus just noted. As a matter of fact, we can conceptually distinguish between this idea as *content*, on the one hand, and the representations as *processes* on the other; and can designate the former as the “group mind”—that is, as something autonomous. This autonomous something, however, is not a mystic entity *detachable* from human beings and, as it were, floating over them as a sort of supersensible cloud; it is only a more or less clearly formulable idea, a neuropsychic pattern manifest in the consciousnesses of the group members with varying intensity and indefiniteness.

We have still, however, to answer the question whether such a basic idea must be regarded as a characteristic of *every* group, for, as we have seen, the category of group is very extensive and comprises markedly contrasting plurality patterns. There are groups which absorb almost the total personalities of their members, and there are others which lay claim only to fragmentary portions of the neuropsychic organizations and actions of those belonging to them. For example, the groups usually called purposive unions (in a classification given later these are called spurious *B* groups) which exist only for one or at the most a few highly specialized purposes—e.g., a jewelers’ protective association, a return load van movers’ association—certainly have a central idea; it consists of the purpose of the group. But should such a purpose be called the “group mind” or the “group spirit”? Confusion soon arises if it is so called, for the same terms are frequently applied to a socializing force, the *esprit de corps*, that fusion of camaraderie and voluntarily accepted discipline which dis-

tinguishes certain bodies devoted to the service of an idea sanctioned by the prevailing moral code.

The way out of the dilemma seems to be as follows: in conjunction with considerations (usually rational) serving group purposes, there develops from tradition and common representations of the nature of the group a moral "group mind," which then imparts specific content to the forces making for closer ethical agreement and socialization within the group. When this occurs, however, *the germ of an abstract collectivity has developed within the group*, and although it is undoubtedly necessary to deal with the former type of plurality pattern primarily in terms of the ideology, etc., it embodies, the common practice of assuming, in advance of investigation, that the group as such is characterized by a "group mind" must be regarded as highly questionable. Sufficient attention is called to the psychical core of every group by stressing the characteristic noted under (3) above. It certainly does not seem justifiable to jump at the conclusion that every bridge club and sewing circle possesses a "group mind," although the excessive zeal lavished on all kinds of petty associations in Germany and elsewhere brings with it the tendency to hang an "ideal" on every trivial purpose of the group. The following generalization is broad enough: the group usually has a tendency to develop a specific "group mind" or "group spirit." (There is no reason why such a *tendency* should not be listed as a sixth characteristic of the group.)

§3. THE GENESIS OF THE GROUP

How does a group arise? When does it begin? As noted above, it is sometimes a stage of development subsequent to that of the crowd. The latter becomes organized, makes an effort to stay in existence over a long period, and divides functions among at least a part of its members. There are many transitional forms between the crowd and the group; among them may be instanced the troop formed on joint pilgrimages, excursions, and "hikes"; its organization is looser and more transitory than is that of a genuine group. This transitoriness provides the chief justification for distinguishing it from the group.

In spite of such instances, however, the origin of the group in the crowd is relatively rare in comparison with other sources. In fact, it may be frequently observed that crowd and group constitute direct opposites. The Sacco-Vanzetti riots in Paris furnish a good example: the rioters in the form of a concrete crowd were opposed by the police acting as a group (chap. xxxv, §3). The same is true of some demon-

strations: the demonstrators form a group, with leaders and orators selected beforehand, and follow a previously determined line of march. After the orderly conclusion of the affair, it frequently happens that part of the procession becomes a mob, a violent concrete crowd, the actions of which are conditioned primarily by basic attitudes and the situation. In short, the group becomes a crowd in spite of previous group efforts to prevent such an occurrence—here again the opposite tendencies of crowd and group are evident.

In most cases a group grows out of a concatenation of relations; all the association-engendering factors pointed out in the systematics of action patterns may play a part. For example, there are groups which suddenly shoot up on the basis of contacts alone; more frequent, however, are groups based upon advance, adjustment, or accordance. More frequently still, not only one or two principal processes but all of them in conjunction operate in the formation of a group.

When do groups grow out of relationships? This may best be exemplified by the relatively simple case of the dyad or of the small groups ranging from the triad upward.

An instance of the latter: a small number of persons travel together in a long-distance omnibus. Mere spatial proximity does not constitute them a group. In the beginning there are only contacts; conversation finally starts when a halt is made for lunch, and several of the occupants learn that they have a common destination—they are going to the same summer resort. A box of candy is shared; contacts have led to common-human processes. A later meeting is planned, but it cannot be said that a group has come into being. If it should happen that the relationships among the fellow travellers grow so intimate that during the whole vacation period they form a closed circle of table companions who in many ways show preference for each other's company, an incipient group is plainly evident. Still more frequently, groups arise out of relationships generated during long ocean journeys: examples are afforded by the play groups which take part in the deck games in a loosely organized way and sponsor dances and masquerades.

§4. COMPONENTS OF THE GROUP

Comte believed that four elements could always be discovered in every human group: the operative, the directive, the intellectual, and the emotional. This classification, early in the history of sociology though it was, seems adequate. Every group must embody one or

more guiding or directive forces. Second, it must be able to put its projects into operation. Further, the ability rationally to plan for the group must be possessed by at least one member to whom this function is assigned. Fourth and last, it must not be forgotten that emotions usually sustain and preserve the unity of the group; frequently its emotional life is represented by all the operative forces, often by only a few members, and sometimes in its full depth and persistence only by the leader.

Although we can agree with Comte's assertion that all division of function in the group can finally be reduced to this four-fold form—direction, operation, rational planning, and emotion—it is necessary to add a qualification. Such separation of group powers must not be understood to involve so complete and lasting a division that the leader never has any part in operation, that the planner is neither leader nor operator, and that the emotional life of the group is lived by someone who has no part in anything else. Probably all that Comte meant was that every developed group must have directive and operative, planning and emotional capacities. This of course does not indicate who the possessors of these capacities are. Often the functions of leading, planning, and feeling for the group are united in only one person who therefore is, so to speak, its soul. He could truthfully say of himself, "I am the group," even though it has thousands of members.

At this point an extremely interesting question arises: Is a group whose members are all on the same level possible? A group in which there is neither leader nor led and in which there are no differences in rank? There has been no lack of experiments along this line; indeed, in Soviet Russia the attempt has been made to train orchestras to play without a director. If experience teaches anything, however, it teaches that the group *in particular* is a plurality pattern primarily based upon leadership; the maxim, "Without leadership, no group," is valid. And, inasmuch as the leader implies the led, these *two* functions must be regarded as a necessary attribute of every typical group.

This of course means only that a complete absence of higher and lower status in the group is impossible in the long run. Higher or lower status, however, does not necessarily mean higher or lower degrees of recognition; although equality of function is impracticable, equality of recognition is by no means impossible—for leaders need not always demand or receive greater recognition than their fellows. Moreover, it is even less necessary for the function of leadership to be

carried out, either for a short or long period, by one person only. Leadership may change; those previously led may take over the leadership by turns or in other ways. This circulation of function may under certain circumstances be greatly accelerated. Sometimes it is quite possible to reduce the function of leadership to mere regulation of group affairs through general discussion in which every member has an equal right to participate, but the person who can even for a moment dominate the discussion must be regarded as at least a temporary leader. Hence the pyramid-like structure of the group, although it can never be made entirely horizontal, can be "democratized" by provision for a very rapid interchange of the various levels forming the pyramid. It is not necessary for someone to be permanently a leader and the others permanently followers. Systematic circulation of function, however, is not adapted to all groups, and the above analysis of possibilities should not be construed as a recommendation. The contrast has merely been drawn between rapid change of function on the one hand and a rigid hierarchy on the other. The completely leaderless group is practically impossible to maintain over more than a short period.

§5. THE GROUP AND ITS MEMBERS

The study of the relation between the group and its members is always interesting, even though the connection between the two is not so complicated and far-reaching as in the case of the abstract collectivity.

Enough has already been said regarding the fallacious "universalistic" argument that the group is logically prior to the persons who compose it (chap. xxxviii, §2); we shall merely repeat our conclusions: the group and the single member are simultaneous; the member functions in the group and the group functions in the member. We search for and discover the human being as a *socius* primarily in his group relationships. The statement that "We find the true man only through group organization" may be regarded as valid if by this nothing more is meant than that human beings manifest their capacities primarily in social actions involving group associations. But note that the statement reads "the true man," *not* "the whole man"! Not all the inner powers of the human being enter into group actions; there always remains something inalienable, an extrasocial fragment (cf. chaps. ii, §6; v, §4).

It is necessary, however, to give due weight to the group as an essential element in all social structure in order that the fallacies of

the false antithesis between "individual" and "society" may again be exposed (cf. chap. iv, §§2, 3). "Society" as a whole does not form one hemisphere of the social globe and "individual" existence the other. Such empty abstractions mean nothing; actual, concrete plurality patterns such as groups are the structures with which human beings become interwoven, within which they live, and for which they work. Moreover, groups in general absorb a greater part of the personalities of their members than do crowds and abstract collectivities. Groups, to be sure, are greatly dependent upon the forces of collectivities; at the same time, however, they mediate between the latter and human beings. Not "the church" as a whole but the parish or the congregation is the religious sphere of most ordinary persons. Again, the state is manifest to the majority of citizens only in its more or less tangible bureaus and departments.

There is a widespread but false tendency to conceive of the member and the group antithetically, to think of them as mutually exclusive opposites. Wygodzinski says: "The group demands for its own benefit the renunciation of individuality"; and again, "We become aware of group-consciousness only because of its antagonism to self-consciousness."²

Are such absolute statements correct? No, for the relation between member and group is not so simple. Two possibilities exist: first, the group may at times demand renunciation, or at least suppression or restraint, of self-expression or "self-will"; second, the group relation and group experience may set free for the first time the latent originality and "personality" of its members. To restate: as a result of group dominance many wishes, many previously acquired attitudes, many impulses, find no possibility of expression, but just as often group influences are responsible for the emergence of new, previously suppressed, or vaguely felt tendencies and volitional stirrings that thereafter determine behavior.

The person joining a company of soldiers, a college fraternity, a trade union, a lodge, or a Boy Scout troop, the man who becomes a son-in-law, the woman who becomes a daughter-in-law, is almost always remodelled; adjustment, often painful, to the standard valid for the group takes place. The greater the discrepancy between the previous attitudes of the person and the group standard, the more must the divergent traits of the former be temporarily or permanently sacrificed, but the new attitudes acquired in the process are seldom

² Willy Wygodzinski, "Skizze einer allgemeinen Gruppenlehre," *Köln. Vt. Soz.*, I, 3, pp. 45-53.

wholly at variance with his inclinations. As a general thing, connections are established between his own personality traits and the "group spirit." The newcomer gives and takes, wins and loses. To be sure, a personal deficit sometimes results, but frequently the group also gives opportunities for action that previously did not exist; unused powers are called upon. The newcomer learns to know himself in an aspect that he had never before suspected. For the first time he becomes a definite personality, for he has become truly "*self-conscious*."

In conjunction therewith, is it possible to have "group-consciousness" only because of its supposed antagonism to "self-consciousness"? Inasmuch as the group as such has no consciousness, the phrase "group-consciousness" as here used can mean only the knowledge and emotion of the members with regard to their group; this "group-consciousness" is often said to be in antagonism to the consciousness the person has of himself. In order to clear up the confusion obviously present here, three typical, basic interconnections must be distinguished: (1) group-consciousness may be in antagonism to self-consciousness; (2) self-consciousness may be closely linked with the feeling of belonging to the group (the former may draw its "nourishment," as it were, from the latter; or conversely, group-consciousness may be wholly subservient to self-consciousness); (3) finally, both inner experiences may exist side by side without any interaction between them.

Ethnologists perpetually argue whether group-consciousness or self-consciousness predominates among preliterates. The question has no meaning, for it is based upon the erroneous assumption that the psychic lives of preliterates are just as highly differentiated as are those of persons shaped by more complex cultures. This assumption is erroneous because the preliterate is not even emotionally aware of any antagonism between individual and social (cf. chap. xv, §3, footnote 6). He lives naïvely in and with his kinship group, and usually feels himself so bound up with his group, so "organically" a part of it, that a feeling of independent personality has little or no opportunity to develop. This of course does not mean any lack of the feeling of "I"; the preliterate may under certain circumstances react with a strong "I-feeling." This is usually true of the chief at least, although the intensity of such feeling varies among different peoples and at different periods; it is similarly true, in most instances, of the priest, although in another and more complicated way. When a chief is so powerful as to be absolutely dominant (which is not always the case), he often feels thus: "I am the tribe; my personal cravings and lusts

are all that need be considered" (although at times belief in magic may impose some limits). In such cases, consciousness of the existence of the group is in large measure subservient to the "I-emotions."

Such naïve mingling of group-consciousness and self-consciousness, however, gradually undergoes differentiation. The group becomes more independent, more matter-of-fact, and temporarily and partially dissociates itself from the cravings and lusts of the leader; the separate person, whether leader or follower, develops self-consciousness as something specifically in contrast to his knowledge and emotion regarding the group.

Consequently, the assertion that group-consciousness precedes personal consciousness lacks foundation. Lotze once said, "Even the trodden worm has a dim self-consciousness, and holds that its agony outweighs everything else in the world." The doomed war-captive undergoing slow torture, the chief glorifying in a human hecatomb, the handmaiden tottering under a crushing burden, the youth revelling in the orgiastic dance, all feel pain and pleasure in their "I-capacities," as separate selves, but they also vaguely feel how closely their own weal or woe is linked with that of their sib or tribe, and in this sense we may say that the group thinks and feels in them.

Further, social development increases "the selfishness of the self," but also brings with it a realization of the claims of others. Egoism appears, but altruism and purely personal sympathy also awaken. In conjunction with these phenomena, there simultaneously emerges, as a partial union of egoism and altruism, something that may (if the phrase is used with caution) be called the "group spirit." Sometimes this group spirit degrades the more advanced members, but it also is the most effective means of bringing the less advanced to a level higher than the merely animal.

Nevertheless, little can be said about the group spirit that is generally valid; a dyadic marriage group, for example, has an effect altogether different from an octadic or decadic family group (octad = eight members; decad = ten). Therefore the further ramifications of the points above raised can be traced only in specific analyses of various types of group; these follow later.

§6. SIGNIFICANCE OF NUMBER OF GROUP MEMBERS; THE OPTIMAL LIMIT

Simmel has already paid a good deal of attention to the influence of the number of members upon the group. Certain it is that the three types of group distinguished in the present system—small, medium-

sized, and large—manifest essential differences as well as common features.

The assertion has been made that the intensity of group bonds is usually in inverse ratio to the size of the group; the smaller therefore would have greater stability. This is too sweeping; nothing more than tendencies and statistical probabilities could be demonstrated under any circumstances. Further, small groups have no greater statistical probability of stability than have large; under certain conditions the intensity of group bonds is greater in large groups, and under others greater cohesion is evident in small groups. Beyond any doubt a larger number of members means a larger amount of power redounding to the benefit of the group; moreover, the large group can institute a more elaborate system of division and combination of labor, i.e., a more intensive organization, and this also strengthens it. On the other hand, the situations likely to arise in the small group are more predictable and controllable; further, ordination and sometimes subordination of the members is more readily effected. There is not so great a number of opposing wills. The chief remaining difference between the two types lies primarily in the fact that the large group necessarily has a matter-of-fact, detached, objective influence, whereas the effects of the small group are intimate and personal. The intimate character of the small group is most plainly evident in the type smallest of all—the pair or dyad.

The effect of numbers varies greatly among the more specific types: it is not the same in a sect as in a corporation, in a company of soldiers as in a coterie of conducted tourists. Wygodzinski has formulated the important proposition: "Every group has an optimal limit varying according to the situation." To be sure, this limit does not depend merely on the situation; it is determined by the existing combination of social processes in conjunction with the situation.

No matter how apparently valid the proposition that groups have a changing optimal limit may be, however, a closer inquiry is necessary. Moreover, the fact that optimal limit means the same as "margin" affords an opportunity to raise the important question as to whether the concept of margin, which has been so fruitful in economic theory, may not also be usable in sociology. In economics, margin denotes the last unit which must be taken into account in order to attain a certain economic goal (in practice or theory). It is well known that by the use of this concept phenomena such as value, price, rent, and income may be explained. But in spite of its manifold applications in economic theory, its usability in sociology is nearly

nil unless two essential postulates can be fulfilled: there must be a divisible whole, and this whole must be relatively scarce.

Because of this, it follows that the concept of margin cannot be so extensively used in sociology as in economics, for economic activity always implies dealing with goods that are relatively scarce; indeed, all economic activity may be deduced from the principle of scarcity. Once this is plain, an essential difference between economic theory and economic sociology (to speak of the most closely related special sociology) becomes evident, for in the latter the interconnections of economic life must be observed without any attempt at deduction from the principle of scarcity. This being true for special sociology, it is still more true of the general type here set forth: sociology can make no use of the principle of scarcity in analyzing social processes and plurality patterns, for these sociations are not relatively scarce in the economic sense, i.e., they are "free goods." The most fundamental objection of all, however, is that sociological problems are not quantitative problems at all; sociology does not deal with multitudes, statistical aggregates of fixed units, but with interhuman behavior.

But to return to the specific problem, i.e., the relation of number of members to group stability. Here the concept of optimal or marginal limit is significant in two ways.

First, every group is engaged in carrying out a function for one or more "higher" and as a rule larger plurality patterns. The extent to which these functions are effectively fulfilled varies, and this fact raises the problem of the most suitable number of members for maximum achievement, i.e., the problem of the optimal limit or margin.

Second, it is possible merely to study the degree of group stability, without reference to the function the group serves within a superordinate plurality pattern, and such study will demonstrate that there is a definite relation between its extent (number of members) and its density (stability). The desideratum is the determination of numerical limits (exact or approximate) for empirical groups that will correspond to their purposes and to the social processes coming to a focus within them. Emphasis must be laid on the word "correspond," for it points out the fundamental difficulty involved, namely, the multifarious purposes and relationships to which the numerical limits must correspond. There is no possibility of fixing an optimal number of human beings that holds good under all conditions; the number will and must vary, depending upon whether the group in question is a sect, a conspiratorial band, a college fraternity, or a squad of soldiers. Not only this: we must go still further and say that the optimal

number will necessarily vary in every specific, empirical example of the sect, band, fraternity, or squad.

Nevertheless, the problem of the optimal limit may be very pressing indeed in just such empirical groups. At some time or another in the history of each of them a stage is reached that evokes such questions as: Is the group becoming too large? Does it contain too great a number of "outsiders"? Is it growing too slowly? Is it too loosely or too rigidly organized? If he is to be successful, every organizer must seek and find the specific optimal limit of the group for which he is responsible. The problem can be solved only by taking full account of the existing and predictable combinations and sequences of processes and situations.

§7. MEANS OF GROUP PRESERVATION

What means are available for the preservation of the group? It must defend itself against both outer and inner enemies. Its existence may be endangered by its own members, by non-members as well, and also by other plurality patterns (superordinate, co-ordinate, and subordinate).

Let us first discuss internal factors of preservation. Elective groups (chap. xxxiii, §4) are more dependent upon the volitions and wishes of their members than are regulated groups, for the latter are as a rule able to bring about conformity through the support given them by superordinate plurality patterns such as the state. Many groups are maintained primarily by coercion. Others, however, are based in greater or lesser degree upon voluntary membership. Of the latter it may be said that their preservation is directly proportional to the measure in which they contribute to the basic wishes of their members. Here as elsewhere the classification of wishes in four groups is a useful device for bringing order into confusion. Many groups, for example, vouchsafe their members security; as long as the latter are satisfied in this respect the group is at least internally secure. Others provide new experiences and sensations; examples are afforded by associations for sport, travel, art appreciation, erotic stimulation, etc. Still other groups aim at securing for their members recognition and prestige; among these may be instanced college fraternities, war veterans' posts, and luncheon clubs such as Rotary and Kiwanis. Other groups gratify the wish for response, or at least attempt to do so; among these might be numbered all those which emphasize fellowship, friendship, community spirit, and neighborliness. All these groups, based as they are upon voluntary affiliation and withdrawal,

depend for their very existence on the approbation they secure by gratifying the wishes of their members.

The relation of plurality pattern and person in such groups is consequently fairly simple; it becomes much more complex, however, when groups based upon coercion are considered. Groups maintained solely by the fear which coercion evokes in members are rare; much more frequent is the mixed group based partly upon coercion and partly upon voluntary membership, and the social psychologist may learn much from it.

The discussion has thus far been confined to internal preservative factors; the external are next to be discussed. In order that the latter may be considered in the proper light, however, it is necessary to point out certain implications of the former.

Coercion is of course but another term for "threat or infliction of more or less serious disadvantage"; conversely, voluntary affiliation with a group is a result of the advantages such affiliation provides or promises. When these simple facts are kept in mind, the following brief analysis of external preservative factors also serves to demonstrate the close similarity of external and internal.

A group may be free from external attack either because its existence is advantageous to other plurality patterns (at the very least because its extinction or diminution would be a greater evil than is its continued existence) or because it possesses sufficient power to coerce other plurality patterns. This power of resistance may be possessed by the group in its own right; it is also possible, however, for it to derive such power from relationships with other plurality patterns or even with a single powerful person, e.g., a chief or emperor.

When the two internal and the two external factors are combined, the various means of maintaining a group fall in two inclusive categories: (1) those which tend to or actually do satisfy wishes of their members or of other plurality patterns; (2) those which exert upon their members or opponents coercive power deriving from themselves or others. Aside from these two categories, no other alternatives exist; every possible means of group preservation falls in one or both rubrics: advantage and/or coercion.

§8. METHODS OF GENERAL GROUP ANALYSIS

In the systematics of action patterns, the first half of the present system, the primary purpose is to outline a method through which socially relevant occurrences or sequences of occurrences may be uniformly analyzed. In this way, it is hoped, the maze of interhuman

happenings can be surveyed and adequately comprehended. The task consists of (1) discovery of the social process exerting the predominant effect in the particular phenomena examined, and (2) the classification of these processes in a system in which all possible social processes may be placed.

Similarly, in the systematics of plurality patterns we wish (1) to establish a valid method for the analysis of plurality patterns, and (2) to work out a suitable classification of the various types of plurality patterns. Inasmuch as these patterns are based solely upon the results of recurrent social processes, i.e., upon networks of social relationships, the methods usable in the two halves of the system are closely related. The immediate task is to determine what social processes most frequently recur in the plurality pattern now under examination, namely, the group.

Following the procedure already discussed with regard to the analysis of social relations (chap. vi, §3), cross-sectional analysis of the group will be separated from its temporal or chronological analysis. First, the group will be observed at a definite instant in its history and, so far as possible, will be unalterably held, as it were, in this instant. The object is to examine existing connections in cross-section. Two questions consequently arise: (1) What holds the separate members in their group (group *A*)? (2) How do neighboring or otherwise related groups (*B . . . Z*) view their connection with group *A*, and what is their attitude toward the bond uniting the members of group *A*?

In answering both questions we must of course discriminate between our own direct observations and the subjective opinions of the members of group *A* and of groups *B . . . Z*. In order to learn these subjective opinions the persons concerned must be questioned, either directly or by questionnaire. Closely linked with this effort to ascertain actually existing relations is the second problem, that of determining the group's functions. Those *sociologically* relevant are only those involving service to other plurality patterns or, more rarely, to separate persons. The plurality pattern to which service is rendered is usually a larger, more general structure which, at this stage of exposition, may be termed an organization. For the sake of simplicity in this extremely general survey, it will be assumed as typical that every group (*G*) renders services to an organization (*O*). This means that we must first determine the function *G* carries out for *O*. (In analyzing *O* it is of course necessary to ask what service, if any, it renders *G*—see chap. xxxvi, §1.)

Here, just as in the first set of questions, the effort to unite subjective and objective judgments should be made. The objective aspects are yielded by the disinterested scientific criteria of the sociologist. These should then be complemented by questioning the chief participants—in this case, the functionaries of *O* primarily.

The content of all observations and answers is to be analyzed just as a series of social occurrences is dealt with in the systematics of action patterns. There the process is analyzed in terms of attitude and situation ($P = A \times S$), thus paying due attention both to motives and to external conditions; similarly careful procedure must be followed in all investigations of plurality patterns, even though the material available is apparently superficial and meager. Mere questionnaires are never sufficient; again, knowledge of official documents—ordinances, let us say—and of statistical details is never adequate in itself; further, our own direct observations, so frequently restricted to random factors, cannot be depended upon altogether; once more, study of the physical environment alone is too fragmentary; and finally, psychological exploration of the inner lives of the participants, so often asserted to be all-explanatory, is much too partial if depended upon entirely. *All* these methods, so far as the concrete case under investigation permits, must be used in conjunction; each one must complement every other.

As an example, let it be assumed that the local group affiliated with a national political party is to be analyzed. One step would be to circulate questionnaires among the members asking them what, in their opinion, unites them with their party; another would be to make a careful study of the local group at the national headquarters of the party, thus obtaining valuable secondary material; still another would be to learn as much as possible about the local group in question from the local groups of other parties; further steps would be statistical study of election returns and of group membership, as well as research into the local platform of the group, the type of candidates put forward, and the actions of their parliamentary representatives; one more valuable step would be intensive social-psychological study of typical local members and leaders. Along with the application of these more formal devices, maximum use must also be made of all the general insight into human behavior afforded by that capacity of “understanding” (chap. iii, §4) resulting from our prior experience of life, of the world, and of people.

Let the further assumption be made that this procedure has been followed and conclusions reached. What are these hypothetical con-

clusions? To begin with, the organization does not primarily derive its support from the enthusiasm of its members for a particular political program, but from aversion toward other political parties dominant in the locality. In addition, the group in question provides gratification for wishes for response and recognition otherwise thwarted in the small-town setting. Again, the connection with national headquarters is not so effective as it might be because of the antiquated electioneering practices of the local leader. These are concrete conclusions; the next step is to answer the abstract questions. What social processes here play a determining part? What are the disguised or spurious interhuman relations (chap. iii, §8) really operative in this group, which on paper and to official view is purely political in purpose?

One more important question is still to be mentioned. When we ask: Along what lines is this local party likely to develop? we thereby come to grips with the intricate problem of social change. In the systematics of action patterns the method proposed for the making manifest of the mechanisms of social change is (1) linking the chief occurrences in the order of their temporal sequence, and (2) bringing to the fore the recurrent or cyclical processes and process-series. A somewhat similar method is advisable in the systematics of plurality patterns: (1) careful study of the past history of the group; and (2) comparison of its development with that of similar plurality patterns in similar situations. Only by such detailed investigation can the currents of social change be traced and explained.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE GROUP: THE PAIR OR DYAD

§1. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SMALLEST GROUPS

To recapitulate: sociology as here set forth achieves comprehension of plurality patterns sufficient for its own purposes when the social processes and relationships predominating in them are laid bare. This is true of the great abstract collectivities, such as the state and the church, and of the more concrete large and small groups as well. Only an unprejudiced analysis, far removed from metaphysics and the philosophy of history, is here in order. Other sciences may if they wish deal with the church and the state in other ways (e.g., as wholes interpreted by *a priori* principles), but so far as the sociologist *qua* sociologist is concerned, the nature and behavior of such plurality patterns is adequately explained when he has discovered, properly analyzed, and systematically classified the social relations actually prevailing in them.

As already noted, not only the abstract collectivities but also crowds and groups are objects of sociological research. Moreover, it should not be assumed that the sociologist deals only with *large* groups, i.e., with aggregates adapted to statistical manipulation. On the contrary, his attention is quite as sharply focussed on small—indeed, on very small—plurality patterns. When it is recalled that plurality patterns are after all nothing more than neuropsychic patterns, and when the relative nature of sociologically relevant isolation is held in view, it becomes apparent that plurality patterns may be analyzed when only *one* person is studied. Let us quote a passage from an earlier chapter in support of this apparently inconsistent assertion:

“The concept of solitude, insofar as it is important in man’s inward life, certainly does not denote mere absence of all affiliation. On the contrary, social intercourse is in some fashion imaged or presented to the mind’s eye and *then* is abjured. The result is solitariness in the true sense; its unambiguous, positive meaning is given it by influences radiating from an ever-so-distant set of associations—whether these influences are reverberations of past or anticipations of future relationships, whether felt as longing or as voluntary renunciation. We do not call a human being solitary because we imagine him to be the only

inhabitant the earth has ever had; his state is determined by the process of sociation even though this process may be negative, i.e., dissociative. All the bliss as well as all the bitterness of solitude is brought about by different reactions to stimuli which are social in their origins; solitariness is a sort of interaction between persons, one or more of whom are no longer present although they at one time exerted certain influences. These influences are no longer "real" (in a certain material sense) but continue to live and act ideally in the mind of the solitary one.¹

"Spykman quite properly heads his adaptation of the foregoing passage 'The Monad,' and begins with these words: 'The simplest structure [plurality pattern] which may be subsumed under the sociological category is the individual, however paradoxical and essentially contradictory this may seem.'" In other words, the solitary human being is after all a nexus of relationships; most of his humanness would disappear if they were suddenly to be wiped out. Neuro-psychic patterns persist, however, and thus the term 'monad' is not a misnomer; the solitary person is really a mirror of the social order even when removed from it. It would be entirely possible to begin that part of the systematics of plurality patterns dealing with the group by first analyzing the monad and then following with the dyad (pair) triad, tetrad, and so on. . . . The point is raised . . . in order to show how closely interwoven the two divisions of our science really are and how necessary it is to abandon the 'individual-society' antithesis. . . ." (chap. viii, §2).

Inasmuch as we have already dealt with the monad, and also because analysis of the group is more fruitful when a tangible, immediately present *plurality* provides the basis of the *pattern* under observation, it seems best to begin with the pair or dyad, but we cannot too strongly emphasize the close connection of the systematics of action patterns and of plurality patterns above indicated.

The sociologist is not merely free from the supposed necessity of dealing only with large statistical aggregates, but he is also free from the restrictions which would be laid upon him were he to use the methods of the sociology of law. He cannot submit to these restrictions, for if he did only legally regulated plurality patterns would come within his purview; he is quite as much concerned with those social structures which have not been created by an authoritative power—that is to say, with those groups which are not based upon norms set up by an abstract collectivity, and which therefore originate and act spontaneously in agreement with the voluntary decisions of their members. The state and the church, for example, either play no part whatever in creating them, or at the most prescribe only the external forms of certain types. In order to distinguish them from the regulated groups, we term them elective groups, for they are consti-

¹ Georg Simmel, *Soziologie*, p. 77.

² N. J. Spykman, *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*, p. 129.

tuted and maintained through the elective affiliations of their members. As already noted (chap. xxxiii, §4), the term "elective" is chosen because of its use in Goethe's great novel, *Elective Affiliations*, in which the contrast is drawn between relationships based upon spontaneous attraction on the one hand and relationships based upon blood kinship and the sanctions of state and church on the other.

Study of specific types of groups is best begun with the smallest, namely, dyadic groups or pairs. Some are biologically determined, others are regulated, and still others are elective.

The notion that analysis of the pair should be left to psychology is mistaken, for the pair presents a very clearly defined sociological problem, namely, how the behavior of two persons in close interaction differs from the behavior of either when in isolation (on this point see chap. iii, §6).

Our questions raised are as follows: Which social processes predominate in the dyadic group, and which occur rarely or not at all? To what extent does the pair constitute a plurality pattern rather than a mere interhuman relationship? What are the characteristic configurations of relationships in the dyadic pattern? What, altogether apart from the numbers involved, distinguishes pairs, the smallest of plurality patterns, from other types? What fundamental traits are common to all pairs, and what are peculiar to certain varieties?

Sociological theory or practice that disregards the dyadic pattern and its influence upon the whole range of social life—i.e., that deals only with single human beings on the one hand and with large groups and abstract collectivities on the other—commits a far-reaching error.

§2. THE CHIEF VARIETIES OF THE DYADIC GROUP

What are the most important types of the pair? Plainly, the answer must take into account more than "sympathetic" dyadic groups, for there are also "anti-pairs" based upon antipathy, e.g., upon rivalry, competition, contravention, or even conflict—that is to say, upon relations of avoidance and dissociation. Furthermore, mixed relations are frequent; associative and dissociative trends combine (chap. vii, §5). We may distinguish (I) typical pairs (genuine pairs) and (II) atypical (derivative) pairs. Among the former may be reckoned: (A) the sexual pair, (B) the generation pair, (C) the friendship pair. These three varieties manifest most clearly the dyadic characteristics noted below; atypical pairs may arise in a wide range of situations of which the dyadic relationship is not genuinely characteristic. The following set of categories seems usable:

CLASSIFICATION OF DYADIC GROUPS

(Table 4)

I. TYPICAL (GENUINE) PAIRS.

A. Sexual pairs.

1. Heterosexual.
 - a. Premarital and extramarital.
 - b. Marital.
2. Homosexual

(The homosexual male or female groups are divergent types, of interest only in specialized sociological study; whether or not they belong in the field of social pathology cannot be decided here.)

B. Generation pairs.

1. Father-son group.
2. Father-daughter group.
3. Mother-son group.
4. Mother-daughter group.
5. Parental pair.
6. Sibling pair.
7. More general: adult-child group.

C. Friendship pair.

II. ATYPICAL (DERIVATIVE) PAIRS.

(Only a few of the more important examples of atypical groups can be given here.)

A. Superior-subordinate (frequently but not always in pair relationship).

1. Professor-assistant.
 2. Captain-mate.
 3. Physician-nurse.
 4. Officer-orderly.
 5. Political boss-henchman.
- Etc.

B. Aider-aided.

1. Physician-patient.
 2. Supervisor-delinquent.
 3. Pastor-parishioner.
 4. Attendant-inmate.
 5. Social worker-client.
- Etc.

C. Teacher-pupil.

D. Pairs primarily conditioned by the economic order.

- | | |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. Master-journeyman. | 5. Mistress-maid. |
| 2. Master-apprentice. | 6. Guide-tourist. |
| 3. Foreman-workman. | 7. Executive-secretary. |
| 4. Engineer-fireman. | Etc. |

If any thorough understanding of a given person is to be achieved, one of the most necessary items of information must be the dyadic relations affecting him. Moreover, if the development of larger plurality patterns such as clubs, sects, families, and business enterprises is to be correctly comprehended, close attention must be paid to the dyadic groups which have or might have formed during the period covered.

In considering such dyadic groups there is danger of mistaking transitory relationships for pairs, and of including antithetical social types such as utilitarian and artist or priest and layman in this classification. Utilitarian and artist, however, do not form a pair and only rarely an anti-pair; the same is true of priest and layman. On the other hand, patron and artist or priest and sexton may sometimes constitute pairs. The union of two persons for transitory specific purposes and actions cannot be regarded as a dyadic relation; a singer and her accompanist need not necessarily form a pair as that term is here interpreted. The pair pattern is characterized by a type of interlinking or attachment which, to be sure, need not totally absorb the human beings concerned, but which nevertheless comprises essential traits of both and which, above all, is expressed in more than a single special purpose. Further, the affiliation, whether sympathetic or antipathetic, must have a certain temporal duration if we are to speak of a pair. The dyadic plurality pattern may be distinguished from the mere relationship by the fact that the former is woven by *several* social processes that continually recur in varying combination.

Pair patterns also differ in the intensity of the affiliation involved. As the degree of intensity diminishes, the specifically dyadic pattern is less likely to be found. As a rule, typical pairs are more closely interwoven than are atypical. A great deal that is quite true of friendship and sexual pairs is scarcely valid at all for business associates or for superiors and subordinates. A pair does not always exist wherever two persons with relationships differing from those of the balance of their group can be distinguished: for example, it should not too readily be assumed that superior and subordinate—clerk and office boy, let us say—form a pair or an anti-pair, even when isolated from their co-workers. In certain instances, however, when a relatively large and characteristic share of the personality of *A*, the superior, exerts its influence for a considerable period upon *B*, the subordinate, there may result a more or less intensive dyadic pattern that, for instance, may have some traits of the father-son group.

Moreover, the teacher does not enter into a dyadic pattern with each of his pupils; where the lecture method and large classes prevail this is in fact almost impossible. When, however, the pattern is like that of the domestic tutor and pupil (a pair akin to the father-son group), it is possible to speak of a teacher-pupil group, as in the above schema. Every dyadic plurality pattern is based upon a type of interdependence in which, as already stated, either the total personalities or large and characteristic portions of the personalities of the participants are involved. The persons concerned do not constitute a pair if to each other they seem mere functionaries or representatives, i.e., if contacts are merely categorical; on the contrary, human being must meet human being as human being. The bureaucrat and the applicant, the non-commissioned officer and the recruit, the police magistrate and the defendant, or even the father-confessor and the penitent, do not necessarily form pairs. In ordinary cases of the kind noted the sociologist is not primarily interested in contacts and networks of relations connecting two persons, but rather in processes of political life, of the legal system, or of the ecclesiastical organization. The persons concerned are instruments controlled by abstract collectivities that extend far beyond them. For example, when between a public official and a business man a social connection is established that is relatively lasting but that nevertheless leads them always to comport themselves as official and merchant respectively, or when the sergeant perpetually makes one green recruit in his company show the respect due him as a superior officer, a special pair pattern prevails which in addition to its own characteristic traits also has certain features common to the typical pair.

§3. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PERSONAL ELEMENT IN THE PAIR

The nature of the dyadic plurality pattern as contrasted to that of all others has now been brought into the foreground: the pair is the most personal of all plurality patterns; its members affect each other as unique selves. Let us exemplify this by considering a conspiratorial band devoted to ends that call for a large measure of personal devotion. Such a band (which in comparison with the pair is a large group) is strictly controlled by ritual and by-laws, and is therefore a regulative plurality pattern. The personal element consequently can be expressed only so far as it is in harmony with the purposes of the band or in definite opposition to those purposes. The circle of one hundred, fifty, or perhaps only twenty men feel themselves quite closely united in the service of a common cause. Within the circle,

however, *A* comes to know *B* on a basis of greater intimacy; they become friends. In other words, the intimate, personal element, which in the more numerous circle cannot be realized because of the regulated and purposive nature of the band's relations, becomes effective in the intercourse of *A* and *B*.

Of all plurality patterns the dyadic group is the one which allows most scope—whether for weal or woe, good or evil—to the uniquely personal. It may even be said that its function is to give scope to the common-human relations, for these are always intimate relations as well. The great bio-social institutions of marriage and the family, and the two most deeply rooted forces of approach and association, namely, love and friendship, find in the pair pattern the form of union best adapted to them. Love and friendship can never exert their full binding force outside the pair; their very nature makes for intimacy, and this intimacy diminishes when the number of participants to which it must be extended increases.

Nevertheless, we must distinguish between the types of intimacy found (1) in the pair, (2) in love, and (3) in friendship. No matter how closely the nature of the pair pattern is bound up with the spirits of love or friendship—indeed, so closely bound up that it might easily be assumed that the nature of the dyad is to be found in them alone—sharp conceptual distinctions are necessary for thorough analysis. No attention can here be paid to the difference between love and friendship; it certainly exists, and must be presupposed. Our attention is focussed on this question: Is there a special dyadic intimacy which as such is neither love nor friendship? And our answer is: Of course.

This dyadic intimacy is revealed (1) when the common traits of all the principal varieties of pair patterns (*Verhältnisse*) are distinguished; (2) when the recurrent characteristics of premarital, extra-marital, marital, generation, and friendship pairs are noted; and further, (3) when the differences between love or friendship patterns that are *not* cast in the dyad form and those that are so cast are closely observed. When this procedure is followed, as in the preparation of the present chapter, we may confidently assert that there is a type of intimacy peculiar to the pair *as such* that is always present as a common element in all other types of pair intimacy, no matter whether they derive from love, friendship, family ties, or common interest.

This is most obvious when pairs of lovers are examined. (1) There is in the course of erotic relations a rhythm primarily due to fluctuations in sexuality—an increase and decrease of libido, differing in

male and female; (2) there is also a rhythm in the emotional (*seelische*) attraction of lovers that does not run parallel to the ebb and flow of the sexual drive; (3) in addition, independent of the rhythm of the sexual and emotional processes, there are fluctuations in dyadic intimacy based solely upon certain peculiarities of the pair *as such*, peculiarities of this smallest of all groups.

This is much more important than it at first appears. A great deal that is regarded as the result of love or friendship or family life or business interests is simply the product of pair-formation and pair-habitation. Many actions of those in love are ascribed to that amiable weakness when as a matter of fact they really arise out of the dyadic pattern, for in larger groups similarly united by erotic bonds these peculiarly dyadic features cannot be discerned.

Again, larger groups can more easily be forced to function in the service of the great abstract collectivities than can the pair. Such large groups have a complicated structure, and they are often regulated by means of ordinances and statutes—which means that they must be organized. The consequence is that they can more easily be controlled by the great collective forces (the state, the church, etc.), for the regulations upon which they are based derive their sanctions and final authority from these collectivities. Dyadic groups are small, numerous, and diverse, and cannot be differentiated, organized, or controlled, but they are nevertheless entrusted with tasks extremely important to the social order; without their co-operation the state and the church, for example, could not accomplish anything. These abstract collectivities, however, can at the most set up the framework within which such dyadic groups function; the task of infusing living content into dyadic patterns is quite beyond the power of the state or the church—human beings alone can perform it. When only two persons are in interaction, the result of their paired endeavors is necessarily much more dependent upon the unique characteristics of both members than is the group achievement of a large number of persons.

The extent to which the nature of the dyadic group depends upon the unique personalities of the interacting persons is most clearly evident in the friendship pair. It is clearly impossible for friendships to be prescribed and regulated by the authorities. Friendships as such are seldom susceptible of coercion of any kind; consequently, they are relatively independent of the abstract collectivities. Upon what is the course, intensity, mode of expression, and achievement of a given friendship dependent? Solely upon the traits imparted to it by the unique personalities of the friends.

Pairs formed by lovers, on the contrary, are often quite dependent upon standards, circle of intimates, locality, social status, and family affiliations. In many cases, collective influences and regulations more or less determine whether a pair of lovers forms and whether it lasts. This negative influence, however, is all that the Procrustean bed of the social order can exert. The inner expansion and intensification of such pair patterns can be carried out only by and through the lovers concerned, although they may make extensive use of existing conventions or even of sentimental stereotypes.

The marital pair now claims our attention. Inasmuch as marriage is regulated by the state and at least in part by the church, marital actions are strongly influenced by these collective forces. Here again, however, nothing more than a framework of negative prescriptions and controllable duties (such as support, etc.) can be imposed, and then only by means of legal compulsion. Within this framework, each marriage is dependent entirely upon the personal element, just as in the case of the lovers noted above. A mixture of social coercion and relative freedom is consequently operative in the inner growth of the marital group. Indeed, the task incumbent upon married persons is that of shaping the opposing forces of coercion and freedom into some measure of harmony. There are just as many kinds of married life as there are marriages.

Practically the same may be said of the generation pair; some slight modifications might perhaps be made, but for present purposes the above discussion of the marital pair will serve for both (cf. chap. xix, §§3, 4).

In the case of the atypical dyadic group, however, the task of shaping a pattern strongly conditioned by conventional and utilitarian considerations into a personal pattern is somewhat more difficult, but it is fundamentally the same as that peculiar to all dyadic groups. The two persons thus united must enter into mutually intimate interaction, no matter how dispassionate, objective, or even mechanized their behavior toward human beings in general may be. When they once interact intimately, obscured or intentionally concealed idiosyncrasies, emotions, and inclinations manifest themselves; in other words, they reveal themselves as "personalities," as "human beings." The humanization of social intercourse is perhaps the essential function of the pair. In the dyadic group each of the members must assimilate as much as possible of the other's personality, and usually desires to do so. In much greater degree than in other groups, therefore, the pair offers the possibility of breaking down isolation, of

changing the condition of solitariness (chap. viii, §§1, 2, 3) for one of personal intimacy. (As we shall later see, however, the fact that this possibility exists does not mean that such a change will necessarily take place.) The possibility is afforded by the fact that in the pair the more basic personality traits have a greater opportunity of expression; the conventions and formalities are not so strictly enforced. If the effort is made to restrict dyadic intimacy to the conventional self, if the basic personality traits have no opportunity to manifest themselves, the resulting pair pattern is inevitably superficial and fragile.

In direct contrast to this, larger groups frequently maintain themselves most successfully if they draw only upon the external traits of the self, except when a daring leader or innovator is needed if the group is to survive.

In all pairs based upon association, therefore, it is usually difficult to limit the bond to the less intense degrees; mere advance and adjustment are not the final stages. If accordance, at the very least, is not achieved, if, for example, compromise or mere sufferance marks the limit of approach, the positive pair pattern may easily be transformed into that of the anti-pair. Here again is a point of contrast to larger groups, for the latter are frequently most lasting when based upon a considerable degree of social distance, i.e., upon a mixture of association and dissociation (chap. xvii, §2).

§4. INTERHUMAN RELATIONS IN THE PAIR

The essential nature, value, and peculiar attraction of the pair pattern derives from its fundamental "humanness," but this very fact endows it with the dangers and difficulties as well as the advantages peculiar to this smallest of human groups. The question arises: What can life in the pair be like if it vouchsafes to the fundamental traits of two necessarily different persons greater possibilities of expression and development than can be found elsewhere? Is such life based upon exactly equal interchange, so that *A* exercises just as much initiative and influence as does *B*?

This is very seldom the case; usually the aspects in which *A* affects *B* are not the same as those in which *B* affects *A*. Nevertheless, complete passivity of one of the partners is not possible; moreover, it will rarely occur that *A*, let us say, is always the active partner and *B* the passive partner in *every* relation. More frequent is the combination in which *A* is the active member in some relations and *B* the active member in others. This is true even of the teacher-pupil re-

lation, to take an example in which one member may seem always dominant.

Social actions issuing from strictly private decisions and wishes are much more rare than is usually assumed; indeed, they are almost non-existent. Inasmuch as only a few human beings live apart from all pair relations (and even when they do, their isolation is usually transitory), the human pair is the structure upon which a great many social processes are based, and may be regarded, metaphorically speaking, as the cell-unit in the social structure. The Biblical myth that mankind has its genealogical source in Adam and Eve, however dubious biologically, is a very good sociological metaphor because of the emphasis it lays on the pair. The family is based on marital pairs; the mutual confidence of two friends often gives rise to a great business enterprise; similarly, the father-son group sometimes results in great business families such as the Rothschilds or Rockefellers; the traditions of scholarship depend upon the teacher-pupil pair; and the dyadic group composed of noble and priest, considered as general social types, is in the early stages of all cultures the guiding power of the state.

Above all else, this point must be grasped: the pair always behaves otherwise than either member would if alone, or at the very least, in cases where one partner is overwhelmingly dominant, than the passive member if left to himself would behave. The personal influence of both members upon a third person is usually intensified by the pair pattern, but on the other hand, interaction with this person often changes, weakens, or even breaks up the pair. Frequently attitudes toward the third person manifested by *A* are only partially derived from his own original attitudes, being chiefly due to the expressed likes or dislikes of his companion *B*. Here again a Biblical metaphor is apropos—Eve's influence upon Adam. This effect of the pair should not be assumed to result solely from the influence of the wife or other female love-object upon the male, however, for such assumptions lead directly to the facile advice, *cherchez la femme*, and consequently to a distortion of the whole problem by undue emphasis upon erotic phenomena. To be sure, the latter frequently yield adequate explanations of behavior, but more frequently still the general pair pattern, which may be quite non-sexual, is the fundamental source.

A further effect of the intimately personal nature of the pair pattern is that it usually vouchsafes its members more inspiration and power of achievement than do larger groups. Conversely, indifference toward a partner, undue reserve, restriction to merely formal mem-

bership, pecuniary valuation, and superficiality are followed by more serious consequences than in larger groups. In brief, harmony brings greater advantages, discord greater disadvantages in the pair than in other plurality patterns. Spurious pair patterns (homologous to spurious relations—chap. iii, §8) make the integration of personality very difficult, if not impossible; on the other hand, disguised pairs, because of the secrecy they involve, may intensify the bond uniting their members—as, for example, when there is a joint effort to conceal the existence of the pair from a third person by claiming that it is only the relatively formal connection imposed by common membership in a larger group.

The more simple, undifferentiated, and undeveloped the personalities of the participants are, the less friction is found within the pair pattern and the more it is taken for granted. As cultures differentiate, however, and as human beings consequently become highly specialized in status and function, the harmony of the dyadic group is more and more difficult to maintain. Complex personalities, especially those with extraordinary but inhibited emotional and mental capacities, derive benefits much greater than those accruing to the “poor in spirit” if pair patterns suitable to their unusual gifts can be established, but such patterns are becoming more and more difficult to enter and the chances of their successful maintenance are decreasing. Moreover, disillusionment, misunderstanding, and discovery of fundamental differences in interest may readily transform the pattern into that of the anti-pair—a calamity which is much more painful to the complex personalities involved than it would be to simpler natures. Gradual estrangement or the sudden catastrophe of complete separation frequently occurs.

In every normal pair there flows a continual stream of energy or of lassitude, creative faith or scepticism, from one member to the other. Frequently the inhibitions of one partner impose themselves upon the other in spite of the fact that they were in the beginning quite foreign to his nature. Distraction and intimidation frequently occur. In many instances, essential personality traits are lastingly repressed and even ultimately destroyed by the partner's influence. Further, the less energetic member quite often learns to depend upon the greater vigor and initiative of the other, and the practice of “letting George do it” becomes deeply rooted. Again, third persons sometimes make use of the influence which *A* has upon *B* in order to exert indirect pressure upon the latter; for example, the priest or pastor frequently concentrates his efforts upon the wife in order to make a good church member of

the husband. Once more, the "looking-glass self" of the person is most affected by his intimate, pair relations, and his positive self-feeling may thereby be greatly increased or diminished. Studies of bereavement have demonstrated that when the death of a partner breaks up a dyadic relationship that has extended over a long period, the survivor frequently shows marked alterations in behavior and manifests characteristics either long suppressed or not previously evident.³ Occasionally the survivor and his intimates realize for the first time how far-reaching the effect of the deceased partner upon their previous behavior had been. Relatively complete disorganization (which may even induce death) is another fairly common result of the disruption of the pair; aged persons, in particular, are frequently unable to bear up under the additional burden imposed by readaptation. Still further, many persons are unable to make important decisions, even though they lie in a field outside that shared by the pair, until they have consulted the partner; in some cases the latter's decision is always accepted.

Much of the foregoing may be attributed to deep affectional bonds, a great deal to habitual responses, and more than a little to lack of capacity for self-direction. It should also be noted that the pair frequently presents a united front to the outside world, thereby deriving the external benefits of close-knit union even though such union does not really exist within the group. Shoulder to shoulder when attacking or attacked by others, but civil war when the outer danger passes by!

§5. THE ANTI-PAIR

Indeed, relations of avoidance and dissociation play a large part, generally speaking, in the dyadic group. This is especially true among the economically underprivileged; the petty cares of daily life increase the friction of the partners. Exploited, helpless, irritated, and disillusioned persons release upon their companion in misery all the impulses toward retaliation generated and at the same time inhibited through the desperate struggle with the world outside. More often than not, they fail to understand the social conditions which force them into "the submerged tenth" or keep them from rising out of it; they attribute their troubles to the other member of the pair. Precisely because the intimacy of the dyadic group is seldom penetrated by outsiders is it possible for one or both partners to discharge within

* Cf. T. D. Eliot, "The Adjustive Behavior of Bereaved Families: A New Field of Research," *Social Forces*, VIII, 4 (June, 1930), pp. 543-9; and Howard Becker, "A Social-Psychological Study of Bereavement," unpublished M. A. thesis, Northwestern University, 1925.

it all malice accumulated through disappointed ambition or frustrated vanity; accusations are heaped upon the companion, and the misery of both is thereby rendered greater. Remorse often appears, but it is usually too late to remedy matters.

The hatred of the persons composing the anti-pair is increased by the fact that they are in greater or lesser degree bound to each other; in extreme cases, especially where mental ill-health or deficiency is present, such hatred piles up until murder is committed. Numerous examples could be given, as any criminologist will agree.

Not infrequently pair members make the disquieting discovery that they have "nothing more to say to each other." Mutual absorption of personality through continual intimate relations, which affords the characteristic strength of the dyad, may also be responsible for its weakness. Relations become ossified, and aversion or even loathing sets in; the once brimming stream of personal revelation dwindles to a mere trickle and finally dies away altogether; nothing remains but the dry, stony river-bed of monotony. The exact reverse, however, may occur: daily irritation and petty friction through nagging or scolding becomes a habit which, though not admitted even to themselves, the partners cannot do without.⁴

The inner entanglements and snarls of the dyadic pattern frequently lead to betrayal. The bonds uniting the partners, even when originally elective, come to be felt as fetters if they were woven under circumstances that seem utterly irrelevant to the immediate situation. Those elements in the personality of either partner which have been thwarted or otherwise limited by the traits of the other or by the characteristics of the pair pattern itself often burst forth with unexpected vehemence in a surge toward freedom. The old friend, for instance, may be felt as a hindrance to free, creative endeavor because of his "eternal criticism" and "know-it-all attitude"; hence he may be disavowed or insulted in the presence of a third person, or informed that his one-time companion has chosen to "go his own way." As a rule, the person directly responsible for the disruption of the pair sooner or later seeks for a new and more suitable partner; wishes for response and recognition, hope of reciprocity and liberation from loneliness—precisely the desires dominant in dissolving pairs—urge toward new pairing if extreme disillusionment has not led to profound introversion and hence to persistent solitariness.

More often than not, however, neither of the participants in either

⁴ Cf. the excellent discussion of this point in W. W. Waller, *The Old Love and the New: Divorce and Readjustment* (1930), chaps. ii, vi, and ix.

a dissolving or a coherent pair pattern desires its disruption. A third person unexpectedly intervenes—perhaps consciously, perhaps unconsciously. (This intrusion of a third person gives rise to “laws” or regularities of interhuman behavior quite different from those just discussed; the following chapter considers them in detail.)

Last of all, we must ask this question: What social relations are characteristic of the pair *as such*? The answer is: All types of common-human relations, but no circumscribed relations, for the latter *presuppose* the existence and effect of plurality patterns (cf. chaps. vi, §1; vii, §3; xii, §1). To be sure, when the main types of pairs—namely, sexual, generation, and friendship dyads—are subjected to a detailed comparison (which cannot be done in this general study), it is possible to establish certain correlations with particular plurality patterns and thus to take circumscribed relations into account. In these cases, however, we are not dealing with the pair *as such*; the latter is an ideal-typical abstraction. Furthermore, even when circumscribed relations are included in the reckoning, it can still be asserted that in empirical pair patterns of every kind common-human processes, processes tending toward or based upon intimacy, easily hold the ascendancy.

CHAPTER XL

THE GROUP: THE TRIAD

§1. THE PAIR AND THE THIRD PERSON

The life and continuance of the dyadic group depend in some measure upon its connections with larger plurality patterns that surround or include it. Still more important for the existence and duration of the pair, however, is its behavior toward a third person whom it approaches or takes into affiliation; further, his behavior toward it is also of great significance. For simplicity's sake we speak here and henceforth only of a third *person*, and therefore in the singular; most of what is said, however, is also valid for a plurality pattern that intervenes in or otherwise enters into the erstwhile dyad.

First and foremost in the phenomena to be considered is the *change* in the existing pair pattern that occurs, almost without exception, when a third person comes into close relation with it, no matter whether that relation is permanent or transitory. This fact is not given due weight by the average observer; just as he believes that the characteristics of the persons he knows are more constant and consistent than they usually are, so also he fails to note that pair patterns are sensitive and mutable. "Once a pair, always a pair" is the naïve belief of many. At any rate, only the coarser and more conspicuous "triangle" disturbances of marriage, friendship, etc., seem to come to the notice of Mrs. Grundy, but the less obvious discord produced by the intrusion of a third person, as well as the increase in the solidarity of the pair often brought about in the same way, are seldom used as the common coin of gossip.

The sociologist, in contrast to the casual observer, always bears in mind the tremendous importance of the situation for interhuman behavior. Even though the basic temperamental attitudes may be relatively unaffected by the changing vicissitudes of everyday life, nevertheless overt behavior is always conditioned by the situation in far-reaching ways; it varies with every new place, person, or plurality pattern. The human being, especially the cultivated European or American, and more particularly the city dweller, is like a musical instrument with an almost infinite number of strings. In each situa-

tion some are played upon, but others are untouched and therefore silent—but this silence does not mean non-existence!

To change the figure: such persons are like the switchboards in a great telephone exchange; at a given moment, the majority of the lines, so to speak, are not busy, but a few of them are carrying messages which in some instances are of tremendous importance.

Unless he is extremely narrow and limited, one and the same person, *A*, may, for example, be stimulated to carefree abandon upon meeting his friend *B*; if *C* appears instead, however, a biting ironical mood may be evoked and expressed; whereas if *D* is the person with whom interaction is established the inclination may be toward colorlessly formal greeting or toward "strictly business" conversation. It would certainly be a mistake if, taking any of these situations in isolation, *A* were to be declared frivolous, insulting, or conventional, for these varieties of behavior were called forth only in specific cases where the transitory or relatively lasting effects of others or of accidental external circumstances played important parts.

The consciously or unconsciously perceived attitudes of others and the external elements in the situation tend to repress some aspects and to release other aspects of the behavior of *A*. An analysis of meeting must take into account at least five factors: (1) the effect of the specific personality of the other and of memories of previous meetings; (2) the mood of *A* at the moment of meeting; (3) the mood of the other at the same moment; (4) the purpose or occasion of meeting; and (5) the immediate external circumstances.

Quite often persons who go to an important conference fully equipped with definite plans discover when it is over that the course followed by the discussion took a completely unexpected turn. Much that was to have been said remained unsaid, whereas a great deal that was not in agreement with prior intentions was brought forward without being specifically called for. A further illustration is afforded by the fact, known to every orator or lecturer, that every audience evokes a different response; unless memorized, no speech is ever quite the same in external form, and its emotional variability defies memorization.

Just as the separate person, no matter how well integrated, varies in his responses as the personalities and external circumstances confronting him vary, in the same way, the pair, however much a unity, responds differently to the third person; moreover, the latter always effects changes in the characteristically "pair-aspects" of the relations of the partners, and in addition their attitudes toward each other

are altered. This is due primarily to the fact that in virtually every case each member interacts with the third person in a different manner and degree. Again, the latter is influenced, in ways sometimes surprising to himself, by the pair pattern (*as such*) into which he has wittingly or unwittingly intruded.

The cyclical rise and fall in the relationships of persons living or working together may be observed with great ease in cases such as those now being discussed.

When the third person makes his influence felt, one or both of the pair members, especially if they have been relatively isolated from other relations, may experience wishes previously foreign; new opportunities are dimly apprehended. Sometimes one of the partners has long cherished a secret desire which becomes more difficult to repress when the third person appears. The restless partner may ascribe to the newcomer qualities and capacities for gratifying the wish that in reality do not exist. The previous situation is contrasted with the hoped-for opportunities which the intruder is believed able to provide. Once more, the qualities of the partner, lacking in the charm of novelty, are contrasted unfavorably with the supposed qualities of the interloper. He is fancied to be a savior, a "soul-mate," "someone who understands." A pair pattern precariously based upon the devotion or submission of one member alone may therefore be revealed in all its tenuousness when for the first time new possibilities of happiness are imagined; the fragile bond begins to give way.

Such cases must not lead us to forget their opposites, however; in the latter, the appearance of the third person also leads to comparison, but the effect is entirely different. The partner realizes for the first time the full stature of his companion, and devotes himself with new interest and energy to the cultivation of the existing relationship. It sometimes happens that companions, as a result of taking each other too much for granted, lose the faculty of revealing their most intimate thoughts and emotions; only in the presence of a third person whom they trust or who evokes memories of the past do they become capable of genuine *communication*. When this occurs (and it is not at all unusual) they not only renew their intimacy with the third person but also with each other. Not as rarely as might be supposed, however, the old silence sets in again when they are once more left to themselves. Hence the third person, intentionally or unintentionally, frequently intensifies, if only for a short time, the bonds uniting the dyadic group. If, however, this group represses the funda-

mental wishes of one of its members, the intruder appears as a liberator who disturbs or destroys the galling pair pattern. On the other hand, when the pair vouchsafes to its members adequate gratification of all their basic and acquired tendencies, the appearance of the third person usually strengthens it, for the possibility of a less favorable relation becomes, through imagination, fully evident and repellent for the first time.

Consequently it may be said that an existing pair relation is either weakened or strengthened by interaction with another person; rarely if ever does the degree of association or dissociation remain unchanged.

Mention of dissociation recalls what was said of the anti-pair, i.e., the dyadic group in which relations of avoidance predominate. The enmity characterizing this group may be conscious or unconscious; in the latter case the peculiar function of the third person is to make its members aware for the first time of the full extent of the antipathetic relations involved. When this occurs, it of course does not mean that any fundamental change takes place; quite frequently the mutual hatred of the members of the anti-pair is only intensified.

A few plurality patterns in which it is possible to study the effects of the third person upon the pair may perhaps be mentioned in illustration: the child as the third member of a family; the mother-in-law and the newly married couple; the friend of the family and the marital pair; the two friends and the fiancée or wife of one (sometimes both the woman and the unattached friend are jealous of each other as third persons who convert "company" into "crowd"); similarly, the two woman friends and the fiancé or husband of one; the chronologically adult but emotionally childlike son and his doting parents; the maid or the governess and her employers; the roomer or the "star boarder" and the family; etc. The task of living in a triadic group is frequently difficult, often very serious, and still more often marked by comic traits; if it is to be satisfactorily solved, tact, knowledge of the world, self-control, devotion, adaptability, kindness, and a saving sense of humor are required.

This problem occurs not only where the sexual pair is concerned, but also with the generation and friendship pairs, as well as with all atypical dyads. Its peculiar difficulty inheres in the fact that the triad, resulting from the addition of a third person, has a structure altogether different from the pair. In fact, the triadic group has an innate tendency toward discord.

§2. THE PROBLEM OF ORGANIZATION IN THE TRIAD

Indeed, what might be supposed to be the normal type of triad, i.e., a type in which the relations of *A*, *B* and *C* to each other are based upon complete equality in every respect, and in which the power and influence of all three members are equal, is *not normal at all, but on the contrary is extraordinarily rare*. What is really normal (in terms of frequency distribution) is that two of the members are more intimate with each other than they are with the third, and that *A* affects *B* differently from the way in which he affects *C*. Again, it sometimes occurs that one of the group is the leader and the other two are followers; more frequently, however, two members become allies, as it were, and do not permit discrepancies of influence to develop sufficiently to separate them, but at the same time, they automatically relegate the third to an inferior rank. This unequal distribution of power need not necessarily affect *C* unfavorably and *A* and *B* favorably in all respects and at all times; reversals often occur. The structure of the triad gradually alters or rapidly mutates, but in spite of the changed distribution of power and intimacy, reconstruction upon the two-to-one basis usually takes place, so that in such groups it may be considered quite normal for one member to be more or less isolated, suppressed, or at any rate excluded from complete participation in all the benefits of the triad.

Not infrequently, the underprivileged third member engages in a struggle with the other two. In family life and elsewhere this is frequently carried on by making light of the pair or by belittling one of its members. This is especially true of the newcomer who attempts to make himself a place in the triad; he perpetually endeavors to demonstrate the inferiority of the erstwhile dyad ("Is he a suitable companion for *you*?"). The old partner, who sees his position as *beatus possidens* endangered, suspiciously observes the changes in the behavior of his former comrade. Such changes are sometimes quite extensive; traits may become evident which were not perceived before the third person appeared—at any rate, they were not observed by his former comrade, whom habituation may have rendered blind. When this occurs, remarks such as "You are quite different from what you used to be!" "I have never seen you so talkative (or so quiet) before!" naturally follow.

In such cases, however, changes certainly are not always observed with suspicion or ill-will; indeed, many persons are so constituted that they look with favor upon anything that increases the happiness of

the partner. Even here, however, it must be repeated that the tendency for the triad to show a distinct pair *vs.* third person structure is characteristic.

Hence it may be asserted that the triadic pattern has a tendency partially to exclude one of the three participants through pair-combination, or so to influence him that his isolation is in some measure voluntary.

Case studies or extensive illustration cannot here be adduced in support of this statement, but one example may be better than none: the history of triumvirates of all kinds gives some empirical indication of the accuracy of the above pronouncement. Witness the fact that when administrative or governmental affairs are entrusted to three officials with equal rights, it is at the same time necessary to specialize and limit the functions of each as over against those of the others. Even then the preponderant power frequently slips into the hands of two of them. When this occurs, it sometimes happens that one of the three succeeds in seizing the reins, with the result that the previously suppressed member throws in his lot with the ruling member, assuming, of course, that to the former it still seems worth while to strengthen the latter's position. The dyad, for reasons already noted, has little need of division of labor unless such division is the natural result of differences in native endowment; the triad, however, must have an artificial differentiation of function if complete discord is not to ensue. In brief, *the triad marks the beginning of organization*, which in a much more highly developed form is a distinguishing characteristic of larger groups.

Modern industrial undertakings in Central Europe have made some use of the principle of three-member directorates; such groups are made up of a financial, a technical, and a personnel administrator. Such triumvirates are highly successful if the three functions named are demarcated from each other sharply enough. From a formal point of view, the triad has the advantage (but also the disadvantage) of making a majority vote possible; however, the maintenance of equal rights and privileges as well as of a certain feeling of fellowship that facilitates the joint undertaking is always difficult. The old proverb, *tres faciunt collegium*, should not be understood in the sense that all three have equal influence; as stated above, the most frequent situation is that one of the three colleagues is pushed into the background. Administrative problems of course prevent this subordination from being complete and permanent, inasmuch as the specialized knowledge and co-operation of the third is necessary, and his

opposition, passive or active, cannot be risked. Consequently, mutable pair-formations are the rule; in certain matters, *A* and *B* make decisions, and in others, *A* and *C*. Usually *A* retains the dominant influence; *B* and *C* are thus used by turns in order to consolidate *A*'s position. Nevertheless, *C* is frequently nothing more than an indispensable assistant who must be forever content with the tertiary rôle.

§3. THE TENDENCY TOWARD DISSOLUTION OF THE TRIAD

In many instances the underprivileged member seeks to strengthen his position by forming alliances outside the triad. He searches for and finds a new partner, so that *a new pair is formed*. The triadic group has been transmuted into a double pair; this quite often manifests more harmony and stability than the previous plurality pattern, because the isolation and suppression of the odd member of the pair-third person arrangement ceases. When this expansion of the triad into a tetrad—or, more exactly stated, into a double dyad—does not meet with success, the perpetually disadvantaged member of the triad, if he is sufficiently active and not too closely bound to the latter group, often relinquishes membership in it, thereby causing it to shrink to a pair.

Such instances, which occur quite frequently, enable us to regard as well attested the hypothesis that the triadic group always has a tendency to turn into a group of different numerical composition. This is a consequence of the persistent trend toward the pair *vs.* third person pattern already discussed.

So far we have considered primarily the disadvantages of the member isolated by this pattern, but the fact cannot be overlooked that the exact reverse is often evident: the pair itself is sometimes at a disadvantage in contrast to the isolated and therefore freer member of the triad. The case of the *tertius gaudens*, already discussed in the systematics of action patterns (chap. vii, §5), is of course relevant chiefly to the relation of the third person to the anti-pair. Nevertheless, the network of relationships may be woven in such a way that the *tertius gaudens* derives his advantage from the economic or other difficulties of a pair which as such is harmonious.

In certain instances there may be an effort to control a pair (*A* and *B*) exercising an important function by adding to their number a third person (*C*). The latter need not necessarily be superordinate; sometimes his function can be adequately carried out if he is merely co-ordinate, for this is frequently sufficient to prevent *A* and *B* from making common cause against the person or persons instituting the

control. Such procedure is usually based upon the experience or insight that a dangerous or over-powerful pair pattern can be most easily weakened or limited by adding a member to the group. When prohibitions, accusations, and threats cannot reduce the excessive influence of the pair, an additional member may at times act as a dissolving force, and often does so most effectively when his position is that of an equal rather than a superior.

Whether or not the third person manages to get and keep the upper hand, however, does not rest with him alone, no matter what his abilities may be; indeed, the question is decided only by the character of the existing pair pattern—primarily, by the possible points of attack it offers. Not as seldom as might be imagined, pair patterns which seem genuine prove to be spurious under the impact of the newcomer. The intimacy between the former partners is discovered to have been hypocritical or superficial after the third person, who often has a personal interest in tearing away the mask, has carried out his work of criticism and fault-finding.

This is not the only possibility; sometimes a pair pattern previously characterized by genuine intimacy becomes spurious because of the intentional or unintentional influence of someone else. Apropos at this point is the case noted a few pages previously, namely, where one of the partners was more strongly drawn to the newcomer than to his old companion, a change which consequently deprived the pair relationships of their earlier spontaneity; the members of the disintegrating dyad could therefore no longer take each other at face value, but perpetually questioned the most harmless acts or furtively gazed at the stranger.

If the latter acquires prestige, both partners sometimes recognize what they feel to be his superiority, and he may become a model or *standard* for the pair, especially if its members are ambitious or vain. They attempt to form themselves in his image, and are no longer so careless of their personal appearance and behavior as they were in the past. They are perpetually self-conscious, in the belief or fancy that two watchful eyes are focussed upon them, and thus they are controlled even though the third person may have no conscious intention of so influencing them.

The triad is especially adapted to the masking of relationships actually existing and to the disguising of opinions and ways of thinking, for the very reason that a combination of two against one or the antagonism of one to both the others cannot issue in open conflict, but must be restricted to competition or contravention, inasmuch as

all are members of and as such are interested in the survival of the triad. As a consequence, it often happens that such a group frequently manifests those relationships of avoidance which issue from resentment, envy, malice, and, as is quite understandable, jealousy. Every effort is made to supplant the favored person by outdoing his achievements. This is fertile ground for those complicated social relations, which, following Ross, we term "anticipation" and "simulation" (chap. xxx, §10). Attitudes rooting in discord and hatred (which may not even be avowed to oneself) flourish most luxuriantly in the triadic group, and produce spurious relationships that are often extremely complicated.

Jealousy, as already noted, frequently is a characteristic outcome of triadic relationships; indeed, it may be distinguished from envy by the fact that the latter usually arises most easily in the pair, whereas jealousy grows most rapidly in the extra-sexual as well as the sexual relationships of the triad. The process through which jealousy arises may be described as follows: two persons seek the favor, recognition, or love of a third, and the partner who apparently or actually is least successful in his attempt at approach regards the relationship of the successful member with an emotion into which dejection, disgust, and intensified desire enter as components. Here again we have the pair-third person configuration so often referred to; this is one more demonstration of the fact that the triad is inherently unstable.

But although unstable, such a configuration need not necessarily collapse, for the third person frequently effects a reconciliation of the discordant pair; the special position of the odd member of the triad may become a force tending to unite the pair more closely. Tension tending to separate the marital pair is not infrequently lessened by their child, sometimes even by the mere advent of a child, although it is also true that in other instances tension is increased or even caused by this particular newcomer. Again, the grandfather sometimes mediates between son and father, and in fact is especially fitted to do so when, as is usually the case, two generations immediately related are less able to arrive at an understanding than those more widely separated (cf. chap. xix, §4).

No matter how many types of triadic groups varying in structure and function are examined, the same configuration of relationships recurs almost without exception; namely, the pair-third person pattern. The probability of the occurrence of an identical degree of social distance between *A*, *B*, and *C* is very slight. The triad is therefore quite important where relations of avoidance and disjunction—i.e., dissoci-

ative action patterns—are concerned, although the tendency to intensify associative relations between two of its members must not be overlooked.

The triad is fundamentally similar to the pair in one respect, for they both provide more scope for the development of the less stereotyped elements of personality. In another respect, however, the triad is as different from the pair as it could well be, for its peculiar configuration frequently makes necessary an elementary division of function that is not inherent in the native endowments of its members, i.e., that is strictly social rather than bio-social. In other words, the triadic group represents the most rudimentary stages of organization, and in this regard is more closely similar to many larger groups than to the pair, although its numerical difference from the latter is very slight.

CHAPTER XLI

THE GROUP: MEDIUM-SIZED AND LARGE

§1. TYPES OF *B* GROUPS

In classifying the different varieties of groups, it seems advisable to continue the use of our simple numerical criterion; hence we may distinguish dyads, triads, medium-sized groups, and large groups.

As already noted, the tetrad or group with four members has a tendency to divide into two dyads. In fact, the class of genuine medium-sized groups does not really begin until the pentad or group of five persons is reached. Unfortunately a precise lower limit of the large group or polyad cannot be fixed, for the optimal limit or margin (chap. xxxviii, §6) determines the classification; for example, although a group having fifty members may be only medium-sized when its particular purpose is taken into account, from other aspects it may be regarded as large.

Generally speaking, the difference between medium-sized and large groups is relatively slight. In fact, where genuine groups rather than crowds or abstract collectivities are concerned, there is little use in distinguishing more than two numerical varieties: (1) small groups of from two to four persons; and (2) large groups, or all those having more than four members. The former are characterized by predominance of the personal element, whereas the latter usually repress or attempt to repress everything of a personal nature in favor of one or another variety of objectivity or formality, whether or not it plays any useful part in the essential functions of the group. Further, large groups are always organized (oftentimes disadvantageously and imperfectly); this tendency toward objective regulation is characteristically expressed in the division of function peculiar to large groups. Small groups, i.e., dyad and triad, differ from each other, as we have attempted to show, by virtue of the fact that the dyad allows the greatest latitude to the interaction of basic elements in personality, whereas the triad manifests a slighter degree of such intimate interaction, if only because it has a tendency to discord and dissolution. Precisely because of this tendency, however, it frequently builds up a kind of rudimentary organization that prevents collapse. When the

drift toward dissolution cannot be checked, it results either in a numerical decrease, thus giving rise to the pair, or in an increase that produces the double pair. The tetrad of course need not necessarily issue in a double pair in the strict sense of the latter term, i.e., in two sub-groups which always have the same membership, for one person may be a member of both dyads, leaving the odd member isolated. (That is, *A* may at times combine with *B* and at times with *C*, but always against *D*.) Moreover, there may be shifts in the membership of the two pairs within the tetrad just as in the case of the single pair within the triad.

In order to avoid pedantic repetition, dyads and triads, i.e., groups in which the personal element predominates, in which common-human relations play the chief part, will be termed *A* groups, and both medium-sized and large groups will receive the name of *B* groups. Whenever it is necessary to distinguish the medium-sized from the large groups, the former will be termed *b* groups, whereas the generic designation of *B* groups will still be used for the latter. The distinction will rarely be necessary, and there is consequently little chance for error in this double use of *B* group as both specific and generic term. Its generic meaning is of very much greater importance.

Nevertheless, the division into *b* groups and *B* groups is not superfluous, for the former (five or more members) have many points in common with *A* groups. The statements about *B* groups in general which follow in the balance of this chapter, particularly those pertaining to group affects, group standards (cf. chap. xxvii, §3), and group objectivity, frequently are only partially true of medium-sized or *b* groups. Such *b* groups possess a peculiarity which shows that the personal element still plays a large part in them: more often than might be supposed, they accord a central position to one of their number without making him a leader. This is not a process of organization, but an involuntary outcome of certain situations. Quite often a child is plainly the axis about which a family or a social circle revolves. Indeed, this centralization in which a concrete person is the permanent or, what is more frequent, the transitory focal point, seems to be a fundamental trait of the *b* group. This person, however, is not the standard by which group behavior is governed; he is merely the object of concerted (but often quickly diverted) interest. This is especially evident in *b* groups devoted to the cultivation of "sociability," but it is by no means lacking in professional and other supposedly impersonal bodies.

§2. THE NATURE OF *B* GROUPS

From now on, our attention will be directed chiefly to *B* groups; these usually incorporate only the more strictly social aspects of the selves of their members; temperamental attitudes find relatively slight opportunity of expression. The greater objectivity of *B* groups is probably due to this fact. They are also characterized by the important place occupied within them by the phenomena of social distance (chap. xvii, §2) and also by the predominance of group affects. An effort will be made to show that, contrary to the prevailing opinion, anti-emotions (i.e., antipathetic emotions) and their correlated dissociative processes are extremely prevalent among *B* groups in particular, that human relationships in such groups are often spurious (cf. chap. iii, §8), and finally, that group purposes frequently become perverted (cf. chap. xxx, §§8, 9).

The nature of *B* groups can be understood through knowledge of the part standards play in their behavior more adequately than through any other means.

B groups are usually elective; the regulated groups found among them are almost always creations and subdivisions of abstract collectivities. To be sure, careful study of *B* groups makes it quite evident that the concept of "free choice" or election upon which the category of elective groups is based is very relative indeed. When we say that the great majority of *B* groups issue from the "free" decisions of their participants, such language implies a concept of freedom that is far more juridical than sociological; we merely mean that, speaking broadly, the state does not compel its citizens to join *B* groups. Viewed sociologically, it is evident that social control in all its forms has a great deal to do with forcing human beings to make "free choice" of membership in many *B* groups; indeed, social determinism is the rule and seldom if ever the exception.

Although not strictly relevant to what has just been said, it seems advisable here to repeat that only rarely can sharp distinctions, based upon externally perceivable traits, be made between the three main classes of plurality patterns; seldom, if ever, can the observer find a body of persons that is only a crowd, another that is a group pure and simple, and still another that has the traits of an abstract collectivity alone. Nevertheless, it is necessary to use theoretical constructs, ideal types perhaps never existent in empirical reality. When confronted by the tremendous number of mixed, transitional, or intermediate types surrounding us on every hand, we must attempt to

focus upon the aspects typical of the crowd, the group, or the abstract collectivity, for without distinctions no mastery of the "tangled skein of sense," of the empirical chaos, is possible. The criticism that such distinctions are theoretical is beside the point; their heuristic, pragmatic value is all that need be considered. Examination of our numerically and externally defined *B* groups almost always reveals some traits of the crowd, especially when transitory impulses are noted, and on the other hand, trends toward the superpersonal often appear to such an extent that the given *B* group behaves as if it were a small state or church.

In the following discussion, emphasis is laid upon "group-like" (*gruppenmässig*) phenomena. In spite of all haziness at the margins, the traits which may most properly be termed "group-like" can best be observed in the *B* group. They inhere in a certain kind of behavior that, ideal-typically speaking, can be observed among human beings so far as they are members of *B* groups (for the sake of brevity, we shall speak of the behavior of *B* groups).

Behavior within these groups, being interhuman, is of course not the same as behavior unaffected by immediate interaction with other human beings; we might even speak of interhuman as contrasted with isolated behavior if the latter phrase did not imply too much. More desirable would be the use of a special terminology to denote exclusively group behavior, as well as all behavior of plurality patterns, as over against the behavior of separate human beings. In this case, however, as in so many others, language leaves a rapidly developing science in the lurch; no such precise vocabulary is available. This lack is most painfully felt with regard to words designating psychical processes, especially emotions and affects. We are compelled to use the same terms for the psychical life of the group (an abbreviation, as above noted) as are used for the psychical life of the individual, in spite of the fact that human beings in social situations behave altogether differently from the way they behave in isolation. This "altogether differently," however, must be explained. Most persons living today will never thoroughly understand it, and indeed will never realize that there is a difference. Ability to grasp it is perhaps most closely analogous to musical ability. One can of course bandy about empty phrases such as group hatred or group sympathy, but the "tone-color" of such affects in the group is quite unlike that in the single human being; moreover, the rhythmical sequence is different. Perhaps the experimental psychologist will some day be able to make comparative measurements and to determine the difference in quanti-

tative terms. At any rate, it is not the task of the sociologist; we must content ourselves for the present with the use of brief descriptions which enable the student consistently to regard the behavior of plurality patterns as on a different level from that occupied by the behavior of the separate person.

§3. THE GROUP AFFECTS

Some progress has been made in this direction, for even now the difference between the behavior of crowds and single persons is widely recognized and has been quite adequately described, although clear definition of "crowd-like" phenomena has seldom been practiced. But this is not as helpful as it might seem, for crowd behavior and group behavior are by no means identical, even though groups and crowds quite similarly yield themselves to urges and emotions; with all their irrational traits, groups nevertheless give more scope to reflection and consequently act with greater foresight. To be sure, the thinking of *B* groups is usually devoted solely to the purpose of rationalizing or justifying previously existing emotions; by and large, *B* groups remain bound by their group affects and group interests. These are basic and relatively permanent elements; rational interpretation is only a disguise and is changed as need arises. *B* groups usually derive their rationalizations from real or fancied interdependence with abstract collectivities that provide them with theories, programs, and dogmas. They are thereby enabled to assert that they exist for the sake of the state, the folk, the church, or the class, for does not the "spirit" of these superpersonal plurality patterns require their existence and unusual characteristics for its fulfillment? In these ways, *B* groups obtain support and justification for their already developed arrogance; they link themselves with the superpersonal by an act of rationalization. Crowds, on the other hand, rarely manifest such justificatory processes; they are as they are and do not reflect, simulate, rationalize, or propound programs.

Now, how are group emotions related to those of the single human being? Let us be plain upon one point: never under any circumstances is the *whole* human being, with *all* his psychical capacities, incorporated in the group. His entire ability for devotion, hatred, or revulsion is never completely absorbed in the life of the group. Each separate emotion and the total capacity for emotion never reaches full manifestation in the group member as group member; the diminution due to group membership may amount to as much, let us say, as fifty

per cent. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that strictly private, personal, emotional life is frequently inhibited and repressed by self-control, reflection, memory, internal conflict (with the opposing emotions), and so on; in other words, diminution of emotional manifestation is by no means a group characteristic alone. In fact, as a member of the group the human being manifests a much lower degree of such inhibition; the emotions peculiar to the group member are almost always more thoroughgoing, more in agreement with temperamental attitudes, and less checked by conscience (not forgetting, of course, that the *sharp* antithesis between social and temperamental attitudes here implied does not obtain in reality). From this second point of view, the group emotions of the human being therefore appear more intense than the strictly private or personal, perhaps by as much as fifty per cent. Consequently, it seems best to avoid entirely words such as hatred, love, pride, and aversion where the inner life of members of *B* groups as *members* is concerned.

A noteworthy attempt at a new terminology has been made by Zweig. He designates the typical group emotions as the differential affect and the central affect. He quite justifiably regards them as the chief forces of the "group soul," i.e., of the emotional lives of group members as members. They are not, however, two different affects, but only two aspects, distinguished for the sake of clarity, of one and the same phenomenon. From one point of view, it is the affect of repulsion correlated with an intense consciousness of difference, and from another, its complement, the delusion of being the center about which all else revolves. That is to say, "the affect of repulsion is bound up with the affect of exaggeration of the importance and perfection of one's own group." Zweig has given an excellent description of the essential elements in this intensified group emotion:

"The members of every group are pervaded by a feeling that comes to consciousness in two ways. First, their membership places them in the very center of the cosmos. To be sure, this attitude is consciously embodied in a program only where especially naïve groups and participants are concerned; usually the feeling of such overwhelming importance is not an object of reflection. All groups, however, possess this attitude, and when especially stimulated or irritated they abandon themselves completely to this irrational conviction. Their group is more important than any other, and around it the whole world of values and facts congregates; their group is the final end of creation. All other groups the world can show, and especially those somewhat similar, as well as all persons not members of any group, are in comparison with their own utterly inferior."¹

¹ Arnold Zweig, *Caliban, oder Politik und Leidenschaft* (1927), p. 54.

§4. PERSONAL AND GROUP EMOTIONS

To repeat: these *group* anti-emotions are quite different from the anti-emotions of single human beings, for the latter usually appear in conjunction with manifestations of shame, and where possible are hidden or disguised, whereas the former are usually displayed with the greatest unconcern—indeed, with pride.

The peculiar connection between shame and emotion in the psychical life of the separate person is undoubtedly due to the influence of standards, institutional ideologies, etc. Whenever he is not ashamed of his emotional manifestations, he attempts to justify them as natural necessities or as virtues inseparably linked with the service of the supreme ideal.

In the group, on the contrary, the human being, morally considered, is very crude. The only virtue he recognizes is that of obedience to the group of which he is a member and which gives him models, standards, and imperatives. (Properly speaking, we should say, "the group of which he is *most entirely* a member," for he often belongs to a great many different groups.)

This complete allegiance to group norms is especially frequent in young men. They are seldom closely controlled internally or externally by the family, even when it retains its characteristics as an abstract collectivity. Moreover, the church exercises little influence except in certain relatively small circles such as Christian Endeavor Societies, Epworth Leagues, sodalities, and so on. Finally, the state is only indirectly connected with the imperatives accepted by the young man, and then only as the object as a vague sort of "patriotism." His real loyalties go to his fraternity, his athletic teams, the R. O. T. C., and so on; such groups literally possess him body and soul, and he usually subordinates his divergent interests to them. He favors everything that furthers the interests of his group and opposes everything that limits them.

The group seems to evoke in many persons a desire to subordinate themselves to it. The abstract collectivities are too intangible and too far removed from the feelings of simple persons; they require much insight and thoughtfulness if any direct emotional apprehension is to take place. Only in the rare and decisive culminating moments of history do they exert appreciable influence. The club, the team, "the mutual admiration society," the trade union local, the departmental clique, the lodge, and the ladies' auxiliary are close enough to more

naïve personalities to be continually effective; such groups are usually the means through which men are linked with the great abstract collectivities.

The desire to subordinate oneself to the group is probably the reason for the astonishing strength and uninhibited nature of group anti-emotion. The differential and central affects reach a high pitch of intensity because they are rarely if ever checked by shame. The separate group members are able to say to themselves, "What I do is not done for my own purposes, but for the social group which I serve." Persons who in other connections would not lie, steal, or murder feel totally released from all such inhibitions in their group capacities. The only question they ask is whether their action will serve the group interest.

The group demands certain sacrifices of the human being, or at least diminishes his freedom of movement and choice. An attempt is usually made to compensate for this deficit, and the greatest of all such compensations—which indeed may more than make up for any disadvantage—is the consciousness of belonging to the group. The old personality is gladly relinquished, and a new personality, a group-self, is eagerly adopted. This mutation takes place among members of many groups, but it is most clearly exemplified in the soldier who, to be sure, is in the service of the army, an abstract collectivity, but who makes contact with that collectivity only through the medium of such groups as the company or the squad. The recruit at first suffers greatly when his old unmilitary self is treated with contempt by his officers and fellows, but he gradually acquires from his group relations a new consciousness of himself as a soldier. If he proves to be amenable to discipline and gifted with the military virtues, he may be promoted, and in this way a new source of recognition and prestige is tapped. The more rapidly his old self vanishes, the more firmly grounded becomes the new set of group emotions clustering about his newly acquired action patterns.

The observation may repeatedly be made that *B* groups foster personal unscrupulousness to an unusual degree. (No value-judgment is intended in pointing out this fact.) When actions are practiced which would otherwise cause a great deal of shame or embarrassment, the group member comforts himself with the knowledge that the other members of his group are doing the same thing and that they even require him so to behave. The feeling of complete personal responsibility does not arise, or if it does is quickly stifled. The group member

asks only one question: "Have I violated the code of my circle, have I broken my oath of allegiance? If I have, then, to be sure, I am a fitting object of contempt, but if I have not, can any one take offense?"

§5. THE GROUP ETHIC

Again without making value-judgments, it may be said that *B* groups as such are almost always presumptuous, arrogant, and short-sighted. The person as a member of the great abstract collectivities of course has a much more intense consciousness of self, but the ideas and sensations entering into this consciousness are freighted with ideologies that are centuries and even millennia old. By contrast, groups are much more naïve; they are coarse and primitive, and vouchsafe a much larger field for the direct expression of relatively unsublimated urges. They "popularize" and distort the abstract ideologies until they can be more readily assimilated by the "natural man."

Other ideals are stamped out of the group member in order to stamp in conventional behavior corresponding to the group's code and purposes. Wherever this conventional correctness succeeds fully in imposing itself, the spontaneous, personal elements are likely to be repressed. The conventional ideal of correctness stifles all verve, youthful vigor, pleasure in initiative, and flights of fancy, and in fact practically all the forces that make for innovation. Human beings whose group functions have made them entirely conventional are altered mentally, emotionally, and physically. Even their postures become stiff and angular and their faces expressive only of accepted forms. Such persons seem completely lacking in spontaneity—as indeed they are; their personal, intimate selves are too thoroughly encased in the hard, lifeless shell of conventional requirements. Nevertheless, the wish for new experience is not completely extinguished even in such seeming automata, but its gratification is sought for in an impersonal sphere, namely, in connection with the life of the group. The new experiences desired are not the sensual-aesthetic stimuli of personal life, but rather the sensations immediately linked with the differential and central affects. Efforts are made to assert group superiority and to force other groups into subservience. The greatest pleasure is derived in demonstrating that competing or opposing groups are in one way or another "inferior." This has nothing in common with private, personal values; recognition of and by the group is the supreme goal.

§6. *ESPRIT DE CORPS*

This central affect of the group has been much praised under the name of *esprit de corps*. It undoubtedly accomplishes a great deal in consolidating and maintaining the group, for when it is not present, the tendency of the more egocentric personalities to abandon the group because of the restrictions the latter places upon them often results in complete dissolution. The spirit of fellowship, which is quite different from *esprit de corps*, is rarely found among average group members; a true feeling of fellowship with no admixture of central affects occurs only among those occasional groups united by some deeply shared experience. Sometimes a common burden of suffering or an extraordinary measure of mutual happiness creates fellow-feelings which the participants attempt to render permanent by forming themselves into an organized group, an effort that has little hope of success, inasmuch as organization tends to destroy the intimately personal.

However great the difference between the spirit of fellowship and *esprit de corps*, it nevertheless cannot be denied that the latter has an important function in the discipline of *B* groups. Inert and loosely organized personalities frequently are galvanized into greater and more consistent activity when they become group members. Human beings who would otherwise dream and dally away their lives win a foothold that gives an opportunity for achievement and a meaning to life that their vocation does not supply, particularly if it be a mere bread-and-butter occupation. In brief, the *esprit de corps* in some measure characteristic of all groups may bring about an increase in the energy of group participants.

From what has been said, it should be plain that no value-judgment is rendered against group life as such; we have merely noted the fact that a great majority of contemporary *B* groups are still rather crude, morally and mentally undeveloped, and that they do not even begin to show the capacity for creative achievement which even the average human being uninfluenced by *B* groups often manifests.

Further, most groups are utterly uncritical of themselves and have no respect for values they cannot understand. Most group leaders inculcate aggressiveness, self-assertion, and snobbery. This is true not only of the numerous exclusive clubs, private schools, "country club universities," fraternities, sororities, and so on, but also, *mutatis mutandis*, of workers' organizations, scientific bodies, literary societies, etc. It is quite amusing to note the differential affects evidenced

by all varieties of social groups which derive their chief significance from the fact that "certain persons are not admitted"; they cultivate exclusiveness under the guise of many pretexts and supposedly "worthy" purposes. Charitable enterprises, for example, have sometimes been known to be promoted most advantageously when the persons approached for contributions have been assured that only the "best people" will be solicited. Such exclusiveness furthers the consciousness of the supreme value of one's own group, and that after all is the principal thing.

The external precision and smartness evidenced by many groups such as fraternal organizations on parade is likely to be deceiving; many of these groups are at bottom quite undisciplined. Their resounding list of principles and their eternal harping upon "service" leads some persons to praise the devotion and fidelity of such groups as groups. In reality, although it is probably true that most of the separate members zealously defend and further the interests of their group, there can be little doubt that the latter, considered as a functional unity, serves nobody but itself.

§7. EVOLUTIONARY PARALLELS

Perhaps this group behavior can be interpreted by making use of the evolutionary point of view, although the false analogies to which this approach so often gives rise has caused its virtual exclusion from other portions of the present system. Speaking in terms of analogy rather than of homology, is it not possible that interhuman plurality patterns, social "organisms," must pass through the same evolutionary stages as the human being, phylogenetically considered, has already done? We know that the latter was once completely dominated by a sort of naïve animal selfishness, i.e., by biological urges, and that, in spite of the long process of humanization, traces of the earlier levels still remain. The group, however, instead of merely manifesting traces of its cruder antecedents, has hardly anything else to show; although it is as old as humanity itself, it is at a very low point in the developmental process. This is probably due to the fact that throughout the whole course of human history moral and ethical teaching has dealt almost exclusively with the separate person; little or no attention has been paid to the group because until recent times almost no one has recognized that plurality patterns, although made up of human beings, constitute functional systems presenting traits not manifested by mere aggregates. Sociological thought, which gives due weight to this fact, is only in its beginnings; it has not yet appre-

ciably influenced social practice. Here and there, however, a few social scientists and even a few laymen have grasped the surprising difference between the behavior of human beings who when acting singly are intelligent, well-adjusted, and mature, but who as members of groups frequently indulge in the most puerile and foolish demonstrations.

The human being when acting singly rarely if ever has need of differential or central affects in order to achieve the utmost of which he is capable. This of course is not to say that he is free of *personal* affects; a great many of mankind's leaders in all fields have been marked by intense egocentricity. Nevertheless it is also true that those who as separate personalities are dominated by crudely egoistic affects are usually ashamed of the fact and regard them as hindrances to fullest accomplishment; they are not "*die Fittiche zu grossen Taten*." The scientist, artist, or technician usually is well aware that others are striving for the same goal and that they may reach it sooner than he if he does not put forth every effort. He rarely believes that everybody else is inferior and that he alone can win the prize. Does he accomplish less because others have the same object in view? And—this is the decisive question—does he need an exaggerated feeling of his own importance, an egocentric affect, in order to do his utmost? Beyond any doubt there are such things as pathological ambition and delusions of grandeur, but does mankind at large attribute to these weaknesses—and they are usually recognized as weaknesses rather than as strong points—the function of bringing forth great achievements?

If the parallel between the single person and the group is followed through without prejudice, there can be little doubt of the conclusion here advanced, viz., that the existence and effectiveness of the group does not depend upon the predominance of differential and central affects. The following logical (or rather illogical) sequence is false: the group affects just mentioned are necessary, for their function is indispensable in producing fruitful group activity; and fruitful group activity is in turn necessary to "the progress of humanity." It is false because great achievements are usually those of separate persons, such as Darwin, Edison, and Einstein, rather than of groups, and because the term "progress" begs the whole question.

§8. THE FOUR WISHES AND THE *B* GROUP

But considerations like the foregoing are leading us into the field of value-judgment—it is high time that we return to strictly sociological description and analysis.

The mere fact that the presence of group affects can be demonstrated is no solution of the problem. The social psychologist must more thoroughly analyze and compare the psychical processes involved, and must wherever possible reduce them to their component elements, thus clarifying those aspects of the phenomena which may be resolved into data of consciousness and other intra-organic phenomena.

As sociologists rather than social psychologists, however, we must bear in mind that the psychical must always be traced to the social. The interhuman elements manifest in the behavior of *B* groups must be drawn upon as well as the strictly psychical if satisfactory explanation is to be attained.

Let us ask a question that leads from the social-psychological to the sociological: Why is it that *B* groups have so little capacity for humility? This leads us to the more general and, as it were, more *interhuman* question: What is the particular configuration of relationships linking the human being to his *B* group and to his fellow-members?

Entry into a group and more or less gradual assumption of all the duties and privileges of membership create a situation which (1) imposes certain trends upon and (2) vouchsafes certain possibilities of realization to the wishes of human beings. The method of explaining interhuman processes as products of the situation and the dominant wish, already used in other parts of the present system ($P = A \times S$), also furnishes the guiding principle in the analysis of *B* groups. It will be recalled that human beings continually attempt to gratify one or another wish falling in the following categories: security, response, recognition, and new experience. The situations inherent in group life provide many opportunities for the gratification of these wishes; and, under certain circumstances, the great majority of human beings can satisfy, in the group, wishes falling in all four categories.

For most persons, although not for those of more active temperament, the opportunity for security is perhaps of greatest attraction. The group protects its members, intervenes in their behalf, and up to a certain point makes common cause with them. The desire for security, however, is more than a need for merely external protection. The great number of less active temperaments find satisfaction in situations where the criteria of activity do not have to be set up by their own personal efforts. In the group, only obedience is necessary. And obedience, as Spencer showed in his discussion of ceremonial institutions, is the most primitive and widespread virtue. For the ma-

jority, it seems an advantage when the opinions held in their social circle, and therefore by themselves, are also prescribed as duties. Such group-mediated ways of thinking are favored and fostered not only by so-called "like-opinion groups," "communities of belief," but also by other types of plurality patterns, especially those existing primarily for "social purposes"—where on "common-sense" grounds it might least be expected!

For example, the average small-town citizen feels, consciously or unconsciously (most often the latter), that his lodge affords him security against the world outside, although at the same time a certain degree of independence and even of difference of opinion is desired in his fellow-members. The worshipful master is quite well aware of the fact that his friend the junior warden has other professional interests and points of view than himself, but he is also certain that in matters basic to the gratification of wishes agreement may be counted upon—as, for example, in mutual scorn of other secret societies having a different "religious" background. Similarly, the sewing circle that foregathers once a month at the homes of its various members guarantees mutual dislike of bobbed hair, modern dancing, and similar frivolities, and all the "lady members" think lovingly and longingly of the days when no such disconcerting novelties were abroad in the land. Once more, the "pledge" finds in the fraternity that has "paddled" and otherwise initiated him a new home that prescribes his way of life, even to the observance of special "study" hours, and he also learns the minutiae governing the presentation of fraternity pins to co-eds, as well as the best ways to defeat the political ambitions of other fraternities.

More or less explicit in the above illustrations is the point that the gratification of internal and external security is often associated with the wish for response, especially in less independent personalities. Now, of all four categories of wishes this is the one which is most likely to be disappointed; but it is also true that the social circle into which the new fraternity member enters, for example, provides him with a set of relationships that offers a possibility of forming pairs, of establishing friendships, higher than is likely to be found in any other connections later established. As a general thing, however, it is extremely difficult to find completely adequate response within *B* groups because, as already noted, they are likely to lay greater stress upon conventional rather than intimately personal traits, and the latter must always be uppermost if response is to be entirely satisfactory. Indeed, *B* groups are almost always based upon a fairly high degree

of distance between their members; when interaction is too intense and intimate, the structure of the group as a whole is likely to be in danger. As a consequence, *B* groups sometimes attempt to prevent too much or too evident intimacy between their members by stamping as proper only those non-committal degrees of distance that result in uniformly tepid relationships. In other words, the prevailing relationships are more categorical than personal. If *B* groups are regarded as common-human, relatively permanent unions, and if only those relationships are regarded as genuine which result from the interaction of the deeper levels of personality, a great many relationships in *B* groups must be regarded as spurious (cf. chap. iii, §8). There is often only the appearance of comradely aid or friendship, even though the formal program of the group may enjoin mutual "aid and comfort"; in reality, the *B* group offers too many possibilities of mutual friction, of clash of personalities, to prevent discrepancies between the announced and the actual relationships. Precisely because the resulting antagonisms—the consequent relations of avoidance—are not openly manifested, because they must be suppressed or at least must not be verbally expressed, the obtaining relationships are frequently spurious. For example, no one with a realistic bent who has attended an annual conference of ministers of any of the evangelical churches with a centralized type of organization will fail to recognize the lack of correspondence between the protestations of brotherhood and the undercover jockeying for desirable churches.

The less attention is paid to intimate personal traits, the more possibility there is for gratification of the wish for recognition; indeed, it is in many instances a direct substitute for response. The *B* group requires that its members achieve something in its name. The achievements of the members are at the same time the achievements of the group, and in order to stimulate such achievement and thereby to gratify differential and central affects, the group must publicly recognize and praise the successful activities of its members. Athletic associations of all kinds are good examples of this practice, but the veterans' organization or the woman's club frequently places a similar premium upon "our" victories.

All these gratifications are purchased by readiness to relinquish self-direction and to abandon oneself to practices instituted by others. This, however, is a relatively slight sacrifice for most persons to make, especially when the group concerned makes an appeal to familiar prejudices, interests, and desires.

§9. GROUP STANDARDS; SPURIOUS GROUPS

Entry into a *B* group almost always means that the newcomer is subjected to a molding process having as its goal a certain uniformation (chap. xxvi). After they have reached a certain stage of development, such groups almost always give the impression of being composed of two personality types only, instead of the wide variety found outside. There is first of all a general, uniform type of group member, and within this certain sub-types which, however, are relatively few. In spite of the ebb and flow of membership, these types remain so constant that it frequently seems as if the group were still composed of the same human beings who formerly made it up.

This phenomenon may most easily be observed among vocational or occupational groups, and is usually explained—in part quite properly—by the fact that the practice of every occupation involves the formation of certain bodily habits and ways of response. Obviously the soda clerk will not resemble a steam-shovel operator, nor will the tailor look much like a structural-steel worker. Nevertheless, this transformation into group members of a definite social type is not due solely to the effects of certain kinds of labor upon body and mind, although these have some influence; far greater effects are exerted by the taking over of group standards (see chap. xvii for an analysis of the process of “standardizing”). These group standards are the most sociologically essential and characteristic traits of *B* groups in general.

When dealing with the general theory of the group, the presence of standards was not listed among the necessary characteristics of all groups, inasmuch as *A* groups do not always, nor even frequently, possess standards. Dyadic and triadic groups, for example, seldom manifest them, inasmuch as these groups are more or less intimately personal plurality patterns, and hence can exist without the buttressing influence of group standards. In fact, it may be said that lack of discrimination, that disregard of the personal element so characteristic of *B* groups, finds its most perfect exemplification in the standard. This is of such great significance for *B* groups of all kinds that it may categorically be asserted that a *B* group without a standard or standards cannot maintain itself as an elective group.

The standard or model is of such importance in the *B* group because every member strives to embody it both internally and externally. It is always the complete or partial personification of the goal toward which the group strives, and is usually a concrete model or tangible symbol, rarely if ever a mere abstract rule or concept.

That is to say, it is based upon direct sensory experience rather than upon reflection. More often than not it is a person, known to all members of the group, who may be affiliated with it, although this need not necessarily be the case. Quite often this person is a historical figure; sometimes fantasy shapes a future-man or superman and endows him with the traits of a standard. The more immediately present, the more nearly embodied in flesh and blood, a standard is to a group, the more plainly the nature of that group may be recognized. Not infrequently a person with a definite name is set up as a model: in 1925 every member of the high school team in Columbus, for example, probably envisaged Red Grange as a little god in whose image all good football players should shape themselves. Again, the corporal often makes the grizzled, taciturn, profanely efficient sergeant his model. Once more, many instructors have discovered by their third or fourth lecture that the posture or enunciation of an influential professor finds its reflection in their own.

In these or similar cases, external characteristics rather than more essential traits are imitated; tangible, corporeal traits appeal more effectively and rapidly than those accessible only to reflection and intellectual comprehension.

An indispensable step in the sociological explanation of a *B* group is the discovery of the standard in agreement with which its behavior is actually shaped. For legal purposes, such formal and numerical traits as number of members, constitution, whether or not incorporated, etc., may be of considerable importance, but for the systematic sociologist the chief object of attention is the standard; *from the methodological point of view this is the most important principle in the investigation of B groups.*

Organizations in which a distinct group standard cannot be recognized, as is frequently the case with purposive unions and associations (cf. chap. xxxviii, §2), where the only requisite for admittance is the payment of a fee or a decision dependent solely upon the person joining, show few if any *B*-group characteristics. Indeed, they will here be termed *spurious* groups; although they may be of some significance from the legal, economic, or political point of view, they have little or none from the sociological. A corporation, for example, if it is defined in terms of all its stockholders, is of little sociological importance in the majority of cases; if defined in terms of its board of directors, however, it may yield for analysis a very good specimen of *A* group or *B* group. Again, the annual meeting of stockholders (at which a relatively small proportion are usually present) may evidence

sociologically relevant data, inasmuch as certain social processes of contravention or even of conflict, as well as a great many mixed relationships, can often be observed. But the thirty-three thousand stockholders of Swift & Company, to choose a striking instance, are certainly a spurious group, even though they may constitute a plurality pattern (even this is doubtful). This is primarily due to the fact that no group standard can be distinguished. On the other hand, although the directors mentioned above show little resemblance to Art Young's or Robert Minor's cartoons, they do manifest some typical traits corresponding to their particular businesses or professions, and these traits are modelled after corresponding standards.

§10. GROUP STANDARDS AND ETHICAL IDEALS

The standard dominates all the members of the group. Though seldom found empirically, it is nevertheless possible at least to think of another type of relationship between the member and the group, a relationship in which the former is thoroughly and intensely aware of himself as a distinct personality. He attempts to preserve this distinctness under all circumstances, and requires that his social circle adapt itself to him rather than the reverse. Such mastery of the group by the self is sometimes found among leaders, who at times seem to give free play to the less conventional, less externally conditioned layers of their selves; temperamental attitudes struggle to the surface. This is of course quite unusual: ordinarily the leader is more or less identical with the group standard; moreover, the standard is usually the prior and determining factor, and the leader the later and determined. In other words, only those men who voluntarily or involuntarily correspond to the standard can become leaders under such circumstances.

Two stages can be distinguished in the extent and kind of membership in many *B* groups: that of the novice on the one hand, and that of the adept or initiate on the other. Examples of the first are freshmen, recruits, apprentices, and "tenderfeet"; of the second, veterans, upper-classmen, "oldtimers," and journeymen or master workmen. Transition to the latter of these sub-groups sometimes takes place by means of formal confirmation or initiation (which often assumes the character of a mild form of trial by ordeal). In its informal aspects, attainment of the second stage is usually recognized when the behavior of the new member demonstrates that the erstwhile novice has adequately comprehended the group standard and has begun to shape himself in accordance with it. Members are rarely chosen to

fill the function of leader until they have become sufficiently adept in the group's formal or informal ritual, sufficiently stamped in the group's image, for the other members to be convinced that the process of accordance and standardization is well on the way to completion—that is, when the leader has himself become a model or standard or promises to do so in the near future.

Now, such group standards are not shaped in agreement with the ideals of the great moral and ethical leaders of humanity, but on the contrary, embody the egoism, or even egotism, of the group. The standard is the flesh-and-blood incorporation of group self-aggrandizement, and as a consequence, training and education producing similarity to these standards is at the same time inculcation of the group's central and differential affects.

Speaking psychologically for the moment, we may say that the whole process of inculcation is largely subconscious. Most *B*-group members have no inkling of their strong tendency to become similar to the model set before them, but no matter whether they are awake or asleep, thinking or dreaming, a great number of their mental and bodily functions are steadily at work producing such similarity; the appropriate neuropsychic patterns soon appear. Consequently, the standard becomes the focal point of psychical life and of bodily habituation. Attention is diverted from other possible models; when the novice bows the knee in Rimmon's house, worship at other altars is relinquished. This constant striving for conformity inevitably brings about one-sidedness—after all, the energy available is limited.

In order that the deficiencies resulting from this one-sidedness may not be too keenly felt, or indeed felt at all, the group member elevates his model or standard to the rank of an ideal for which no sacrifice can be other than right and just. The intensity of group affects may largely be explained by the fact that the group member becomes increasingly dominated by the feeling that the extent of sacrifices made prevents change to any other object of devotion, that no other path can henceforth be followed without loss of satisfactions that have become second nature (and hence "ten times nature"), that relinquishment of membership means relinquishment of a personality acquired with much toil and struggle.

Without too great intrusion of value-judgment, it may perhaps be said that this constitutes a vicious circle: every group member attempts to model himself after the group standard, and at the same time renounces all other goals. Concomitantly, the person who serves as the standard or as its representative necessarily incorporates the central

and differential affects, i.e., the arrogance and selfishness, of the group, for no man who doubts the supreme value of its goals can possibly become its model.

The group therefore inculcates in its members group arrogance and selfishness, using its standard as a means to this end: the corresponding affects are derived from the group structure (or at least cannot arise without it), and at the same time tend to consolidate that structure still more firmly.

The foregoing considerations of course should not cause us to lose sight of the fact that grouping in agreement with a particular standard leads to definite advantages. If social life consisted only of a labile, mutable, unpredictable concatenation of impulses issuing from wholly divergent human beings unwilling to adjust to each other and striving toward strictly private goals, enterprises consciously or unconsciously undertaken for the common welfare would be few and far between, and at best would be much more halting and poorly developed than is even now the case. Social life is appreciably simplified and accelerated by the fact that it consists largely of the actions of groups directed by leaders rather than of the random behavior of disconnected, uncontrolled persons.

Group models and standards, however, are at present too crude, too naïvely central and differential, too undeveloped, to achieve their maximum integrative and constructive effect (these terms are free from value-judgment; see chaps. xxi, §2; xxix, §1). If groups are to function in the real rather than in the merely proclaimed service of mankind, their models and standards must conform to the fundamental requirements of such service. Let it again be emphasized, however, that so-called group evils cannot be abolished by making the average group member independent of standards of all kinds, even if this were possible. The solution lies in changing the content of the standards.

The above discussion of the nature of *B* groups also makes plain the sense in which it is possible to speak of perversion of group purposes. There are very few if any groups that shape their program wholly with a view to cultivation of a standard or achievement of a social purpose directly related to it; by far the greater number have certain material or objective purposes, such as bridge, swimming, dancing, basketball, literary discussion, and religious or semi-religious practices. With these material purposes, however, there are linked certain interhuman and personal-formal trends of great sociological interest. Broadly speaking, it may be said that the more active mem-

bers strive to make themselves prominent, to intensify their consciousness of their own value, and to achieve influence or mastery over others. The more passive are moved largely by desires for security, guidance, and even dependence. Hence the gratifications secured by group activity are not solely the product of bridge, swimming, etc., but are largely the result of interhuman processes, of the relations of one person with another, of the purely social. It often happens that the interhuman network is so closely woven and so strong that the particular activity the club or other group is supposed to foster becomes more or less completely hidden. The objective purposes are modified, changed, or completely abandoned if they interfere with purely social diversion. The group is transformed into a "mutual admiration society," an assembly for retailing the latest unsavory anecdotes, or a periodic meeting for the exchange of gossip.

Such considerations as the foregoing provide points of departure for the analysis of social distance in *B* groups in general, but this can be accurately performed only when we concentrate on specific kinds of *B* groups, of which but a few examples can be given here.

§11. METHOD OF ANALYZING *B* GROUPS

These examples will be adduced in the course of the discussion of method forming the main theme of this section. It will perhaps be recalled that the chief task of the systematics of plurality patterns is that of outlining methods which may be followed in analyzing plurality patterns now and in the future. The conclusions advanced in the immediately preceding sections are the result of careful observation extending over a fairly long period, and they lay before the reader the results of direct experience and close study. No matter how great the effort at objectivity, however, the sources of these conclusions are after all nothing more than the observations of *one* fallible human being, who with the best will in the world cannot wholly free himself from his personal equation. In checking over these conclusions, a good deal of doubt arises as to whether pro and con, light and shadow, have been distributed as found in real life. It is possible—and indeed probable—that other sociologists may, upon the basis of their own observations, draw another picture of the interconnection of approach and avoidance, association and dissociation, and their picture would be quite as valid as that sketched here. Fortunately enough, the most important thing is not to decide upon the absolute correctness of the foregoing conclusions; it is far more necessary to raise questions, to define problems, to point out neglected

or little-observed relations, and to evoke the spirit of discussion rather than of debate.

The most important question raised seems to be this: Do the group affects, standards, and wishes determine, or at least primarily condition, the behavior of the group? In case the question is answered in the negative, the more necessary it seems to give due regard to the method which led to the emergence of the question. The desideratum is to provide methodological openings and research leads for the more exact sociological investigation of the future. Even if nothing else has resulted from the present chapter, (1) some fairly important points have been raised with reference to the general analysis of groups; and in addition, (2) what immediately follows concerning *B* groups in particular seems significant.

The nature of each specific *B* group or type of *B* group may be determined in the following way:

(1) To what category or categories may the wishes gratified by membership in the group be assigned? To what extent are they gratified? In what combination?

(2) What is the standard of the group?

(3) How are the group affects, i.e., central and differential affects, manifested?

First, a few remarks about point 1. The question to be answered has to do primarily with elective groups. Where compulsory or regulated groups are concerned, their connection with their respective abstract collectivities is more important, and consequently another set of questions must be used: What is the nature of the compulsion or control which the collectivity imposes upon the group? How much of the fundamental nature and spirit of the collectivity can or will be absorbed by the group under compulsion?

When dealing with types having traits of both regulated and elective groups, i.e., with mixed types, the questions relating to the wishes involved as well as to the control exercised by the collectivity must be answered. An example of a mixed group is afforded by such a trade union as the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. There is no legal requirement compelling membership in this body, and from this point of view it is an elective group; nevertheless, the workers among whom it functions are intensely class-conscious, and hence there is a high degree of social pressure upon those eligible for membership. The resulting problem may therefore be stated as follows: What is the relation between the private wishes and expectations of the separate workers and the class compulsion to which they are subject?

Even groups that from the legal point of view are merely elective, of which most clubs and similar bodies are examples, usually attempt, as we have seen, to derive sanction for their existence from abstract collectivities of one sort or another. They may consequently be classified as political, religious, economic, scientific, or artistic associations. Within the framework of the present system this means that the ideologies in terms of which these groups rationalize their prejudices and partialities are political or religious, etc., or a combination of several.

Next, some comment on point 2, which relates to the group standard, and on point 3, which is concerned with the emotional aspects of group behavior, seems advisable, more especially in view of their close connection with the foregoing discussion of point 1. The method used in dealing with the standard and with the group affects must take into account both subjective and objective elements (in the way already outlined in the section on general group analysis—chap. xxxviii, §8).

§12. PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY SPECIAL TYPES OF *B* GROUPS

The necessity for taking both elements into account is shown in studies of Bohemian life such as those of Zorbaugh² and Honigsheim,³ wherein the importance of both wishes and standards are evident, and in analyses of lodges and their "ladies' auxiliaries," for the members of these groups also are both subjectively and objectively conditioned. Cliques of all kinds, however, may most clearly be recognized by their conformity to their respective standards. Group affects, on the other hand, may be most easily recognized in the forms manifested by gangs⁴ and bands of conspirators.

We can be much less certain about the respective importance of subjective and objective elements in the behavior of beggars or of particular groups of criminals such as pickpockets. The same is true of the groups sometimes formed among the *intelligentsia* and *litterati*, as well as of the peculiar groupings sometimes found among large staffs of domestic servants. Very little is known of the factors constituting the relatively unique nature of such plurality patterns, and still less of the traits they have in common with others. The work of

² H. W. Zorbaugh, *The Gold Coast and the Slum* (1929) chap. v, "Towertown," pp. 87-104.

³ Paul Honigsheim, "Die Bohème," *Köln. Vt. Soz.*, III, 1, pp. 60 ff.

⁴ F. M. Thrasher, *The Gang* (1927) part III, "Organization and Control in the Gang," pp. 251-2.

Gesell, Charlotte Bühler, Anna Freud, Dorothy Thomas, and similar students of children's groups is well known, but practically nothing has been done from a genuinely sociological point of view; here indeed is a great opportunity for research. The occasional flare-ups and friction between director and orchestra point to interesting group configurations, but here again we have no accurate studies.

And so one might go on mentioning problems presented by special types of *B* groups, but enough has been said to indicate the paucity of our information and the desirability of intensive study.

§13. THE *B* GROUP AS AN ORGANIZED PLURALITY PATTERN; ITS GENERAL GROUP CHARACTERISTICS

The previous sections dealing with the *B* group have been devoted almost exclusively to group affects, standards, and wishes; as a consequence, it may seem that one of the most general group characteristics, namely, division of function among members, has been lost sight of entirely. Certain it is that it cannot be neglected, for organization is an essential trait of medium-sized and large groups, i.e., of *B* groups, although *A* groups are organized very slightly if at all.

One of the reasons for this seeming neglect is that although it is possible to say that every "pure" type of *B* group is necessarily organized, little that is generally valid can be said about the exact way in which this organization is manifested (except for some extremely general remarks about equality of function and equality of status—chap. xxxviii, §4). In fact, little can be said until the particular objective purpose for which each group exists or is supposed to exist is taken into account; the purpose conditions almost exclusively the particular *form* of organization. When confronted with the great variety of political, economic, artistic, and "social" groups, it is obvious that no uniformly valid answer can be returned to such questions as the respective desirability of democratic, monarchical, or aristocratic constitutions, of electoral or appointive systems, of direct representation or delegation of powers, or of permanency or rotation of functions. Beyond the assertion that large groups require constitutions differing from those of smaller bodies, very little can be said. It may be observed, however, that non-political groups frequently model their organizations in accordance with political standards, and that legally sanctioned constitutions are not infrequently imitated by elective groups. From the standpoint of the present system, the numerous detailed questions relating to organization are the legitimate problems of political science and the sociology of law rather than of

general systematic sociology; at the same time, such special social or sociological sciences should take due account of what general sociology has to say with reference to wishes, affects, and standards, for these are characteristics common to all interhuman behavior, and a great many organizational problems can be properly solved only by taking the broader interhuman aspects into account.

CHAPTER XLII

THE ABSTRACT COLLECTIVITY: GENERAL ASPECTS

§1. THE HUMAN BEING AND THE ABSTRACT COLLECTIVITY

The series of concentric circles arising when a stone is thrown into a quiet pool affords a good metaphor for the phenomena observed by the science of interhuman behavior. The stone is like the human being, the central point of any social process no matter how complicated it may be. The first small circle surrounding him is the sphere of his intimately personal life, and all the larger circles, which with increasing distance or abstraction become more and more indefinite, manifest in greater dimensions the processes evident in the first small circle. The latter perpetually advances, repeating itself in content and form, and the separate sections of the circular line—sections which we conceptually distinguish as family, state, people, church and so on—are also found in the smallest circle; they each comprise a few degrees of his social self. The circle of life is nevertheless a unity; the smallest portion of its line merges with every other, and it is still a circle even when it reaches the distant, indistinct region of the abstract collectivities. In the present context only these last, faint ripples are relevant; we here deal with them as the ultimate circles of movement surrounding human beings.

It is a grave but often repeated error to deal with abstract collectivities without reference to human emotions, wishes, and strivings. The current effort to draw a sharp line between the concepts "individual" and "social" results only in dividing human history into two parts that can properly be understood only when joined in a whole. Social occurrences, with their insistent pressure, are constantly impinging upon and molding human beings throughout their lives. There is no doubt that our internal and external lives would be utterly inconceivable without the social world that not merely surrounds us but is in us. Nevertheless, social occurrences are after all nothing more than human behavior. They belong to the same genus as do other human activities; they are neither suprahuman nor subhuman. They are no more mysterious nor awesome than are the processes going on within the person; moreover, they are no more permanent than are

the psychical processes, for the latter continually recur in other human psyches.

Two things must be clearly distinguished: first, the ideal forms of collectivities, created by human minds longing for perfection and freedom from the bonds of mortality; and second, the objective (although similarly neuropsychic) realities of state, church, and other structures in whose power we now live, in which our ancestors have lived, and in which our posterity will live. These realities never attain to the perfection of the ideal; on the contrary, they evidence all the traits of human weakness, crudity, and sloth, as well as human endurance, resolution, and striving toward perfection. *Such plurality patterns are not simple summations of social processes, but abstract products of simpler plurality patterns which are products of such processes.* Abstract as the great collectivities may be, however, they always show some traces of the desires and fears of human beings. Nevertheless, these neuropsychic facts are always combined with the objective phenomena of changing situations. They must be understood socially and not merely psychically—that is to say, as the product of situational factors multiplied by motivating factors ($P=A \times S$). It is obvious that this is not fundamentally different from the results achieved in the analysis of the simplest type of interhuman behavior, that involving only two human beings. Even when we attempt to explain the most general forces, such as those of folk, state, and church, there is no excuse for passing out of the realm of social actions (cf. chap. iii, §4). *The whole complex maze of plurality patterns, no matter how far removed from a given human being it may seem, is nothing more than the total sociation of all persons (1) who have existed in the past, (2) who now exist, and (3) who will exist in the future.* (The latter qualification is added because a great many social bodies take some account of future generations, e.g., the sib.) Social control, whether physically coercive or otherwise, can be understood only as the superior power exercised by the sum total of other human beings, although it must be admitted that in their corporate capacities they act quite otherwise than they would singly, viz., with less sympathy. Such plurality patterns possess no powers that are not human in origin, although they may be so intensified by summation and long continuance that this fact may be hard to recognize. The social world, the interhuman macrocosmos, is not one whit more ideal than is the microcosmos of the separate person. No higher qualitative level is attained by indiscriminate “socialization,” that fetish of the pseudo-sociologist; the only possible

qualities are those which can be found among human beings anywhere. The social sphere possesses a greater accumulation of energies, but their source is human after all.

Moreover, interhuman behavior provides no basis for moral or ethical action that is not already present in the human organism. No doubt, human grouping and the formation of more or less permanent plurality patterns help to realize what is potentially present in human beings, and may even intensify its manifestations, but so-called "socialized" behavior does not call forth new and unique values; it is always pertinent to inquire the purpose of "socialization." It can; to be sure, bring about harmony and loftier aims, but this is no reason why every kind of activity to which the adjective "social" can be applied should be praised any more than should private or isolated endeavor. A great deal can be accomplished, of course, when all join forces, but, if the goal of such "socialized" effort is not worth striving for or positively harmful, it is certainly desirable to have a little disturbance of the harmony.

Not only is the plurality pattern usually stronger and longer-lived than the human being—it is also simpler. This is an additional reason for its power and predominance. The human psyche is forever changing, and is rarely if ever at one with itself; clashing impulses and attitudes are always struggling for mastery. Attention, volition, and imagination are continually being diverted from one object to another. We all know that it is quite impossible to say exactly what we do and do not desire unless we studiously ignore or suppress wayward trends. If it were possible to incorporate all the forces of the human organism in the abstract collectivities, and thus to reflect in our major social structures the whole chaos of conflicting emotions and wishes possessed by their members, the state, the church, and all similar bodies would be monstrosities altogether incapable of survival. As it is, however, we construct plurality patterns in accordance with particular purposes whenever possible. Purposes are definable and in specific cases are never numerous. We ascribe certain purposes to state, church, economic structures, etc. Jurists are especially prone to deal with abstract collectivities from the standpoint of purpose only. But even though the actual functions of the plurality pattern extend far beyond the expressed purpose, as is almost always the case, nevertheless only a few of the numerous urges and wishes of the participants can be satisfied. Plurality patterns do not penetrate to the deeper levels of the psyche. Consequently their relative simplicity makes them seem much more unified, clear, and imposing than a separate person, with his

mutable emotions and his restlessly searching mind. This simplicity, however, carries with it rigidity and crudity. The temperamental urges and emotions which do not fit into the Procrustean framework of the abstract collectivities are lopped off; this is quite as true of the church as of any other plurality pattern. For example, there is a vast difference between warm, intimate sympathy, based upon personal contacts, and the timidly tepid "brotherly love" of the Christian churches. In spite of this, the simplicity of abstract collectivities, together with their relative permanence and accumulated power, is the reason for the almost magical attraction they possess for so many persons. The person who is compelled to rely solely upon himself sooner or later finds his relative helplessness, weakness, and solitariness intolerable. Self-observation teaches him that no matter how much vitality he possesses, it finally wanes; a day comes when he feels himself growing old. He discovers that he forgets, is unable to understand or to learn certain things, and that many of his so-called achievements are due little, if at all, to his own efforts. He must reckon with the fact that he is sometimes moody, incapable of complete sincerity, and inconsistent. Knowing all this, he often seeks refuge in the supposed perfection of an abstract collectivity.

In religious periods, this insight into personal fallibility and frailty is the root of belief in a god or gods. Only through superhuman agency can the weak become mighty; consequently the man who once realizes his utter impotence is in a fair way to regain some of the power that once was his but now, as it were, is God's. He abandons himself to what he feels to be extrahuman or superhuman power; he loses his life to find it. Modern man frequently has an inclination thus to yield himself to collective forces such as the state, the political party, the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and similar bodies, either because he regards them as the modes in which deity reveals itself, or because, although considering them quite mortal and temporal, he nevertheless reveres them as ideal forces.

The total achievement of the abstract collectivities necessarily grows larger from generation to generation, while at the same time increasing population density diminishes the value of separate persons. In addition to this, the capacity for comprehending the full importance of plurality patterns has only recently been acquired; human beings have just begun to think abstractly about interhuman matters, and the new sources of knowledge thereby revealed sometimes evoke almost religious fervor.

The belief in personal immortality placed some check upon collec-

tive aspirations in earlier periods, but at present there seems to be a well-developed belief in the immortality of abstract collectivities. Reverence for and devotion to such bodies gratifies a great many inclinations which would otherwise have no focal point; indeed, many persons seem to think it possible to prove rationally or even to demonstrate empirically that plurality patterns such as the state or church are worthy of reverence and devotion; there is no doubt, however, that the real basis is non-rational and emotional, and must be experienced before rationalizations attempting to justify it are evolved. Its power derives from at least two sources: first, the craving to yield oneself to the superpersonal; second, the desire for self-expression in action. The worship of the abstract collectivity permits the devotee to feel that he is a functioning part of an enduring, coherent, and intelligible field of force.

Many modern men are oppressed by feelings of inferiority; they long to relinquish the task of self-direction to powers outside themselves. Others, more simple and contented, are so thoroughly a part of their families, churches, villages, and classes that they cannot and in fact do not wish to think of themselves in detachment from the plurality patterns in which they are incorporated, for the latter are the sources of their strength and stability. In both cases, the need for protection and the wish for security are stronger than the consciousness of personality and the wish for new experience.

This faith in the power of abstract collectivities is in part necessary; frequently, however, it is a delusion that borders on the pathological. As already noted, the differences between the sphere of plurality patterns and the intimate, personal sphere are only differences of degree; the spatial and temporal dimensions of the former are greater—that is all. States, churches, scientific, philosophic, and artistic schools, and in fact culture complexes of all sorts, finally pass away just as do separate personalities. The Roman Empire, Islam in Europe, the domains of the Normans, the Byzantine Empire, and the commercial hegemony of Venice have disappeared just as the British Empire and Soviet Russia will one day vanish. Moreover, the state in its final and most general forms will eventually deteriorate and become extinct in the same way as will all other plurality patterns. The common-human forms of the social processes, approach and avoidance, however, will remain as long as human beings who are at all different from each other remain.

Still more important than the relativity of time is the fact that the powers possessed by collectivities endure only so long as there are

human beings who desire their existence and efficacy, as well as the further fact that these powers are after all only those of interacting human beings, so that we can study human imperfections as manifested by abstract collectivities in much the same way as the weaknesses of any person can be studied.

The impression is easily acquired that human beings have the wondrous capacity of transferring only their highest qualities to the abstract collectivities, so that the latter become repositories for religious devotion, justice, scientific endeavor, altruistic service, and aesthetic capacity. But this superficial impression is false; human shortcomings and defects always enter through the unavoidable crevices in the walls of the abstract collectivities.

No error is more egregious than that of building up theories of the state or the church in complete detachment from the real world, of idealizing the arts and sciences, and in general of attributing virtues and powers to collective forces that they cannot possibly possess. Just as all the other work of human hands and minds falls short of the ideal, so also does the blight of imperfection rest upon the abstract collectivities.

It is true that they often last for a long time, extend over large areas, accumulate great power, and possess relative simplicity—all of which may seem to make them superior to separate persons, but these characteristics, seen from another point of view, make them quite inferior. (To be sure, they are not inferior to average persons, for the latter are almost altogether formed by plurality patterns.) The very fact that men can look forward only to a relatively brief period of existence releases the energies of richly endowed personalities to an extent that would be impossible if they were as long-lived as the great abstract collectivities. The latter are necessarily conservative and, so to speak, egocentric, because of the long future before them, the need for expansion, and the attacks of opposing forces.

§2. THE ABSTRACTNESS OF COLLECTIVITIES

A point has been reached at which it becomes desirable to define more strictly what is meant by abstract collectivities and their various sub-varieties (corporate bodies, etc.). They are plurality patterns just as are crowds and groups, and consequently are constituted in and through social processes in substantially the same way. The only noteworthy difference between the crowd and the group (as ideal types) on the one hand, and the abstract collectivity on the other, is the greater abstractness of the latter. This differentiating character-

istic simply means that abstract collectivities cannot be perceived as totalities and that they are not so closely linked with the physical presence of a plurality of human beings. They are not closely correlated with the corporeal and tangible; but nevertheless they are products of accumulated processes which as such are separately perceivable. The great spatial extent and time-span necessary for such accumulation is the reason why these most abstract of all plurality patterns cannot be perceived as wholes.

Groups and crowds, especially the latter, are much more concrete; they make it much easier to recognize the fact that plurality patterns are nothing more than accumulations of social processes. The concrete crowd offers the simplest and most obvious instance: perceivable processes are at work within it, and these processes arise from the attitudes of the particular participants in conjunction with a particular situation ($P=A \times S$). The reason why the crowd and the abstract collectivity are apparently of altogether different genera is the rapid sequence and interaction of the processes going on in the former. This intensity of interhuman behavior, dependent as it is upon the bodily presence of the participants, frequently leads to confusion between the crowd processes and the human beings who serve as their loci. Consequently the statement is frequently made that the crowd is composed of human beings, whereas only the multitude, the simple plurality, is made up of corporeal, tangible individuals; the crowd is composed only of relationships between persons, and these relationships are the results of social processes. The crowd is not a simple plurality, but a plurality *pattern*.

Abstract crowds are apparently devoid of perceivable actions; it may seem that only an attitude of strictly psychical quality is present, a latent condition that makes certain behavior possible or even probable in the event that a given type of situation occurs. Closer observation, however, will show that the existence of abstract crowds such as the public, "the masses," or "polite society" is manifested long before the occurrence of any situation in which concrete crowd action is called forth; this manifestation is effected by a large number of ordinary social processes which the superficial observer regards as fixed behavior quite unrelated to whatever concrete crowd action later supervenes.

The group is in similar case. Human beings often act in groups, and their various actions are social processes. These processes differ because of the inevitable differences of the various situations in which the group is placed and because of the varying attitudes of its mem-

bers, but at the same time there appear a great many common traits directly due to the nature of group relations. The sociologist endeavors conceptually to isolate these traits and to demonstrate that they are characteristic of social processes arising in groups. Further examination of these same processes usually reveals a surprising similarity in the course followed, the mode of expression evidenced, and the tendency and the future trends foreshadowed by these processes. Consequently the recurrence of a particular group pattern is for the sociologist an occasion for determining whether or not processes previously evident in such plurality patterns are similarly recurrent. When sufficient inductive proof has accumulated, a given group configuration may be regarded as primarily the result of accumulated social processes of certain kinds (whose rôle in such plurality patterns has previously been discussed in the systematics of action patterns). Conversely, it should be possible to infer that a particular combination of processes will result in a particular kind of group.

Relatively simple configurations of group relationships, such as the majority of small groups, as well as those larger groups which have comparatively few purposes and activities, seldom manifest more than a few definite social processes. For example, a pair of lovers, a boat club, or a sect is characterized by only a few processes—assuming, of course, that no spurious, disguised, or perverted relationships complicate the pattern.

When we turn to the more complex groups, however, it is much more difficult to demonstrate their dependence upon particular situations and upon the attitudes of their members. They often seem to act as though they possessed personality in their own right, and this is perhaps the reason why there has developed the legal fiction that corporations and like bodies are persons. A superficial analogy can in fact be established between the human being and the group: the latter as well as the former is born, receives nourishment, grows, acts, and dies. It enters into partnerships and similar unions, struggles, serves, sacrifices itself, and demands service and sacrifice. For a great many practical purposes (and unfortunately for some "scientific" purposes also), the group can be dealt with as if it were an organism. We do business with a firm, write for a newspaper, are boycotted by an exclusive club, and so on. Indeed, absolute values may be attributed to the group to such an extent that separate persons are no longer thought worthy of consideration; in Soviet Russia, for example, the official ideology frowns upon the photographing of single persons and favors group pictures. The collectivity is everything, the separate hu-

man being nothing. The outcome of this glorification of the group is that finally it becomes difficult to observe anything but groups. The person without group relationships seems to be a twig broken from the parent stem, a fragment incapable of life and growth, slowly withering away in isolation. The way in which this curious distortion of the real state of affairs arises has been discussed at length in a previous chapter (xxxviii, §5). It is of course true that connections with other human beings are absolutely necessary if the human being is to gratify any of his fundamental urges—indeed, relationships must be entered into if a bare existence is to be maintained. Moreover, in most cases it is not even necessary to make decisions about such entry, for we are born into relationships, grow up in them, and live our lives encompassed in and dependent upon them. Further, it would be a great waste of energy if old affiliations had to be continually dissolved and new ones sought in order to carry out the multitudinous and ever-changing purposes inherent in life as it is lived; this would be equivalent to shattering human intercourse into millions of merely momentary relationships. The group is a form of social conjunction that is absolutely indispensable if certain vital, interlinked sequences of social processes are to run their course.

Nevertheless, the group cannot accomplish anything qualitatively different from the achievements of single human beings. Everything that has already been said about the great temporal and spatial extent, accumulated power, and simplicity of abstract collectivities is also true of the group, although of course to a lesser degree. Similarly, only the coarser and cruder forces are incorporated in the great majority of large groups, for the more subtle aspects of human interaction demand more intimacy and emotional rapport than is possible outside of small plurality patterns such as the pair, triad, and some medium-sized (b) groups.

If groups were the only plurality patterns besides crowds, however, ordered social life would probably be impossible, because groups, to say nothing of crowds, lack the power of social control that derives from deep-rooted ideologies of superpersonal unity and duration. Groups are too dependent upon the lives of their members, and too numerous as well; they are consequently fragile and transitory, whereas abstract collectivities are non-material culture complexes of tremendous integrating power. They evoke the reverence and fear that are necessary to enduring social control.

Let it not be thought, however, that these collectivities are products of highly developed cultures only. In the earliest epochs of human

association these neuropsychic patterns were undoubtedly present, even though in all likelihood almost entirely unconscious.

The vague emotional states associated with early magic and religion, with early supernaturalistic congregations (see chap. xlv, §1), provided the only "ideological" element, but the effect was quite as great as if a clearly outlined system of theology with a definite distribution of rewards and punishments had prevailed. Moreover, as far back as palaeolithic times beliefs concerning the influence of the dead were in effect, which means that departed generations continued to play a rôle in the social world, thus lending the characteristics of an abstract collectivity to what would otherwise be a mere group. How far back in human history abstract collectivities existed is impossible to say; efforts to fix dates for the beginnings of the family, the state, the church, and the economic collectivity are quite arbitrary, the more so because there is no single continuous history of mankind, but rather a great many histories with different "beginnings" at different times and with different occasioning factors.

§3. HOW ABSTRACT COLLECTIVITIES ARISE: AN EXPOSITORY FICTION

In order to make the foregoing points more clear, let us construct an expository fiction.

A group of present-day men and women are shipwrecked on a previously uninhabited island. Let us suppose that, realizing the impossibility of rescue, they plan to begin a new life entirely free from tradition, and that they have at first no inclination to create anything of a permanent nature. Moreover, they do not desire to construct a social order, but simply seek to live as easily as possible, helping and sympathizing with each other as impulse dictates or as need requires. There is no desire to "found" anything, but merely to live from day to day with no particular purpose in view, to enjoy life as it comes, and to avoid unpleasantness as far as possible. The condition of this island group is a fiction, to be sure, but it is quite thinkable and in its earlier carefree stages might even be desirable. Here is a state of affairs into which no abstract collectivities have been carried over and in which there is no conscious effort to create them. We may now ask this question: Would such collectivities inevitably arise without rational purpose or planning of any kind, i.e., as entirely involuntary growths? Let us see.

At the very beginning a new group organization is forced by the need for the material bases of life. We have a great many descriptions of the undeniable fact that economic activity cannot be a purely

private matter when several human beings are present. The scarcity of economic goods cannot be overcome by strictly single-handed effort. The fact or the fear of hunger compels planned activity for its alleviation or prevention, and it is not rationally conceivable that each person would or could attend to his wants alone.

A group engaged in economic activity, however, need not necessarily develop into an economic abstract collectivity. A superpersonal unity, "the economic order," conceived as an abstract idea, is the result only of complex social conditions, and probably has a more recent historical origin than the state or the church. In other words, no matter how inevitable and common is the development of the economic *group*, the abstract collectivity, "the economic order," is closely linked with a level of cultural complexity that presupposes most of the other collectivities. Consequently, the necessity for obtaining economic goods on our island calls one or more economic groups into existence, but in itself is not sufficient to evoke an abstract collectivity.

In order to forestall every possible doubt, let it be assumed that the supply of material goods is abundant and obtainable with the greatest of ease. The inhabitants of the island need concern themselves little about food or clothing because of the profusion of edible animals and plants and the mildness of the climate. Economic activity, if present at all, is not essential. What may we therefore say about the lives our islanders lead?

Beyond any doubt, sexual pairs, transitory or relatively permanent, will come into being; in addition, various age-groups will develop because of fundamental differences in basic attitudes (cf. chap. x, §4), and will become more firmly consolidated than will the group as a whole. The superior abilities of some persons will be resented by others, and the latter will become more closely united in order to keep the presumptuous in their proper place. Soon the growing network of relationships gives rise in all concerned to a heightened awareness of self; each person is assigned a rôle or rôles by his fellows and, no matter how "self-determining," acts accordingly in some degree, while his fellows in turn respond to these manifestations of his "looking-glass self."

There arises mutual communication of internal and external experiences, and this practice eventually brings into being a common store of emotions, ideas, plans, and aspirations which is so highly regarded that the desire to place it in the protecting and cultivating care of some permanent agency arises.

For example, let us imagine that two of our islanders set out one

night on a short voyage. Unusual circumstances call forth emotions in both to which the more gifted of the two gives expression in song. The rhythmic intensity of this new means of communication accentuates the existing affective states of singer and listener. The latter says little, but while hunting a few days later he uses the same means to express his feelings and introduces new elements into the existing model. When he returns he sings the ballad that has thus arisen in the young men's house, and inasmuch as it is an expression of experiences which all have shared in some degree, it soon becomes common property. Before long, it becomes customary to sing it whenever joint enterprises to which the ballad has some relation are undertaken. Singing then begins to be systematically cultivated; persons especially qualified are delegated to memorize and transmit to others the songs already accumulated and to make new ones. Music, which is only one of many possible examples, has become an activity practiced and perpetuated for its own sake, and it has thus reached the stage when it is ready to be taken over by a collectivity as a value to be preserved beyond the life span of the human beings who created it—it has become an institution.

No genuine abstract collectivity can arise, however, as long as the islanders do not and do not wish to reproduce themselves (rational connotations should not be attached to this statement; see §5). Nothing more than the material, content, and possibility of transmission of stored stimuli exist, i.e., only the prerequisites of abstract collectivities have accumulated.

But sexual relations result in children, and the islanders rear them instead of killing or exposing them in the Spartan fashion. *This fact is decisive.* At the same time that non-material culture (music, etc.) and measures for its perpetuation are developing, the physical possibility of such perpetuation is vouchsafed by the beginning of the chain of posterity. *Reproduction and the rearing of children make possible the creation of abstract collectivities.* The more important social actions must henceforth be directed toward the purpose of forming an ongoing human stream. The only possible channel of such a stream is an abstraction that has a superpersonal existence in and through the wishes and volitions of its creators and the generations that follow them. The measures previously instituted for the general welfare of all the islanders were simple group arrangements guided solely by their immediate utility or pleasure-yielding capacity. Now, however, the need of providing for succeeding generations calls institutions into existence which are felt and vaguely conceived to be

attributes of a superhuman "organism," namely, "society." Eventually these institutions are so revered that contemporary experience is thought an insufficient basis for judging their validity and authority. In the effort to win fixed criteria for the present and future, attention is turned to the past. The past, however, does not live in clearly formulated documents as much as in myths, customs, standards, confused memories; the abstract collectivities are consequently supplied with an ideal background that is impressively obscure and susceptible of multifarious interpretations.

The islanders now have a simple but complete social order. Let us carry the fiction a little further: a hitherto unmentioned member of the original group escaped shortly after landing and now returns. He not only finds that his former comrades are surrounded by numerous progeny, but also that there have developed notions of family and folk which give expression to the desires of the islanders for continuance as a totality. The character of the religious practices will largely depend upon the traditions (brought to the island) which have lived and have been further developed. As long as there is no desire for the persistence of the group, however, there may be piety and worship but there is no church in the most general sense of that term, for the latter presupposes an organized effort to train coming generations in the faith. Inasmuch as the islanders *do* wish to project themselves into the future through their posterity, here again arises the notion that social structures (in this case the church) are not dependent upon human beings but are social organisms that endure for centuries and are independent of their members.

Will a state also arise on the island? As long as there is no attack from without and as long as approximate equality and harmony of interest prevails within, there is no occasion for the state. If either condition is interrupted, a military or police organization (drawing its members largely from among the younger men) is formed; this, however, exists only during the period of the emergency. Such transitory measures do not constitute a state, but when the necessity of caring for posterity becomes evident, these temporary provisions are made permanent; a political structure with coercive power is erected. The islanders may regard this power as most conducive to safety when the dominance of one person who represents the power of all is guaranteed by hereditary transmission, or there may be an effort to realize so far as possible the fiction that the totality itself constitutes a unitary power. It eventually seems advantageous to entrust other important matters to the central authority because their unimpaired

continuance is most easily assured by the guidance and protection of this supreme coercive power, namely, the state.

When the hypothetical visitor returns a second time, he is therefore astonished to hear of a great variety of political institutions, co-existent with the church and with intimate groups, which not only provide the ultimate coercive sanctions of law and defend the island against attack, but also have charge of education, transportation, sanitation, and what not.

From the moment when a group of human beings living in conjunction feel themselves to be a unity which possesses relative permanence—that is to say, which should be perpetuated in and by its posterity—abstract, superpersonal collectivities come into existence.

Now, the later descendants of the first settlers on the island are born after the abstract collectivities have arisen. They have no knowledge of any situation in which they are not surrounded, influenced, and trained by such collectivities. For these persons, then, “society” (which is made up predominantly of the abstract collectivities) is *prior* to them. In this sense only is Aristotle’s dictum that the whole is prior to the part sociologically valid.

The changed circumstances that confront these later generations lead to new experiences which cannot be harmonized with the social structures they have inherited, so that a large part of the lives of some persons is occupied in making changes, which they believe to be improvements, in the abstract collectivities. The intensity of the conviction that they must be changed of course varies from person to person and from group to group; the fundamental intellectual and emotional conflicts of every era center about the needlessness or the necessity of changing abstract collectivities and their subsidiary institutions. The innovators who assert that the old structures are ossified and decadent and that they destroy personal happiness, especially the happiness of the younger generation, are always opposed by the great majority, who feel so closely bound up with the traditional forms that they are greatly disquieted by all attempts at alteration.

The reformers and revolutionaries then begin their never-ending “struggle against society.” Their opponents are not only their conservative contemporaries, numerous as these may be, for all former generations, so to speak, are enlisted against them. Inasmuch as the continually growing power of the abstract collectivities transforms most living human beings into mere instruments for the attainment of their purposes, the reformers are compelled to struggle against practically

all the existing collectivities, not merely those they propose to change. Indeed, they must also struggle against themselves, for several portions of their personalities have been formed by the forces they oppose, and in all probability are unconsciously dependent upon them. Much militant atheism, for example, derives from such an internal struggle.

The desire for permanence and perpetuation is, to be sure, the strongest force in the creation of abstract collectivities, but the foregoing considerations show that it is not the sole force. The desire for security and order, for stability and opportunity to profit by past experience, combines with the wish to make cultural achievements of all kinds independent of the death of the persons to whom they are due.

Rarely, if ever, are human beings fully conscious of the impulses that determine all the social actions mentioned above, for these impulses spring from basic drives that have little if anything to do with conscious decisions. The development of abstract collectivities goes on quite independently of conscious willing and desiring. Instance the fact that almost everyone has a strong tendency to reify or even to personify the nexus of social relationships of which he happens to be thinking. It is extremely difficult, for example, to think of familial processes and arrangements, political activities, or religious rites without constructing a substantial subject or object within which the social occurrences in question take place; we think of *the* family, *the* state, *the* church.

Quite probably the tendency to think in this way is, first of all, a mere following of the path of least resistance, and second, the result of the training children receive in the schools and elsewhere. They are deliberately taught to think in terms of abstract collectivities; in this way it is believed that selfishness is overcome and the readiness to serve others and forego present gratifications for the sake of posterity is inculcated. Regardless of the value-judgments that may be attached to efforts of this kind, such pedagogy is justified by the fact that all quantitatively superior achievements presuppose the close co-operation of all persons in any way connected with them. The mere formation of groups is not sufficient to secure the unified effort necessary, and the most successful collective enterprises are based upon the devotion arising from belief in superpersonal powers possessed of ideal unity. Hence, the inculcation of principles and convictions similar to the following is necessary:

"You are a child of your people, to whom you owe everything. The

state can require you to sacrifice your own life in its behalf. Only obedience to your church will lead you to God. Art and science are the two great entities governing the life of the mind. No thought can be valid that is not scientific and nothing is beautiful that does not conform to artistic standards." These are all fictions which nevertheless serve great purposes; by their aid human powers are united for the accomplishment of enterprises extending far beyond the petty considerations of the moment—enterprises that bear within them the future. The total process producing such results is commonly, although erroneously, believed to be dependent upon a substantial entity called "society." But whether erroneous or not, the name is all that is needed. The greater the impossibility of saying anything valid about "society" as a substantial "carrier" of the total process of sociation, the easier it is to pay it reverence—which after all is the important thing. Why? This reverence is necessary if the emotional appeal of service for the common welfare and sacrificial willingness to labor for higher cultural values are to be maintained. Whether they *should* be maintained is of course not a matter for sociological decision.

§4. THE QUALITATIVE ASPECT OF ABSTRACT COLLECTIVITIES

In outlining the fiction of our island, the attempt was made to show that abstract collectivities arise when human beings desire to perpetuate their kind, and that they soon become strong coercive forces to which all persons must submit in one way or another. The point was also made that they function in practically all matters fundamental to human existence, that they are indispensable, and that they are *quantitatively* far superior to their separate members. Little or nothing was said, however, about the *qualitative* nature of their achievements as compared with those of the separate person, except for a few statements at the beginning of the chapter to the effect that abstract collectivities correspond quite closely to the qualitative attainments of the average human beings comprising them. To be sure, we have already called attention to the fact that a certain accentuated crudity and simplicity, exceeding that of the average man, is quite as manifest as is their tremendous accumulated power. This crudity is due to the fact that the readiness to forego personal advantages and to yield to the more sympathetic impulses is strongly inhibited by nearly all abstract collectivities.

Our expository fiction of the island may throw some light on the statements just made. We have already seen how abstract collectivities arise as concomitants of a desire for permanent order, safety, and

accumulation of power, but above all, in conjunction with the effort to transmit ideal values to coming generations. The materials of these collectivities are shared experiences. These experiences are composed of two different elements: they are in part technical-material, and in part social. The following extension of the fiction may make this plain:

One of these islanders wishes to found his own family, and consequently must acquire a household. He must build a dwelling-place and a barn, construct furniture and other movable property, etc. His mental processes are governed by utilitarian considerations, by purposive rationality. The end to be obtained and the means available are compared and brought into harmony in agreement with technical principles, and in such ways technical-material experiences accumulate.

The social experiences, however, consist of neuropsychic patterns ramifying into interhuman relations, existing or desired, which at bottom always lead to association with or dissociation from other persons—in this case varying degrees of association (never wholly free from dissociative tendencies) with wife, children, "in-laws," and other members of kinship patterns. To be concrete: It seems more desirable to the would-be founder of a family to establish a separate dwelling where he can live and work with a woman of his choice throughout life than to remain in the bachelors' quarters. The vague affective states urging him toward this new form of group life gradually give rise to symbolic neuropsychic patterns (ideals, principles, ethical imperatives) for which he seeks general recognition and acceptance. His efforts are directed first to the influential persons of his own intimate circle, and if he is sufficiently persuasive and if similar desires arise among his comrades, the institution of the monogamic family slowly comes into being and, as a result of processes already described, becomes, in the course of generations, an abstract collectivity.

The human being always desires the elevation of relations which he seeks to perpetuate to the superpersonal category of the abstract collectivities, and the inhabitants of our fictitious island are not exceptions. Wise, kindly, and sympathetic persons will try to secure for future generations what they regard as a means of averting general suffering and what they think will lead to a greater measure of happiness or virtue. More frequently, however, strong, tenacious, and passionate personalities will establish abstract collectivities that seem advantageous and are gratifying to themselves and others like them. Their ideals are products of their wishes, and their basic wishes are

in large part outcomes of their particular type of vital organization—endocrine makeup, etc.—as cast in the molds of the total structure of interhuman relations.

The importance attributed to human wishes in the above fiction of the islanders and their abstract collectivities should not cause the important rôle played by the various environments, by the objective conditions of life, to be overlooked.

Marxists, for example, are right in emphasizing the significance of conditions of production and trade. Witness the fact that the wish to render existing power over menials, herds, and lands more secure and to ensure its transmission to posterity leads the possessor of such power to support all the abstract collectivities that seem adapted to the perpetuation of the *status quo*.

There is no human craving, no hope, no fear, no important experience, and no idea that does not have a tendency to become incorporated in an abstract collectivity. Whether or not such tendencies are realized is in part a question of utility and in part a question of sheer power. On the island, as elsewhere, the socially powerful manage to embody many of their wishes in abstract collectivities, and the socially ineffective must tacitly accept the *fait accompli*. Rarely, however, will any one person possess sufficient power in his own right to cause his ideal to be so accepted by others that a permanent institution and an enduring norm arise. More commonly, a body of commonly shared experience gives opportunity for the powerful person to express the wishes of others in a decisive, releasing, and objectifying way. But such concentration of collective and personal power cannot function creatively for any length of time, and the resulting practices consequently become forced, short-lived, and external formalities. If permanence and effectiveness are to be attained, the measures instituted either by personal or collective power must be in accord with the objective conditions of life, historical and otherwise, thus gaining acceptance as fundamental needs, becoming linked with customs and standards, and losing all trace of their actual origin through the transforming aid of mythical accretion.

Every new abstract collectivity alters existing interhuman relationships, for it brings a new configuration of association and dissociation into a given cross-section of human life, and it also effects changes in other regions of the social sphere.

From the foregoing it may be seen that every abstract collectivity manifests three components: (1) objectification of effort toward amalgamation, manifested in highly recondite, symbolic, neuropsychic pat-

terns ("lofty ideas," etc.) that are unintelligible without a great effort at abstraction, and in an "idealistic" ethos; (2) utilitarian considerations of a technical-material nature; (3) residues of human urges and segmental drives such as lust for mastery, anger, fear, and so on.

Just such components as those above listed are to be found in varying proportions in the separate persons whose interaction is responsible for abstract collectivities. Finally, the influence of the continuity of life and the fact that the present always has its roots in the past are not to be overlooked in any discussion of the quality of abstract collectivities in comparison with that of separate persons.

It will perhaps be recalled that, in describing the development of abstract collectivities on our fictitious island, an effort was made to avoid giving the impression that human beings create abstract collectivities quite arbitrarily and of their own volition. At the same time, the necessities of exposition, of making clear the fundamentals of a complicated sequence of occurrences, made it necessary to use expressions which are really fitted only for the analysis of conscious actions. As a consequence, two points remained somewhat obscure:

(1) Human beings rarely, if ever, have sufficient knowledge of the sources of their actions. To be sure, they often think that they are making entirely rational decisions, and that they fully comprehend the total situation, but as a matter of fact their knowledge is quite one-sided and their real motivation, in most cases, is unconscious.

(2) Human beings are greatly influenced by existing abstract collectivities, and while they believe themselves to be building new collectivities they are merely carrying out certain functions of those already existing; they are like ants that carry grains of sand from one labyrinth to another. As a result of the peculiar fact that human beings frequently fulfill functions for an old abstract collectivity when they think they are engaging in creative effort, a certain erroneous assumption becomes possible. This assumption is that abstract collectivities spontaneously evolve from other collectivities and lead an existence that not only is over and above all the separate existences of human beings, but also is independent; and that such collectivities even control completely the lives of mere mortals and supply every detail that enters into them.

The true situation, however, is quite otherwise. It was noted that the descendants of the first islanders are fully immersed, from childhood on, in the modes of thinking, feeling, and acting current in the abstract collectivities into which they are born. They are dependent

upon these collectivities even for their categories of abstract thought. Their judgments regarding such collectivities are consequently a mixture of the following ingredients: (1) vital cravings and wishes conditioned by the total sociative structure; (2) relatively free logical thought; (3) the personal experience, pleasant or unpleasant, which they have had with the abstract collectivities; and (4) the historical bonds uniting their selves to these collectivities. Only in the degree that the persons thinking and living in agreement with existing abstract collectivities desire to retain or to change them do they remain static or develop. They collapse like soap bubbles when living generations forget or wish to ignore them. Those majestic abstractions, the state and the church, exist only as long as there live human beings who desire them to exist.

In most instances, the great majority of human beings desire the retention of such abstract collectivities, or at least are not prepared to cast them aside. Moreover, a small but influential minority, or even *one* sole person, that carries on the tradition ensures the continued existence of these structures. In the latter instance, to be sure, their existence may be only that of a powerless ideology with no effect on human behavior; a plurality pattern may be called a real (i.e., effective) abstract collectivity only when it continues to regulate and dominate *interhuman* life.

The possibility of effective existence is vouchsafed: (1) when the abstract collectivity is useful; or (2) when it satisfies the urges and cravings of human beings; or (3) when it meets the ethical needs of a large proportion of persons; or (4) when there is no available substitute and custom favors it. (All four conditions may of course be fulfilled.) The great respect that most human beings have for abstract collectivities which to them are unintelligible, intangible, and mysteriously gigantic is sufficient in itself to perpetuate their dominance over mankind. Even comparatively intelligent persons often dare not venture the thought that abstract collectivities are after all nothing more than the products of interhuman behavior. Moreover, when upon rare occasions the thought is admitted, it is usually accompanied by the belief that thousands of human minds have been engaged for centuries in the rational planning of such abstract collectivities, and this belief then evokes awe and amazement sufficient to check further thought. The belief is obviously quite erroneous: relatively few human beings have thought rationally about abstract collectivities; their anxieties and inadequacies, their wish-fulfillments and hesitations,

their fantasies and dreams have greatly influenced if not determined the development of supposedly rational social structures.

§5. THE REALM OF VALUES AND ABSTRACT COLLECTIVITIES

Minds that are naïve and undisciplined, and consequently incapable of thinking without recourse to antitheses, are greatly desirous of securing a final pronouncement upon the eminently practical question: What is the source of social evil—are separate persons responsible or must collectivities bear the blame?

Much of what has been set forth in the earlier portions of the present work affords an implicit and indirect answer. Inasmuch as the answer is given in conjunction with other problems, however, it seems advisable to repeat it in more direct and explicit form.

The first step is a clear understanding of the meaning of the phrase "social evil." Even if it were desirable, it would be impossible to indulge in a lengthy ethical excursus designed to exhaust all possible connotations; a brief statement must suffice: Social evil is that mode of behavior which is intentionally directed toward the destruction of positive values (these values of course are not absolute nor separable from social situations).

At present it is quite fashionable to speak of "social evil" and "anti-social" as if they were equivalent; current chatter about the desirability of being "socially minded" implies that actions which check processes of association are the source of social evil. This point of view is rooted in the conception that groups and, more especially, abstract collectivities strive toward ultimate good in the form of positive interaction, i.e., adjustment, accordance, and amalgamation. The tacit assumption underlying this point of view is that social evil has its source in the "animal nature" of human beings—in feral, perverse, or degenerate urges—and that the more thoroughly the human being is controlled, both internally and externally, by the social structures about him, the better he becomes. In other words, a high degree of social control is regarded as a preventive of social evil. Many types of behavior may be observed which appear to attest the accuracy of this theory. Happy families are frequently destroyed by an unusually intense, reckless infatuation of one of their members. A flourishing state may be involved in ruinous warfare by the megalomania of an emperor who fancies himself a successor of the Caesars. A "communion of the faithful" which to its devotees seems to render certain the blessed path to an adored redeemer may be made ludicrous in the eyes of the world by the malicious deceit of a self-seeking leader.

Moreover, it is quite demonstrable that strong and wisely directed social structures succeed in repressing an appreciable proportion of the destructive tendencies of their members. Every motive requires a situation if it is to issue in action, and situations can be provided, intentionally avoided, or wholly eliminated. One of the chief functions of all abstract collectivities is that of exercising control over the total range of possible situations in order that the ends they (the abstract collectivities) hold desirable may be attained. Many homicidal tendencies, erotic impulses, inclinations to theft, and other behavior that is commonly regarded as evil may be "abreacted," suppressed, or gradually weakened by opposing habits because opportunities for their gratification are not afforded by prevailing situations. If new situations favorable to such tendencies come about—war, revolution, natural catastrophe—the horrified observer will have occasion to witness how many previously latent passions suddenly become manifest in action.

Further, the motives of human beings, the subjective forces of social occurrences, are influenced by plurality patterns, especially by abstract collectivities, in a long process of education and inculcation. There is no doubt that social structures have contributed to the diminution of crime, to the control of unruly passions, to the "humanization" of mankind. The crude biological urges that lead to ruthless extermination of the physically weak, to pitiless exploitation, to malicious destruction, are either diverted into less socially harmful channels or are weakened by habituation to work, by mutual aid, and by inculcation of the teaching that the suffering of other human beings is to be avoided as much as is one's own. In these and other ways the abstract collectivities help to transform members of the *genus Homo* into genuinely *human* beings.

It is a grave mistake, however, to over-estimate the extent of the "humanization" accomplished in and through such social structures. Quite frequently what appears to be a rise to a high ethical level of behavior is nothing more than a shift in the conditioning situation. Instance the fact that although abstract collectivities have partially succeeded in causing numerous persons to obey the commandment "Thou shalt not kill," such success has been accompanied by the rise of state-sanctioned slaughter. To be consistent, the commandment should be revised to read: "*Thou* shalt not kill—we can do it more effectively."

The influences which abstract collectivities exert upon human beings are multifarious, and are far from being beneficial only. Al-

though many "bestial" tendencies are restrained, numerous impulses toward tenderness, benevolence, and intimacy, toward genuinely altruistic behavior, are smothered almost before they see the light. The abstract collectivities bind and regulate all human conduct within their power, erect themselves into final, absolute values, and do not permit the human being to exercise his kindly tendencies in ways other than those prescribed or in groups other than those sanctioned.

The profound problems posed by such considerations as those just noted are extremely difficult to solve, for persons who have been wholly uninfluenced by abstract collectivities are nowhere to be found. We cannot compare human beings having only their native endowments with human beings having only socially acquired characteristics. Even child study provides no wholly satisfactory solution because of hereditary differences in the subjects. Similarly, no abstract collectivities can be found in which influences deriving from the deeper vital strata in the personalities of their participants are wholly lacking. Figuratively speaking, the blood of Christ and the martyrs—mingled, to be sure, with grosser fluids—flows in the Christian churches.

At least one conclusion, and that one quite important, seems justified by the foregoing considerations: Forces issuing from the vital sphere, the biological level, of human behavior continuously flow into the social level, and conversely, forces from the social level are continually mingling with those of the vital level. The outcome of the total process we term personality ($N \times E$).

§6. FUNDAMENTAL TRAITS OF ABSTRACT COLLECTIVITIES OF THE FIRST ORDER

Inasmuch as the attempt will be made in this section to formulate some generalizations applicable to each of the major types of abstract collectivities, and not simply to the traits common to all such social structures, the field must be charted in order to avoid submergence in the boundless morass of problems and speculations. The question that serves as our landmark, our point of orientation, is this: What social processes chiefly condition the particular type of abstract collectivity under consideration? The thesis governing the attempt to answer this question is as follows: Every plurality pattern, especially the abstract collectivity, is a framework within which a particular interacting plexus of social processes is enclosed. These social processes, it should be noted, are not limited to the particular sphere of human behavior occupied by the particular abstract collectivity encompassing them,

but they are most deeply rooted in this sphere. Every major type of abstract collectivity is characterized by a configuration of human association and dissociation of a variety peculiarly its own.

All abstract collectivities would be superfluous if the social interaction of human beings took place without meeting with difficulties or obstacles, i.e., if it were a mode of behavior passed on in the germ plasm, and if the objective ends pursued in common by a number of persons could be attained without relatively permanent organization. Because of the circumstance that certain kinds of obstacle in the extrahuman or natural world must be overcome, if for no other reason, the various forms of abstract collectivities are rendered necessary. To every abstract collectivity there corresponds a particular configuration of extrahuman obstacles which human beings attempt to master by means of an appropriate plexus of social processes. Our present task therefore consists in describing these obstructions and the processes they evoke in the most general terms possible.

(1) The family: sexual intercourse, reproduction, and the rearing of progeny impose special problems if orderly, regulated life in common is to be achieved. Strictly biological factors cannot be depended upon; social intercourse characterized by dependable human relationships cannot be maintained for any appreciable period by such means. The sexual urge, the helplessness of children, the antagonism of the sexes and of the generations, are obstacles which are surmounted in some measure by appropriate regulation of relationships leading to a definite form of social structure. Inasmuch as this problem must be met at all times and places by every race of mankind, the mere formation of groups is not sufficient to insure continuity; the family as an abstract collectivity develops to meet the need.

(2) Sib, tribe, and folk: the difficulties of existence confronting human beings living in association cannot be overcome by the family structure alone. Much larger social units are also required. Just as in the family, the most readily acceptable basis for such units is blood relationship. In periods when human beings are united by relationships that are relatively crude, predominantly irrational, and with little conscious purpose, the biological link between those of common ancestry is taken for granted as the source of social unity capable of overcoming life's difficulties. The sib, the tribe, and the folk become abstract collectivities by creating a stable connection (of the type just mentioned) that links human beings into units having considerable effectiveness in overcoming obstacles, arising within a given area, that derive from inorganic nature, sub-human organisms or—

this in particular—from human beings belonging to other kinship units. Nevertheless, kinship units such as those above mentioned have functions altogether too vague and transitory to permit their continued existence as abstract collectivities with a purely bio-social basis. In order for a folk to exist at all, genuinely social collectivities created and formed by that folk itself must regulate and guide those which are merely bio-social. The state is especially necessary; a folk without a state is usually incapable of resisting the attacks of other peoples having this basic form of political organization.

(3) Humanity: this is not a mere ideological construct, but a genuine abstract collectivity—a fact that is frequently denied at the present time, especially in those European countries still in the throes of the emotions aroused by the World War. Such denial, however, cannot overcome the overpowering weight of the data to the contrary—all the more compelling because of their utter naturalness and self-evident character.

Numerous circumstances give rise to common bonds—bonds that reach the most profound depths of human character. Some of these circumstances are: the fundamental physical and psychical sameness of human beings; the relative similarity of needs and urges; the common ignorance of the “whence and whither” of earthly existence; the knowledge that death comes to all men alike; the vague wishes for supernatural aid in which all human beings sometimes indulge; the capacities for joy and sorrow common to all; the universal dependence upon the inorganic world for maintenance; the essentially identical impulses toward mastery of all extrahuman factors affecting the lot of man; and many more basic similarities which space forbids listing here.

(4) The state: the parts played by different types of abstract collectivities in giving human beings relative control over certain specific obstacles become clearer when corporate bodies, in the full sense of the latter term, are discussed. The state, for example, would be quite superfluous if there existed, or could exist, a general love of all human beings for each other, if egoism were opposed by a more powerful altruism, and if there were no desire to dominate other human beings, singly and collectively. The function of the state is to mitigate the difficulties and friction in human sociation arising from the desire of human beings to dominate each other. It exercises this function by establishing and maintaining by force certain regulated forms of superordination and subordination.

(5) The church: this social structure endeavors to alleviate or

wholly to eliminate the discord issuing from the human sense of dependence upon supernatural powers and from the limitations of human association in the sphere of mundane existence. In social units where a materialistic outlook on life, with its accompanying conception of impersonal energy as the world-source, is generally accepted (e.g., Soviet Russia) every effort is made to abolish the church in all its forms, for it is in direct opposition to such a *Weltanschauung*. There is little doubt that the church is not essential to the continued existence of social units based upon a materialistic philosophy, and persons who make up such social units seem able to maintain their character-attitudes and life-organizations fairly well. The state, alone or in conjunction with other abstract collectivities, takes over the task of providing extrapersonal sanctions for the behavior of its members. As soon or as long as metaphysical needs are felt by an appreciable proportion of the members, however, plurality patterns meeting those needs arise or persist, for if they did not, the entirely unbalanced nature of the metaphysical need and the effort to give it expression would completely disorganize the internal and external relationships of the human beings affected.

(6) The station: the English-speaking world is most familiar with the term denoting this social structure as part of the phrase "station in life." Stations are primarily vocational plurality patterns functioning within the total organization of economic activity. Such vocational groupings diminish or avoid the energy-consuming antagonism or aloofness of those who carry on the same function within a given folk and state.

(7) The class: these structures draw human beings into a relative but imperfect unity which, because of approximately equivalent financial status, education, and degree of political power, brings about a close connection between ideologies and interests. With special reference to the proletariat, it may be said that such plurality patterns attempt to lessen the risk of exploitation by the economically and politically powerful—a risk which is almost a certainty for the isolated worker.

(8) The economic order: economic functions give rise to this abstract collectivity wherever the division of labor within a folk or cultural group has widely separated the various spheres of human endeavor and has rendered production relatively independent of consumption. The economic order, as distinct from mere economic activity or unrelated economic groups, is a relatively fragmentary plurality pattern, characteristic of modern European and American life, which

in some aspects functions in the service of the given folk as a whole, of the state, and of the classes producing material goods, but in others dominates them. This collectivity should function in such a way as to prevent the people it serves from ignoring or neglecting the material bases of their existence.

(9) Corporate bodies serving mental ends: these are aesthetic and expressional, educational and scientific, etc. Their present function is to assert the claims of certain forms of non-material culture; there is little doubt that without their support many of the most prized traits in our non-material culture would be misunderstood or despised by many persons who now give them tacit approval. Non-material achievements of all sorts which do not become incorporated in plurality patterns usually have an ephemeral and ineffective existence.

A survey of all the abstract collectivities listed above, all of which are of the first order (i.e., primary—see chap. xxxiii, §9), makes evident the fact that they find their most perfect exemplification in the state, and wherever and to the extent that their functions permit they are modelled after it. The church, the station, the class, the economic order, aesthetic and scientific bodies—all have traits deriving from or resembling those of the state. Such similarities are easily accounted for: the state is the most highly elaborated, most “ideal” type of abstract collectivity. At bottom, all such social structures are forms in which power is manifested; they represent energy stored up in order to overcome obstacles and hindrances in the external world, and thus to perpetuate the results of certain types of human endeavor.

§7. THE GRATIFICATIONS AFFORDED BY ABSTRACT COLLECTIVITIES

The foregoing analyses have concentrated upon the functional aspects of abstract collectivities, but it must not be forgotten that they are also phenomena of interhuman life which become effective under certain conditions as a result of definite causes, and that they must consequently be explained without primary reference to the purposes they serve. There can be no doubt that abstract collectivities are brought into existence with little or no conscious purpose on the part of human beings, and that only after they are well developed is purpose ascribed to them.

The human family, for example, is based upon urges that are essentially similar to those of sub-human animals. Again, all the manifold varieties of political organization may be found, in a crude form, wherever human beings differing in physical and mental endowment strive toward a common goal—common because natural factors leave

no room for deviation. Once more, persons sharing the same belief form a "communion of believers" because of their implicit agreement, if for no other reason, and this "communion" is felt in greater or lesser degree to be a superpersonal *corpus mysticum*, a "communion of the saints." Further, stations owe their existence as plurality patterns to the feelings of unity in basic social attitudes arising among persons on the same general level of inherited status. Similarly, classes are consequences of complex types of production and exchange; the resulting complication of relationships automatically transcends earlier types of guild fellowship. Classes are the result of marked functional differentiation within a given social order. The economic order is comparatively unintegrated, and is more recent in origin than are aesthetic and scientific bodies, but they all owe their existence to the concepts and attitudes human beings develop with regard to those social circles carrying on economic, aesthetic, and scientific *activities*; as soon as such circles are thought of as unities they tend to be set apart from other social structures because of their quasi-organic characteristics.

The decisive factor always is whether or not human beings habitually recognize as abstract collectivities the various functional integrations listed above—whether or not they customarily deal with the complex network of stable relationships by the energy-conserving device of symbolic abbreviation—in short, whether or not they think in terms of plurality *patterns* rather than of mere formless multitudes. For example, there are cultures in which the concept of church is entirely alien, and others in which class is equally strange. Again, many persons with a relatively high degree of sophistication live their whole lives without comprehending the real nature of the state. From what has just been said, it follows that the distinctions just made between the nine chief types of abstract collectivities are valid only for present-day European and American culture. It is possible to imagine a type of social order recognizing only one vast abstract collectivity comprising all humanity. Indeed, there have been in the past marked trends toward a condition of affairs in which church and state were one and the same. In the Middle Ages the various levels of society were regarded as stations rather than classes, whereas at present stations are frequently looked upon as antiquated survivals—the modern tendency being to over-emphasize both the significance and the notion of the reality of classes. Further, the Philistine, familiar only with the world of business, does not conceive of the ideal unities known as the aesthetic and scientific structures, while on the other

hand, narrowly specialized aesthetes and scholars frequently fail to perceive the tremendous importance of the economic order.

All abstract collectivities are conditioned by situational factors, although in most instances the situations involved are of a more or less permanent character. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that the various types of abstract collectivity are frameworks within which psychical forces find support and re-inforcement. Certain wishes, cravings, and hopes are continually gratified by them; certain fears are either dispelled or quieted.

The family, for example, is not wholly dependent upon situational factors for its maintenance; it derives a great deal of support from the wish to survive in posterity, from the desire for the preservation of property beyond the death of the possessor, and from the longing to be revered or worshipped as an ancestor. Moreover, wishes for stability and satisfaction in the sex lives of the persons involved, and the desire for shelter from the competition and conflict of the social world outside the family, play a large part. Still other psychical factors are involved; instance the craving to dominate and the pride in possession found among males in certain types of patriarchal family, as well as the semi-masochistic pleasure in surrender to the more vigorous male frequently found in females. These needs of the person combine with the social necessities listed above to form a relatively firm type of family structure.

Similarly, the state provides gratifications for a great many temperamental tendencies of the male: impulses to activity, craving for dominance, desire for recognition, and wishes to exploit others are gratified among the politically superordinate, whereas the politically subordinate are frequently content when their wishes for security are fulfilled.

Once more, the church frees many persons from the discomfort of doubt and gives them the assurance of salvation. Whatever distrust of the subjectivity of religious longings may arise is dispelled by self-abandonment to the objective power that accrues to the church as "keeper of the keys," steward of the divine revelation, infallible proclaimer of the divine will, and executor of the divine commands.

Again, the abstract collectivity "class" gives persons on the lower economic levels a source of satisfaction, inasmuch as from membership in the proletariat they derive courage to assert themselves against their employers and hope for a day when the social order will favor them instead of the bourgeoisie.

All in all, it may be said that abstract collectivities furnish ample

encouragement for the inclination to shift responsibility, for the desire to relinquish the irksome task of self-direction, and for the facile belief that thinking for oneself is unnecessary. "Surrender yourself wholly to the service of society" is the familiar rationalization by which all these cravings and wishes are transformed into supreme values.

The social processes giving rise to abstract collectivities are not confined to those of association alone. The cardinal error in most current attempts to explain social structures lies in the assumption that the latter are generated solely by unifying processes (from advance to amalgamation). Processes of dissociation (from competition to conflict) are quite as important. Speaking in terms of physical analogy, the centrifugal forces of interhuman life would find no release if processes of association were exclusively involved in the formation of plurality patterns. But, still speaking analogically, just as the basic patterns of physics are built up by attraction and repulsion, in the same way (as earlier chapters have sought to demonstrate) the patterns of interhuman behavior are formed. Approach, conjunction, association necessarily involve avoidance, disjunction, dissociation.

In exemplification, we need only summarize what has already been indicated: The abstract collectivity known as the state affords quite as much opportunity for competition, contravention, and conflict, for differentiating and destructive processes, as it does for integrating, remodelling, and upbuilding processes. To be sure, every unifying process tends at least partially to eliminate internal opposition, and in certain aspects to lessen the distance between human beings within the collectivity. But in almost the same degree that it does this, distances separating the members of the given collectivity from other collectivities are increased—indeed, integration provides the power to bring about and maintain wide social distances. This shows the double nature of abstract collectivities. Members of the abstract collectivities called nations, for example, frequently become conscious of their allegiance and their national unity only because of the differences between themselves and other peoples. The fact that Germans are not Englishmen and that Russians are not West Europeans leads to readier self-recognition of the characteristics peculiar to Germans or to Russians. Every consolidation of formerly particularistic political units into a large national state calls forth antagonisms that previously were latent or even negligible. The particularistic Germans and Italians of the eighteenth century were not regarded by the rest of Europe as inimical and dangerous political powers.

Similar statements might be made of stations and classes. The various churches and sects often train the children in their care to distrust or even hatred of other confessions; the consequent aversion for, contempt of, or bitterness against members of other religious bodies affords gratification for tendencies toward dissociation. Similarly, classes engender class hatred, and stations the "pride of place." Abstract collectivities always afford abundant opportunity and satisfaction for the passions and prejudices that lead human beings to persecute each other. Everything that has already been said with regard to central and differential affects (chap. xli, §4) might also be repeated here with only slight differences in emphasis.

Groups of course have more definitely human characteristics, i.e., they are more closely in agreement, both in degree and kind, with the personalities of human beings comprising them. They are demigods or semi-devils, whereas the abstract collectivities are wholly divine or wholly satanic.

The contrast between groups and abstract collectivities derives from the fact that outstanding personalities who help to form or who are themselves standards for political, ecclesiastical, and economic actions cannot shape the state, the church, or the economic order in harmony with their own personal idiosyncrasies in the same degree as is possible with groups. Instead of dominating abstract collectivities, such persons usually are mere functionaries; they can seldom do more than satisfy the needs of the plurality patterns they serve. These needs are historically conditioned, and genuine genius is usually required even partially to meet them. If leaders oppose their plurality patterns, they are almost always deposed or otherwise brushed aside. The power of ideals and the tremendous physical forces at the disposal of abstract collectivities gives them superpersonal characteristics which easily lead to the assumption that they are wholly independent of mortals both in origin and development.

CHAPTER XLIII

THE ABSTRACT COLLECTIVITY: THE STATE

§1. STATE IDEOLOGIES AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL VIEWPOINT

As already noted, a great deal of the previous chapter is chiefly applicable to the state, inasmuch as the latter most clearly typifies the abstract collectivity. Consequently the present task is restricted to a closer delineation of those characteristics of the abstract collectivity due primarily to the state. Space forbids even a superficial outline, to say nothing of an exhaustive analysis, of the vast field sometimes summarily designated "the sociology of the state"; complete exploration of this field is an almost limitless undertaking requiring nothing less than a lifetime for completion.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that *sociological* study of the problems associated with the political plurality pattern or state is much narrower in range than the investigations commonly graced with the title of *Staatswissenschaften*. The sociologist has no concern with the philosophy of law, with juridical doctrines of the state, and least of all with public law. Further, the numerous speculations of philosophers, ethicists, political scientists, historians, and biologists are relevant, if at all, only in connections quite different from those proper to sociology when the latter discipline is defined as "the science of interhuman behavior as such."

The constellation of concepts centering about the state is focussed upon by all thinkers whose speculations are devoted to the establishment of norms. For centuries and millennia such speculation has produced theories, recommendations, and demands that as a totality form a truly colossal mental achievement. The peculiar nature of the political plurality pattern has induced—indeed, necessitated—intensive consideration of the fundamental problem it presents. This in turn has afforded much opportunity to gratify the longing for a supreme ideal, but also for the rationalization of secret wishes, prejudices, and interests.

If one attempts to evoke a total impression of everything he has read or heard on the subject of the state, the best analogy for the result obtained, if personal experience affords ground for generaliza-

tion, is that it is like the view of London one gets by making a circuit of the gallery surrounding the dome of St. Paul's Cathedral. A jumbled mass of high and low buildings meets the eye; traces of Gothic style are often evident; and a somber, depressing sky arches over the maze.

There is no doubt that many persons with a keen sense of realities, little credulity, no sentimentality, and no marked capacity for self-deception often lose their immunity to vertigo when they talk about the state. In modern life this plurality pattern is everywhere and nowhere; its reality is indubitable, for it profoundly affects human behavior, and yet it is wholly intangible. Many reasons can be given in support of the assertion that it is merely an empty fiction, and many others can be given in support of the counter-assertion that of all "organisms" it is the one most thoroughly alive. To ascribe to it every possible virtue, and to meet objections pointing out that these virtues are nowhere to be found in empirical examples, is extraordinarily easy for some persons: they simply claim that the reality does not approximate the ideal.

Now, the more abstract, the more general, and the more numerous the forms in which such a social structure as the state manifests itself, the greater is the possibility of making unverifiable assertions about it, as the following instances show:

Jurists frequently derive the state from the idea of law—an idea which to them is fundamental, universal, and changeless. Occasionally, however, they subscribe to the thesis held by many political scientists, namely, that the state creates the law. In either case, the result is likely to be the fusion of state and law into a lofty and sacrosanct ideological unity.

In contrast to this, many historians are repelled by the extreme abstractness of such concepts as "*the state*." They therefore proceed inductively by examining all the various forms in which the state has appeared, and they frequently reach the conclusion that combat and physical force are, at bottom, the powers controlling it. As we have seen, most jurists regard the state as a derivative of law or as an entity from which law is derived, and as a corollary they often add the assertion that the creation and maintenance of justice is its sole function. Historians of the school above noted counter such opinions with the concise phrase: The state is force.

The conclusions of the historian, in turn, seem wholly inadequate to those social ethicists who believe that the state binds human beings

into closer fellowship, more intimate union, and who therefore regard it as the ideal form of human association.

Moralists are gratified by the fact that the state is frequently a rigorous disciplinarian with power to command or prohibit overt acts or even to demand conformity of opinion—the latter, to be sure, oftentimes without success. But successful or unsuccessful, the mere fact that coercion (in the sense of *physical* force) is a function of the state endears this collectivity to persons with authoritarian inclinations.

Proponents of social and labor legislation ("social politics") are enamored of the coercive power of the state for other reasons, viz., because it makes possible adequate collective provision for the lower economic strata.

All those who render homage to the state, either in its empirical manifestations or in its "ideal" form (if empirical reality is repulsive), present a marked contrast to those who despise it no matter what its historical or theoretical structure. Persons in the latter class are commonly termed anarchists; their opposition to the state is not merely relative, but absolute. Persons in relative opposition usually have only one chief historical type in view: for example, radical socialists and communists seek to overthrow the traditional states of Europe because they are all forms of the "class state," the hated organization devoted to the exploitation of the proletariat by the upper classes.

Such negative conceptions of the state represent ideologies quite as one-sided as do the positive varieties. The latter are over-idealistic; the former fail adequately to recognize certain features of the state that make for genuine justice—justice above the struggle of interests, the defender of the weak against the strong. The negativists take note only of the oppression and exploitation historically evident in the growth of the state; they ignore tendencies toward social harmonization which, although weaker than the forces opposing them, are also to be found in the historical record.

Anarchists, who regard the coercive sanctions of law as the root of all social evil, renounce the state, the supporter of law, altogether; they stake their hopes of human happiness on a future social order in which coercion will be wholly abolished. The sociologist, however, well knows that no *complex* culture can maintain itself without sometimes resorting to force; he therefore holds that the state as such is neither good nor evil, but merely an instrument which can be used in the service of either. Under certain circumstances it may even become

a superlatively desirable means for the attainment of worthy social ends.

The foregoing considerations point to the necessity for suspended judgment; none of the current ideologies are acceptable. Dispassionate analysis is the task immediately before us.

§2. POWER, ORDER, AND THE STATE

Considered in its most typical manifestations, the state is the most general form of human association in which order and permanence are the basic desiderata. It is therefore a plurality pattern of a type having relatively little inherent content, and hence is capable of encompassing elements that are almost infinitely varied, changeful, and susceptible of development.

Such an abstract collectivity might readily be confused with other types were it not for certain distinguishing characteristics implicit in the following definition: *the state is that type of abstract collectivity present wherever relative permanence in the association of human beings, differing singly or as groups in native and/or acquired capacities, is to be maintained.* Wherever rich and poor, mentally gifted and mentally handicapped, energetic and apathetic, tenacious and yielding, conqueror and conquered, fertile and infertile—and all other varieties of socially significant difference—are found, there develops a network of social relationships, which may be of widely varying form, but which always has the function of establishing order and defending it against foes both within and without.

The order thus achieved is rarely, if ever, characterized by genuine harmony: it is *usually* a means of objectifying and sanctioning current modes of exploitation. But although exploitation may at present characterize the state, it need not do so in the future, inasmuch as it is not inherent in the state as such. On the contrary, this social structure is capable of development in ways directly opposed to exploitation. Moreover, profound alterations in the balance of power are always possible; the weaker party may gradually or suddenly become the stronger. Philanthropists, religious geniuses, and political leaders are perpetually attempting to infuse new content into the old, ever-present social form called the state, and sometimes they succeed. Numerous instances point to the indubitable fact that striking transformations of the political plurality pattern are possible even though its external form still persists. All that is necessary are the proper conditions and the collective will to change.

Some of the chief historical characteristics of the state (but not the

state itself) arise as a result of social processes that are oftentimes although not always historically traceable in the following sequence: a kinship unit (clan, gentes, sib, etc.) in which approximate (but by no means absolute)¹ equality of the adult males prevails, conquers a similar group which is held to be of alien lineage. Not all the conquered persons are killed; a few or even many are included in the conquering body as menial workers. Such inclusive conquest,² however, destroys the relative unity of the conquering body. An organization for the purpose of holding the lower class in subjection by means of physical force must be built up. The regulation and perpetuation of the *status quo*, of domination and submission, characterize the relevant processes.

Inclusive conquest and its consequent social stratification, however, is not absolutely essential to the formation of the state, although it is undoubtedly the method of greatest historical importance. Even kinship groups cannot *long* maintain themselves without a fairly rigid type of social order, more or less explicitly expressed in formal regulative principles, i.e., in law. The relation of the warrior-chieftain to his followers, of the priest, shaman, or medicine man to the political powers, of age-groups and generations to each other, of families to men's societies, of the physically powerful to their weaker comrades, of the wealthy to the poor, and so on, necessarily give rise to a social order. This order, moreover, is inextricably connected with the particular form of economy practiced (pastoral nomadism, hoe culture, etc.), tradition, vicinal position with regard to outer enemies, and in fact to a host of other factors conditioning the life of the group. There is a determined effort to maintain a condition of equilibrium which promises to preserve the group as a totality. The very nature of the processes involved, however, brings it about that the goal at first striven for is *external* order only. An ethos transcending efforts at collective "self-preservation" is not a necessary concomitant. The primary requisites are strength, force, power, and domination with its correlated submission.

In the previous chapter, the attempt was made to show how persons born into such politically organized societies easily acquire the notion—although usually in a vague and confused form—of a super-

¹ Cf. on the inadequacy of the extreme combat or "conflict" theory of the origin of the state, the excellent treatise by W. C. MacLeod, *The Origin and History of Politics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1931) chaps. iii, iv, and v.

² Cf. Howard Becker, "Pastoral Nomadism and Social Change" and "Conquest and Pastoral Nomadism," *Sociology and Soc. Res.* XV, 5 and 6 (1931), pp. 415-27, 512-26.

personal entity that transmits and maintains the political *status quo*, i.e., of the state.

Even though the true nature of this social structure sometimes is not recognized, though it is often confused or amalgamated with other social structures, and though it often lacks a distinguishing name, the tendency to force interhuman relationships into the framework of such a permanent plurality pattern is very strong and almost universal. This may be due to the gradual development of a hazy belief—seldom if ever verbally formulated in earlier stages, but none the less powerful—that the lack of a rigid political structure results in social chaos and the *bellum omnia contra omnes*, the “war of each against all.”

Such ideas are hard to avoid but are quite erroneous; there is no way of knowing how human beings who have never been subjected to the influence of political structures would interact. Attempts to solve the problem by speculation lead to fruitless controversies like those between the Stoics and Epicureans or the various schools of thought engrossed with “natural law” and the “state of nature.”

There can be no empirical solution of the problem because many animals live in quasi-political groupings and because human beings have never been observed at any time or place in the so-called “state of nature,” i.e., wholly without implicit or explicit political organization or influences. Transitory absence of explicit political bonds sometimes results from natural catastrophes or revolutions, but the survivors have ineradicable political attitudes woven into their personalities; political organization consequently is never wholly absent and soon reconstitutes itself. Further, small sects and brotherhoods that attempt to dispense with political organization succeed only in barring its explicit forms, for such sects are composed of human beings who through their ancestors or their own experience have been influenced by political structures.

Nevertheless, the problem we have been considering cannot be regarded as wholly irrelevant; the considerations that have been advanced are not sufficient to permit setting it aside. Even when the possibilities inhering in the state are pushed to the utmost limit, as in the famous realm of the Incas, the whole of human personality cannot thereby be absorbed. There are certain activities and certain periods of life in which the presence and influence of the political plurality pattern have no discernible effect upon its members, particularly upon the female contingent. Whatever influences there are produce

only indirect effects, and hence some personalities develop as if they were almost untouched by the state.

When the World War broke out it was quite apparent that many artists, writers, and scholars became aware almost for the first time of the tremendous power of the state. Indeed, many business men and, above all, many women seemed to perceive what they had previously vouchsafed little or no attention; in peace-time the state had simply been taken for granted. When such persons had been aware of the state at all, they had regarded only its non-characteristic functions—such as postal service and school provisions—and had overlooked its basic activity, namely, the maintenance of the internal and external *status quo* through the *ultima ratio*, physical coercion as exemplified in army, navy, and police force. These persons consequently were thoroughly confused and unsettled by the outbreak of war and its sudden manifestation of the “omnipotent, omniscient, omnicompetent, and omnivorous state”; they found channels to drain off their unrest only through complete and credulous devotion to the newly revealed “superpersonal entity.”

Before the war had wrought the effects noted, it was often possible to gain, by association with the groups just referred to, some idea of a condition of affairs relatively uninfluenced by political processes and based upon interaction between human beings whose attitudes were in fact relatively unaffected by any of the chief abstract collectivities. Moreover, at the present time it is possible to study vicinally, socially, and mentally isolated communities in which similar common aims and mutual confidence prevail, with the result that the daily existence and thinking of their members is not essentially affected by the coercive regulations of the state. Indeed, it may be said that political or quasi-political organization becomes necessary only when external differences in native or acquired power are regarded as fundamentally significant, and hence call forth a superordinate authority, which in turn produces attitudes and ideologies making for social equilibrium. But inasmuch as a community composed of equals is very seldom found—because of inherited biological differences if for no other reason—and inasmuch as every difference is taken advantage of by the stronger contingent and is either unwillingly endured or regarded as their predestined lot by the weaker, there soon arise conditions to which in almost every instance the term “state” must be applied. In the earlier portions of the present volume, moreover, certain facts were adduced which went to show that human beings living without political plurality patterns are likely to live amicably and

co-operatively only (1) if they regard themselves as equal in power, or (2) if they ignore discernible differences in the belief that they are unimportant. Behavior of this kind, however, presupposes either freedom from the external cares of existence or a great capacity for sympathy and love—a capacity that will be reached, if ever, in remote future eras of human history.

It is therefore possible to assert that the state is necessary in order to regulate the struggles issuing from natural differences in the strength (physical or mental) of human beings. The word "regulate" is used intentionally; the state does not prevent or abolish struggle. Moreover, the foregoing assertion must be supplemented and qualified by the further assertion that external differences between human beings are perpetuated by the coercive force of the state, and thus hinder the development of the fruitful inner elements of altruism and liberty.

§3. THE POWERFUL AND THE STATE

Reasons for thus supplementing and qualifying the above thesis concerning the essential nature of the state must now be made plain. Let us first ask ourselves how an "order" can be created which fosters and maintains the interaction of human beings differing in natural and/or acquired capacity. Ideally speaking, an agency would have to be constituted which would not only be more powerful than the weaker contingent but also more powerful than the stronger; this would mean the introduction of a third component which would be able to subdue the master class; this power would then be termed the state. In accordance with this ideal, the third and superior power should play no favorites, should give equal weight to the interests of all parties, or should even practice Platonic justice by treating unequal things unequally, i.e., by helping the weaker more than the stronger.

Now it is true that the history of almost all states shows traces of such transcendent, equilibrating justice; it is never entirely absent. Moreover, law as law manifests many embryonic attempts toward the establishment of an impartial order in which abstract justice is to be the foundation of the state. It is also true, however, that pure, theoretical justice rarely if ever finds application in practice. Disputants soon learn to present their demands as if they were wholly in accordance with general social well-being. More important still, it should be recalled that the political structure can be instituted and maintained only by the stronger contingent in any given plurality pattern,

and that the members of this stronger contingent "submit" to the creature their own hands have made³ only for the ultimate purpose of rendering themselves stronger still. The efforts of the weaker contingent or of a third group not party to the struggle of interests (theorists, etc.) to effect impartial adjudication are usually rendered fruitless by the counteracting pressure of the stronger.

The needs and ideology of the particular group in power in any specific historical instance supply the content which fills the abstract form of the political plurality pattern. No generalization as to the particular persons or social types who will *de facto* control the state at any given time can be made. Sometimes dynasties are supreme, although they rarely maintain such supremacy unaided; at other times, a priestly hierarchy, usually with the support of political overlords, holds sway; castes and stations afford many instances of domination; and classes at times are in the saddle. By and large, it may be said that an aggressive minority holds the reins, but there are a few cases to show that a majority may rule in fact as well as appearance, *de facto* as well as *de jure*. Political power often but by no means always has an economic basis—it should be noted, however, that men rarely have power merely because they are rich; more often they are rich because they originally possessed extra-economic or political power.

When the probe penetrates deeply, it is usually discovered that the powerful either possess superior physical force themselves or by means of deception manage to utilize the physical force of others in their service. Whatever the idealists may say, there can be little doubt that mind as such is almost if not wholly devoid of power *directly* affecting the material world; indeed, Scheler has said, "Mind in history is powerless."⁴ Mind, however, is the creator of deception, and deception is often more effective than direct action.

Physical force *per se* is limited; it can be used to brain or throttle a weaker foe, but even the very earliest stages of culture show a progressive diminution in its effectiveness. This is largely due to the fear of supernatural influences usually linked with it—fear of influences that can be counteracted only by mental means. Thunder, lightning, and similar natural phenomena, as well as the multitudinous array of ghosts, vampires, gods, and devils, often seem to be feared

³ This metaphor should not lead the reader to conclude that we assume the state to be a planned structure; in most instances it develops with virtually no reflection on the part of its participants.

⁴ Max Scheler, *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft* (1927), p. 4.

less by the weak than by the strong. The Ionian Greeks, for example, succumbed to the superior might of the hosts mustered by the Persians, but they eventually reasserted their mental supremacy over the minds of the credulous horse-archers because they neither believed in nor feared any of the gods.

Moreover, fear that supernatural powers, against whom physical strength avails nothing, may come to the aid of the downtrodden and oppressed oftentimes makes the dominant group somewhat reluctant openly to avow their superior strength. They seek to have their authority supernaturally sanctioned, and hence call to their aid specialized intermediaries between man and the supernatural, namely, the priestly caste. These functionaries are of great assistance, not only by providing extrahuman approval of the *status quo*, but also by proclaiming its moral, cultural, or political necessity. Rarely, if ever, is the sword, the court of last appeal in most if not all states, drawn from its concealing sheath; an ideology, sometimes designedly deceptive, disguises the true basis of the political plurality pattern, *physical force*, the *ultima ratio*, the final arbiter.

Further, the political plurality pattern is greatly complicated because many of the weaker contingent make great efforts to gain the approval of the stronger by hypocritical or genuinely loyal service. As a consequence, the members of this servile group help to elaborate and bolster up the all-concealing ideology by tacit or outspoken justification of their masters. The upshot is that the political order thus brought into being is decked out with trappings that give it the appearance of an impartial, independent, disinterested, and superior power. Still other factors enter into the complex situation; for example, the dominant group is more amply provided with the material means of existence, and the temporary or permanent biological superiority of its members is thereby accentuated and perpetuated. This in turn frequently provides a basis for genuine mental, moral, and aesthetic superiority, with the result that it finally becomes much easier to conceal the inequitable conditions to which the higher status of such persons is primarily due. This is not all: elevating cultural influences that make for finer qualities of mind and feeling are more easily available to the dominant group, and they thereby become genuinely objective, just, informed, and courteous. In this manner many persons from the ranks of the masters acquire an entirely honorable desire to transform the social order, fundamentally based upon force, to which they owe their own advantages. They wish to institute a type of association "more pleasing in the sight of God" because

erected upon just foundations. In these and similar ways the modern state has come to be an extremely tangled web of interhuman relations of approach as well as of avoidance, of association as well as of dissociation.

Let there be no misunderstanding, however: in spite of modern democracy and humanitarianism, to say nothing of pacifism with all its good intentions and scanty influence, the task of eliminating the grosser uses of physical force in the maintenance of the political order is extremely difficult. It may often be observed that relationships which are vacillating and insecure when based upon naked force alone become more rigid and resistant when sanctioned by the state.

This is possible because prior to the development of the state and its sanctions mere physical superiority is a natural fact without dignity or grandeur, but as soon as the *de facto* domination-submission relationship is formally organized along political lines, it rises in the scale of values. Soon the power of the master is thought to be divinely decreed, to be for the best interests of everyone, and above all, to be worthy of and destined to perpetuation. When such an ideology prevails, the rebel against the powers that be is believed to rebel against supreme and eternal values as well—values incorporated in a political entity supposedly towering far above all passions and human frailties. Consequently rebellion is rarely ventured except by persons who promise to bring a more perfect state into being. Even the most perfect state, however, is in essence a social structure based upon physical force, so that all that can thereby be accomplished is the expulsion of the Devil of force by the Beelzebub of violence.

Efforts to abolish the state entirely are obviously futile. A social order that for centuries and millennia has been subject to its influence cannot suddenly dispense with that influence; whoever demands that this be done is like the fabled fool who asked that fishes be given wings so that they might permanently transfer themselves from the water to the air. The social "organs" of present-day mankind are, with all their advantages and disadvantages, chiefly the products of a total situation dominated by the political plurality pattern; social structures thus conditioned cannot survive in a social order lacking a state (supposing such an order to be possible).

Further development of the associative configurations of mankind along lines of greater justice and freedom probably can be brought about only by a very gradual diminution in the power of the state. Indeed, this diminution can occur only in the same degree as the human beings making up the state themselves become more reluctant

to resort to coercion and less in need of it. Analysis of the group demonstrates that the characteristics of plurality patterns are in close accord with the traits of prevailing majorities and the traditions transmitted by such majorities (chap. xli, §§4, 5). Groups, and abstract collectivities as well, do not lead an independent existence in some empyrean realm of transcendent values; on the contrary, interaction between the values they incorporate and the behavior of the human beings most influential in their formation is extremely close.

§4. THE UNIQUE NATURE OF POLITICAL PROCESSES

Some attention must now be paid to the specific quality of that type of abstract collectivity called the state. As above noted, it must evidence sufficient difference from other abstract collectivities to justify separate treatment. This difference can be manifested only by a unique constellation of the social processes predominant in it—a differentiating requirement basic to systematic sociology as here set forth.

It may at first seem impossible to delimit the concept of the state by means of such a criterion. Two reasons make this assumption of impossibility plausible:

First, the state in its most general and typical form seems altogether too general. To be sure, it has already been noted that the political plurality pattern *par excellence* represents an extremely empty form or framework, the content of which is historically variable and strikingly diverse. If the essentially artificial and heuristic separation between form and content is to be prevented from going too far, it becomes necessary to provide concrete subdivisions of the second, third, and fourth degree, thus making more distinct historical contours possible. That is, we must discuss not only the state as such, but also the European state, then the European state of the modern period, then the European state of the modern period in highly industrialized countries, and then the Belgian, the German, the French, the British states. In so doing, however, the transition from general to special sociology (in this case, the sociology of politics) takes place, and inasmuch as we are here concerned with general sociology alone, form must receive more attention than content. This narrow focus is eminently justified, for, as already noted, one of the most striking characteristics of the state (as a general category of thought) lies in its relative lack of content; only culture case study vouchsafes perception of clear-cut outlines. Such study, however, is especially liable to distortion by value-judgments, and must be avoided here

because of the vital necessity of counteracting current speculative and subjective theories of the state that interpret it teleologically, i.e., in agreement with value-judgments.

The second reason often adduced for the supposed impossibility of differentiating the state as a unique constellation of social processes is that it is an extremely complex web woven by all possible inter-human processes of association and dissociation. The fact that the state is a very complicated social structure must be admitted, but it does not therefore follow that it is impossible to distinguish the principal types of social processes predominating in it.

The supposed impossibility disappears when distinction is made between (1) processes characteristic of the state as such, and (2) other processes bound up with political activity because the state tends increasingly to spread its influence over all spheres of social life, and thus becomes (although in appearance only) omnipresent and omniscient.

The previous chapter gave some indication of a similar tendency toward expansion evident in other plurality patterns, a tendency that causes them to grow more and more similar to the state. As a result, quasi-states, states within states, and state-surrogates either come into being or the plurality patterns involved seek the protection and direction of the state. The more human beings are obsessed by the desire to exert influence, to become powerful, to force others to serve them, the more readily they discover that their desires cannot be gratified if they rely upon their own isolated efforts. Hence they endeavor to attain their ends collectively, and therefore shape the social structures in which they have most influence into greater and greater similarity to the state. Thus the genuine state simultaneously acquires a greater probability of and capacity for (1) extending its sway over a wide range of social activities, and of (2) justifying such extension. The result is that social processes are gradually drawn into the field of force centering about the state, in spite of the fact that such processes were originally far removed from that field. The modern European-American state has absorbed so many functions of the family, the church, the station, the class, and the economic, the scientific, and the aesthetic structures that it now manifests many features of these abstract collectivities, with the further consequence that social processes previously characteristic only of the family, the church, *et al.*, now occur primarily within the jurisdiction of the state.

The purpose of the present analysis, however, is to determine the processes peculiar to the chief genera of abstract collectivities by con-

sidering them in their ideal-typical rather than their empirical forms and in a sort of "standard" cultural context, hence it is necessary to disregard such intermingling of structures as has just been discussed and to pay sole attention to the functions inseparable from the fundamental nature of the state.

In the previous chapter (xlii, §7) the state as such was delimited by pointing out that its function is to mitigate difficulties and friction in human association arising from the desire of human beings to dominate each other, and that this function is exercised by establishing and maintaining by force certain forms of superordination and subordination.

It may therefore be said that *the specific processes constituting the state as a plurality pattern are those necessarily involved in the common activity of human beings and human groups differing in native and/or acquired endowment, which is to say that the processes primarily involved are domination and its counterpart, submission.*

Now it is highly significant that, as already noted, the state is generally regarded as an entity superior both to the submitting and the dominating contingents, i.e., as a general organization directing the totality of the human groups it incorporates. According to current political ideology, the state should be the sole source of power from which are derived the subordinate powers of all other groups and persons who act as its representatives and functionaries. Such a concentration of power is supposedly instituted to guarantee and administer order, security, and general welfare. In addition, this central authority arrogates to itself the extremely difficult task of adjudicating between contending interests with their concomitant rivalries, competitions, oppositions, and conflicts. This adjudication, moreover, is thought undeviatingly to follow certain legal principles inherent in the structure of the state. It should be evident that any central authority that even attempts to carry out such a program can at best achieve regulations making for external conformity only and inevitably ignoring the inner lives of the persons controlled. Genuine harmonization is therefore out of the question.

And here we have an essential characteristic of the social processes which enter into the political plurality pattern as such; they all have a similar sociological-psychological "tinge" inasmuch as they all tend, in greater or lesser degree, to follow the channels laid by processes of domination and submission. All interhuman relationships involved in political plurality patterns produce an external situation, at the very least, that causes the participating human beings to behave as

if their respective powers were to be regulated for the purpose of bringing about an equilibrium among otherwise unequal participants. In this way either a definite relation of domination and submission is established or, in case the degree of superiority or inferiority is not great enough to make a master of one and a servant of the other, an external "balance of power" is effected. In all social relations characteristic of the state, therefore, an external order is striven for, and this order objectifies an existing ratio in the power possessed by the particular persons or groups concerned.

Such objectification is plainly apparent in all legislative, judicial, and administrative procedures, but it may also be observed in other spheres of social life influenced by the activity of the state: for example, in official social amelioration (unemployment relief, child welfare, etc.), regulation of competition, promotion of scientific research, reclamation projects, and conservation. Interhuman relations typical of those occurring within the sphere of the state or modelled along similar lines are instanced by the relations of commissioned and non-commissioned officers and privates, and of these in turn to civilians, the device of shifting responsibility either to subordinates or superiors, the united front that bureaucrats present to the public, and the procedures of representation, commission, and deputation. Instruments or means for the establishment and maintenance of such relationships are the court-martial, official etiquette, ordinances, laws and statutes, mandates, protocols, motions and votes, jurisdictional limitations, parliamentary practice, salutes and bows, diplomatic precedence, requesting and granting audiences, and so on *ad infinitum*.

All these objectifications of and means for objectifying relationships are always used to regulate authoritatively, to support and consolidate, or to hamper and abrogate relations of dissociation, and sometimes relations of association as well. The necessity for such regulation arises, as already noted, from attempts to assert personal power or to deprive others of it, from conflicts of interest, from avowed or latent antagonisms, possible or existent enmities, and all similar conditions inherent in the nature of the political plurality pattern.

§5. HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN THE SPHERE OF THE STATE

From the foregoing it is evident that all political behavior as such finds its ultimate source in organization for overt conflict or combat, and bears the traits, although often in minimal degree, of martial behavior. The chief effort is to secure discipline, for discipline alone

makes possible far-reaching collective achievements of the kind demanded by the state. This in turn explains the peculiar inflexibility, harshness, rigorousness, and lack of imagination and sympathetic understanding peculiar to the zone of life most affected by the political plurality pattern. In those countries where centralization of political power has gone to extremes (e.g., prewar Germany, postwar Italy), citizens are regarded primarily as subjects; "the insolence of office" dominates the affairs of men. Private life is felt to be subordinate and undesirable, obedience is the highest virtue, contradiction is impudence, and high treason is the worst of crimes.

In the sphere of the state, the manner in which human beings meet, interact, and assert their respective claims issues from certain basic attitudes and their implicit or explicit assumptions concerning the ratios of power and prestige proper to various persons and groups. Regulation and conservation of the *status quo* is the goal consciously or unconsciously in view. Under such conditions all interhuman relations are marked by a certain reserve and a considerable amount of distrust; unemotional coldness and objectivity are dominant. All persons are graded according to the functions they carry out in the total organization of the state; they achieve recognition in the degree to which they function successfully. In this way the human being becomes a mere functionary, both to himself and others; no one is interested in him as a person unless his idiosyncrasies fit him for a particular niche in the organization of the state or quasi-state.

The result is a distortion of the need for recognition and of the consciousness of self—a distortion which may be frequently observed and which brings about far-reaching consequences. The functionary of the state (using the latter term in the broadest possible sense to include social structures borrowing some of their traits from the state *per se*, e.g., an established church) is bound by the requirements of his office and its traditional etiquette. Spontaneous behavior in his relations with the public is wholly excluded. He cannot permit himself to treat anyone either worse or better than his official capacity requires. Personal arbitrariness, which usually is a distinguishing characteristic of those in power, is almost totally set aside in favor of the objectified, superpersonal power of the state. Manifestations of energy, dignity, and superiority are permitted only within the limits set by the particular function of the official. At the same time, the state functionary evidences marked feelings of importance and security because of the particular niche he occupies. He is "somebody": a Senator, a colonel, an admiral, a police captain, or consul. The

unobtrusive self-confidence and assurance ordinarily possessed by the healthy human being of acceptable social status is supplanted by the "pride of place." All activity in the state's behalf both vouchsafes to and takes from him the same gratification, namely, the feeling of power in comparison with other persons. In other words, the official develops the differential and central affects already discussed in connection with the group (chap. xli, §§4, 5). This fact is of great importance for any general understanding of interhuman relations: plurality patterns do not shatter or abolish but merely remold emotional convictions of the supreme value of one's own ego; they only divert into other channels feelings of pleasure and power in being stronger than others; they simply disguise arrogance and egocentricity. *Political patterns exist and expand because they afford opportunities for gratifying human self-seeking in disguised, collectivistic ways.* Such social structures necessarily deprive their members of the consciousness of personal freedom and power, but they provide compensation by making possible the pleasures that accompany servile domination (or domineering servility). In either case impregnable vanity, consequential dignity, and conceit are evident; in either case humility is the rarest of virtues. The conformable official may lack youthful spontaneity or freedom and capacity recklessly to abandon himself to pleasure, he may "crook the pregnant hinges of the knee, that thrift may follow fawning," but in his own estimation all such self-abasements and deprivations are more than made up for by his title, his precedence, his seniority, and his power to demand obedience from his subordinates.

Current over-estimates—sometimes verging on apotheosis—of abstract collectivities in general and of the state in particular are at least partially due to the fact that many persons have completely surrendered themselves to such social structures, and subconsciously are somewhat ashamed thus to worship abjectly before the idols human hands have made, to bow down in Rimmon's house, to have become wholly dependent upon institutional prerogatives. They consequently compensate for their humiliation by magnifying the value of the social structure they serve. When men have become abject vassals of the state, it may be expected that the state will be acclaimed as a lordly and magnanimous master.

§6. SYMBOLS AND STANDARDS OF THE STATE

Nevertheless, it is indeed remarkable that the state (the very existence of which the men of the Middle Ages and even of the

eighteenth century were but little conscious) has acquired such extensive and profound significance in modern life. It is the more remarkable because the high degree of abstraction peculiarly characteristic of the state makes it extremely difficult for the naïve person to understand its inner nature. There can consequently be little doubt that its almost universal prestige has been brought about chiefly by two devices: (1) by *symbols* purporting to represent its essential traits; and (2) by the influence of *standards*.

The fact that abstract collectivities, like all plurality patterns, exist (in the material sense) only in the neuropsychic structures of human beings, and not at all in the external world, is also remarkable in view of their efficacy in dominating human behavior. Many persons find it difficult to comprehend that structures having such power over them—in the case of the state even over their lives—is after all nothing more than a neuropsychic pattern present in a large proportion of the population.

The simple fact that plurality patterns are nothing more than neuropsychic patterns is often obscured, particularly where abstract collectivities are concerned, by the possibility of representing the latter by perceivable symbols. It is precisely the non-material elements of culture which human beings are most inclined materially to symbolize; moreover, they are prone to vouchsafe these symbols all the reverence thought fitting for the thing symbolized. The church has been especially skilled in the use of symbols, from the era of simple fetishism and totemism until now. Long habituation to thinking in terms of symbols has led human beings to adopt the same method of making the state "perceivable." To be sure, it is not possible, even with a large number of symbols, to make all the essential aspects of an abstract collectivity perceivable; many attributes are not susceptible of such treatment. In addition, it is quite doubtful whether any symbol represents the corresponding trait of its abstract collectivity in an objectively appropriate way. All in all, a symbol reveals only the particular manner in which human beings at a certain stage of development visualize or otherwise represent what they regard as fundamental features of the abstract collectivity in question. It is never possible to discover from symbols the actual nature of the abstract collectivity; the most that can be learned is what the persons symbolizing it think it ought to be.

But after all, symbols must not be judged according to the objective knowledge they yield; they are instruments or even weapons by means of which collective forces are mobilized for and released in action. This

is well exemplified in the state; interhuman processes and relationships within the political plurality pattern obviously are not perceivable as material objects, and they therefore receive material representation in the manifold symbols of the state: e.g., throne, flag, coat-of-arms, uniform, scepter, palace, capitol. Further, the direct symbols of the state are not the only ones thus instrumentally utilized; the indirect symbols, which in and of themselves are only institutions, establishments, and institutes maintained by the state, are even more efficacious: army and navy, the judiciary and its appurtenances, the public-school system and its functionaries, and so on. A few symbols may be found which are not of the three-dimensional variety noted above; examples are speeches, songs, melodies, and verbal formulæ. The primary requisites of all symbols, however, are visibility and/or audibility.

Conceptual definition and analysis is of little use in bringing the great majority of persons to an understanding of the nature of the political plurality pattern, but it is relatively easy to call forth by the aid of symbols emotionally toned attitudes dominating behavior to a degree amply sufficient for the purposes of the state. Symbols appeal to the imagination, create notions of the mysterious, illimitable, and ineffable. They produce respect and reverence, whereas rational thought, with its clear delimitations, generates doubt and restrains enthusiasm.

Still more important than symbols as such, however, are the standards so often closely associated with them. Frequently symbols become standards and standards become symbols.

The almost ceaseless effort of most persons to model their behavior along lines followed by others whom they regard as superior, and indeed to allow the latter virtually to prescribe all details of conduct, is perhaps the most important factor in making social intercourse possible. Plurality patterns owe their continued existence, and sometimes their origin, to such standardizing and uniformizing tendencies. In analyzing the group an attempt was made to show this fact (chap. xlii, §7). It is still more true of abstract collectivities; they too would not be able to maintain themselves were it not for the ideologies presiding over them—ideologies which in turn are upheld by standards.

It is by no means irrelevant to point out that it is precisely in the sphere of the state that standards are predominantly furnished by living persons rather than by departed worthies or lifeless objects. Certain human beings personify rather than merely represent the political plurality pattern. In monarchies the ruler is the embodiment of the will of the state, and in absolute monarchies he can apply to

himself, in greater or lesser degree, the characteristic boast of Louis XIV: "*L'État, c'est moi.*" In such cases it is easy to evidence one's reverence and devotion to the state in a way fairly certain to be recognized and rewarded, namely, by bowing to the will of the ruler who is the embodiment of the state. This is the chief reason why reverence, evidenced by means of appropriate ceremonial, for the ruler as a *person* is earlier than reverence for him as a functional *representative* of supreme political power. Recognition of the concretely perceivable, vitally personal, and directly individual is always prior to recognition of the abstract, derivative, symbolic, and metaphorical. The predecessors of nearly all chiefs, kings, and emperors were leaders in raids and war parties, men who manifested superior physical strength, courage, cunning, and endurance. Such leaders acquired great personal prestige and reverence because of their impressive physical and mental equipment and the dread and awe thereby evoked. Space forbids an analysis of the processes by which such striking personal superiority gradually led to the establishment of structures centering about relatively permanent dynasties. This much, however, may be said: such establishment occurred in close connection with religious conceptions implanted by a priestly caste, with political necessities, with the greater possessions of the powerful, and with the desire to bequeath the achievements of a lifetime to descendants. Moreover, even though the present analysis is cross-sectional rather than historical or evolutionary, it is nevertheless permissible to point out that although the peculiar homage paid to the supreme ruler of the state is of ancient origin, non-rational, and sometimes almost absurd, it is still strikingly evident. The only difference is that the reasons and explanations offered are different. At present homage is supposedly offered to the ruler's function, not to the ruler himself; the ideological superstructure concealing the actual fact is new, but the fact itself is old.

An important qualification is introduced by the fact that at present the prestige and power of the state do not accrue to one or a few powerful rulers only; the whole body of functionaries benefits by the deference formerly paid to the monarch or the lordly caste alone. In this way the political plurality pattern comes to be personified in a large number of functionaries, all more or less exemplary in conduct, influential, and capable, and hence there arises, in the course of generations, a vague notion of an elaborate, gigantic state "organism" supposedly embodying values far higher than any incorporated in

mortal personalities. This contrast in value is in part due to the imputed and often real superiority of political functionaries; their superiority is thought to derive from the state they serve.

All attempts to develop loyalty and devotion to the state would have no effect upon the majority of citizens if resort were had only to rational analysis of the purposes of the state. The really effective means are the living example of officials, officers, and similar functionaries, the opinions they express, and the preferential treatment they receive; a total impression of the state as a living thing active in the visible world is thereby produced. Inasmuch as all such functionaries manifest in some measure the external, rigid, coldly objective characteristics noted above, there arise not only notions of the corporeal existence but also of the specific "nature" of the state as an entity quite detached from all merely human considerations. Its purposes are thought to be in some occult way "higher" and "worthier" than the welfare of mere human beings.

§7. THE MULTIPLICITY OF STATES

The problems most frequently occurring in connection with the political abstract collectivity have their origin in the fact that even in areas having a *relatively* uniform culture (such as Europe-America, for example) there is not simply one but on the contrary a multiplicity of states. The complex problems arising from this fact alone are rendered still more complex by the fact that these states are markedly unequal in many respects. Now, the ideology of universal power, carried to its logical conclusion, admits of only one supreme state. As a matter of fact, every existing state conducts itself wherever possible as if it alone existed; this is relatively easy to do with respect to its own citizens. All states mutually ignore each other unless forced to do otherwise; they all oppose in some measure the development of rivals; and at times they all seek their own advantage and their own security by entering into alliances, customs unions, and other reciprocal understandings. But above all, each citizen is expected to think of *his* nation (or similar political entity) as the favorite of an inscrutable Providence and, although perhaps not at the moment supreme in military and naval strength, destined some day to dominate all others. Every group, as we have seen, cultivates in its members the delusion of its paramount and unique importance; this is still more true of abstract collectivities, and especially true of those types most actively functioning in the gratification of cravings

for power. Just as human beings in need of recognition derive a substantial amount of self-assurance from the compensatory belief in their supreme importance and predestined preferment, in the same way the political plurality pattern, so closely modelled to fit the elemental urges of power-seeking human beings, cannot as yet dispense with similar megalomaniac delusions of grandeur. But as such delusions, no matter how firmly held, are frequently exposed to contradiction and disenchantment in the hurly-burly of combat, it is necessary to resort to deliberate falsification, concealment of unpleasant realities, and elaborate rationalization in order to support the fanatical belief in the foreordained supremacy of one's own state. Most persons are so credulous and blindly confident (especially in war-time) with regard to such matters that they obviously do not seek objective truth, but on the contrary seize anything that seems to gratify their most urgent desires. Even among those who have opportunity to observe other peoples are to be found only a very small proportion of persons willing and able to make *real* comparisons. Human beings after all are able to perceive only what they are trained or desire to perceive; certain aspects of the object under observation are especially stressed to the neglect of other aspects; all human beings tend to season their facts to taste. This holds true even for everyday, relatively unimportant matters; it is therefore clear that distortion of reality has wide scope in a sphere so filled with ideologies, symbols, and arbitrary interpretations as is that of the abstract collectivities. The results are in the long run disastrous, just as is all self-deception or conscious deceit, although so-called "shrewd manipulators" magnify the advantages that sometimes accrue in earlier stages.

Thus we have, on the one hand, ideological exaltation of the state to the point where it not only presumably receives the full approval of the Deity but is partially or even wholly identified with him; and on the other, we observe actual political practices far beneath those ordinarily expected of a conventionally moral and honest man, to say nothing of a really noble personality. But this, however, is an ethical and not a sociological antithesis.

From the latter point of view the primary consequence of the fiction of sovereignty is war between states that claim it as their exclusive possession, and hence war between peoples, inasmuch as the state is only the pattern in which the combative force of a people is organized.

§8. WAR

The space here available for discussion of the sociology of war is so scanty that it almost seems better to say nothing. The sociologist, of all persons, should be well aware that so far-reaching a constellation of social processes as is represented by war, and especially by modern war, cannot be adequately analyzed in a few sentences. But, half a loaf . . .

War seldom if ever is physically or materially beneficial to either victor or vanquished, but at the same time it must be admitted that such tremendous collective efforts always have many influences of moral value. The sacrifice of everything that human beings hold dear for the sake of an abstract collectivity (when the sacrifice is freely offered as the result of deep personal conviction) may be the greatest deed of which anyone is capable. Such efforts must have a meaning, however, which is in accord with and in the service of the highest moral values. Is this meaning really present when the efforts supposedly bound up with it necessarily involve the extinction of countless other human beings?

The answer is not so simple as a rationalistic and optimistic faith in the possibility of immediate harmonization would have it. The various considerations advanced in the present volume would seem to indicate that the perceived regularities or "laws" of social occurrences are not in accord with our all too unilinear moral logic. Contradictions perpetually arise which the "practical reason" would gladly deny; an act that from one point of view is profoundly moral may from another be altogether despicable. In this confusion human beings have only one possibility of decision, a possibility which arises when the following question is answered: Can the necessity and inevitability of a collective act (in this case, a particular war) ever be unmistakably recognized?

The responsibility for the answer rests upon the state, inasmuch as the coercive power it possesses leaves little leeway for individual decision. This responsibility, however, is extremely difficult to assign because of the peculiar nature of the political plurality pattern. Circumstances generally admit of a fateful shifting of responsibility; the interconnections of political life are frequently if not always so complicated that they must be subjected to an arbitrary interpretation if they are to be comprehended at all. This interpretation usually follows lines laid by the ideology of power, and the result is that one's

own nation (or similar political entity) is always in the right, or at least less in the wrong than is the opponent.

Further, the very nature of the state renders it so aggressive and eager for combat that at certain critical moments it is almost inevitable that the necessity of war should be affirmed. The assumption that democracy tends to avert such crises is quite erroneous; on the contrary, public opinion frequently forces both governments involved to cast scruples and caution to the winds. Such public opinion is created by those who are in the grip of overwhelming emotions, of differential and central affects—persons who are wholly incapable of calm deliberation, comparison of forces, and prevision of consequences.

The fact that wars perpetually recur, and that all the terrors of war seem insufficient to extinguish or even diminish the desire for fresh encounters, enables us to recognize, more clearly than is usually the case in social matters, that all networks of interhuman relationships, and particularly abstract collectivities, have no characteristics other than those found in the great majority of their members. The only real differences are that they manifest particular characteristics in a more or less one-sided way, and that this manifestation is dependent upon their special social functions. The state as such has all the craving for power, the pleasure in exerting physical force, the self-seeking, the courage, and the callousness of the average man. It is wholly unwise, unsympathetic, and ungrateful. More precisely stated to avoid reification: Functionaries of the state feel themselves compelled to behave in the ways noted because various situations in which they have been or are placed make any other type of behavior difficult or impossible.

Why this occurs is easy to see: the state is particularly adapted to give scope to efforts at collective preservation and expansion. Desire to perpetuate personal power and its attendant advantages—indeed, to increase it beyond all bounds—has given rise to the state and has dominated it from its earliest beginnings until the present. The persons most active in creating and maintaining political plurality patterns are in the grip of emotional drives to power and prestige, and such persons consequently demand that the social structure most like themselves manifest similar cravings; wisdom, restraint, and objectivity are regarded as altogether secondary if not superfluous. There is little hope that the modern state in any of its forms will hearken to the plea of reason and refuse to participate in warfare—not until such time as their members, and especially the younger males, have learned to restrain their aggressive impulses! The his-

tory of warfare should teach the optimistic idealist (if anything can) that at bottom ethics and "spiritual" forces are of little avail when opposed to the more basic vital forces.

It must of course be admitted that the state has had effects other than those noted: after a long struggle with private combat, as exemplified in feuds and duels, some semblance of internal order has been achieved. At the same time, it is entirely possible that such order can be maintained only because collective combat in the form of warfare provides a sort of alternative.

Certain developmental tendencies, however, point to eventual limitation of collective combat in the form of warfare; these limitations do not arise from any particular increase in rational control or social teleosis, but simply appear because the present proliferation of means for mutual extinction is leading to abandonment of so dangerous an arbiter. The greater the use of technical means in warfare, the more costly it is and the more questionable its outcome. Moreover, peculiar contradictions inherent in modern warfare make it extremely doubtful whether in the future any genuine gratification will be afforded to desires for personal aggression and release.

Yet, in spite of all the irrationality and absurdity of modern warfare, all efforts at ensuring future peace meet with extraordinary resistance of a type that cannot be overcome by rational argumentation. All sorts of reasons and apparently logical conclusions are adduced, but at bottom the resistance is wholly emotional; it merely makes use of rationalizations as disguises. The advocate of peace cannot hope for the victory of reason in the near future; the state alters its basic nature with extreme slowness because it is the expression of basic human tendencies. These of course are not immutable, but they cannot be rapidly changed nor diverted.

§9. DEVELOPMENTAL TRENDS

It would be quite erroneous to assume that the negative tone of the foregoing analysis implies opposition to the state on general principles. The purpose is neither to accuse nor to excuse, but to learn what *is* and how it came to be, rather than to proclaim what *ought* to be.

Even if we were to assume that the objective of the foregoing discussion was not to uncover causal connections as they really are (as of course it was), but rather to discover practical ways and means of changing the existing situation, it would nevertheless be quite unnecessary to formulate a single sentence in a different way. Social

telesis is not advanced by artificial and extravagant praise or blame of the *status quo*, but on the contrary, by impartial analysis of the factors in its genesis and maintenance. Only when these are known in all their ramifications can proposals for change be acted upon intelligently.

Let us suppose that the state were to undergo a profound mutation and thereby become less ethnocentric and rigid, more ethical and sympathetic, but that its average members were to remain as they now are—namely, credulous, vain, eager to exploit, and narrowly self-seeking. The result would be a condition of affairs even less desirable than that now prevailing. In all probability the new state, with its elasticity, sympathy, and moral suasion, would be set aside and the old “genuine” state revived, a reversal that would entail frightful sacrifices. Social structures cannot, on the whole and in the long run, be any better than the persons comprising them.

In pointing this out, there is no intention of advocating a policy of quietism or indifference. If a value-judgment may be permitted as a finale, it may be said that the goal toward which social telesis should direct the state seems quite clear: it should be deprived of its characteristic power of physical coercion and transformed into an organization relying upon non-violent coercion or even wholly non-coercive measures. It is useless, however, to attempt to anticipate what can come only very gradually indeed; hasty reforms simply call forth reaction.

A hopeful note is introduced by the fact that the state, in those countries where it is most highly developed, already has drawn into its sphere of influence a great many other regions of social life; for example, woman suffrage is tending to introduce familial and ameliorative factors of a character wholly at variance with the physically coercive traits fundamental to earlier forms of the state. Hence, the change from a wholly coercive plurality pattern to one in which coercion is subordinate to other ends is progressing quite rapidly, so far as internal or domestic affairs are concerned; foreign affairs, however, are still largely under the aegis of brute force.

CHAPTER XLIV

THE ABSTRACT COLLECTIVITY: THE CHURCH

§1. THE CHURCH AS A SOCIOLOGICAL CONCEPT

The prime requisite of the present introductory discussion is a sufficiently simple and general definition of the chief concept, hence: The church is a plurality pattern devoted to the collective gratification of religious needs. The task before us is to determine the principal social processes taking place within this abstract collectivity, and thereby to characterize the rôle it plays in the social order as a whole.

The above definition raises this basic question: How is it possible collectively to gratify religious needs? As we shall see, the sociological peculiarity of the church lies in its function of uniting the religious with the collective. Our analysis must therefore lay bare the social processes that in such a plurality pattern necessarily lead to such union. The concept church has a very broad meaning in sociological usage; it denotes every plurality pattern which is devoted to the service of supernatural forces. The crude and at times apparently almost areligious supernaturalistic congregations of various preliterate peoples, with their magical and orgiastic rites, are included in these broad limits, just as are the credal communions of monotheistic religions commonly called churches in the narrower sense of the term, including the Roman Catholic variety, which many persons would call *the church*.

It would be more satisfactory if we possessed an alternative term for the totality of religious collectivities, and could thus reserve the word church for the confessional bodies of Christendom, for to some persons it may seem undesirable to bring the followings of shamans and magicians into the same inclusive category with the Church of Christ, "against which the Gates of Hell shall not prevail." The objection might be sustained if our present purpose were to characterize the mental or spiritual element in the different religious bodies, but at this point we are concerned only with the place they occupy in the social world, and the fact that such infinitely diverse ideal qualities may be incorporated in interhuman structures

that are essentially similar is precisely what interests us most. Inasmuch as language does not offer a word both generally understandable and brief, it is necessary to speak of the church or churches in the very broad sense above indicated—just as in the case of the state, where structures having great qualitative differences are comprised in the same term. Nevertheless, it seems advisable to use the phrase “supernaturalistic congregation” when discussing the religious collectivities of preliterate in the genetic-historical sections, and to use church in a narrow as well as a very broad sense. In the narrow sense it will be used to denote the religious collectivities of the five chief world religions—Judaism, Buddhism, Brahmanism, Islam, and Christianity. Thus, when the phrase “supernaturalistic congregation” is used in the following section, only the social structures of preliterate are designated, and the most frequent use of the term church will be to denote the social structures devoted to the world religions named.

§2. THE GENESIS OF THE CHURCH (IN THE BROADEST SENSE)

In marked contrast to the one-time assurance of students of comparative religion, modern writers are inclined to say, with Kirkpatrick, “The beginning of religion is unknown.”¹ The classic doctrines that traced the origin of religion to ghost fear, crowd elation, or orgiastic release are now quite outmoded. Further, the evolutionary sequence beginning with manaism or animism, passing through polytheism and henotheism, and culminating in late nineteenth century ethical monotheism has been wholly discredited. Nevertheless, the genesis and development of a priestly caste and of the supernaturalistic congregations dependent upon it, as outlined by Spencer, is separable from his erroneous doctrine of religious origins and is generally valid, in the light of present ethnological knowledge, for all major cultures. In this one respect Spencer’s fundamental thesis still stands today.

The church (in the broadest sense) is quite similar to the state in certain phases; they are both so closely linked with the fundamental characteristics of human beings that they seem to be as old as humanity itself. In spite of G. Elliott Smith, there is nothing in our present knowledge of human origins which would lead us to conclude that the point at which *Pithecanthropus erectus* or his fellow-hominids became definitely human antedated the first crude collective nuclei which could be called the church or the state. This much, however, seems certain: some degree of social differentiation had taken

¹ Clifford Kirkpatrick, *Religion in Human Affairs* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1929), p. 1.

place. Just as political life develops definite patterns when social stratification advances, when military organization develops, when the warrior-chieftain and his personal following become dominant—when, in brief, the formation of stations and an aristocracy produces the historical state—in the same way, the early (and perhaps earliest) aristocracy of magicians and priests may be regarded as the indispensable condition for the rise of a supernaturalistic congregation. Collectivities do not grow out of an undifferentiated mass of human beings like mushrooms from compost; they require different soil. Although abstract collectivities are never consciously created by any one person—indeed, perhaps are never consciously created as totalities—it is nevertheless true that they can develop only when there is an influential body of persons who devote their lives to and identify their interests with the elaboration of collective forces of which they have only the vaguest inklings. Supernaturalistic congregations presuppose collective mental or spiritual needs essentially the same for all or nearly all members. These needs and cravings rarely if ever lead to definite organizations apart from the efforts of priests—or of laymen who use priests for their own purposes. In this sense, but in this sense only, it may be said that magicians and priests created the supernaturalistic congregations out of which, in a long process of development and refinement, the churches (in the narrower sense) have arisen. The latter in turn owe their transformation from such congregations into churches primarily if not wholly to the efforts of priests.

The collectivities which have thus grown out of age-old magical practices and age-old tradition manifest the shortcomings and flaws inherent in their crude antecedents. The religious element is almost wholly buried by accumulated deposits of the desire for domination and exploitation. Much malicious deceit, resentment, and cruelty is also present. In spite of all this, however, the end-product is a type of social structure which is capable of embodying, and not infrequently does embody, the highest values known to man.

§3. RELIGION AND SOCIAL CONFLICT

But in spite or perhaps because of this embodiment of supreme values, the history of all confessions is little less bloody than the history of all the contending states that have plagued mankind. The paradox is partially due to the persistent effort of all the churches to impose their particular message of salvation upon those opposed or indifferent to it.

For the very reason that the churches always attempt to further the highest values of human life or even claim to create them, and because as a matter of principle all mankind must be helped to attain a state of blessedness, they cannot rest content with those who voluntarily enter their portals, but must engage in campaigns of conquest in order that the powers of this world, and more especially of other churches, may be overcome. They are all aided in their endeavors by the fiction that they alone possess saving grace, that all other doctrines are grievous errors, and that all persons who do not gladly follow them are incapable of recognizing the sole source of blessedness. Everyone who fights for his church also fights for God and the salvation of his erring fellow-mortals. This fiction lends religious conflicts of all kinds (from war to private intrigue) the amazing vehemence that wholly transforms love into hatred. The fateful rôle that violence, deceit, and betrayal have played in the history of supernaturalistic congregations and churches stands in distressing contrast to the teachings of their simple yet unfathomably wise founders.

But it could not well have been otherwise. As soon as a principle is entrusted to a collectivity and injunctions such as "Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel" begin to be followed, the original intent of the founder has been thrown, as it were, to the lions. Even preaching is at bottom competitive; the effort is to win legions away from the group condemned as sinful, and thus "to add one more soul to the communion of the saints." The pious monks who brought their message to the naïve and inoffensive Germanic heathen soon began to fell the trees consecrated to Odin and to Thor; genuine belief is always intolerant. Now, the person who in the enthusiasm of devotion proclaims to the unbeliever, "Your god lies," has uttered the greatest of all insults. Resentment flames up to meet righteous indignation; the consuming fire of controversy forms a fatal ring that forever bars the entry of truth. And if resentment does not meet such insult, the old god has been betrayed, and the foundation of the indifferent believer's power is thereby shattered.

The fact that certain churches are victorious in such struggles, and hence oust and supplant others, is not always due to the profound and exalted values which they contain; it frequently happens that their greater material strength or their advantageous alliances with the state or other social structures is decisive. At times the lower belief shoulders the higher aside.

Various churches consequently feel that they are forced to use extra-religious means in asserting, defending, and expanding their power.

Oftentimes their functionaries manifest in their observable behavior greater solicitude for tangible success in the social world than for the cultivation of definitely spiritual values. At the same time, such persons are frequently torn by inner conflict; they generally wish to seek "the greater glory of God" in ways their own consciences will approve, but the total situation forbids, and they therefore strive for the prestige of their faith in ways that can lead only to Pyrrhic victory.

Moreover, churches cannot confine their activities merely to aggressive assertion; they must also endeavor to hold their believers firmly within the fold. This cannot be done simply by praising the moral value of voluntary adherence, for the great majority of human beings are inert and insubordinate in such matters; consequently, the church is compelled to practice methods also used by the state: discipline, fear-governed obedience, and early indoctrination.

§4. THE DILEMMA OF THE CHURCH

The foregoing considerations give us some clue to the most fundamental characteristic of the church as a plurality pattern; this characteristic lies in a dilemma which is here much more plainly marked than in other spheres of interhuman life. Two distinct and irreconcilable sets of values are present, and values of the one type can be realized only by the extinction of values of the other.

One constellation of values clusters about the religious principle or idea. This principle is associated with a certain imperative and norm. The abstract collectivity which has the function of enforcing this in social life is the church. Hence there arises a second constellation of values clustering about the power of the social collectivity itself. The church combines, after a fashion, the water of the religious and the oil of the social. The religious component is made the foundation and content of an abstract collectivity or, in reverse aspect, the abstract collectivity, usually if not always of a coercive nature akin to that of the state, is constituted the limiting and protecting framework of the religious element.

The two sets of values which are here bottled up together are wholly alien to each other and often directly opposed. The union of diverse elements thus effected can never do justice to the characteristics of either. The church must either be a plurality pattern serving social ends or a shrine where a deity may be worshipped. Either the effort is made to compel other persons to develop certain attitudes and thus to bind them into a unity of faith and practice, or to direct "the

weary and heavy-laden" along the paths of personal salvation from the crushing burden of mortality. The church, however, attempts to transform this "either-or" into a "not only-but also."

Here a fundamental contradiction arises; the religious principle must effect a compromise with the demands made by the interhuman sphere. An abstract collectivity is, after all, a plurality pattern; in other words, it has the function of arranging in a definite pattern, of regulating, of ordering, the chaotic to-and-fro of efforts issuing from groups, abstract crowds, separate persons, etc. Every organism possessing vital vigor strives toward goals determined by its special organic characteristics; in the higher organisms, and especially in the hominid category, these goals (although greatly influenced by cultural variations) may all be assigned niches in the four categories already used: new experience, security, recognition, and response. Unless restrained by external limitations, such impulses are capable of almost infinite expansion. Moreover, similar impulses and strivings tend to find their way into similar channels and mutually to re-inforce each other in the interhuman world regulated by plurality patterns. Such consolidation and re-inforcement leads to vigorous antipathy against all tendencies that for one reason or another are not included.

The abstract collectivities, in their rôles as comprehensive and dominant plurality patterns, tower above this tumult of tendencies and endeavor to subject everything to the regulatory principles or concepts they represent. This they do by using as a coercive device a particular principle which in itself seems valuable or attractive to the human being. In short, abstract collectivities embody ideals but they also embody coercion. Consequently, such collectivities are not generated solely for the sake of the particular constellation of values they represent, but rather for the purpose of asserting and defending these values by collective force.

The dual character of such abstract collectivities makes it impossible for them wholly to realize one of their two functions. The principle they incorporate usually enjoins sacrificial service in the interest of interhuman life as a whole. As a consequence, the principle is drawn into the tumult of interhuman relations, and is thereby linked with tendencies of approach, conjunction, association, or of avoidance, disjunction, dissociation. The former are often thought to be in close conformity with principles enjoining service for the good of all merely because they lead to the formation of new or the extension of old plurality patterns, but the type of association they represent oftentimes is marked by all the flaws of narrow group loyalty, and has

little or nothing in common with the principles more or less accidentally linked with them. Nevertheless, the connections thus established lend to the particular ideal principle involved the character of a "social" value as well, which means that it has been dragged from its lofty position and forced to clothe itself in the parti-colored disguise of a temporally and spatially limited form of interhuman behavior. It is possible, of course, that the resulting union of the ideal and the social may lead to a valuable strengthening and qualitative elevation of particular networks of interhuman relations, for social relations themselves quite low in the scale of values may be notably elevated by connection with an ideal or principle. But it is also true that the principle may lose most of its effectiveness because the burden laid upon it by faulty social relations is too heavy. All the shortcomings of the social sphere press with crushing weight upon the ideal principle, and the resulting struggle to cast off the trivial, the base, and the "human-all-too-human" does not always end in victory for the ideal.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that abstract collectivities would be unable to attain dominance over the centrifugal tendencies of their members (persons or groups) if they did not incorporate particular values in the form of ideals or principles. The fact that they are often able truly to assert that *extra collectivum nulla spes salutis*, that the salvation afforded by the principle can be obtained only through the collectivity, results in a notable increase in the strength of social bonds. Only when these bonds are thus united with principles that transcend the mere limitation of egoism or domination through fear can social relations lay claim to moral value.

Now, the dilemma just discussed undoubtedly exists; it often takes the form of a genuinely tragic conflict. The merely superficial observer, failing to perceive the profound and inevitable nature of the dilemma, may say with some appearance of justification that the principles or ideal values are only used as decoys or disguises in order to achieve a much less exalted goal—namely, repression of the rabble and the maintenance of external order. Similarly, the purveyor of half-truths may say that instead of making a direct attempt to unite human beings in one great association for mutual aid—a goal worthy of attainment for its own sake—energy is diverted along indirect paths that lead to mendacity rather than mutuality.

From a methodological point of view, such misunderstanding of the basic dilemma is instructive, for it shows how necessary it is conceptually to differentiate between form and content, between inter-

human relations and ideal ends. Ideals, principles, and norms fall within the field of focus only to the extent necessary for understanding of the concrete relations of the interhuman zone.

This dual character of abstract collectivities is least in evidence where the state is concerned, for the ideal or normative element in the latter is the regulation of power, and this is very closely allied with the purely interhuman purpose of all plurality patterns: namely, the exaltation of collective rather than personal ends. The state is therefore an abstract collectivity of almost "chemical" purity. The principles, norms, and ideologies clustering about it are secondary, and when properly understood are manifestly mere means to a single end: subordination of the personal to the collective.

Other collectivities, in so far as they are not mere quasi-states, are considerably different in this respect. Their strictly collective characteristics can always be differentiated—conceptually at least—from the particular ideals, principles, and norms they incorporate. As has already been indicated, the distinction—indeed the discrepancy—between the ideal and the actual is most evident where the church is concerned. Economic, aesthetic, and scientific structures also present well-marked differentia. Stations and classes, on the other hand, are more similar to the state, and hence evidence few characteristics by which the ideal and the actual may be distinguished.

(This intersection of ideal and actual zones is to be found only in the strictly social structures; the bio-social collectivities such as family, folk, and humanity are the product of another type of intersection. They are not primarily characterized by the union of principles, ideals, and norms with collective tendencies, but rather by the close co-operation of *biological* and social forces.)

§5. PRINCIPLE AND SOCIAL CHARACTER

The connection between the informing principle (using this term to denote ideals, norms, concepts, and similar factors) and the actually observable character of the various types of strictly social collectivities is next to be considered.

The economic order may justifiably be regarded as one gigantic abstract collectivity pervaded by the principle of overcoming the relative scarcity of goods necessary to human existence. All sorts of institutions and organizations are created in order to reach this goal. The economic principle, however, is always linked in actual practice with the function of regulating the struggle for economic existence,

which at its lowest stages may be simply the fight for the feeding trough. The economic abstract collectivity therefore unites the strictly economic principle with actual social requirements, with the result that conflicts between the two frequently come about. First one and then the other is emphasized, although there have been fairly long historical periods in which this double character of the economic abstract collectivity has been misunderstood, thus bringing about neglect of the strictly economic problem or ignorance of the actual interhuman function.

Aesthetic and scientific plurality patterns are fruitful soil for the growth of guiding principles. Their mode of organization and the age-old traditions of which they are the heirs lead them, like the church, to seek for supreme or "eternal" values. The discovery of knowledge and the expression of the beautiful or the characteristic are regarded as specific values for the attainment of which humanity must strive. The search for knowledge for its own sake, the apprehension of the harmony and profundity of existence by means of poetry, music, and the graphic arts, are goals of peculiar attraction pursued without ulterior motives. The aid of collective organization is sought only as a means to an end, but even in the case of such specifically mental or non-material activities, there arises a second zone of interest in which collective purposes become ends in themselves; the principles just mentioned provide means and material for their attainment. The groups, vocations, and separate persons who wholly or partially devote themselves to the arts and sciences inevitably desire to acquire power (in this respect they show a quasi-state tendency). But even when only moderate and direct power is desired, the persons who strive toward it can achieve their goal only when they constitute themselves a plurality pattern that verges upon or is an abstract collectivity. If they do this, all the social processes characteristic of plurality patterns pursuing much less exalted goals appear among the devotees of the arts and sciences as well. The acquisition and maintenance of collective power requires a special sort of exertion and even struggle. At times, to be sure, such struggle is for the sake of gaining prestige—not for the arts and sciences, but for particular artists and scientists. Again, the latter persons frequently conceal their subjectivity and their self-seeking with a cloak woven out of the objective principles of the arts and sciences. But the mere indication of such practices only partially reveals the forces at work. Even those persons who are wholly de-

voted to art or science for its own sake are compelled to participate in interhuman life, in the social struggle for existence, and to draw strength from the whole vast network of relations of approach and avoidance. More important still, strength must be sacrificed to these relations as well as drawn from them, for the arts and sciences are subjected to the recurring regularities of social life from the moment they become abstract collectivities. The protecting armor of the plurality pattern gradually makes its weight evident; mind is hampered by the forces it has invoked in its service. Its own laws, its own *élan*, and its own profundity must become adjusted to the conventions of interhuman intercourse, to the dullness, awkwardness, and superficiality of group life—for the plurality patterns mind has called to its aid are no different from others.

The dilemma thus created is still more evident in the case of the church; the inherent contradiction between transcendental principles and the inevitabilities of social life oftentimes lead, as we have seen, to tragic conflict.

Attention should also be called to another dilemma, closely related to that we have been discussing, and particularly characteristic of the web of social relationships constituting the church as an abstract collectivity. Interhuman life in general consists of an extremely heterogeneous mixture of social processes. An effort is made to subject most of these to certain norms incorporated in abstract collectivities, and as a consequence every abstract collectivity is at variance with the actual configurations of social and personal life. Urges and tendencies not satisfied in any existing collectivity gradually lead to the development of new plurality patterns, which in turn endeavor to impose their norms upon all other spheres of social life, and thereby become involved in competition, conflict, or compromise with other plurality patterns. No single collectivity can provide means for exercising and gratifying all human desires; only a small segment of human life ever finds a place in any one of them. Nowhere are any all-inclusive "social wholes" to be found, in spite of the fact that every collectivity tries to expand itself into a social whole and usually proclaims itself already to be such. The church in particular endeavors to include the total human being and to absorb all phases of social life. But the more complex and comprehensive the culture of a given people becomes, the more the church must renounce its claims to hegemony in favor of other abstract collectivities, with the final result that the sphere regarded as proper to the church is greatly limited.

§6. THE SOCIAL PROCESSES CHARACTERISTIC OF THE SPHERE OF THE CHURCH

The point has now been reached where the social processes characteristic of interaction within the church and basic to sociological explanation of that plurality pattern may be analyzed.

None of the more inclusive social processes or relationships may be regarded as peculiarly characteristic of the church; all the relations of approach and avoidance may be found within it. Moreover, the church frequently has many features of the state, and hence the processes involved are often strikingly similar to those occurring within the latter structure; there is nothing distinctively characteristic of the church about them. In general, it may be said that the admixture of religious elements alone provides genuine criteria for distinguishing processes peculiar to the church. This means that in analyzing all the processes in this sphere we must take account of the real or fancied bond uniting human beings with the supernatural or divine. The definitely religious wishes and experiences of the participants provide the means of introducing into factor *A* (attitude) and factor *S* (situation) certain differentia which enable us to designate the process concerned as characteristic of the churchly plurality pattern. In taking account of the religious component, the most general method should at first be followed. The primary stages of analysis should not be needlessly complicated by asking whether the supposed bond with divine powers is a matter of sincerity or of hypocrisy, whether it is open or disguised, genuine or spurious. Such questions are irrelevant when the most general analysis possible is desired, for even the behavior of wholly sceptical or even irreligious persons is strongly influenced by the prevailing religious belief whenever they act within the sphere of the church. Such persons must either become thorough hypocrites or, at the very least, must continually reckon with the element of religious belief present in all the persons with whom membership in the church leads them to associate.

It is the mixture of really or supposedly supernatural and interhuman relations that brings about the configurations of association and dissociation characteristic of the church. The social processes there taking place can be at the most only semi-religious; in other aspects they are in close agreement with general interhuman behavior.

These half-religious, half-social relationships of human beings gradually give rise to powerful and close-knit plurality patterns such

as the Roman Catholic Church or the gigantic, complex edifice of Hinduism; millions upon millions of religious-social actions accumulate and eventually interweave to form abstract collectivities; and these, the products of social relations, in turn produce or at least influence social relations. The church cannot be understood when the dynamic social relations, i.e., the social processes, characteristic of it are not understood.

§7. THE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERACTION OF THE ECCLESIA, THE SECT, THE DENOMINATION, AND THE CULT AS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE DILEMMA OF THE CHURCH²

The foregoing discussion of the dilemma of the church, of the irreconcilable conflict between religious ends and collective tendencies, between principle and social character, finds ample historical illustration in the various religious bodies of Christendom. The early phase of the development of the Christian church might well be centered upon, for the struggle with the pagan world, with Manichaeism, with the Arian heresy, with divisive trends that finally culminated in the schism between East and West, and so on, provides vivid exemplification of all that has been said in this chapter. Even better adapted for present purposes, however, is the later phase beginning with the break-up of the medieval unity of Catholicism and ending with the last great religious movement in Christendom proper, namely, the rise and consolidation of Methodism. In order properly to deal with this vast maze of phenomena, it will be necessary to distinguish several sub-varieties of the concept of the church (in the narrower sense); these sub-varieties are: (1) the ecclesia, (2) the sect, (3) the denomination, and (4) the cult.

(1) The social structure known as the ecclesia is a predominantly conservative body, not in open conflict with the secular aspects of social life, and professedly universal in its aims. The phrase "Come out from among them and be ye separate" has no place in the ideology of the genuine ecclesiastic; "Force them to come in" is likely to characterize his thinking. The fully developed ecclesia attempts to amalgamate itself with the state and the dominant classes, and strives to exercise control over every person in the population. Members are *born into* the ecclesia; they do not have to *join* it. It is therefore a social structure somewhat, although remotely, akin to the nation or the state, and is in no sense elective. Membership in an ecclesia is a

² This section is taken from an unpublished manuscript by Howard Becker, "Protestantism and Religious Differentiation."

necessary consequence of birth into a family, folk, or similar structure, and no special requirements condition its privileges.

The ecclesia naturally attaches a high importance to the means of grace which it administers, to the system of doctrine which it has formulated, and to the official administration of sacraments and teaching by official clergy. It is in a very real sense an educational institution which, when functioning properly, trains its youthful members to conformity in thought and practice, and thus fits them for the exercise of the religious "rights" they have automatically inherited.

The ecclesia as an inclusive social structure is closely allied with national and economic interests; as a plurality pattern its very nature commits it to adjustment of its ethics to the ethics of the secular world; it must represent the morality of the respectable majority.

Two main varieties of the ecclesia may be distinguished: international and national. The Catholic Church is the most outstanding example of the first, whereas the Lutheran and Anglican varieties illustrate the second.

It should not be supposed, however, that a sharp line can be drawn between the two. Catholicism, nominally international, as a matter of fact is pervaded by a great many minor nationalistic rivalries that sometimes flare out in controversy. French Catholicism, for example, sometimes maintains an attitude of marked aloofness toward the Vatican; just before the Reformation it was so thoroughly detached from the papacy that one could justifiably speak of two Catholicisms: French and "other." When all the necessary qualifications are made, however, there is no doubt that the Catholic ecclesia is much more international in character than is any other.

Lutheranism and Anglicanism, to mention but two varieties of the national ecclesia, are and have been extremely nationalistic; they are types which began to flourish when the isolated sacred structure of the Middle Ages began to give way to the new ethnic cultures born in the Renaissance, soon after the Commercial Revolution shattered the agrarian basis of medieval life.

(2) The sect is in marked contrast to the ecclesia. In the first place, it is a relatively small plurality pattern that has abandoned the attempt to win the whole world over to its doctrines; the phrase "Come ye out from among them and be ye separate" is followed literally. It is readily seen that the sect is an elective body which one must join in order to become a member. At bottom, the sect is exclusive in character, appeals to strictly personal trends, and emphasizes ethical demands; it frequently requires some definite type of religious

experience as a prerequisite of acceptance. It therefore attaches primary importance to the religious experience of its members prior to their fellowship with the plurality pattern, to the so-called "priesthood of all believers." It frequently rejects an official clergy, preferring to trust for guidance to lay inspiration rather than to theological or liturgical expertness.

In many instances sects are persecuted, but this persecution only reinforces the separatist and semi-ascetic attitude toward the world inherent in the sect as a social structure. At times it refuses participation in the government, at times rejects war and other resort to force, and at times seeks to sever as much as possible the bonds which tie it to the common life of the larger plurality pattern within which it develops. In general, the sect prefers isolation to compromise (chap. xi, §3).

Sects exist in great variety at the present time, but they were to be found even before the period of the Reformation, as evidenced by the Cathari, the Waldensians, the Wyckliffites, and others. Since the Reformation, of course, many such bodies have come into being: Anabaptists, Mennonites, Huguenots, Presbyterians, Baptists, and scores of others dot the pages of history.

(3) Denominations are simply sects in an advanced stage of development and adjustment to each other and the secular world. The early fervor of the self-conscious sect has disappeared, as a general thing, by the second or third generation, and the problem of training the children of the believers almost inevitably causes some compromise to be made in the rigid requirements for membership characteristic of the early phases of sectarian development. Thus, for example, the Presbyterians inaugurated the Half-Way Covenant in order that children whose "calling and election" was not yet sure could be held within the fold, with the consequence that in time the greater proportion of professing Presbyterians were those who had gone no further than the Half-Way Covenant. Similarly, the Baptists have gradually lowered the age of "adult baptism" so that at the present time, in some branches of the denomination, it is possible for children only twelve years old to be baptized. Similar instances can be gleaned from the history of almost any sect one cares to name; age inevitably brings compromise.

A further factor in mitigating the mutually exclusive tendency of the sect in Western Christendom is the common opposition of all genuinely Protestant bodies to Roman Catholicism. In the early phases of the Reformation members of rival Protestant sects de-

tested each other just as thoroughly as they detested adherents of "Babylon the Mighty"; the burning of Servetus by Calvin is a case in point. With the passage of time, however, opposition to the common foe has gradually drawn the Protestant sects, especially of the evangelical variety, into a vague sort of mutual adjustment; it is tacitly agreed that Protestants should engage in polemics with Rome rather than with each other. It should not be forgotten, however, that any denomination is a sect in historical origin and doctrine, and only failure or unwillingness on the part of the clergy to emphasize the grounds of division can obscure this fundamental fact.

(4) Tendencies toward religion of a strictly private, personal character—tendencies fairly well marked in the sect—come to full fruition in the cult as here defined. The goal of the adherent of this very amorphous, loose-textured, uncondensed type of social structure is not the maintenance of the structure itself, as in the case of the church and sect, but is that of purely personal ecstatic experience, salvation, comfort, and mental or physical healing. Instead of *joining* a cult, an act which implies the consent of others, one simply chooses to believe particular theories or follow certain practices, and the consent of other members of the cult is not necessary. It therefore verges on the abstract crowd, although its well-marked ideology probably entitles it to a place among the abstract collectivities. The religious mystic of the Catholic or Protestant varieties has marked leanings toward the cult, although his mystical practices may be incorporated in the general body of sanctioned behavior.

The sources of emotional satisfaction for the cult believer lie wholly within himself; the injustices or good fortune which others may suffer affect him, to be sure, but the center of his cosmos is his "I."

Only a highly atomized and essentially secular social order gives rise to extensive cult belief. The frontier cities of Ionia, Athens in the famous fifth century (see chap. xxv, §1), the cities of the Italian Renaissance, and the urban centers of the modern world have been and are the fertile soil from which new cults arise in rank profusion. The cult is the most ephemeral of all types of religious structure—indeed, it is usually so loosely integrated and so transitory that the term "structure" is almost a misnomer.

Cults frequently are much like sects, and it is extremely difficult to draw a line between the two—just as it is difficult to draw a line between the sect and the denomination. At the same time, the following cults are fairly well marked types: Spiritualism, Theosophy, New Thought, Christian Science, Unity, Buchmanism, and the various

pseudo-Hinduisms associated with Swamis and Yogis who consent, for a consideration, to carry their messages to the materialistic Western World.

We now turn to consider the historical manifestations of these various sub-varieties of the church.

The period just before the Renaissance and Reformation represents in striking form the phenomena correlated with culture contact and release; no other era in European history affords quite so detailed and vivid a picture of what happens when a highly organized culture is suddenly brought into new vicinal and social relations with other cultures. The isolated sacred structure of the Middle Ages began to give way to the accessible secular structure of modern times—the process of secularization was well under way. When to the factors just mentioned we add the growth of urban centers, the decay of the feudal system, the ever-increasing extent of the market, the rise of a thoroughgoing money economy, the breakdown of the scholastic doctrine of Just Price, the appearance of the wandering Goliardi, the secularization of learning, the paganism of the Humanists, and the expansion of Europe, it is fairly easy to see how the continued dominance of Catholicism proved impossible. The social philosophy of Aquinas, upon which the Catholic Church even now bases some of its doctrines, was developed in a simple agrarian culture that was practically unaffected by intrusive factors deriving from other cultures. As soon as its isolation broke down, as soon as trade, commerce and their associated urban economy emerged, its all-inclusive sacred character vanished. The great ecclesia of the Middle Ages lost its hold upon many of its members, and the schisms of Catholicism and the sects and cults of the Protestant Revolution appeared on the scene.

Moreover, nationalism as a principle of culture was ushered in by the Renaissance. The latter movement of course had its universal aspects, but in its practical effects it promoted the differentiation of culture. Latin, once the universal language of the learned in the Middle Ages, gave way in the mouths of savants and preachers to the speech of the common people, to the native tongues once deemed barbarous. National literature brought national self-consciousness, for language more than anything else is the medium of ideologies that cement plurality patterns. Language, however, imposes its limitations even upon "civilization"; it is not only a means of communication but oftentimes a barrier to communication as well. Factors other than language of course contributed to the rise of national cultures, and

one of the most important among these was the growing power of that mobile medium of exchange, money; those devoted to its acquisition were not only desirous of shattering the shackles imposed by the ethics of the earlier community, but also required stable and favorable local governments so that they might pursue their ends without disturbance. The nationalistic tendencies above noted have a wider significance than their relation to the Renaissance alone; the Reformation or, as some writers term it, the Protestant Revolution, did not take place in a vacuum. Niebuhr puts it thus:

"The coincidence of the Reformation with this rise of nationalism may not indicate an intrinsic relation. As a religious movement the reform of the church with its theology and worship might well have taken place without compromise with nationalist ambitions and policies. But, given the political constitution of Catholicism, given the provincial views and petty aims of the Italian papacy of the time, given the political organization of Europe in the Holy Roman Empire, given, also, the reformers' lack of ability to visualize any church save a politically supported one, and given a nationalism which regarded the church's wealth and power with greedy eyes, the outcome could scarcely have been other than it was—the development of divided national churches. The result was that close alliance between the rising national states and the new religious spirit, which became the source of the greatest process of ecclesiastical disintegration in the whole history of Christianity. The Reformation might claim that it was returning to the faith of the first century; but in its organization it relied more on Constantine than on the New Testament church, and in its social ideals it came eventually to approximate pre-Christian, particularist Judaism more nearly than Pauline Catholicism."⁸

The interaction of all the factors thus far described may now be shown in detail by analyzing briefly some of the concrete manifestations of the Protestant movement, especially those that took place in northeastern France, nearly all of Germany, the Scandinavian countries, England, and Scotland, where the early phases of the transition from the Middle Ages to modern times was markedly different from that initiated in other parts of Europe, and where as a consequence a great many ecclesias and sects had an opportunity to develop before social atomization had gone so far that cults alone could flourish. (1) Lutheranism and (2) Anglicanism represent the ecclesias arising during this period; (3) Calvinism in its early stages was an ecclesia but later developed into a sect; (4) the various Anabaptist and Baptist groups, the English Diggers and their successors, and the Method-

⁸H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Social Background of Denominationalism* (1929), p. 36. It should be noted that this section owes a great deal, directly and indirectly, to Niebuhr's cogent analyses of churchly plurality patterns.

ists of all varieties were well-marked sects. Let us consider them in the order given.

(1) The historical events associated with the rise of Lutheranism will not be considered in detail, but some emphasis must be laid upon two factors: (a) Luther's ingrained authoritarian tendencies; and (b) the political particularism of those portions of Germany in which his doctrines gained readiest acceptance.

(a) In the early phases of Luther's career he expressed himself in ways that might be taken to indicate a fundamental revolt against authority of all kinds, but such interpretations would be quite erroneous. He merely substituted one type of authority for another. The traditions of Roman Catholicism and the binding force of papal decrees were rejected or ignored, but appeal was not made to reason; on the contrary, an infallible book, the Holy Bible, was his new source of authority, and when that did not give him victory he fled to the secular authority of the German princes. This is well illustrated by his attitude toward the Peasants' War and the Anabaptist movement. They were both fundamentally sectarian at bottom; they both represented the political and economic as well as the religious interests of the poor, and they championed types of faith which promised not only the salvation of emotional experience, wherein the adherent of the sect transcended the problems of a toilsome, humdrum life, but also gave assurance of deliverance from the political and social oppression of their princely rulers through the establishment of Christ's perfect brotherhood of man.

The Peasants' War and the Anabaptist movement eventually became openly revolutionary, but they were not so at first. The lower economic strata of Germany, the peasants and petty artisans, had honestly believed that Luther's appeal to the New Testament, the source of authority which he first proclaimed, was more indicative of his social ethics than the Pauline theology to which he later resorted. They soon found, however, that they were delivered neither from the verbal hair-splittings of dogma nor from the arid formalism of the sacraments, and least of all from the gross injustices of the prevailing political and economic order. Their disillusionment was complete when they heard from the lips of Luther himself the withering statement that they could not look to Protestantism for salvation from the prevalent dual standard. This standard permitted rulers to exercise domination in accord with the rigid code of the Old Testament, while at the same time subjects were required to submit to their political and economic exploiters in agreement with the ethics

of the Gospels. The German lord could rule his flock with a rod of iron (most often a sword), whereas the flock had to show a sheep-like servility. Luther stated this explicitly:

"Dear masters, deliver here, save here, help here, have mercy upon the poor people. Stab, hit, kill here, whoever can; and though you die in this, happy are you, for a more blessed death you can never find; for you die in obedience to the divine word and command . . . and in the service of love, to save your neighbor from the bonds of hell and devil. . . . Here let whoever can give blows, strangle, stab—secretly or openly—and remember that nothing can be more poisonous, harmful, and devilish than a revolutionary; just as one must kill a mad dog, for if you do not slay him he will slay you and a whole land with you . . . in the New Testament . . . stands our Master Christ and casts us with body and possessions under the Kaiser's and worldly law when he says, 'Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's.'"

The dilemma of the church!

(b) All this indicates that Luther, who had only been partially affected by the new freedom of the age, remained basically conservative in temper, basically an ecclesiastic. Frightened by the excesses of the Peasants' Revolt, he and his followers sought the protection of territorial princes and free cities. Under their auspices the German Reformation lost much of its popular and spontaneous character; it became a pseudo-reform dictated from above rather than a sectarian movement arising out of the masses. When the conflicts between French and Hapsburg policies developed it became still more involved in the machinations of the minor German princes, and when, after Luther's death, the Schmalkaldic War broke out, to be followed in the next century by the Thirty Years' War, the subservience of Lutheranism to the interests of the state became almost complete. Even at the present time the spirit of Lutheranism in Germany, and to a lesser degree in the Scandinavian countries, is in general "the spirit of an isolated national ecclesiasticism." Despite the increasing accessibility and secularization of Western society, this section of the Reformation Church has remained the most isolated, the most narrow, the most nationalist, and the least cosmopolitan of all the Western branches of Christendom.

(2) Much that has been said of Lutheranism also holds good with respect to Anglicanism, if changes and qualifications made necessary by differences in the total situation are not neglected.

Both Lutheranism and Anglicanism, for example, represent types of Protestantism most dependent for their success on political rulers; hence the recognition of the divine right of kings has been more ex-

plicit than elsewhere, and in the countries holding to these faiths kingship has long endured. The words which serve as the text of most sermons in times of political crisis in both England and Germany would seem to be: "Let every soul be in subjection to the higher powers; for there is no power but of God; and the powers that be are ordained of God."

Moreover, Anglicanism, like Lutheranism, has been the mainstay of the courts of law by enforcing the non-legal sanctions of the oath, and has been the supporter of the *status quo* by teaching that both civil and military service may be divine vocations. It is no accident that so many military schools in the United States are equipped with Anglican or Episcopalian chaplains. Indeed, it may be said that the Anglican, like the Lutheran, is not prone to seek reform; he is the bulwark of political conservatism. This conservative attitude is fortified by a theology and an ethics which draw a clear distinction between the realms of grace and sin, regard the social world as a part of the latter realm, and hence restrict the ethics of Jesus to the former. Although there have been striking exceptions to the general rule, it may be said that the good Anglican ecclesiastic is able to live with a relatively easy conscience in a slave-holding society, amid the oppressions and privileges of upper-class governmental domination, the exploitation of "backward races," and the military exaltation of war. God is conceived in the likeness of the king; whatever there is of evil exists somehow by his permission, and the good subject is he who receives in patient resignation whatever life brings of good or evil and who will not presume to believe that he may help in any save a passive way to enforce the rules of a just social order. The dilemma of the church certainly is present in Anglicanism.

(3) Calvinism is a form of Protestantism that has many of the characteristics of both ecclesia and sect. The surest clue to the unravelling of its complications is Max Weber's phrase: "In some countries a middle-class ecclesia, in some countries a middle-class sect, but middle-class in tendency everywhere." Extreme conclusions should not be drawn from this statement; Calvin and the religious leaders who followed him often transcended class and economic conditions in the effort to set forth a purely religious ideal; they disregarded most mundane interests, including their own personal and financial security. Yet, the acceptance of their ideal by a particular social group, and the modification of their religious doctrine by selective emphasis, were due to other than the primarily religious motivation prevailing in the founders.

One of the most enlightening contributions of sociology to the analysis of religious structures is the revelation, as set forth by Weber and others, of the connection between capitalism and Calvinism; it clearly shows the perpetual dilemma in which the church is placed. Despite the over-statements made by some of Weber's uncritical followers, there is little doubt that a close relation has existed in modern times between these two movements and that they have profoundly influenced each other. For present purposes it may be stated that the Calvinistic religious bodies are representative of the middle class, and that the rise and development of these bodies has been conditioned by the economic interests of the bourgeoisie, who in turn owe their position as a trading and capitalist class to the faith established by Calvin at Geneva.

The spatial distribution of this form of Protestantism coincided at an early date with the vicinal location of the rising commercial classes: Swiss cities on the trade routes between northern and southern Europe; the commercial cities of France; the provinces bordering on the Rhine, that aorta of the early Commercial Revolution; the Netherlands, with their highly developed banking and commerce and their extensive shipping activity; England, in which Calvinistic Puritanism and the new capitalism arrived together a hundred years later than on the Continent; and finally, America, the scene where both Calvinism and commercialism have achieved their most complete triumphs. Venice and Florence, it should be noted, were also sympathetic to the faith, but certain factors which cannot be discussed within present space limitations prevented any thorough and permanent acceptance. There is one notable exception to the spatial coincidence of commercialism and Calvinism—Scotland; that country lacked a bourgeois class and, just as in Germany, the nobility provided the fighting front of the Reformation. In the course of time, however, the association of commercialism and Calvinism also became established among the Scots, to a degree that has not been paralleled in some of the countries where the correlation was earliest manifest.

Calvinism in its peculiar function as a religion of the middle class has a more difficult task to meet than a simple sectarian faith appealing to the poor, for the bourgeois present a more complex pattern, both of social structure and of social interest, than do proletarians. Political and cultural interests combine with economic desires in various ways, and the relationship of the governing class—the bureaucracy—and of the professional class with the group engaged exclusively in trade is often very close; it subjects the latter to many modifying

influences. Yet the psychology of the bourgeoisie contains certain constant features which are reflected in this religious organization and doctrine. Among these the most important are the high development of self-consciousness and the prevalence of an activist attitude toward life. To these primary factors others of secondary importance may be added: the general high level of culture and education, the financial security and physical comfort in evidence, the sense of class superiority which is fostered, and the direct effect of business and trade upon its code of ethics. All in all, it may be said that the net result of these factors is the tendency of the bourgeois to think in terms of persons more than of forces, and in terms of personal merit and demerit more than of fortune and fate. This attitude finds expression in what has been called "sectarian asceticism."

The asceticism of the sect is quite different from the asceticism of the ecclesia. The latter may be called extra-worldly, whereas the former is intra-worldly. The difference between the two types is well illustrated in the history of Calvinistic Protestantism. The dropping of the *concilia evangelica* by Protestant groups meant for them the disappearance of the dualistic extra-worldly asceticism of Catholicism. The stern religious characters who had previously gone into monasteries had now to practice their religion in the light of the world. For such an intra-worldly asceticism an adequate ethics was gradually created through the dogmatic pronouncements of Protestant divines. Celibacy was not required, marriage being viewed simply as an institution for the rational bringing up of children; sexual intercourse was supposed to be confined to purposes of reproduction. Poverty was not required, as in some of the Catholic orders, but the pursuit and administration of wealth were brought under the doctrine of stewardship; the wealthy man could not wander astray into reckless enjoyment, but had to conduct his life along rational and ascetic lines in accordance with the divine plan. Thus Sebastian Franck was correct in summing up the spirit of the Reformation in the words, "You think you have escaped from the monastery, but everyone must now be a monk throughout his life."

The wide significance of this transformation of the ethical ideal can be followed down to the present in the countries where Protestant intra-worldly asceticism has reached its highest development. It was until very recent times plainly evident in those portions of the United States most influenced by Calvinism. Although the church and the state were separate, nevertheless no person in a position requiring public confidence—lawyer, banker, or physician—could lightly ignore religious

affiliations; when he took residence in a new community he was always asked to what religious body he belonged, and his prospects were good or bad according to the answer he returned. The motto "Honesty is the best policy" is eminently Calvinistic, an expression of intra-worldly asceticism, and is not a mere expression of cynical opportunism. It is based on the belief that God will take care of his own, the belief in predestination, election, and reprobation. Moreover, it must be said that the belief received ample pragmatic verification; as one English Calvinist put it: "The Godless cannot trust each other across the road; they turn to us when they want to do business; piety is the surest road to wealth." For a modern statement of this same Calvinistic confidence, the reader need turn only to the utterances of Roger W. Babson, forecaster extraordinary and avocational religionist. Such men are not at all hypocritical or giving vent to "cant"; they are merely expressing certain logical consequences of Calvinism—consequences of which the original founders of that doctrine were not aware and which in all probability would never have been sanctioned by them. But, sanction or no sanction, the dilemma of this form of the church, as of any other, could not have been avoided.

The acquisition of wealth, made easier if not possible by intra-worldly asceticism, led to a dilemma in all respects similar to that into which the medieval monasteries fell; the efficiency possible in a sternly ascetic community led to wealth, wealth to luxury, luxury to fall from grace, and this again to the necessity of conviction of sin and renewed asceticism. Calvinism sought to avoid this difficulty by the theory of stewardship; man was only an administrator of what God had given him. All fleshly joys—gluttony, intemperance, concupiscence—were roundly condemned, but were not to be evaded by flying from the world into monastic seclusion. On the contrary, the person who would be sure of his state of grace was required to prove it to himself and others by a specific type of conduct unmistakably different from the way of life followed by the "natural man." This desire for proof of salvation gave the person an incentive methodically to supervise a state of grace in his own conduct, and thus to penetrate it with asceticism. Such ascetic conduct meant a rational planning of the whole of one's life in accordance with the assumed will of God; moreover, it could be required of everyone who laid claim to salvation. The religious life of the saints, as distinguished from the natural life, was no longer to be extra-worldly, to be cut off from the currents of daily existence by the walls of the monastic community, but was to be intra-worldly—in the world and yet not of it. This rationalization of conduct in the press and bustle

of worldly affairs for the sake of the world beyond was the consequence of the concept of "calling" inherent in ascetic Calvinism. Weber has discussed this as follows: "Christian asceticism, at first fleeing from the world into solitude, had already ruled the world which it had renounced from the monastery and through the Church. But it had, on the whole, left the naturally spontaneous character of daily life in the world untouched. Now it strode into the market-place of life, slammed the door of the monastery behind it, and undertook to penetrate just that daily routine of life with its methodicalness, to fashion it into a life *in* the world, but neither *of* nor *for* this world."

The rationalistic type of behavior inaugurated by the Calvinistic concept of "calling" quickly gave to the entrepreneur following this belief a fabulously clear conscience and—what was perhaps of greater importance—assured him of faithful and industrious workers if they too were Calvinists. The reward of the ascetic devotion practiced by the Calvinistic employee was the prospect of eternal salvation. This was to such persons complete compensation for their ruthless self-exploitation in the interests of their similarly ascetic exploiter, for the prospect of salvation, in an age when ecclesiastical discipline took control of the whole of life to an extent inconceivable to us now, represented a reality quite different from any it has today. In the Calvinistic ecclesia admission to the Lord's Supper was granted only to the ethically fit, and their ethical fitness was in turn identified with business honor—while no one inquired into the actual content of the "bloodless bundle of logical categories" formally held as the faith requisite to salvation. So powerful and so subtly although unconsciously refined an organization for the production of capitalistically minded individuals has never existed in any other church or religion, and in comparison with it what the Renaissance did for capitalism shrinks into insignificance; it is one of the most striking manifestations of the dilemma of the church.

(4) The Anabaptists began to flourish at about the same time as the movements clustering about Luther began to develop, but the breach of the former body with the doctrines of Roman Catholicism and with secular rulers was far more thoroughgoing. Indeed, Anabaptism is one of the most clear-cut examples of the sect to be found in the history of Christendom; even its doctrines give evidence of the fact. For example, it was held (a) that infant baptism had no warrant in Scripture and was wholly unavailing; (b) that the sect could be composed only of the Saints, i.e., of those who were true Christians and had been baptized after properly confessing the faith at maturity; (c) that there should

be no union of church and state and no interference of the civil powers in ecclesiastical affairs. Here we obviously have a sect, with all its intense appeal to the lower economic strata; it is significant that it was in the Swiss city of Zurich, where the bourgeois doctrines of Calvinism later flourished among the middle classes, that the representatives of Anabaptism first appeared. Smith has analyzed the significance of the reformer Zwingli's unfriendly attitude toward the Anabaptists as follows: "The humanist could have little sympathy with an uncultured and ignorant group—such they were, in spite of the fact that a few leaders were university graduates—and the statesman could not admit in his categories a purpose that was sectarian as against the state church [ecclesia] and democratic as against the existing aristocracy." Soon the Anabaptists were accused of communism, which the followers of Zwingli considered a sin in the light of their belief in the divine sanction of private property implied in the sixth Commandment; as a consequence, the leaders of the Protestantism of the poor were fined, banished, and in some instances executed.

In the Netherlands, in Poland, in England, and at last in the United States the Anabaptists met a similar fate, and the expulsion of the poor and uneducated from the nationalistic Reformation ecclesias went on with violence and much shedding of blood. Neither Lutheranism nor Calvinism had a real message for the poor, and the leaders of both ecclesias resented, with the vehemence of those whose economic rather than religious interests are threatened, the attempt of the poor to found for themselves a religion which met their need for a Christianity of emotional fervor and for a radical social reconstruction. Under such circumstances the first Protestant sect *qua* sect emerged. Its ethical interests came into appearance not only in its early revolutionary movements but even more in the later practice of pacifism and non-resistance, in refusal to take the oath, in rejection of warfare and participation in government, in the practice of equality and mutual aid, as well as in the frequent communism of separate groups. Its sectarian religious character, as already indicated, was made evident in the insistence on elective membership, on adult baptism of the converted, in the democratic election and ordination of pastors by local churches, in lay preaching and congregational organization, and especially in the phenomena of revivalism. Niebuhr has thus described the fate that ultimately befell Anabaptism:

"Persecuted vindictively on the continent and lacking adequate leadership, Anabaptism all but disappeared there, leaving the peoples who had been disappointed by the failure readier for the message of the old Catholicism than

for that of the new Protestantism. A remnant was gathered by Menno Simons, founder of the now much divided Mennonites. But with Simons began also the inevitable tendency accompanying the rise of a religious group in fortune and culture—the tendency toward a relaxation of the ethical demand and toward formalization of the sect. From violent revolution the path of development led through stubborn non-resistance and unyielding assertion by non-assertion of the principles of equality and love to an accommodating quietism. The Anabaptists, however, were too broken by the Protestant Inquisition to become a strong church, affiliated with wealth and prestige. Isolated by persecution, as the Jews had been isolated, they formed a narrow sect, cut off from other churches not only by the caste-consciousness of early Lutherans and Calvinists but by their own social loyalties to their outcast group.”⁴

When the proper qualifications made necessary by differences in cultural setting are introduced, practically everything that has been said of the Anabaptists can be said of the General Baptists of England and their successors, especially those groups arising in the time of Cromwell—Millenarians, Diggers, Antinomians, Seekers, Ranters, and finally, Quakers.

With relation to the sect last named, however, it should be noted that in the second and third generations, with the aid of the prosperity prevailing in the days of good Queen Anne, middle-class tendencies were introduced, and eventually the earlier origins of Quakerism were almost lost from view. It continued formally to hold the tenets of its social program, but they were pruned and pared to fit a sedate denomination rather than a radical sect aiming at complete social reconstruction. This was especially evident in America, where the economic rise of the Quakers was speedy and permanent, and where Quakerism is now either a denomination or a cult.

The other movements mentioned retained considerable vitality, but were eventually isolated by the persecutions of the established ecclesias and were driven back upon themselves to form extremely narrow sects, with jealous loyalty and sectarian consciousness replacing the larger plans for social reconstruction which inspired their founders. Not until the release afforded by the Industrial Revolution and the American frontier freed them from their bonds did they gain a new lease of life. This revivification did not so much affect the older sects, however, as it tended to bring new sects into existence, the most outstanding of which was Methodism.

In order properly to understand this movement it is necessary to gain a clear picture of social conditions in England during the eighteenth century. The first half of this century brought more prosperity

⁴ *Ibid.*

than had been experienced for many years. But, as is usually the case, that prosperity only tended to make class disparities more obvious by flaunting in the faces of the lower economic strata the luxury which they had helped to create but could not share, and by calling forth in the landed gentry and commercial classes that sense of superiority which flourishes most luxuriantly where possession has no relation to merit. Class distinctions were apparently more real in the days preceding and during the Methodist revival than they had been at any time since the rise of the Baptists, the Millenarians, and others mentioned above. This stratification of society played a large part in excluding from the churches of the nobility and the middle class the unwanted and uninterested poor—"uninterested in the comfortable, aesthetically pleasant, and morally soft religion of the well-to-do." The second half of the eighteenth century, bringing with it the Industrial Revolution, greatly accelerated this tendency toward stratification in English society. The coming of the factory severed the old ties which had united laborer and employer in the feudal relationships of agriculture or in the patriarchal connection of master and apprentice. The cleft between the classes was widened by the wage system and uncertainty of employment, by the development of capitalism and the competitive order, and by the proliferation of cities and its accompanying increase of poverty. Lecky summarizes the situation thus:

"Wealth was immensely increased, but the inequalities of its distribution were aggravated. The contrast between extravagant luxury and abject misery became much more frequent and much more glaring than before. The wealthy employer ceased to live among his people; the quarters of the rich and of the poor became more distant, and every great city soon presented those sharp divisions of classes and districts in which the political observer discovers one of the most dangerous symptoms of revolution."⁶

The symptoms bore fruit, for when revolution occurred (as it usually does under similar conditions), it was, like most of its predecessors in England, a religious revolution deriving its driving power from "the disinherited classes." Some writers have claimed that it was not so spontaneous in nature as the insurgencies which preceded the emergence of the Anabaptists or the Diggers, but Wesley and the rest of the highly trained Oxford Methodists would have won no following had they not offered the poor a type of faith and religious life which met their needs. Leadership or no leadership, the current unrest was bound to generate some sort of attempt to relieve the unbearable tension that the tremendous changes in the economic and social structure inevitably

⁶ W. H. R. Lecky, *History of European Morals*, p. 87.

brought with them. The primary leadership was supplied by the upper classes, to be sure, but the lay preachers and the membership, with little exception, were drawn from the lower economic levels of society, and without the lay preachers and the members of the "bands" and "classes" whom they so powerfully influenced and disciplined, the generalship of the brothers Wesley would have been barren indeed. In his "Advice to the People Called Methodists" John Wesley himself points out to his followers that they "have been hitherto, and do still subsist, without power (for you are a low insignificant people), without riches (for you are poor almost to a man, having no more than the plain necessities of life), and without either any extraordinary gifts of nature, or the advantages of education; most even of your teachers being quite unlearned and (in other things) ignorant men." It is true, of course, that converts were also gained from other social strata, but the attitude of "polite society" (chap. xxxviii, §2) was on the whole probably truly, if somewhat extravagantly, represented by the Duchess of Buckingham in her letter to Lady Huntingdon: "I cannot but wonder that your ladyship should relish any sentiments so much at variance with high rank and good breeding."

The characteristic features of the new sect also marked it off as especially adapted to the poor. Its emotionalism made it thoroughly repulsive to the "enthusiasm-hating" upper crowd and at the same time extremely attractive to those for whom religion had to mean much more than prudential counsel and rationalized belief, if it was to mean anything at all. The lay character of the movement, no less than its emotionalism, followed the pattern of the poor man's faith. The use of lay preachers in Methodism, as among Anabaptists and in related medieval movements, was due to many factors connected with the economic and social status of the members: (1) to the unwillingness of a clergy nurtured in comfort to share in the popular religious revolt; (2) to the people's antagonism to a professional class which they regarded as being without real understanding of and sympathy with the needs of the poor; (3) to the ability of the lay preacher to meet the new group on its own terms; and (4) to the simple fervor and naïvely genuine piety of the unsophisticated proselyter.

The social ethic of Methodism also distinguished it from the Calvinistic middle-class churches, as well as from the national Anglican ecclesia appealing primarily to the ruling landed gentry. Its democratic character had a marked influence upon the social order. Nevertheless, in its social ethic Methodism was far removed from the revolutionary sects of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The difference lay in

the substitution by Methodism of private, personal ethics and philanthropism for the egalitarian ethics and millenarianism of the earlier Anabaptist and related sects. Methodism had some interest, of course, in the economic fortunes of its constituency and in the social inequalities from which they suffered, but it was much more interested in the correction of their vices. Indeed, it may be maintained that the democratic results of Methodism were never designed by the founder, but that they accrued as a mere by-product of the movement. This difference between the earlier sects and Methodism doubtless had much to do with the latter's success in a class-governed world that feared nothing so much as social revolution. Methodism was never subject to the same official oppression as had been its sectarian predecessors, and it grew respectable in a much briefer time than these required. Moreover, the virtues of the Methodists, although not quite the same as those of the Calvinists, contributed almost as much to the former's early rise into a higher economic and cultural stratum. John Wesley himself pointed out another aspect of "the dilemma of the church" when he neatly described the process whereby sects like the one he founded lose their original character:

"Wherever riches have increased the essence of religion has decreased in the same proportion. Therefore I do not see how it is possible in the nature of things for any revival of religion to continue long. For religion must necessarily produce both industry and frugality, and these cannot but produce riches. But as riches increase so will pride, anger, and love of the world in all its branches. How then is it possible that Methodism, that is, a religion of the heart, though it flourishes now as a green bay tree, should continue in this state? For the Methodists in every place grow diligent and frugal; consequently they increase in goods. Hence they proportionately increase in pride, in anger, in the desire of the flesh, the desire of the eyes and the pride of life. So although the form of religion remains, the spirit is swiftly vanishing away. Is there no way to prevent this—this continual decay of pure religion? We ought not to prevent people from being diligent and frugal; we must exhort all Christians to gain all they can, and to save all they can; that is in effect to grow rich. What way then can we take, that our money may not sink us into the nethermost hell? There is one way and there is no other under heaven. If those who gain all they can, and save all they can, will likewise give all they can, then the more they gain, the more they will grow in grace, and the more treasures they will lay up in heaven."⁸

It is perhaps not quite fair to make the cynical remark that Wesley omits all reference to the *manner* in which Methodists are to "gain all they can"; nevertheless, the passage well describes the rise of Methodism, first in the Old World and then in the New, from a sect of the poor

⁸ John Wesley, quoted in Niebuhr, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

to a denomination, now verging on an ecclesia, of the middle class. The economic and cultural character of the movement underwent profound modification and, more rapidly than was the case with the other sects already described, it became a respectable body of staid and placid citizens. Originally urban in character, it slowly spread into the rural districts of both England and America, while at the same time it retained the loyalty of the tradesmen and workers who, rising in the social scale through their thrift and diligence, became the petty capitalists, and sometimes the great as well, of the growing cities of the nineteenth century. It left behind the emotionalism of its earlier years and adapted its ethic, never typically lower-class in character, to the needs of its socially aspiring constituency. It abandoned lay preaching in favor of a regular and theologically trained ministry; it modified and softened in many ways the original stringency of its method; it gave up its old program of mutual aid, so typical a feature of the sects of the poor; it left aside the intra-worldly asceticism of its early communities, arranging its rules to accommodate those whose interests made some conformity to the world necessary. Once again we see exemplified the dilemma of the church.

The Methodist revival was the last great Christian movement deriving its motivating force from the poor; it was not wholly a popular movement, and perhaps that is one reason why it has had no successors. The revolutionary tendencies of the poor in the nineteenth century were almost completely secular in character; social and economic laws were substituted for the angels who fought on the side of the Anabaptists and Mennonites, and in place of the early coming of the Son of Man the underprivileged worker looks forward hopefully, when he looks forward at all, to the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat according to the gospel of Marx.

CHAPTER XLV

RELATIONS BETWEEN PLURALITY PATTERNS

§1. METHOD OF ANALYZING ABSTRACT COLLECTIVITIES

In the foregoing chapters an effort has been made to delineate the most general features of abstract collectivities and in addition, to depict political and churchly plurality patterns in somewhat greater detail. The method has been empirical; direct or indirect observation of social processes actually occurring in the present or that have occurred in the past provides the basis for generalization. The results achieved, however, are merely submitted as hypotheses for further verification, or for refutation, by others; it is hoped that this tentative viewpoint has been consistently maintained. Hypotheses must of course be checked against the available evidence; they cannot be rejected merely because they disagree with emotionally surcharged, a priori opinion. Scientific method has been used in formulating these hypotheses, and scientific method must be used if criticism is to be fruitful. This means that monographic studies of interhuman behavior in particular spheres of social life should be made with the object of determining the social processes characteristic of each. The results thus achieved by monographic investigation should then be compared, and the resulting general and specific conclusions used in correcting or extending the hypothetical outlines here presented.

These outlines may be of much assistance in such detailed research, for they can be made to serve as points of departure and bases for further observation. The questions raised should probably take forms somewhat like the following: To what extent must the ideal-typical plurality patterns serving as frames of reference be altered to accommodate variations discovered through further observation of concrete, historical phenomena? Are the discrepancies between empirical data and ideal-typical configurations resolvable by providing ideal-typical sub-varieties, or is the superordinate ideal type incorrectly outlined and therefore in need of changes that reckon with new data? Are existing discrepancies due at bottom to the fact that no ideal type can wholly correspond to reality? Is the heuristic, pragmatic, fictional nature of the ideal type sufficient justification of minor discrepancies?

(Cf. chap. ii, §2.) Would the ideal type under investigation be a more useful heuristic device if it departed *further* from empirical reality than is now the case?

Every correction is welcome, provided it is the result of relatively unprejudiced observation and careful generalization. This means that two difficulties must be overcome:

First, the temptation to distort unpleasant realities so that they fit into a scheme of things agreeable to the investigator's wishes and inclinations must be steadfastly resisted. The satisfaction derived from correctly describing and analyzing an objective series of interrelations must be stronger than all the ties binding thought and emotion to favorite theories, dogmas, class affiliations, interests, and traditions. The social scientist in general and the sociologist in particular must observe human affairs without attempting to force everything into the Procrustean bed of preconceived theories and assumptions. It is of course undesirable—indeed, impossible—wholly to dispense with theories; they serve a useful function in giving focus to investigations that might otherwise be diffuse and vague. In other words, they may and should be used as hypotheses, not as dogmas to be bolstered up in any way possible. For example, it is quite permissible to make use of the various theories connected with the materialistic interpretation of history, or with the dogmas of Hegelianism, or even with the beligerent assertions of Spann's universalism, so long as they are regarded as heuristic aids for distinguishing between the relevant and the irrelevant. This should not be taken to mean, however, that it is permissible to select from the dense jungle of social occurrences verifactory facts only; in the profusion of available data there are certain to be some that at least appear to disprove the theory, and they should never be ignored. They should all be subjected to a method of analysis similar to that set forth in the present volume. Complex social occurrences should be reduced to relatively simple processes, and these should then be grouped and recombined without regard to harmony with the theory. The resulting synthesis should then be compared with the theory or theories held when the investigation began, e.g., with Marxism, Platonism, or Machiavellianism, in order to see whether it provides confirmation or refutation. This is easy to say but very hard consistently to carry out; yet the effort must be made if the first difficulty, that of freeing the mind of the investigator from bondage to dogma, is to be overcome.

The second difficulty is that of properly assessing the historical character of all social phenomena. The adherents of the extreme his-

torical viewpoint, whom we shall here term historicists (closely related to cultural sociologists), are very dubious of the possibility of making usable ideal-typical generalizations. They perpetually call attention to the spatial and temporal limitations and the ceaseless change of historical phenomena. They consequently assert that the state, for example, is different in different periods and cultures, and that valid assertions can be made only with reference to definite states in definite epochs.

In *some* respects this point of view is entirely acceptable, and is implicit in much if not all of the present system. There is no doubt whatever that usable ideal types must be based upon numerous concrete, exact, and detailed monographic studies—in short, upon culture case studies. Moreover, deductions based upon ideal types regarded as heuristically valid must be subjected repeatedly to the test of induction; the pyramiding of hypotheses should be avoided.

So much for unreserved agreement with the historicists; now for qualification. Although history presents us with a great and ever-changing variety of concrete events, it seems safe to say that the basic traits of interhuman relations and plurality patterns alter very gradually indeed. Moreover, the method of generalization followed in the present treatise takes full account of the possibility of alteration, for the emphasis upon social *action* avoids unduly static interpretation. Developmental tendencies, dynamic features, and even mere “probabilities” (to use Max Weber’s mode of expression) are given proper prominence, and hence the historical character of social interconnections is, we believe, granted full recognition.

The historicists are convinced of the supreme importance of knowing what changes have taken place in definite areas at definite times; they are interested in the ceaseless, changeful flux of events. To the systematist, however, it seems manifest that not only the cosmos but the interhuman world as well is composed of relatively few elements, although the permutations and combinations into which these elements may enter are almost infinitely numerous and variable. There consequently arise two distinct sets of problems: one for the historicist, who traces the changes that occur in full and concrete detail, and another for the systematist, who separates the elements from the conglomerate masses in which they are found. Both tasks necessarily involve different goals, but in other respects they are interdependent. Instance the fact that elements after all can be found empirically only in complex union with others; they never appear in pure or isolated form in the world of actual phenomena. The systematist

must therefore analyze historical data as "given." The historicist, on the other hand, can *explain* particular combinations and changes only when he knows something of the particular elements involved.

The abstract collectivities exemplify this quite clearly: the multifarious secondary alterations and differences which they all manifest in the course of time, and which are of particular significance for proper historical understanding, change their fundamental characteristics in such moderate measure that it is quite possible for the sociologist to conduct his analysis by using a relatively small number of ideal types, if only he defines them in a way that is sufficiently general and that takes account of the dynamic nature of collective forces. In fact, it is possible to defend both of the following theses: "Everything repeats itself," and "Nothing repeats itself." That is to say, the proportionate intermixture of secondary components and the quantitative proportions in which the basic elements of all complex social phenomena are united are different in every historical period; the same elements, however, are always present. There is no abstract collectivity that does not possess the basic characteristics noted in previous pages, but these characteristics are always weaker or stronger, more or less concealed, in course of deterioration or reconstruction, influenced in greater or lesser degree by other social factors, and so on—with the result that to the superficial view they appear irreconcilably diverse. From the standpoint here represented—namely, the systematic—it is possible to demonstrate that the basic traits of the chief ideal types of abstract collectivities are quite general and persistent over long periods of time; this can be done by laying bare the networks of social processes which repeatedly become manifest at all times and places, and which correspond to a few ideal-typical configurations easily differentiable from each other. In this way, it seems possible to give due weight to the historical bonds of empirical plurality patterns, while at the same time achieving a systematic, conceptual analysis of their elements—thus overcoming the second difficulty above noted.

§2. INTERACTION BETWEEN PLURALITY PATTERNS

The analyses of the church and the state already made give some indication of the method advocated for dealing with abstract collectivities of the first or most general order. The other primary social structures (station, class, the economic order, aesthetic and scientific bodies) have been characterized only with regard to their chief functions and basic traits, for space forbids a closer study of the social

processes predominating in them. Methodological completeness, rather than detailed exemplification of method, is the chief aim of the present volume.

In order to achieve this aim, however, it is necessary to pay some attention to the relations between plurality patterns. We have already pointed out that most of the interhuman behavior of single human beings is explicable when we understand the relations existing between them; in the same way, plurality patterns are explicable, not as entities with inherently fixed characteristics, but as plastic configurations owing many of their traits to and changing as the result of mutual influence. For example, it has already been implicitly if not explicitly shown that both the state and the church would be markedly different from what they now are if they were not knit by thousands of relations to each other, to the remaining abstract collectivities of the first order, to all their subordinate bodies of the second order, to the vast number of groups affected by and affecting them, to the multiplicity of abstract crowds (and under certain circumstances even concrete crowds) interacting with them, to the vast array of separate persons whose ideologies they mold, and last but not least to the few creative personalities who occasionally alter or transform them through the introduction of new ideologies. There is obviously no possibility of dealing with all these intricate ramifications here; only a few relations between the abstract collectivities of the first order can be even superficially indicated.

The "two-powers" controversy, the struggle between the temporal and spiritual domains of the church and the state, is familiar to everyone; it furnishes striking exemplification of the way in which abstract collectivities limit and restrict each other.

Again, interaction between the church and the various stations is not only of great historical but also of major systematic importance. The ecclesiastical station for a long period held the first rank in the history of Western culture. In combination with the nobility, the station of the second rank, it formed an upper stratum that was a genuine plurality pattern, separate from that composed of the bourgeoisie and peasantry until the time of the French Revolution. The dilemma of the church, to which extensive reference has already been made, is especially evident here. In agreement with their ideology, the servants of the ecclesia should have been the humble servants of all mankind without distinction of persons, whether beggar or king, for they held that in the sight of God all men are equal. But in spite of the fact that many monks and other ecclesiastics really desired to function

thus, almost every prevailing tendency operated to make those who were dignitaries of the ecclesia into secular aristocrats as well; they were members of the landed gentry, and in addition possessed large quantities of movable wealth. Not only the dignitaries but even the humblest monk formed part of this upper stratum. The priesthood in general was free of the limitations and privations hampering the bourgeois and the peasant.

Once more, a similar set of relations is exemplified in the history of Indian castes. After the Aryan-speaking invaders had conquered the peninsula, the warrior caste was the uppermost stratum; the entire range of social life, from matrimony to epic poetry, was profoundly influenced by the dominance of the fighter. Then the Brahmins, the priestly caste, gradually managed to achieve pre-eminence, and eventually the most insignificant details of the interhuman sphere were subjected to the requirements of this caste, who ever since have constituted the station of the first rank.

Further, relations between the present-day church and the various social classes provide splendid opportunities for research by the systematic sociologist. This is especially true where the proletariat is concerned: once the source of the numerical strength of the church, it is now either indifferent or inclined to such ideologies as communism, except in those countries where the church, by wise sponsorship of social and labor legislation, has managed to hold or even to attract the workers. Valuable systematic studies might be made of the interaction of Catholicism and Fascism, on the one hand, and of the Greek Orthodox faith and Communism, on the other.

Still further, the material for systematic treatment seems almost limitless when attention is directed to relations between the church and the economic order, the church and scientific bodies, the church and aesthetic structures. All the activity of the church may be viewed as a process of defining attitudes and situations with regard to all the other abstract collectivities and (depending upon the orientation achieved) of co-operation with or opposition to them. The resulting processes of association and/or dissociation fall within the general categories already discussed.

Moreover, the relations between abstract collectivities are not exhausted by conflict between diametrically opposed forces, nor by compromise between them (when neither can achieve the extinction of the other); relations giving rise to mutual adjustment, participation, emulation, and capitulation are extremely important. Some evidence has already been adduced to show that all abstract collectivities

tend to acquire some features most clearly evident in the state, but it has also been shown that the state in turn takes over a great many characteristics of other plurality patterns. It frequently resembles the church, a particular class (the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia!), an economic structure (state socialism, etc.), and often is an agency for promoting aesthetic and scientific activities.

The same might be said of relations of all the other collectivities to each other, including all the bio-social structures, and especially the family. Many cultures previous to our own discriminated more sharply between the state, the church, and the family than do we; at the present time, all three intermingle to some extent, although in Europe at least the state seems to take more than it gives. For example, it is fairly evident that many of the functions of familial and religious structures are being absorbed by the political plurality pattern. By and large, it may be said that the family has relinquished more of its power and prestige to other plurality patterns than have any of the remaining abstract collectivities of the first order.

§3. STATE AND QUASI-STATE

In thus emphasizing the predominance of the political plurality pattern, certain qualifications and explanations are called for, inasmuch as observation of the empirical-historical states of the present day (rather than ideal-typical and schematic analysis) yields an extremely confused impression. The state is dominant in Italy, to be sure, although some observers think that time will show that the church did not get the worst of the bargain. Be that as it may, the star of Fascism is still in the ascendant, and all of Italy's activities take place under its aspect. In other countries, the situation is by no means so clear. Germany, in the first three years of the World War, experienced a degree of state control that could hardly have been more complete; this was the so-called "era of state socialism." Such nearly absolute dominance proved short-lived, for with the fall of the monarchy, the unfavorable outcome of the peace negotiations, and the series of severe political crises that followed the establishment of the Republic, the burden became too heavy for the state to bear. At present (1931) several large bodies of influential citizens who formerly supported the *status quo* are engaged in an effort to weaken the existing form of the political plurality pattern, and therefore to weaken the state itself in some measure. There is no general recognition of even the domestic sovereignty of the existing German Republic; it is far from being *the* state. Nevertheless, the Republic has

proved efficient and resistant—to a degree most unwelcome to many of its opponents. But after all, there can be little doubt that not only in Germany but in much of Central and Western Europe as well, a considerable proportion of the power of the state has passed into the hands of the economic order and of certain classes.

It will be recalled, however, that one of the principal conclusions of the chapter on the state was this: Whenever empirical-historical states decline in power, other collectivities take over their functions and thus perpetuate the essential traits of the political plurality pattern in other zones of social life (chap. xliii, §4). Quasi-states arise which oftentimes possess a sum total of coercive force surpassing that of the weakened state.

The particular configuration of social processes which lends any given abstract collectivity its essential characteristics endures as long as human needs and endeavors render it necessary. This configuration, however, cannot be confined to the framework within which it arose; it may shift from one type of plurality pattern to another.

Such distortions, transferences, or shifts are possible because all abstract collectivities are closely and continuously interwoven with the whole fabric of social life; processes of approach and avoidance bring about the expansion of one plurality pattern at the cost of another, and *vice versa*.

§4. THE INFLUENCE OF THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION

It is apparent to the most casual observer that the social structure which as an abstract collectivity is perhaps the most recent of all the chief types, namely, the economic order, is continually increasing its sphere of influence and the completeness of its domination within that sphere. The greater the density of population and the greater the increase in material needs, the more important becomes the plurality pattern which organizes the production of the means of existence.

The capitalistic mode of production is not necessarily the only one adapted to this function. Only so far as it is really more efficient in reducing the relative scarcity of goods than any other economic system will it be able, in the long run, to maintain itself. This statement, however, should not lead to the erroneous assumption—an assumption which the sociologist, of all persons, should avoid—that only systems in every respect the most efficient are adopted or maintained. This occurs only when the most efficient mode at the same time corresponds to the wishes of those persons who are in a position to secure its adoption or maintenance. Hence the persistence and general recog-

dition of the capitalistic system can be only in part due to the degree of general efficiency inherent in it; in at least equal measure it is dependent upon the natural and/or acquired traits of those persons able to influence the form of economic organization.

In Germany, the United States, France, Great Britain, Belgium, and other countries with similarly complex industrialism, the great corporations controlling production and trade are more and more assuming the character of quasi-states. If space permitted an extended description and analysis of relations between the modern state and the economic order, important elements might be added to conclusions about the influence of social processes already advanced. Commercialization (chap. xxx, §7) has made inroads into the sphere of the state, and institutionalization (chap. xxxi, §2) of a political character has gripped the economic organization.

§5. SCIENTIFIC AND AESTHETIC BODIES

We must now turn for a brief glimpse of the interrelations found between (1) the collectivities presumably serving strictly mental or spiritual ends, and (2) the state, the church, the class, and the economic organization. From the state there pours forth a steady stream of emotions, cravings, and prejudices usually placarded with the slogans of nationalism or internationalism, and usually if not always exerting deleterious pressure upon the scientific collectivity. It loses its political impartiality, and in some instances is relegated to the rank of a collectivity of the second order with no function other than furtherance of political interests—it becomes a mere derivative or auxiliary institution. This condition of affairs prevails to a startling degree in present-day Italy and Russia. The logical limit of the subordination of science to the state seems already to have been reached.

Where the aesthetic plurality pattern is concerned, the danger of value-judgments is especially great; statements may be made only with great reservation. This is particularly true when relations between the economic organization and the aesthetic structure are discussed. Such a theme is a red rag to the aesthete, on the one hand, and to the proletarian ideologist, on the other. Some assertions can nevertheless be made with considerable assurance, and one of them is that a great deal of the tortured and distorted stylization evident in modern artistic circles can readily be explained in the light of relations stressed by the so-called materialistic interpretation of history. The fact that even the practitioner of "art for art's sake" must keep body and soul together by definitely material means is the primary reason

for the curious and offensive regimentation so frequently evident in the various divergent schools, each of which exacts uniformity from its members. Very few artists at present venture to express their deepest personal preferences, for they fear lack of recognition and its attendant lack of wherewithal. In most instances, each artist is feverishly eager to join the dominant school, no matter how much its over-emphasis and arbitrary differentiation may diverge from the style that appeals most to him as a person. It is of course true that in some cases the artist chooses to start a school of his own rather than to join that of another, but this usually involves quite as much artificiality, for deliberate sensationalism is sometimes resorted to as an advertising device. The new school announces itself with a blare of trumpets, and if the din is loud enough may succeed in stamping its own trademark upon artists who at first affected to despise it. The uniformation (chap. xxvi, §1) of art is a social process that cannot be explained by the nature of art itself. The only valid explanation lies in the dependence of art, when it has become an abstract collectivity, upon other abstract collectivities such as the class, the economic order, and, in lesser degree, upon the church and the state.

A great many theorists of aesthetics of course attempt to explain the dominance of certain schools and the elimination of others as an inherent necessity explicable only by invoking the "essence" of art; such theorists rarely if ever have or care to have any knowledge of the sociological processes involved. They consequently construct the most pretentious and hollow theoretical edifices in the attempt to gain acceptance for their doctrines. To anyone capable of thinking realistically, such effort is in vain; economic influences almost wholly explain the matter.

§6. MISCELLANEOUS ABSTRACT COLLECTIVITIES OF THE SECOND ORDER

An interesting development that frequently takes place in the inter-relations of abstract collectivities is the tendency of many corporate bodies of the second order more or less to free themselves from their functional duties to those of the first order, to become independent, and if possible to make all plurality patterns of whatever rank dependent upon *them*.

The history of martial institutions is particularly instructive from this point of view. In the early stages of social development, the band of warriors is usually chronologically prior to the state, and indeed often has much to do with its creation. Both plurality patterns exist, in part at least, for the sake of each other. In the modern period, it

is taken for granted that all military and naval forces function only in the service of the state, but this naïve assumption is frequently contradicted by a reversal of the relationship. In China, for example, the state is at times the tool of and wholly dependent upon the army of one or another of the war-lords; somewhat similar instances may be found elsewhere: e.g., the White and the Red armies in Russia, and the military régimes in South America. The question at once arises: What social processes are most active in producing this changed condition of affairs?—but space forbids any attempt to answer it here.

A fleeting glimpse of perspectives equally wide is vouchsafed when passing mention is made of the influence of finance and the peculiar predominance exercised by industry in Germany and other economically active countries.

A great deal might also be said about the rôle that the two idols of modern life, sport and communication, now play. By implication, some of the influences of communication have already been discussed in the section on individuation and population movement (chap. xxv, §2), but largely from the standpoint of the systematics of action patterns. It is often taken for granted that the power of the state is only a convenient tool for furthering endeavors to cover greater space in less time. The social realist feels no hesitation in asserting that, in popular estimation, the achievements of art and science are relegated to a wholly inferior position when compared to the activities of the record-breaker or the champion in the world of sport. We are not at all concerned here with the curious shift in values thereby brought about, but we are interested in the interrelations thus set up among social structures.

What social processes are primarily responsible for the elevation of sport to a supreme place in the estimation of so large a proportion of the population? What kinds of interhuman and interstructural relationships develop in a period where the body is assiduously trained but the mind is cultivated only to the extent absolutely necessary for the maintenance of social life? What are the cultural effects of that acceleration of transportation now thought indispensable? (Here again chap. xxv, §2, is relevant.) There is much evidence to show that the more highly developed the means of communication (of which transportation is a sub-variety) between human beings, the less they have to say to each other. One need only listen to the average radio program to at least partially persuade himself of this fact. The greater portion of what is transmitted is either of negligible quality or wholly superfluous. Men fly across oceans only to discover that the people

they find on the other side possess the same curious prejudices and superficialities as those they left behind. What social processes are responsible for the cult of aviation and the romantic adoration of the aviator?

Such considerations have as an inevitable corollary the conclusion that many modern plurality patterns of the second order show a tendency to become ends rather than means, to free themselves from their functional dependence upon the state, the church, and similar abstract collectivities of the first order, and even to force the latter into their service.

§7. CAN PLURALITY PATTERNS BE ARRANGED IN A HIERARCHY OF VALUES?

A question that has seduced many sociologists to yield an unequivocal answer is raised by the foregoing section, and may be stated thus: Are some plurality patterns of greater value than others? A great many social science studies, some of which are quite valuable, nevertheless have conclusions cast in terms of value-judgment; a hierarchy of values is set up in which *A* is higher than *B*, *B* is higher than *C*, and so on.

A cardinal principle of the science of interhuman behavior as here outlined is in direct opposition to such practices. Every attempt to create a value-hierarchy of social phenomena is strictly and unconditionally rejected. In previous pages, the difference between the systematics of action patterns and the systematics of plurality patterns was made clear by the statement that in the former the route of analysis is from the single human being to the plurality pattern and in the latter from the plurality pattern to the single human being (chaps. viii, §1; xxxii, §1). Let it again be emphasized that *this is merely a method of exposition*; it does not denote or connote any values apart from those of potential or actual control of phenomenal recurrence. The aim is to achieve a certain completeness of viewpoint by proceeding first from *A* to *B* and then from *B* to *A*. In so doing, the field of observation is always the same; it is merely viewed under two different aspects. The sequence in which these aspects occur does not imply any hierarchy of values whatever. To quote a previous formulation of this principle: "In the [systematics of plurality patterns] the elements upon which the plurality pattern is based seem to be its organs; conversely, in the systematics of action patterns our attention is fixed upon the social intercourse of human beings, and we seem to see plurality patterns arise as the result of such intercourse" (chap. viii, §1). In other words, the sociologist regards the

human being as an organ of the plurality pattern *and* the plurality pattern as an organ or extension of the human being.

But how is the interrelation of plurality patterns to be conceived? May they be placed in a hierarchy of values?

The answer is unreservedly negative. For example, our division of plurality patterns into crowds, groups, and abstract collectivities has no implicit or explicit value-judgments connected with it. We have dealt with the main types of plurality patterns as if they were the three floors of a building: the crowd forms the ground floor, the group the second story, and the abstract collectivity is next to the roof. This order, however, represents only the stages of positive sociation. Any other interpretation is arbitrary and erroneous. Sociation, positive or negative, is to the systematic sociologist neither good nor evil, but simply a fact. The abstract collectivity is not regarded as "higher" (in the sense of more perfect) than the group, and the group is not classed as higher than the crowd. The criteria by means of which they are differentiated have already been adduced (chaps. vi, §1; xxxiii, §7; xlii, §2; etc.) Regarded solely in their sociative aspects, the abstract collectivity is more complex than the group, and this in turn than the crowd—that is all.

It is therefore obvious that the range between *C* (crowd), *G* (group), and *A* (abstract collectivity) is a continuum. No real gaps are assumed by us in spite of our use of only three main categories. The portions of the continuum between these three stages may be further subdivided—as has been done, for example, in the analysis of the group. The degree of organization and stability of union are the decisive criteria. Each succeeding plurality pattern in the series from *C* to *A* represents a greater intensity of power; we have already discussed some of the manifestations of this power, namely, the differential and central affects (chap. xli, §3) of members. If the path of development leading from *C* to *A* is closely observed, there arises a hypothesis already set forth in an earlier chapter: "If a more complex form of plurality pattern has been reached, it attempts to make all its constituent elements dependent upon it; hence they appear to be mere instruments or organs of such a social structure" (chap. viii, §1).

Evidence supporting this hypothesis was advanced in conjunction with the analysis of the *led* concrete crowd (chap. xxxiv, §3); further evidence appeared in the discussion of *B* groups (chap. xli, §2); and still more resulted from our analysis of abstract collectivities (chap. xlii, §1). This evidence showed that not only do separate persons

function as instruments or organs, but that the simpler plurality patterns falling within the sphere dominated by the more complex may also be thus subordinated. In this way, for example, pairs, triads, tetrads, and other *A* and *B* groups may be dealt with as mere elements of *B* groups, and groups of all types may in turn be dealt with as "members" dependent upon the total "organism" of the abstract collectivity. Finally, the abstract collectivities of the second order may be assigned niches within the larger structures of the first order, and more thorough study would probably show the desirability of subdividing abstract collectivities still further.

This procedure is wholly heuristic; the misleading example of the "universalists," who rest content with their supposed demonstration of the dependence of the "part" upon the "whole," should not be followed. On the contrary, the condition of dependence is, as already noted, mutual in every respect. It is solely the viewpoint chosen that leads to the conclusion that the larger plurality patterns are in the service of the smaller, or the smaller of the larger. If one looks from *A* to *C*, the latter appears to be the point to which everything in the wide perspective advancing to *A* is related. Contrariwise, if one looks from *C* to *A*, the latter is the culminating or "vanishing" point, and everything in the intervening space seems to lead up to, i.e., to serve, *A*.

(It should be noted that the more complex plurality patterns need not under all circumstances be the larger, i.e., numerically or spatially greater. There are small abstract collectivities which are served by large groups. Only when deviations are disregarded and the representative case is focussed upon can generalizations about larger and smaller plurality patterns be made.)

Such considerations yield a second hypothesis (also presented in an earlier chapter): "When a more complex (i.e., more extensive, more abstract) plurality pattern is compared with simpler (i.e., smaller, historically earlier, more concrete) plurality patterns partially contained within it, the latter appear from the standpoint of the more complex structure to be nothing more than its subordinate parts, absolutely dependent upon it, and as mere means for the purpose of maintaining it in ways determined without reference to them. From the standpoint of the simpler structures, however, the more complex plurality pattern seems to exist only in order to serve *their* purposes" (chap. viii, §1).

Crowds draw their strength from classes; numerous groups use the state, the church, the economic order to serve their ends. Con-

versely, many pairs, marriage groups (man, wife, and children), and similar plurality patterns exert nearly all their efforts in serving the group of institutions sanctioned by prevailing religious or political collectivities.

§8. FINALE

In closing, a few words with reference to human beings and plurality patterns seem relevant.

The tragic fate of mankind does not preoccupy most of us only because we know of no other destiny and would not be able to change our own even if we did. Each person weaves a tiny portion of the web of interhuman occurrences that encompasses the lives we all live. We work for a few decades on a gigantic scheme of earthly affairs that is partially closed to our straining gaze when we look toward the past and is absolutely shut to us when we look toward the future. Nevertheless, we feel the need and the desire to carry out the bit of labor that temporally and spatially devolves upon us as if the responsibility for the whole rested upon our shoulders. We accomplish what the great and little plurality patterns demand of us, and at the same time work and strive (voluntarily or involuntarily) within our own sphere as if we were immortal and could ourselves perceive the final goal of human effort. Soon the strongest of us is cast aside like a tattered garment; our places are quickly filled, and our successors also partake of the same destiny and the same inevitable readiness to serve country, humanity, civilization, or similar non-rational but unavoidable final ends. The most marvellous aspect of the whole drama is the fact that the long history of peoples, cultures, and races appears to be a unity, to be *one* life—in spite of the fact that it is brought into being by countless succeeding generations, who know and can do no otherwise than to carry out the work of their predecessors in ways they can do little to alter and which they must themselves soon pass on to their successors. The terrible and lofty grandeur of death seems to lie not in the fact that we must all die some day, but rather in the lesson it teaches—that our work is not *our* work, but that we must perform it to the very end as if it were our work. From this point of view, it indeed seems that a part in the development and maintenance of the universal plurality patterns is all that the human being should ask or expect, just as observation of life in the sub-human world seems to teach that nature cares nothing for the single life, that the species is all in all.

Many persons find this common lot of mankind intolerable in its

naked reality; they take refuge in the great ascetic faiths which proclaim that man's life has meaning only when it is sacrificed for the nation, the church, the race, or humanity. They feel that without the triumphant belief in the march of such abstract collectivities toward perfection, without "the arrows of longing toward the farther shore," the human being dwindles into a miserable, forked creature shivering by the fire. "That I should live is of little moment, but that Germany should live is everything"—with this and similar phrases on their lips multitudes of young men who fought in the World War dutifully died; many countries other than Germany were named, but the significance of the sacrifice was the same. Like these men, millions of persons now living feel that their lives have meaning only when placed in the service of superpersonal structures—but do these structures really tend more and more toward perfection? Are they really pleasing in the sight of God? Is each successive generation better or even happier than its forerunners? Is there any way of determining whether classes, states, churches, and other plurality patterns are fundamentally richer, purer, more full of final meaning, than they were centuries ago?

Such questions as these leave the honest and realistic sociologist no recourse but to answer, *Ignoramus et ignoramibus*. No positive or negative value-judgment is *scientifically* possible, for science is but a tool; it can never answer the question "Why?" We can see only the ever-repeated mixture of all human capacities and incapacities, the perfect-imperfect course of earthly matters—the same yesterday and today, there and here. We are and remain without scientific knowledge of the goal and meaning of human affairs. But we also *feel* that we must pledge ourselves to mutual confidence without giving way to illusion, that we must in some way serve if our own personalities are to have any strength or dignity or significance, but also that no amount of devotion to any sort of interhuman collectivity should ever lead us to despise or even to withhold our sympathy for flesh-and-blood human beings.

PART FOUR

HISTORICAL POSTSCRIPT

CHAPTER XLVI

THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF SCIENTIFIC SOCIOLOGY*

§1. LACK OF AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE BEGINNINGS OF SOCIOLOGY

In the system which has just been presented, little or no explicit attention is paid to other writers, earlier or contemporary, except as their bearing upon sociology as here conceived is quite direct. It therefore seems advisable to survey a wider field, if only for the purpose of still more sharply delimiting the area proper to our science as such. Hence this "historical postscript."

Since there are in the past and present many conceptions of the object-matter of sociology that differ widely from our own, and since most of these assign to the science a much broader field, we shall have to use a definition that, because of the number and range of the systems to be included under it, can only be very general and indefinite. Needless to say, we do not ourselves subscribe to this definition; *it is only a vehicle of exposition*. We shall here adopt the statement formulated by Tönnies, and say with him: "General sociology is, on the whole, the theory of human living-together."¹

Its history, if we include therein only the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, may be envisaged as an evolution from encyclopedic to special social science, to which of course must immediately be added (1) that many authors still hold to the once more or less universal conception of sociology as the synthesis and crown of all the social sciences, and (2) that, as will be seen later, sociological *methods* exist for all other social sciences.

In many sciences there is disagreement as to beginnings, e.g., in political economy. Such disputes can seldom be decided. Only in rare cases do new sciences begin with some clearly marked occurrence, such as a discovery or an invention. Rather do they arise through the gradual evolution of general knowledge; divisions are made when it be-

* See preface for acknowledgments regarding the "Historical Postscript" *in toto*.

¹ See his article, "Einteilung der Soziologie," *Zeitschrift für d. ges. Staatswissenschaft*, LXX.

comes necessary, in the course of time, to systematize and to fix limits. The question of origins is a question of what is useful for whatever purpose is in view.

It is more important to be cognizant of the preliminary period; this is usually quite lengthy. We know that economic questions were variously dealt with in antiquity and the so-called Middle Ages, but that in those days they were usually treated as if they were closely related to other sciences. Men have always been thinking about the relations of human beings (our own subject), and many views have been advanced. But the independence of the general problem of the social gradually became clear at last. Essentially, an independent science of the social, i.e., of human living-together, with a distinctive and definite object, was first recognized in the nineteenth century. Earlier thought on the subject had more value as politics (in which state and society were not sufficiently distinguished) or as ethics and public morals than as empirical knowledge of the social as such.

Moreover, it is not possible to maintain without qualification the thesis that the modern theory of society derives from a *single* historical source. The science of human living-together sprang from different roots. It did not develop in response to the needs of only *one* people or of only *one* domain of science. On the contrary, sociology arose when the national culture of a particular people had reached a certain level of evolution. Among the peoples of the Middle and Western European culture area sociology was born approximately at the transition from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century. There is no objection, however, to placing its origin at an earlier date; everything depends upon what is considered the decisive element in its advent.

An exhaustive inquiry into all the possible sources of sociology is impracticable here; for us it will suffice to point out three:

- (1) German romanticism and German idealistic philosophy.
- (2) Comte's philosophy, especially since Comte gave the subject the name which now prevails.
- (3) Its evolution from sciences other than philosophy, i.e., mainly from biology, history, and economics.

Another point of departure, however, is taken by Sombart.² He regards as the creators of the natural theory of human society every thinker of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in France and England who, in opposition to the old (more or less theological) natural

² W. Sombart, "Die Anfänge der Soziologie," *Erinnerungsgabe für Max Weber*, I, pp. 5 ff.

law, viewed human society, together with its culture, as a part of nature. He names, for example, Cumberland, Temple, Petty, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Adam Smith, and others. The work of these men was marked by a new, naturalistic conception of social life which has characterized "Western" sociology ever since their time.

On the other hand, many lay advocates of natural law who propounded afresh the old doctrines of Epicureanism, and many of the earlier social contract theorists, inclined to a causal-empirical interpretation of social happenings.

Brinkmann³ sees the beginning of sociology in the political literature of Western Europe in the period from Hobbes to Adam Smith and Rousseau, and especially in "the lasting opposition of the intellect to the powers of society" which gained expression in that literature.

It seems to us, however, that this view is valid only for the sociological theories of politics, and that it was precisely because of the fact that thinkers like Hobbes, Mandeville, and Ferguson focussed all too exclusively upon political matters that they were barred from closer view of the basic questions of general sociology.

Paul Barth, in his *The Philosophy of History as Sociology*, differs from the investigators who favor the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and has pointed out that sociology in all essential respects goes back to Plato, a claim which Sombart will not allow. But Heraclitus and the Sophists before Plato, and Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Epicureans after Plato, raised numerous problems of social life, particularly those concerning the origin and function of the "state." The word *politeia* implies not only the state in the modern sense, but the "civil society" as well. The method followed in these discussions, however, especially in Plato, is patently unsociological, if by that term is connoted a particular way of regarding and judging facts. On this point Small correctly says:

"As a sample of dialectics, the Republic is the foremost exhibit of what sociology is not. One section of the sociologists rate everybody as a sociologist who has thought about social relations. This paper represents the view that those only are sociologists who practice a method which is in diametrical contrast with dialectic. Plato did not regard the Republic as a treatise on political science or sociology, but as an inquiry in moral philosophy. The Platonic method was an attempt to establish truth by arriving at consistency between concepts or propositions. The scientific method is an attempt to dis-

³ Carl Brinkmann, *Versuch einer Gesellschaftswissenschaft*, and also his "Gesellschaftslehre" in *Enzyklopädie der Rechts und Staatswissenschaften*, XLVIII (1925).

cover truths by observing uniformities of cause and effect in the objective world."⁴

Now this exceedingly serious objection—that philosophers like Plato strove to *create* truth by fitting preconceived ideas into a consistent whole, not to *discover* truth through the observation of the objective world, and that they therefore are not sociologists but philosophers—is also applicable to the theological thinkers of the Christian Middle Ages (like Augustine and Aquinas), of *many* theorists of the natural law and contract schools, and of many contemporary philosophers who interest themselves in problems of society. But if the theory of the "just" state, the divine state, speculations as to the state of nature in the period preceding the social order (e.g., Hobbes, *homo homini lupus*), the old argument between the Stoics and the Epicureans as to whether or not man's social traits are innate, the controversy as to the relations between environment and inner dispositions, and similar dialectic disputes provide the initial orientation in the formulation of sociological problems, they will usually lead into error because they insure the persistence of ineradicable prejudices and antitheses. No advice is to be recommended so highly to the modern sociologist as that which tells him to forget forthwith all the traditional social philosophy except where it recognizes the radical distinction between the ethico-political and the sociological formulation of problems.

Spann regards Kant and Fichte as the founders of the modern theory of society.⁵ Of course, there were many lines of transition from the German philosophy of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century to the later theories, but if one thinker from the ranks of the German philosophers is to be regarded as especially influential (in both the favorable and the derogatory sense), then it is Hegel who must be placed in the front rank, and not Kant or Fichte.

To Below,⁶ the members of Romantic school appear pre-eminent as promoters of sociological knowledge, since they did not trace historical phenomena to the conscious actions of individual men, but pointed to unconscious forces and objective powers as their sources. Especially essential in this connection was their theory of "folk-souls" arising from law, language, and art.

In any case, the investigations of Lorenz von Stein, Robert von Mohl, and other scholars with similar aims about the middle of the

⁴ Albion W. Small, "Sociology and Plato's Republic," *Am. J. Soc.*, XXX, p. 5 (abstract).

⁵ Othmar Spann, *Gesellschaftslehre*, 2nd ed.

⁶ Georg von Below, "Soziologie als Lehrfach," *Schmollers Jahrbuch* XLIII, 4 (1920). Note the replies of Tönnies and von Wiese.

nineteenth century (with whom Heinrich von Treitschke also belonged in his earlier days), were later very effective in advancing sociological thought. They dissociated the concepts of state and society—of course without giving society the abstract sense we attribute to it to-day. These men meant rather the “civil society,” the bearer of public opinion. It is this meaning of society that Kantorowicz still retains today when he regards the “civil society” as “society in the strictest sense.”⁷

For Mohl in particular, state and society are structures of equal rank, standing in changing relations *to one another*, whereas in contemporary thought the state is a structure inside the superior, universal structure of society, if in general such a universal structure is admitted—on which point something is shortly to be said (cf. also chap. iv).

This German emphasis on German thinkers is obviously an effort to oppose the tendency to trace sociology exclusively to French and English sources. In other respects, too, there is at present a definite trend toward national particularisms and traditions in the history of our science and in the chronology of its origin and progress. Thus a Czech writer⁸ points to John Huss and Cheltschki as the vanguard of Bohemian social philosophy, and an Italian⁹ emphasizes the rôles of his countrymen Machiavelli and Vico, ranking them on a par with Bodin, Hobbes, Bossuet, Montesquieu, the Physiocrats, and the Encyclopedists.

The elasticity of the conception of general sociology and the possibility of putting it on the same footing as social philosophy make it possible for these and other efforts to claim recognition, but it would be just as easy to reject them by employing another conception of the science as the basis for decision.

In this connection, Small's work¹⁰ on the beginnings of sociology is instructive. In it there is little reference, and that quite cursory, to Comte, Spencer, or other thinkers of Western Europe, whereas Thibaut and Savigny, Eichorn, Niebuhr, Ranke, Roscher, Knies, Treitschke, Schmoller, the professorial socialists, and the Austrian school are dealt with thoroughly. Adam Smith's work and influence are not unmentioned, but not much more is said of him than would be necessary in a history of *German* economics. True it is, indeed, that in

⁷ Hermann Kantorowicz, “Der Aufbau der Soziologie,” *Erinnerungsgabe für Max Weber*, I, p. 85.

⁸ Basil K. Skrach, “Glossen über die tschechische Soziologie,” etc., *Köln. Vt. Sov.*, V., 3.

⁹ Filippo Carli, *Le Teorie Sociologiche* (1925).

¹⁰ Albion W. Small, *Origins of Sociology* (1924).

Germany in the nineteenth century much sociology was cloaked under other names.

According to the conception to be presented in the following pages, the evolution of sociology hitherto has been a very gradual process of self-limitation. It has fulfilled and is fulfilling itself through a steady contraction of the far-flung boundaries of its original domain, through greater precision in the formulation of its problems, and through the development of a more and more independent method. Simultaneously, such changes mean severance from social philosophy, from doctrines of general culture, from ethics, and from the other special social sciences in neighboring fields. But since this movement toward freedom and independence has taken place only in the relatively immediate present, it may be said to be a demonstrable proposition that all sociology in Germany before Tönnies and Simmel, in France before Tarde, in America before Small and Giddings, may be referred to the preliminary period of its history. *In fact, we assert that sociology as a clearly defined, independent social science is only today coming into existence.*

The first efforts to reach this standpoint, however, began a century ago. We shall therefore distinguish first of all a long preliminary period in the history of the science. We place in this era antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the succeeding period down to the close of the eighteenth century. Then comes the first stage of sociology proper. At this time (nineteenth century) it is characterized as a universal science, and seeks to make good its claims as an independent discipline by choosing the question: What is society? as its basic and essential problem. This very question, however, blocked the path to fruitful knowledge, since in answering it too many questions had to be dealt with which were not sociological even though they were closely related to general social science or social philosophy. Finally, there follows a second stage, covering the period from the late nineteenth century to the present, in which sociology slowly ripens into an independent and closely delimited science, although the boundary between the two stages is vague, depending as it does on the importance attributed to one or another writer.

§2. THE FIRST STAGE: UNIVERSAL SOCIAL SCIENCE

We shall now turn our attention to the genesis of the first stage, which we place roughly between the years 1810 and 1890.

In the great French Revolution, intellectual interest was still preponderantly political, and hence concerned itself primarily with con-

stitutional questions. True, many thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had penetrated to the more general laws of social evolution behind political transformations, and had envisaged the political process as but *one* of numerous manifestations determining social life. But even so, the naïvely voluntaristic conception that the state and civil society could be molded so completely to man's will that the political ethos would be decisive was still too prominent. In dealing with the problems of public life, there was still too great a lack of modes of thought viewing interhuman life as a world with its own laws of structure and movement, i.e., there was a lack of genuine sociology.

Of course, other circumstances were conspiring to release the sociological spirit. In the main, they were the same as those which prepared the way for socialism (which should not be equated with sociology); viz., technical-economic changes, new population data, the massing of men in great cities, and above all the clearer notion of the crowd and the proletariat evoked by the growth of industrial labor classes. "Class" took a place among sociological concepts, and the task of dealing with this plurality pattern compelled reflection upon the interaction of groups in general.

Certainly such reflection was not entirely new, but the import and the clarity of the *social* were growing. It was recognized that even with a completely democratic constitution, with the equality of citizens before the law, with abolition of privilege and all the laws of feudalism, only a very small part of the "social problem" can be solved. From this European soil sprouted a tree eagerly cultivated by those intent upon reform, namely, socialism. Simultaneously, however, an entirely different growth appeared: sociology, a tree of knowledge, not of normative change. (This view of the two unlike developments of course should not be exaggerated to the point of asserting that there is no relation between the theories of socialism and of sociology.)

No doubt the Romanticists and the German idealistic philosophers, especially Schelling and Hegel, were influenced to a relatively slight degree by the social and economic structure of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, their efforts to establish a metaphysical relation between the absolute, the divine, and history, state, folk, and law, an attempt which finally led to Hegel's belief that the will of God takes objective form in the state, is to be historically regarded as a reaction against the Enlightenment, against Liberalism and the revolutionary sentiments of the eighteenth century. These philosophers bequeathed to

sociology the task of explaining the great abstract collectivities: folk, state, church, and, finally, society.

The speculations of these men became a dangerous and misleading heritage for German social theory. Even today many sociologists are still seeking to solve their problems—problems which are *not* philosophical—by the old devices of social philosophy and the philosophy of history. But the chief sociological value of Plato, Schelling, Hegel, Adam Müller, and Novalis is their implicit demonstration of the fact that the sociologist should resolutely refrain from following their leads.

There is, of course, a metaphysics of society: the philosopher has it in his charge. The sociologist should be a realist and an empiricist. In so doing, he does not reject insights gained by other methods, but on the contrary, *complements* phenomenological knowledge by experimental. It must be asserted vigorously, however, that “ultimate questions,” the objective, absolute, God-willed “significance” of social phenomena, are decidedly not in his province. It seems clear that sociologists cannot learn from Hegel, for instance, how to envisage and deal with their problems, but rather can see by his example the fixed limits beyond which sociological research may not go. Sociology leaves the cloud-encircled heights of ultimate solutions to the philosophers.

The second historical source is no less in need of a critical or even suspicious examination. The work of Saint-Simon and Comte is by no means impeccable. Inasmuch as we follow tradition and the example of Paul Barth in beginning our detailed historical sketch with them, we must make the explicit reservation that the sociology of today, so far as it is productive and of future promise, has other methods and other aims than those of Comte.

At present, especially in Germany, philosophers and religionists often profess to be scandalized that these two thinkers, especially the more systematic Comte, were “positivists,” for in the Germany of today war has been declared upon this naturalistic, mechanistic view of the universe predominant in the nineteenth century.

To recognize Comte as the “father” of sociology (having given the science its name, he is indeed its godfather) seems to some persons to be an avowal of positivist modes of thought as well. In fact, many sociologists are looked upon simply as positivists (as is shown by Below’s prejudice). In calling themselves by that name sociologists supposedly acknowledge Comte’s philosophical attitude as their own. Here is one more manifestation of the reprehensible inclination to claim for sociology a kind of religious function and a normative mission, an inclination bound up with the original relation between so-

ciology and philosophy. On the contrary, we assert that the science of society, if conceived realistically, has nothing to do with the struggle between positivism and anti-positivism. What is of sociological interest in Comte's doctrines is to be shown later. Toward his positivism the sociologist should, as sociologist, remain neutral. (If he is also a philosopher, or, more especially, a moral philosopher, then of course he must define his attitude toward Comte's *Weltanschauung*.)

From the foregoing considerations the danger of direct linkage with Comte becomes apparent, namely, that the inherited estate of sociology will be burdened with an insupportably heavy mortgage of speculation.

More fruitful than the historical relations with German or French philosophy of the first half of the nineteenth century were the manifold connections of sociology with the various natural sciences. Here too, however, sources of error were not lacking. It is doubtful, for example, whether the close connection between biology and social theory resulted in more advantages than disadvantages.

Especially valuable, however, are the suggestions and the objectives for which sociology is indebted to history (in Germany, e.g., Niebuhr, Ranke, Treitschke), to jurisprudence (Savigny, Eichhorn, and others), to economics (Knies, and above all Schmoller and Bücher), and to other social sciences. It was precisely the comparison between its own peculiar set of problems and the methods of formulating questions and discovering answers prevalent in related sciences that enabled sociology gradually to win for itself a consciousness of independence and self-reliance.

Its manifold connections with philosophy and a large number of different sciences were great aids to sociology, but its progress toward maturity was made proportionally difficult by this constant diversion into alien paths of thought. Its youth was lively, diversified, and full of stimulating changes; but the great intellectual family of which it was a member made quiet reflection upon its own destiny impossible.

CHAPTER XLVII

THE MAIN TRENDS OF SOCIOLOGY

§1. COMPLEXITY OF CLASSIFICATIONS

We shall classify the main theories during the first stage of the development of sociology proper (*circa* the nineteenth century) according to the answers the authors gave to the question, *What is society?* Secondly, they will be classified according to the connections they had at the time with some older science—connections which at bottom explain the manner in which the problems of society were then viewed by sociology.

Oppenheimer¹ is surely not wholly wrong in declaring a satisfactory classification impossible. The collocation of authors according to their individual tendencies is always contestable, precisely because the older sociologists strove for universality and did not, as a rule, content themselves with the methods and the conclusions of *one* related science. This is especially true of Comte, who cannot adequately be termed a natural scientist; he covered a much wider field. Moreover, since the inclusion of a given writer among the sociologists depends entirely upon the classifier's broader or narrower conception of the object-matter of sociology, it would be easy to increase our already too comprehensive categories by including, for example, the geographical, juridical, and economic groups. Oppenheimer also calls attention to the classifications made by Loria, Squillace, Barth, and Wundt. We must here deny ourselves a critical evaluation of these.

Only two new distinctions deserve mention: Pribram, in an article on the classification of sociological theories²—quite in harmony with our own method, adopted without knowledge of his attempt—suggests the reference of these theories to the various conceptions of society. He distinguishes three groups, "corresponding to the three methods characteristic in general of man's thinking": first, the realists, who see in concrete phenomena merely the reflection of ideas, and value individual men only as parts of collective units; second, the nominalists, according to whom only individual men are really existent; and third,

¹ Franz Oppenheimer, *System der Soziologie*, I, p. 55.

² Karl Pribram, "Zur Klassifizierung der soziologischen Theorien," *Köln. Vt. Soc.*, V, 3.

the pseudo-realists, who first conceive of reality in a nominalistic fashion, but then ascribe to social groups a behavior which is not that of their individual members and a real existence outside the consciousness of individuals. Of the three parts of this division, we think only the designation of the first group should be accepted; it coincides with our first group to be mentioned later ("society equals substance"). If we do not follow Pribram further, it is to avoid the dangerous and false antithesis between individualism and universalism. Unfortunately, more cannot be said here on the point.

The recent treatises of Carli⁸ are very noteworthy. He distinguishes two types of sociological investigation:

"Insofar as the history of sociology contains systematic and rational investigations—and this is the case from Auguste Comte on—it reveals to us the existence of *two* types of sociological investigation, which are defined by the way in which authors conceive the object of investigation and by the methods followed. On the one hand, society has been regarded as an extension of the domain of nature, and those who have this idea of it assign it to natural history. Since society in this sense has been thought of as a unified whole, sociology of this type has assumed a historical, encyclopedic character. Moreover, since a knowledge of the social reality is to be arrived at through mental reconstruction of the reality itself in its entirety, synthetic sociology results. The second type of sociological investigation, on the other hand, is that in which a knowledge of the social reality is arrived at through analysis: the analysis of forces, facts, groups, relations: hence, analytical sociology.

"This second type of sociology began between 1885 and 1890, a period in which fall the first works of Tönnies, Tarde, Durkheim, and Simmel. But the historico-encyclopedic type of sociology did not come to an end because of the rise of the other, and so we find both types in existence at this moment, no matter to what extent the second may now seem almost exclusively to dominate the field."

To the first type, says Carli, belong Comte, John Stuart Mill, Cournot, Spencer and the organicists who followed him (Lilienfeld, Schäffle, Espinas, DeGreef, Novicow [?], Waxweiler [?], Worms) and the social Darwinists; next, the determinists (geographical determinists: e.g., Le Play; historical determinists: e.g., Marx, etc.); finally, the historical school (anthropological, socio-ethnographical, historico-evolutionary, and phaseological tendencies).

To the second: the psycho-social group (Cattaneo, Lazarus and Steinthal, Gabriel Tarde); the crowd psychologists (Le Bon, Sighele); the folklorists and the psychoanalysts; the objective realists (Émile Durkheim, Bouglé, Davy, Fauconnet, Mauss); the relative sociological

⁸ Filippo Carli, *Introduzione alla Sociologia Generale* (1925), and *Le Teorie Sociologiche* (1925).

realism (the doctrine of interrelations) subscribed to by Fouillée, Wundt, Baldwin; the social psychologists (Davis, Ellwood, McDougall, Bogardus, etc.); the sociology of invention and other doctrines of the relative realism type; pure and formal-analytical sociology (Tönnies, Simmel, Vierkandt); pragmatism (Ratzenhofer); the nominalists (Duprat, Giddings, Ross, von Wiese); the system of Pareto.

We must also deny ourselves the evaluation of this complicated classification of Carli's. It is here given in abbreviated form only to make clear to the reader the immense scope and complexity of the task from the point of view of the history of the literature. Our own grouping, which is not presented as an exhaustive enumeration, has most in common with the survey made by Jacobs;⁴ it follows in the next section.

§2. CLASSIFICATION OF THE FIRST STAGE OF SOCIOLOGY

During the nineteenth century, "society" was in the main conceived of in three different ways.

One tendency was to regard it as a whole, a substance, a unity, or at least as something existent in its own right. Here again we must distinguish clearly the two ways of looking at the matter. For the one, this societal entity is an idea in accordance with which the world of man, visible in fragmentary manifestations and corporeal embodiments, is formed. For the other, society is an organism, a living thing (although not, to be sure, perceivable by the senses).

A second conception sees society, in the sense of *the* "society," as a summation of smaller groupings, and hence is inclined to replace the singular by the plural: the *societies*. Nevertheless, the plurality patterns thereby implied are from this standpoint considered as self-existent wholes and unities.

A third group of authors conceives of "society" as a product of the changing occurrences of sociation. The word society in this case is really not a substantive; it does not denote a thing, a being, but has a merely verbal character. It is a ceaselessly moving equilibrium generated and maintained by a multiplicity of processes.

By the side of this three-fold division, let us place the connections of sociology with related disciplines, for these decided the approach of the writers concerned. For many, sociology was (1) a natural science; they connected it mainly (a) with biology, and in this field many set up a close connection with race-theories; another connection with natural science lies in the endeavors of some to achieve exactitude in

⁴ Philip Jacobs, *German Sociology* (1909).

sociology with the point of view and the working methods of (b) physics or, less often, of (c) chemistry. This "social physics" sought chiefly to discover the laws of motion governing social happenings, either, as in the most important early examples, by applying the law of gravity to social phenomena, or as in later cases, by utilizing the laws of the conservation of energy and of matter.

Further, it has already been pointed out (chap. xlv, §1) that the connection of sociology (2) with philosophy was self-evident to many writers. For them there were also two main alternatives: either (a) social philosophy, or (b) the less comprehensive philosophy of history which was held to be the same as sociology. In the former, men struggled with the *interpretation* of the basic social phenomena, and sought to comprehend their objective meaning, their "spirit" or "soul"; in the latter, theories concerning sequences of culture and phases of evolution were predominant.

This connection of sociology with social philosophy and the philosophy of history is not to be mistaken for the significant effort (more significant for the present than for the nineteenth century) to give sociology as a special social science its own epistemological basis. Since every kind of sociology, like every science, must find its solid basis in a theory of knowledge, sociology as a matter of course has its own general philosophical foundation. But it is one thing to mean by the phrase "philosophical basis" only *logic and epistemology*, the laws of thought governing all the sciences, and quite another to mean by the same phrase the *content* of highly subjective speculations as to the "ultimate significance," "spirit," and "essence" of history, society, culture, civilization, and the state.

Among the special sciences from which aid was sought (3) psychology and (4) ethnology (ethnography) were in the first rank. The help psychology afforded the early sociologists was chiefly due to the insight it gave into the function of reciprocal human relations in social life as a whole. The writers of the ethnological group started with the conviction that the complicated relations of contemporary social life can be explained only by reference to simple relations such as they supposed they could observe among "primitive" peoples.

Now if we connect this classification according to affiliation with other disciplines with the previously given three-fold division according to the answers given to the question, "What is society?" it is possible to say (with much simplification): (1) society was conceived of as an entity by the natural scientists and the natural philosophers (e.g., Comte), by the social philosophers (i.e., Durkheim, Schäffle,

and, to name a contemporary, Spann), by the philosophers of history (e.g., Lorenz von Stein, Barth); (2) as a summation of groups by many Americans who find their point of departure in psychology, and by many European representatives of widely divergent standpoints (although they are related, often inconsistently, to both the other conceptions); and (3) as sociation by the philosopher Simmel.

§3. CLASSIFICATION OF THE SECOND STAGE: SOCIOLOGY AS A DISTINCT DISCIPLINE; AND AS A METHOD UTILIZABLE BY ALL THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

The sociological theories of the second or *present* stage of development of the science will be grouped in a somewhat different manner. There would be no fundamental objection to the use of the two criteria already employed; but since the number of sociologies written from the point of view of natural science, for example, has greatly diminished but has nevertheless given rise to new offshoots, we believe that a better view of the present situation can be given by a classification related to but different from that given for the first stage.

At present, it seems to us vitally necessary to distinguish between sociology as a scientific *discipline* in its own right, and sociology viewed as *method* employed in other social sciences. The expression "Sociology as method" is commonly used but is inexact; what is really meant is that the traditional social sciences should pay due attention to interhuman phenomena, but that no sociology *as such* is necessary.

In the domain of sociology considered as a discipline, we must today distinguish three branches (minor divergences and intermixtures disregarded). Of course, in making this division, it is Germany that we have principally in view; for other countries it will be only partially valid:

(1) Sociology as the theory of the historical course of social life (or of "society"); i.e., historical sociology.

(2) Sociology as an interpretation of mental forces in terms of ultimate significance, and as the science of the powers of consciousness; i.e., philosophical sociology, (a) metaphysical and (b) epistemological.

(3) Sociology as the systematic science of social occurrences, on a basis of realism and empiricism (systematic sociology).

Historical sociology, which finds the material for its abstractions in the events of the past, is not to be confused with sociological methods in the science of history, even though the boundaries between the two are flexible. The former seeks to make clear the objective significance

and spirit of culture periods, cultural spheres (*Kulturkreise*), and culture stages, of entire social systems as they occur in history. In Germany, Max Weber and Werner Sombart are prominent as historical sociologists. The sociological *method* of which historians as such avail themselves rests upon the fact that certain historians incline toward the study of group phenomena rather than toward the "great man" method; Lamprecht is an example.

There is a point of view which either countenances in general only a historical (not a general-systematic) knowledge of social life or, less radically, asserts the pre-eminence of a sociology based upon historical sequences over one based upon the study of present-day facts. Thus, any contemplation of social affairs in cross-section, to some degree independent of time or superior to it, is rejected because it is held that the eternal change of things produces phenomena connected only in a time relation (rising, flowering, disappearing). Hence, say the proponents of this standpoint, it is possible to study only *definite* periods of time and (here the relation between historical and geographical determinism is revealed) spatially restricted culture areas.

This conception favors the preference of the past over the present because "a sociology drawing its data from the contemporary scene" would be particularly exposed to self-delusion through the coloring of its "facts" by prepossessions, passions and interests.⁵ This is also the opinion of Barth:

"Not in every tiny ripple of human intercourse is the requisite degree of importance to be found; it is possessed solely by the great permanent currents of will and spirit that can be followed through centuries or at least through decades. To present these and to explain them as far as possible is the task of sociology, which thus becomes at the same time theory of history."

On this point it may be said that it is precisely the danger of subjectivity, emphasized at length by Spencer in his *Study of Sociology*, that necessitates great care in the selection of the materials of history, and in particular, of the generalizations of the philosophy of history. To be sure, the sociologist who gives preference to the contemporaneous will always have to be mindful of the danger of failing to take account of the "personal equation."

In the conflict between the advocates of concentration upon successive events of the past and those favoring the co-existent events of the present, the decisive factor is the degree to which assertions may

⁵ Carl Brinkmann, "Gesellschaftslehre" in *Enzyklopädie der Rechts- und Staatswissenschaften* (1925), XLVIII, p. 2.

⁶ Paul Barth, *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie*, 4th ed., p. 151.

be controlled. *In general it is easier for us to check the present than the past*, easier to view social affairs *sub specie aevi nostri*. In dealing with historical material, we must always reckon with the arbitrariness of selection and omission. Yet after all it is not a question of either-or, but of the complementary function of two different viewpoints. In Germany, down to the most recent times, historical sociology has been so much to the fore that at present it has become a pressing necessity to place by its side a method that favors the contemporaneous but utilizes the historical in details. It should be noted that in addition to the present-past dichotomy, the foregoing considerations also confront us with the alternative: Shall phenomena be regarded historically or systematically? Here again the two positions should complement each other. The general is super-historical, the particular historical.

The system presented in the first three parts of this treatise is subdivided systematically and not historically; it starts from super-temporal, quasi-"eternal" categories, from associative and dissociative relations that were, are, and will be found wherever men exist. But these fundamental processes we divide into principal processes, and these again into sub-processes, and finally, concrete social actions are the point of focus. That is possible only by gradual approximation to definite historical facts. It is true that in so doing we prefer the contemporary to the past, precisely because observation of the former can be verified. Barth's objection that we cannot know from what goes before our eyes whether our observation has penetrated to the essence of things, whereas from history we can learn what has been significant and effective, fails to take into account the power of the prejudices which guide or may guide the historian in his very choice of the "significant and effective" in the broad stream of events. Moreover, when systematic preliminary consideration of our categories and basic concepts has rendered them clear and distinct, we are thereby placed in possession of knowledge that enables us to extract from the material of contemporary observation the elements which are most important for our main problems. The historian usually makes his selection on the ground of value-judgments, the systematist according to logical connections.

Finally, there is another consideration: we are still at the very beginning of scientific knowledge of the social. In order to be able to explain the intricately interrelated processes that link us to the past, we first need preparatory studies of simpler material obtainable only from direct observation. Small's comment (already quoted in chap.

vi, §3) that our knowledge of the most direct and personal phenomena of experience is still quite superficial should meet with complete agreement.

Recourse to so-called "primitive" peoples, whose social structure was considered so simple that ethnological data came to be considered as first-class raw material for sociology (in earlier days by Spencer, and today by, e.g., Vierkandt, Thurnwald, Lévy-Bruhl) is a dangerous procedure, for the social relations of the "nature peoples" are decidedly *not* simple for us, as is shown by the errors into which travellers and even field workers have fallen when studying social organization. Even if the *structure* of their social fabric were generally simple, the interpretation, by reference to social relations, of the ways in which their social life is built up is nevertheless rendered difficult by the fact that we tend to attribute *our* motives and purposes to them. This is not at all to deny the valuable aid that ethnology affords; but the study of the simpler social relations in the field of observation provided by our own culture area is more urgent, and for the purposes of sociology in general, more fruitful.

The intimate historical connection between philosophy and sociology also persists today. Rightly understood, "every productive sociology is in fact philosophical sociology," as Vierkandt has said. The effort to envisage human problems from the point of view of the interhuman relations involved belongs so clearly to the most general type of inquiry, and is so completely beyond mere practice, technique, or art, that it is precisely the "philosophical minds" who take a creative interest in sociology. This has its dangers! Social phenomena, since they usually cannot be verified directly by our senses, all too easily open a path which leads through the gates of epistemology and metaphysics. The sociologist must of course be unceasingly aware of the connection of his domain with the infinities and insolubilities with which the philosopher—not the sociologist as such—must and should deal: What is reality? What is individuality? What is relation, structure? What is whole? What is part? The whole mysterious philosophy of self and other, "I" and "you," and many other questions lies at the end of this intellectual road. Sociology illuminates with the searchlight of its method a portion of the clearly visible surface of the social globe; at the edges everything becomes dim. There its relatively exact means of knowledge fail. It is a part of its task to draw exact boundaries between what is clearly lighted and what is vague. In the neighboring domain, on the other side of the boundary, roams the philosopher, who is provided with another kind of light. He claims to

be able to see excellently with it, although there are of course sceptics who hint that with it only one's own inner countenance is perceived, and that the surroundings still remain obscure.

Much misunderstanding, strife, and many false assumptions would disappear at once if men would accustom themselves to differentiate distinctly between the various conceptions of sociology noted above. It is absurd to play one "trend" against another, and to concede the right of existence, or even of precedence, to only *one* mode of thought. What we demand here is not the exclusion of any method of work or thought, but rather its differentiation from other methods. It is high time that social philosophy should cease being called sociology, and *vice versa*. They are as distinguishable from each other as any other special science is distinguishable from philosophy.

We do not question the right to existence of a social philosophy and its accompanying metaphysics of the social. Metaphysics and exact investigation, however, ought not to be confused. Whoever feels the need of approaching the veiled image at Sais, of finding a basis in human reason for the ultimate connection of human existence with the governance of God—let him devote himself to the metaphysics of society. That there are such connections, that beyond what we can grasp and count, behind every ambitious striving for exactitude, there are the non-rational first causes, infinitely outweighing all empiricism, we all surmise. We have already said that everywhere the rational borders on the non-rational. But science is not philosophy, and sociology should be science only.

There is still another doubt requiring expression. Even if, in the interests of research, we separate metaphysics from science, without radically denying the right of a metaphysics of the social to exist, we are nevertheless of the opinion that the metaphysics of a given social relation or plurality pattern should properly begin only when we have sufficient empirical information about the given phenomenon. Our endeavors to view the celestial, absolute reflection of things before we directly observe their terrestrial form is our scientific curse, particularly in modern Germany, where a certain haughty attitude of mind demands that we regard questions and answers as worthy of a "thinker" only when they are directly connected with ultimate values.

"Ultimate problems," however, are by no means the only ones; the tremendous sum of immediate, proximate earthly problems, which urgently calls for the utmost mental concentration and for a simple but above all *clear* method of working and thinking, confronts us today. The "physics" of the social is so full of problems, so difficult,

and for the most part such a *terra incognita*, that its metaphysics cannot possibly be mature, even if we grant the doubtful premise that the object of science is the same as the object of metaphysics. Indisputably, many profound, acute intellects have speculated about the nature of the social. But in so far as this speculation has been fruitful, it has been so because it was produced by seers and sages, or because it took as its basis an object other than that peculiar to the science of the strictly social. Hence, for example, history, politics, and jurisprudence have been forced to serve as starting-points from which the flight into the metaphysics of the social is taken.

Thankfully, even though critically, sociology accepts enrichment from poet-thinkers of genius, as were Schelling and Hegel in the past, and as are Scheler and Spengler today. It should be suspicious, however, of imitators and near-phenomenologists who, since they are too haughty, undisciplined, and confused to look a problem requiring exact scientific investigation in the face, immediately take refuge in metaphysics and purposely obscure language, champion absurd and arbitrary theses, and pass this so-called "philosophy" off for sociology.

To the pseudo-metaphysical tendency, which at present is bringing upon sociology charges of vagueness and remoteness from real life, we must oppose the assertion that the time for a true metaphysics of the social has not yet come. Metaphysics, like philosophy in general, should be the affair of only the very few for whom there are no worldly ties and who speak when and how the spirit moves them. Metaphysics is for the seer, not the savant.

Our objection does not refer to the closed systems of metaphysical sociology which are clearly designated as such. Victor Branford's system is an example. It would be necessary to apply the title of sociology very loosely indeed if we wished to name examples of thoroughgoing social metaphysics from German sociology of the present day. Nevertheless, the practice of carrying on partially exact investigations on the basis of metaphysical premises is widespread. Such essays towards a metaphysics of society seem to occur particularly in the cases where the author claims insight into the ultimate meaning of society and its divinely willed essence.

Often the tendencies of so-called "universalism," as with Durkheim and Spann, lead to such expressions. Both these authors incline to make the concepts of society and of God almost equivalent. In opposition to these claims to authoritative expression of the ineffable (by means of sciences unfit for the task), we assert that only the *subjective* meaning of social processes, i.e., the meaning that the men

therein concerned have given them, can be scientifically determined; questions concerning their absolute, *objective* meaning we can only meet with an *ignoramus* or even an *ignoramibus*. Interpretation of the superpersonal and the supernatural is the province of religion, not of science.

But what shall we say of "sociology as method" within philosophy? It is comprehensible and gratifying that philosophers today should so frequently and so intensively devote themselves to the study of social relations as part of their investigations into the evolution of mind (*Geist*) in human history. It may well be, however, that they often do so with resignation, for most of them are at first inclined, emotionally and otherwise, toward study of the great personalities (founders of religion, philosophers, moralists, reformers, rulers, priests) who seem to them to be the bearers of mind as it progressively realizes itself on earth. But in our "sociological age" social groups and other plurality patterns—classes, professions, races—come more and more into conflict with personalities. The former, as basic forces, have often had retarding and coarsening influences upon mind, religion, and culture. The effective operation of mind on earth is dependent on the structure and demands of crowds, groups, etc. That was an observation which Troeltsch and Scheler were perhaps compelled to make; resignation naturally followed. They were obliged to study these interconnections scientifically, and were to that extent sociologists (in the broader sense) without ceasing to be primarily theologians or philosophers.

The task of the sociological philosopher is essentially different from that of the sociologist proper. The former proceeds partly or chiefly in a sociological manner (in the sense defined above) to observe and depict the influence of plurality patterns on mind or the influence of mind on plurality patterns; the latter is not concerned with manifestations of mind on earth but with the comprehension of interhuman relations and the plurality patterns they constitute. The philosopher usually regards these plurality patterns as sufficiently understood and analyzed; he operates with such concepts as state, people, group, and class as if they were (in a scientific sense) "known quantities." For the sociologist, the first task is of course to determine what these "known quantities" are and were. Again, we may observe that the non-specialist sociologists have begun and gone far with their work before the specialist sociologists have completed their investigation. The non-specialists content themselves with what other, older sciences or the older, inaccurate sociology has to say on these

subjects, and partly, it must be said, with what is believed to be known about them from general commonplaces.

It is necessary to recognize this distinction, which is concealed by the general use of the word sociology. For the specialist sociologist, sociology is not merely viewpoint, modes of observation, attention turned toward groups, but literally the science of human living-together, nothing more or less. That the great philosophers who have worked "sociologically" can teach the specialist sociologists much, and that they can supply in detail much purely specialist material, is incontrovertible; *critical* and *discriminating* acceptance of such aid is a pressing necessity for sociologists.

It must also be said that much of the interest which is ostensibly directed toward sociology is really intended for sociological philosophy. Only a small proportion of educated persons have recognized the far-reaching fruitfulness and utility of a science that devotes itself, not to the "cultural values" and the achievements of men, but to men in their social intercourse. For many centuries we have been accustomed to a conception of "culture" that is not in accordance with the genuinely social conception. The cultural *result* seems to us more comprehensible than the sociative *process* which led to it.

This delimitation of sociology and philosophy is far removed from the scorn of philosophy quite prevalent in the last century. We are *not* of the opinion that sociology should replace philosophy and that a putative "sociologism" should or could succeed a philosophy now presumably become "academic" and "scholastic." For the very reason that sociology as just delimited is still very young, it can with justice be asserted that philosophy must be thanked for many an insight of value to sociology as well as to other sciences, both in the more remote and the more recent past. These admissions, however, cannot weaken the force of the demand for a clear distinction between the two fields of labor.

Now, this distinction between method and discipline, noted as our first point above, is true not only of the relations of sociology to philosophy but also of its relations with all the sciences which deal with men, animals, and plants. The "sociological" is to be found today not only in jurisprudence, economics, theology, aesthetics, philology, etc., but in zoölogy and botany as well. Since life and culture depend essentially upon the interconnections of sub-human organisms and men, all the sciences of life and culture, in exactly the same sense as in the case of philosophy, must in many aspects have marked sociological implications. At the same time, however, we must express our doubt

of the over-hasty "application" of sociological methods in the above disciplines; the results are not only worthless, but they also bring sociology into ill repute. Moreover, we expressly declare once again that attempts to connect the phenomena of art, language, religion, and law with data drawn from "group life" do not convert the respective subjects into sociologies nor their protagonists into sociologists. Sociological "methods"—either in the narrow sense that *ways of working*, customary or necessary in sociology, are employed for investigations in other fields, or in the loose sense that *objects* with which the sociologist has expressly to deal occasionally come within the scope of other sciences—are very abundant. They must be distinguished from the special sociologies.

By a *special sociology* we mean a science of interhuman relations and of the plurality patterns to which they give rise, *as based on a special section of life and culture*, and considered as a subdivision of general sociology, which is a *special social science*. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the special sociologies should not be confused with general sociology as a special social science; the former are subordinate branches of the latter. There is a special sociology of religion which observes the living-together of men in its changing relations with religion, and a special sociology of law which contemplates this living-together in its changing relations with the state and evolution of law. There are corresponding special sociologies of art, language, economics, etc. In all these special sociologies, based as they are upon a definite domain of human achievement, there is no mere passing reference to "group life" as in the case of methods, but on the contrary the connection with the particular variety of human achievement (religion, etc.) supplies the theme of all the researches of the subordinate discipline.⁷

Let us now turn back once more to philosophical sociology; we have already learned to recognize it in its one main branch, the metaphysical, but this must not be confused with its other branch, the epistemological. In the latter, which today possesses an excellent champion in Adler, the social is conceived of as a category of consciousness; thought itself is held to be social: "The problem of society does not lie in the historico-economic process of sociation, but rather in the sociative thought process of the person; thought is social in its very nature."⁸ Indeed, according to Kant's theoretical epistemology, says

⁷ This contrast between method and discipline is especially familiar to us in the case of statistics.

⁸ Max Adler, "Soziologie und Erkenntniskritik," *Jahrb. f. Soziol.* I, pp. 25-6.

Adler, a transcendental-social character must be granted the individual consciousness. From this point of view, the problems of sociation become epistemological problems; it is not "psychologism" that is in question here (as in the case of many American and English writers), but an analysis of the forms and contents of thought.

In sociology as such, however, there is no reason for analyzing the processes of consciousness; we cannot reach the social through the laws of thought. *The social is not a category of consciousness but of life.* Our business is to observe life correctly and to put the results of our observation in scientific form. This done, the antithesis between individual and social, which has been baselessly pushed to extremes by epistemology, soon disappears. The fundamental *element* of the social is not a process of consciousness, but the social process, an objective occurrence. In most instances, of course, it is also a physiological-psychological process, but one in which rational factors are less influential than wishes.

In thus minimizing the importance assigned to the rôle of thought in the social, we do not conceal from ourselves the fact that the objective life about us is subjectively transformed. But the critical attitude toward our intellectual powers thereby rendered necessary is incumbent upon all the sciences. No special difficulty for sociology resides therein.

From all that has been said about historical and philosophical sociology in the foregoing pages, it should be apparent that, in the present developmental stage of our science, we consider the *realist-systematic* way of attacking the problem an especially necessary and fruitful complement of the two approaches just named.

The first three parts of the present treatise are given over to a sociological system that lays claim to being realistic, so that no space need be used in explaining what is meant by realist-systematic. The balance of this historical postscript will be devoted to analysis of various forerunners of the system already presented.

We have believed it our duty to say clearly that we regard the task of the sociologist at the present day to be the treatment of the social from the realist-systematic point of view. Further, we recommend that the study of the "science of society" from an historical point of view be relinquished to the historian, and from the philosophical point of view to the philosopher. Therefore it appears to us proper to replace the word sociology in the second and third cases just mentioned by the terms "social history" and "social philosophy," respectively. We should today denote by "sociology" only the discipline

and the methods which we have designated as realist-systematic. As a consequence of the past, however, we shall have meanwhile to reckon for a long time with several conceptions of "sociology" which vary widely in the scope they assign to it.

As a next step in exposition, it seems necessary to say something about certain works representative of the history of sociology, in order that the beginner may be orientated and in order that the development of systematic sociology may be illustrated and explained. It is not possible to give here, even in the most summary fashion, a complete review of the literature of sociology in its historical development. The stream is all too broad. Only certain writers will be mentioned, and the test for their selection is their approximation to systematic sociology.

CHAPTER XLVIII

COMTE, SPENCER, WARD

§1. COMTE

If it is quite correct to say that sociology (at least all Western European sociology) proceeds directly from Comte,¹ who was himself very deeply influenced by Saint-Simon, it is fitting to pay at least passing notice to the question of Comte's contributions to present-day sociology.

We must class Auguste Comte (1787-1857) as a philosopher, and not as a sociologist. His comprehensive six-volume *Cours de philosophie*, which appeared from 1830 to 1842, is primarily characterized by the idea that there is a hierarchy of the individual sciences as distinguished from one another by their degree of generality. The degree of exactness possible in each varies inversely with the complexity of its object-matter. The union of the particular sciences gives a *philosophie naturelle*. The series of sciences thus interrelated is Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, and *la physique sociale*, or Sociology. The sequence implies a close connection between sociology and biology, since psychology is lacking as a bond between the two.

What interests us here is not only the assigning of sociology to a definite place in the chain of sciences, and the consequent characterization of its essential nature, but also the explanation, based on a social philosophy and a philosophy of history, of this evolutionary arrangement of the sciences: Each science, like science in general, should be understood in the light of the social organization of the age.

The most notable element in Comte's philosophy of history is the law of the three stages of intellectual evolution, hinted at by Turgot and stated by Saint-Simon. The first stage is the theological, containing successively the periods of fetishism, polytheism, and monotheism; the second is the metaphysical; the third the positive. All knowledge moves from imagination to reason. The social aspects of the first stage are marked by a predominance of priests and warriors, of the second

¹ Franz Oppenheimer, *System der Soziologie*, I, p. 8.

by the predominance of philosophers and lawyers, and of the third by the predominance of industrialists and scientists.

The *Weltanschauung* which comes from the development of the powers of the intellect molds the basic structure of each social stage, and strongly colors the changes wrought by time. Mental and social development are one and the same, and the history of society is therefore the history of thought.

From biology Comte derives the conception of organism; society, in this view, is a collective organism whose life and structure are to be understood by analogy with the individual organism. The individual man is only an abstraction; humanity is the true reality.

Herbert Spencer took over Comte's doctrine of the sciences and also his organicism, but critically and with many alterations. Above all, he urged the importance of psychology (which for Comte was not an independent science intermediate to biology and sociology) as an essential member of the hierarchy of the sciences. He opposed and rejected Comte's intellectualism; the feelings (arising from simple physical sensations) are for him the motive sources of personal and social evolution.

At present, with all due admiration for Comte's systematization of Saint-Simon's great and brilliant ideas, it must be said that we can learn little of sociological value from the foremost exponent of positivism. His associations are predominantly with the philosophy of history. In his separation of social statics, which treats of the natural *order* of human societies, from social dynamics, which contains the theory of the natural *progress* of humanity, the stress is laid throughout upon social dynamics.

Comte was gripped with a glowing zeal for reform (*voir pour prévoir*); in addition, he surrounded positivism with an almost religious aura, and endowed it with an optimistic creed of the improvement of the human lot through the evolution of reason. "Thereby," says Oppenheimer, "upon the young discipline was placed the task of becoming a *practical* science, i.e., a technical guide for the statesman and the social reformer."² Oppenheimer expressly approves this aim; "none of its better representatives since that time have wholly lost it from view." And with good reason; no true sociologist dare lose sight of the goal—to contribute through his intellectual labors to the improvement of the lot of humanity. Nevertheless, indirect contribution through the development of realistic knowledge (rather than the di-

* *Ibid.*

rect fruition of proposals of reform) is the more useful and difficult task of the sociologist as such.

How little Comte really knew of the true laws of social life is demonstrated by his over-simplified antithesis: on the one hand, the living whole of society; on the other, the abstract, simple fragment, the individual. The sociology of today is indebted to Comte simply for his direction of scientific interest to the connection between social life and the evolution of the mind. Certainly this connection was no new discovery; but it was the dominant, central thought of his whole system, and hence he did much to focus attention upon it. Hankins justly says:

"The works of all the great founders of sociology from Comte through Spencer and Ward were mixtures of philosophy of history, social philosophy, pseudo-science, and science. But as compared with their predecessors there was a diminution of mere ideation and an increasing impress of fact and observation."³

"In summary it must be said that Comte's sociology remained for the most part outside the field of positive science. It was social philosophy written in a vein which combined most curiously the spirit of positivism and the spirit of mysticism."⁴

§2. SPENCER

Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) was, for an older generation, simply *the* sociologist, and about the end of the nineteenth century any theory of society other than Spencer's seemed impossible. It need not be decided here whether those who call him the greatest philosopher of the Victorian age are correct; in any case, his bulky *System of Synthetic Philosophy*, to which his sociology belongs, is an intellectual achievement of the first rank.⁵

In the year 1860, this English writer, then comparatively unknown, published his plan of a philosophical lifework in thirty-three parts. Only a few subscribed to the prospectus. Despite obstacles, particularly physical ailments, he kept steadfastly on, and in thirty-six years saw the end of his work. His system rises in eleven imposing volumes, beginning with "first principles" (the philosophical, epistemological foundations), going on to biology, and thence to psychology; on this basis sociology is constructed, and this in turn is crowned by ethics.

The importance of this work, once so highly praised and now rarely read, is still great. Oppenheimer's judgment that Spencer "steered

³ F. H. Hankins, "Sociology," in *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, H. E. Barnes, editor, p. 292.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 296.

⁵ On Spencer as a sociologist, see Leopold von Wiese, *Zur Grundlegung der Gesellschaftslehre* (1906).

the young science back into the channel of the shallowest rationalism"⁶ is indeed not wholly false, but it is prejudiced and too severe. True, Spencer avoided or even scorned every profound investigation. He who judges the value of intellectual work by its profundity and its anticipations of ineffable truth must find the philosopher of Derby trivial; he always remains on the surface. But how magnificently the elements of this superficial survey are integrated, how synthetically the cosmic is viewed in relation to vital processes, to psychical and social life!

The younger generation's intellectual desertion of Spencer is very remarkable; it is apparent even in America, where twenty-five years ago Spencer dominated sociological theorizing. Students no longer take pleasure in reading even his *Study of Sociology*, in spite of its instructive and stimulating nature. And yet the serious study of Spencer would be of the utmost value to many contemporary sociologists—not that they should accept his teaching *en bloc*; they should analyze critically and utilize what they can of the work of this wholly unromantic and sober writer.

When he is designated, as he frequently is, a "pupil" of Comte, the appellation is appropriate only with many qualifications. He himself, in his autobiography, asserts that his only obligation to Comte is that owed to a worthy scientific opponent. This statement is probably an exaggeration, but he is in no sense a mere transmitter of Comte's current of thought.

As a philosopher, to be sure, he possesses, like Comte, a strong inclination toward a monistic synthesis on the basis of natural science. He too (in a greater degree than the older French writer) traces all phenomena on earth, including the social, to the working of a single law: the persistence of force. He finds a simple but meaty formula for the evolution of all things: "From indefinite, incoherent, homogeneity to definite, coherent, heterogeneity." He seeks to demonstrate this interplay of integration and differentiation in the evolution of society as well as in other spheres. For him society is a superorganism, whose nature as an aggregate is due to the nature of its units, human beings.

But it is not possible to recount here the wealth of Spencer's ideas; we wish only to show the historical connection between his sociology and present-day systematic sociology.

Beginning with negative criticism, two peculiarities of his usually consistent system must be emphasized. First, from his biology and his psychology Spencer transfers to sociology a conception of the individ-

⁶ Oppenheimer, *op. cit.*, I, p. 54.

ual which should in fact have led him into the universalism of Comte, his antipode in this matter. Man appears to be quite dependent (in his view) upon what is external to the self; his mind has power only to mirror the objective world and not to control it. Man lives in passivity and in the most extreme constraint. Yet in his sociology (and still more in his politics and ethics) Spencer is the most radical representative of individualism. Comte's thesis of the dependence of the "individual" upon "society" leads Spencer to maintain the precise reverse. (How this contradiction in Spencer is to be explained subjectively cannot be shown here.) Second, his sociology considers, almost to the neglect of what we call history, only the preliterates. His rich factual material is drawn almost exclusively from ethnography. Hence, his sociology gives too little information about our own culture.

Passing on to positive considerations, it may be said that what we of today value most in him is the rich and ordered abundance of concrete data, of facts concerning the beginnings of social life.⁷ Even though a great deal of what he says about the beginnings of religion, for example, can no longer be considered entirely valid, his ground plans for an evolutionary sociology, and especially for a thorough investigation into social origins, are still worthy of attention. Of course, the actual goals and methods of investigation proper to a special science of interhuman relations can draw only indirect advantage from Spencer; his significance today seems to be of a pedagogical and didactic nature. The freedom of his theory from metaphysics and marked subjective influence is the feature most worthy of imitation.

§3. WARD AND AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY

In the intellectual history of the last half century, the place taken by Spencer's system forms an instructive chapter. In such a history it would be especially necessary to point out the rise in America of a sociology mainly dependent upon Spencer and its gradual rejection of his biologism as a result of a new, psychologizing trend less dependent upon the great Englishman. Here we shall have to satisfy ourselves with throwing some incidental light upon this trend in sociology, which began with Lester F. Ward. It is relevant in the present context, for the latest American works, particularly those of the *moderate* behaviorists, exhibit almost the same tendencies as does the present system, although in their case systematization is not a main object to

⁷ Hankins speaks of Spencer as "the first great systematizer of concrete sociological data, and therefore the real founder of sociology" (in H. E. Barnes, editor, *op. cit.*, [1925], p. 302).

the degree that it must be with us (not because of "system-mania," but from a conviction of the needs of our science in its present stage of evolution).

Of the writings of Lester F. Ward (1841-1913), the most important for us are his older work, *Dynamic Sociology* (1883), and his two later works, *Pure Sociology* (1903) and *Applied Sociology* (1908).

Ward, who was originally a botanist, was like Spencer an evolutionist, a monist, and a determinist; but he seeks to go beyond Spencer in that, although he accepts the evolution of thought on a purely biological and evolutionary-historical basis, he ascribes to human reason, once evolved, an independent effectiveness in social life. By thus emphasizing psychic factors as the driving forces in social life, he prepares the way for the transition, so significant for American sociology, from biological to social-psychological conceptions. For him human society was a "play of mental factors" (in which he reminds us of Comte more than Spencer). In his *Pure Sociology*, he says:

"My thesis is that the objects of sociology are human achievements. It is not a question of what men are but what they do; not of the structure but of the function. . . . Sociology deals with social activities. It is the study of actions. . . . It is not a descriptive science in the sense of the natural scientist."^{*}

In order to show simultaneously both the agreement and the difference of these statements with the science of interhuman behavior, let us point out that achievements of man, i.e., his concrete attainments, his material and non-material culture, are for us objects of the philosophy of culture or of special sciences other than sociology. With "cultural sociology" we have neither part nor lot. In sociology it is precisely a question of what men *are* in their relations with one another. Of course we too conceive their existentiality on the basis of their social actions, and these again on the basis of functions. But both Spencer and Schäffle, Ward's contemporaries, have shown that the functions can be explained only on the basis of structure, and changes of structure only on the basis of function, and that one of the two should not be excluded from a system.

As far as Ward is concerned, "pure" sociology concentrates on the evolution of society uninfluenced by the intentional acts of men, whereas "applied" sociology has for its object the rational, "telic" direction of social evolution through human action.

This botanist and philosopher apparently wished to utilize the methods of observation of the natural sciences as an aid to a closer approach to the essence of "culture" conceived as the sum of or-

* Lester F. Ward, *Pure Sociology*, 2nd ed., p. 183.

ganized human activities. On this point the critic must note that, here as elsewhere, the naturalist shows himself unequal to the scientific mastery of social facts because he tries to do too much; further, he lacks historical sense and historical knowledge—his work is overloaded with irrelevant speculations and analogies drawn from natural science.

Ward's emphasis upon motives as social forces is all that remains for realist-empirical sociology. He seeks to show that human impulses are "social forces all of which, in and of themselves, are destructive, but whose combined effect, mutually checking, constraining, and equilibrating one another, is to produce structures."⁹ In the end, a mechanics of the psychical forces becomes the object of his sociology.

§4. THE DRIFT AWAY FROM WARD

We can trace a whole series of American works to this root; the wish theory of W. I. Thomas is an example. *Now, we do not want to fall into the error of mistaking theories of motivation and doctrines of instinct for sociology*; but it is proper to say that motives, as major forces behind social processes, demand close attention from the sociologist.

If the evolution of German sociology down to the present can be summed up in the phrase: "From encyclopedic to special social science," the same statement is valid even to a greater degree of American sociology. How little has survived of the "universal" pretensions of the Spencer-Ward school! No more than ten years after the appearance of *Dynamic Sociology* there began in America, too, the sceptical discussion of questions of method.

In 1896 appeared Giddings' *Principles of Sociology*, in which he very rightly declared that sociology up to that time had been nothing more than a collection of carefully elaborated, seductive hypotheses. He started with the belief that sociology is a psychological science and that the use of biological forms of expression in sociological writings is erroneous; he endeavored to draw attention to the *psychical* side of social phenomena. He found, in part, a model in Adam Smith, who in his *Theory of the Moral Sentiments* attempted to lay bare those psychical forces which bind men together. For Giddings, however, the answer was not to be found in sympathy alone, but in what he called the "consciousness of kind."

It is a question, however, whether this carefully elaborated doctrine of an elemental consciousness of kind is not itself a "seductive" hy-

* *Ibid.*

pothesis. The sociologist will have to apply his critical method to the analysis and breaking up of this psychical element into the social influences which act upon men through interhuman relations, with the same care that the Columbia professor used in distinguishing his fundamental principle from others that resembled or seemed identical with it.

Since Ward's time, it has become increasingly clear that American sociology deals primarily with the *forms of groups* and the processes which go on within them.¹⁰ Gradually, however, the concept of "social forms" is being replaced by the more fruitful one of "social processes." Significant advances along this path were made by Ross' first great work, *Social Control*, followed by his *Principles of Sociology*, by Cooley's *Human Nature and the Social Order*, *Social Organization*, and *Social Process*, by Sumner's *Folkways*, Thomas's *Source Book for Social Origins*, Ellwood's *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, Park's *Principles of Human Behavior*, and many more.

American sociologists in general have come a long way from the desire of the encyclopedists to explain anything and everything; they intend to study definitely delimited problems with all the exactitude such delimitation makes possible.

We must concede that this is a great scientific advance; but it is also true that American sociology, productive in details, at present exhibits a certain fragmentariness and lack of systematic unity. Moreover, its all-pervasive normative affiliations do not help it to gain greater objectivity. Its great superiority lies in its closeness to life, its freshness of outlook, and its constant utilization of observations of the practical life of the time for the purposes of sociology.

¹⁰ In Emory S. Bogardus' *Introduction to Sociology* (1st ed. 1913, 4th ed. 1925), for example, group relations are dealt with in twenty-one chapters.

CHAPTER XLIX

ENCYCLOPEDIC SOCIOLOGY IN GERMANY

§1. THE ORGANIC ANALOGY

The biological trend in Europe was at first much more resistant to "psychologism" than it was in America. Many authors (who went far beyond Spencer's comparatively cautious efforts) clung passionately to the belief that knowledge is to be derived from the analogy between society and organism.

Every analogy is an attempt to gain added knowledge through a comparison between two things. By examining the more obscure in the light of the better known, relations similar or identical to those in the former may be discovered in the latter. The organismic sociologists considered the animal body to have been so thoroughly investigated by the anatomists, physiologists, and pathologists that from it conclusions could be safely drawn in regard to the invisible "social body." Strangely enough, however, the exact opposite occurred when the biologists acted on the deceptive assumption that the cellular structure of states was already so well known by social scientists that it would perhaps be well to regard the human body as a "state."

The Russo-German, Paul von Lilienfeld (whose chief work is *Gedanken über die Socialwissenschaft der Zukunft*, 1873-1881), exhibited great ingenuity in working out a *pathology* of society which rests fundamentally upon the idea that the *societas* is a real, living organism. In later years the French writer Worms sought to push the analogy much further (especially in his *Organisme et société*, 1896). It is noteworthy, however, that the latter writer in his last works had reached a conception which he expressed as follows:

"Study, experience, and reflection have taught us to qualify the approval we at first gave to the principles of the organismic theory or to put in their place statements of adequate clearness."¹

Here Worms reaches the same conclusion as did Schäffle in *his* last work. Worms still says, however, that society exists as an organization of human beings, that there is after all something organic in the structure of society. Societies come into existence after the fashion of

¹ Worms, *La sociologie*, p. 65 (1921).

organisms and at first function according to the same laws. Then they advance in a peculiarly human way by working toward an ideal constructed by the mind: an ideal of justice, peace, freedom, enlightenment. In this way they come to seek for the creation of equality and contractual solidarity among their members. From the organic world to the social world there is a smooth and continuous advance brought about by the mediation of the psychical world. So says Worms. But are not these optimistic statements of belief rather than systematic observations? Are there not many groups and abstract collectivities which in no way subscribe to "an ideal of justice, peace, freedom" and create no equality among their members?

This inclination toward a pathology of society by utilization of the organic analogy today leads Jacob von Uexküll and Müller-Lyer (who looks on evolution from a positivist and optimistic point of view), among others, into arbitrary positions which diminish the value of their statements on the connection between pain and suffering and social life.

§2. SCHÄFFLE

Albert Schäffle (1831-1903) is usually mentioned in connection with the organismic theorists, although it would be more correct to rank him among the social philosophers of *idealistic* tendencies.

This Swabian—who, as a political economist, should be classed with the professorial socialists and thus with the social reformers, but not with the Marxians—sought, in the four volumes of his *Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers*, to draw up "the encyclopedic outline of a real anatomy, physiology, and psychology of human society." But the solidity, clarity, and saving superficiality of his model, Spencer, were not granted to Schäffle. This almost tragic personality was a victim of inner discord; he was an historical and evolutionary monist and seeker after pure causality only up to a certain point, despite his strong intention of being scientific. At heart he stood closer to Schelling and Hegel than to Darwin, Spencer, or Haeckel. Schäffle's way of thinking followed rather an ethical, teleological conception of the world; he was a spiritualist (in the sense of the mind-body dualism) and an idealist. This struggle between the empiricist and metaphysician within him led to the unevenness and inconsistency that mar his work.

In his posthumous *Abriss der Soziologie* (1906), he sought to free himself from the bonds of biologism and to surrender himself to the spiritualism more suited to his needs. Society was to him the equiva-

lent of the "folk-world"; the essence of the folk lies in the "spiritual" connection between men (as is still asserted today by Othmar Spann, who perpetuates the idealistic conceptions at the root of Schäffle's thought). In his view, the gist of a people's life is its civilization; the ideal for society is an increasing socialization.

Schäffle's thinking, from our point of view, is unsociological. The passionless observation of the world as it is, without the intermixture of ideals with reality, was not his forte. Ethical speculation was his field, although many *details* of his social philosophy (so significant for moralists) will, after careful criticism, be found fruitful for the understanding of plurality patterns.

The organicists, beyond whose analogies Schäffle himself advanced, are more remote from scientific sociology as here conceived than almost any other school. Nothing in science is more hazardous than the indiscriminate application of similes and metaphors. Such a procedure tends to result in obfuscation of the original purpose of the comparison, and what was once regarded merely as similarity may come to be viewed as identity.

§3. GUMLOWICZ AND RATZENHOFER

We must here deny ourselves a more intimate examination of the race theorists, and especially of Gumpłowicz's theory² that "racial" combats are the prime causes of social evolution.³ Up to the present not one of these writers has succeeded in surmounting the difficulties presented by his own sympathies and antipathies. They all lack a method for restraining their prejudices. The mixture of biology and sociology, the indeterminate character of the conception of race, has been the nemesis of these occasionally gifted and clever dilettantes.

Yet we ought to consider, if only cursorily, the work of Gustav Ratzenhofer (1842-1904), the Austrian field marshal. After a lifetime of prolific activity in social science, of which the three volumes of his *Wesen und Zweck der Politik* are most representative, he left a neat synthesis of his theories in a *Soziologie* (1907); and so he can be compared, after a fashion, with Schäffle. We find in Ratzenhofer the same vacillation between a Spencerian monism based on natural science, and a voluntarist ethics such as marks the work of the talented Swabian. Ratzenhofer, however, judges human nature in a thoroughly

² Cf. on this point J. P. Lichtenberger, *The Development of Social Theory* (1923), pp. 432-64.

³ Cf. Howard Becker and Léon Smelo, "Les théories du conflit et l'origine de l'État," *Revue de Synthèse*, I, 1 (1931).

pessimistic fashion; for him the baser impulses predominate in mankind. His ethical goal is the sacrifice of individual for societal interests; for him sociology is a "civilizing discipline."

The effects of his theories were strangely varied. In Germany, he was little understood, often disparaged, and on the whole given little attention. In America, through Small and others, he became the point of departure for the sociology of interests. But even in Germany, Stein⁴ has very recently asserted that Ratzenhofer is responsible for having replaced the Lazarus-Steinthal folk psychology with a German sociology. At the same time Stein designates the correct antidote for Ratzenhofer's subjective bias, saying: "First description, then explanation, not the reverse, as in Ratzenhofer, first explanation and then description."

To term Ratzenhofer the founder of sociology, however, is debatable. Before his works, which appeared in the 90's, came the first edition of Tönnies' *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*. If Oppenheimer's view, suggested by Grünfeld, is to be accepted, and Lorenz von Stein designated the first German sociologist, then we must go back to the 50's. Moreover, Ratzenhofer does not belong among the forerunners of sociology whose influence was fruitful and permanent, since he possesses no definitely sociological methods of investigation. He either proceeds biologically or speculates in the subjective manner of the genius. He is, like many talented dilettantes, a man of captivating stimulation whose scintillating ideas are later scrutinized by more scientific minds than his own, as was the case with his ingeniously expounded, suggestive idea of interests. There can be little doubt that a great part of human group formation may be partially explained as a union of similar interests in some cases and as an opposition of unlike interests in others, just as Ratzenhofer asserted.

If one looks back upon the imposing number of voluminous works which have been written by these encyclopedists (whose circle could have been still further enlarged), one will again see that among creative minds who are not satisfied to be science's hewers of wood and drawers of water, there are few who do not aspire to prophecy and propaganda for their practical ideals. Pre-willed and pre-conceived theories are supported by long and apparently quite objective arguments and chains of proof. But "theories" are not sociology! Is philosophy philosophical enough to shelter within its fold these wrestlers with the spirit?

⁴ Ludwig Stein, "Soziologische und geschichtsphilosophische Methode," *Jahrb. f. Soziol.*, I, pp. 222 ff.

§4. STEIN

Lorenz von Stein (1815-1890) is sometimes hailed as the first German sociologist. Oppenheimer calls him and Karl Marx the "two leading German sociologists."⁵ Whether Oppenheimer is right or not depends once more upon the meaning given the term "sociology."

Stein must be sharply distinguished from sociologists of the naturalist type. He derives his theories from jurisprudence and from Hegelian philosophy, and he is an outspoken "cultural" as opposed to "natural" scientist. His interest is directed toward public life, and especially toward the sphere of politics, although he is not primarily concerned with constitutional questions and similar problems. In the 40's he had already applied himself too intensively to French socialism and communism—the ideas of which he discovered, so to speak, for the educated German world—for him to have regarded the state as the sole creation of public life. The connection of the state with the *civil* society was of particular interest to him. In all these wide-flung fields his investigations were partly on a historical and partly on an economic basis.

In his mode of thought Stein resembles Schmoller; defects as well as great qualities seem to us similar in the two men: a lack of clarity in the formation of ideas, weak definitions (so far as they exist at all), and finally, the absence of clearly drawn deductions.

Stein, one of the most talented and stimulating minds in German literature of the nineteenth century, was one of the first to attempt to explain the nature of social *classes*. What Oppenheimer says of him may be admitted: "His traces are to be found everywhere. Above all in Marx." But he goes rather far when he adds: "The influence of the book [*Sozialismus und Kommunismus des heutigen Frankreich*] on German sociology can scarcely be measured. All or almost all of its schools are directly or indirectly linked with it." In addition to the Marxians, Oppenheimer names Tönnies, Schäffle, Gumplowicz, Ratzehofer, Rodbertus, Dühring, Adolf Wagner, and Schmoller.

As a matter of fact, many German political scientists, social philoso-

⁵ It seems an exaggeration to say, as does Oppenheimer, that Stein's work has been "forgotten." In particular, students of public law and the philosophy of law refer to him, as did Schmoller among the economists. It was, however, a service on Waentig's part to have inspired his student, F. Grünfeld, to write his volume *Lorenz von Stein und die Gesellschaftslehre* (1910). After this revival of scientific interest in the social philosopher Stein, Gottfried Salomon earned for himself the credit of republishing Stein's *Begriff der Gesellschaft* and his *Geschichte der sozialen Bewegung in Frankreich* (1921). Oppenheimer's comments (pp. 40 ff., I, *op. cit.*) closely follow Grünfeld and Salomon.

phers, and economists did draw inspiration from him. But it is characteristic of Stein that for him "the science of society" is a part of political science. He makes excellent contributions to the knowledge of the plurality pattern called civil society (which must be sharply distinguished from the abstract, general term "society" of theoretical sociology).

The use of the same expression, "science of society," at one time as an explanatory equivalent for sociology as a whole, and at another time for the theory of a definite plurality pattern (civil society), is very misleading. It must be noted, however, that Stein, from the philosophical point of view, so grounded his observations upon general considerations in regard to "community" and similar categories that his treatment of civil society simultaneously involved a great deal of social philosophy and philosophy of history. He was certainly not the man of sharp delimitations and distinctions. Grünfeld is right in complaining that:

"It is, in general, no light task to stake out the territory of Stein's science of society, for the reason that, as is so often the case, its creator was lacking in the desired precision and stability."⁶

If Lorenz von Stein were admitted to the company of the progenitors of our science, it is probable that the general belief that sociology is a vague discipline incapable of sharp demarcation would be strengthened. What is the basis for decision? If a definite, identifiable method is to be demanded of sociologists to distinguish them from historians, political scientists, and economists, then Stein is in no sense a sociologist. But if men like Comte, Ward, and Schäffle are to be included in our line of descent, then it will be impossible to ignore the gifted jurist who so profoundly influenced subsequent thinking on social movements and the relations of social classes.

§5. MARX

To Marx and the Marxian social theorists the function and structure of the social edifice are practically determined by economic factors—in particular, by the production and distribution of goods. The tendency to attach responsibility for the determination of social evolution to *one* main factor may be found in many social philosophers; we have elsewhere termed it "the single-factor fallacy." At one time it is the development of ideas, at another geographical, anthropological, or demographic factors which are emphasized, so that it is entirely possible to divide social theorists into "schools" according to the special

⁶F. Grünfeld, *Lorenz von Stein und die Gesellschaftslehre* (1910), p. 42.

type of determinism they favor. In the nineteenth century, however, none obtained so much practical influence as the "economic determinism" of the Marxians.

For all its influence, we must forego the effort to give in a few sentences the basic ideas of the Marxian conception of society. We assume them to be known already, or we refer the reader to the voluminous literature on socialism.⁷

Adler, for example, charges non-Marxian sociology with being "bourgeois," i.e., static and smug. He says:

"It seems to us Marxians to be an essentially sociological doctrine that there are in the historical situation of the present day science [of sociology] two tendencies, determined in the last analysis by class interest, even though often unconsciously. I might designate one tendency as the static and the other as the evolutionary. . . . The static science is to be recognized by the fact that its investigations are always marked by a fundamental limitation. It is restricted wholly within bourgeois society, considers this society as its nature-given environment, so to speak, and thinks of evolution inside it only with bourgeois categories. Thus every outlook which goes beyond these categories must appear as 'unscientific,' 'political,' or quite 'utopian.' The investigator here is, as it were, saturated with and buried in the habits of life, the interests, and ideological traditions of bourgeois society, so that to him all that which in itself is but the historical creation of a definite plurality pattern becomes psychologically a necessity of his thought and a fixation of his point of view."⁸

A good many criticisms of this position might be made. Speaking briefly: We have seen that in all the older ("bourgeois") sociology (particularly Spencer's, the most decidedly anti-socialist) it was precisely dynamics, the evolution of society, that was all too strongly emphasized. All "evolutionary" theories of society, however, incur the danger of becoming prophecy, whether "bourgeois" or "proletarian." So far as this contrast is concerned, it can be of value only where general judgments are passed upon culture, the state, and society. Where such affiliations are involved, it cannot be denied that there is danger that the given author's conscious or unconscious connections with rank and class, with social position, will obscure his view. But the empirical type of sociology set forth in the present treatise is very much less exposed to this danger than others, because it is not concerned with pronouncements about the higher or lower ultimate value of social phenomena; and its analysis of action patterns and plurality

⁷ Werner Sombart's *Proletarische Sozialismus* (1924) contains an extended bibliography of the literature of socialism in the appendix to Volume I. Cf. also J. P. Lichtenberger, *op. cit.*, pp. 291-304.

⁸ Max Adler, *Verhandlungen des vierten deutschen Soziologentages* (1925), pp. 200 ff.

patterns is a neutral process, which is just as far from or as near to a "bourgeois" conception as it is a "proletarian."

There is another significant distinction between the Marxian theory of society, based on philosophy of history, and empirical-systematic sociology as here presented. Marxism gives the primacy to *classes*, those plurality patterns which arise from economic facts, and derives social relations from their structure and from the mutual dependence and antagonisms arising between them. In the present system, however, a "class" is regarded as a rather indefinite result of social stratification, as the product of definite social relations. We do not explain relations by classes, but classes by relations. The organization of production is, in our view, not at all an elemental phenomenon which serves as a point of departure, but a derived phenomenon which, when placed within a narrow net of relations and plurality patterns, of course exercises a manifold social influence. The Marxians, however, begin to trace the thread of connections beyond a knot that is quite distant from the starting-point of the analysis—a knot that we first seek to untie.

By way of example: the Marxians trace the social process of exploitation to the "capitalistic" economic order; their thesis is that capitalism creates exploitation. We, on the other hand, do not deny the existence of capitalistic exploitation, but it is for us only *one* of the forms which are found among the phenomena of exploitation. Exploitation appears not only where things are administered capitalistically, but very often elsewhere as well. The destruction of capitalism will not signalize the end of exploitation, but will merely prevent the appearance of some of its forms and will open up new possibilities for others.

Nevertheless, participation in scientific sociology as here defined need not conflict with a "belief" in socialism, nor with any religion or attitude toward the world, as long as value-judgments are rigorously barred from the scientific work done. The basic premises on which socialism, and especially Marxism, rest are articles of faith based on a philosophy of history, and differ in no way from any other "-ism."

Thus we see that the portrait of Karl Marx undoubtedly belongs in the ancestral hall of the social philosophers. Moreover, the economic sociologists will have to arrive at a very careful understanding of him. But *theoretical sociology* as here defined is little concerned over the fact that Marx lived and worked.

CHAPTER L

SOCIOLOGY IN GERMANY AND FRANCE
SINCE
TÖNNIES AND TARDE

We must now recall the two-fold division of sociology proposed by Carli (chap. xlvii, §1), viz., the distinction between historical-encyclopedic sociology and analytical sociology. He adds: "This second type began between 1885 and 1890, a period within which falls the first works of Tönnies, Tarde, Durkheim, and Simmel." Without the intention of too narrowly characterizing their work as "analytical," let us turn to these four thinkers.

§1. TÖNNIES

The life work of Ferdinand Tönnies (born 1855) is not yet completed. We may yet expect a whole series of treatises, based upon older works which have not yet been published, from this vigorous septuagenarian. Tönnies now seems free to systematize his science on the basis of his chief work, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*.¹ It would not be wise, therefore, to attempt, even by way of suggestion, a brief and final review of his writings, such as is possible for the three other writers mentioned, whose lives and work are done.²

Nevertheless, one thing is today quite beyond doubt: Tönnies' dichotomy of "community and society" (*Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*) is and will remain the basis of all his sociological theories. He distinguishes between "pure, applied, and empirical" sociology. In his "pure" sociology, *community and society are the fundamental conceptions*. (A conception of "society" narrower than that customarily used is characteristic of Tönnies. It is virtually identical with that of the "accessible secular structure" discussed in chaps. xv, §3; xxv, §2, and his "community" is practically equivalent to the "isolated sacred structure" also mentioned at those points.) Bentley has thus commented on Tönnies' dichotomy:

¹ The plan of this work dates from 1880-1881; the first edition followed in 1887, the second in 1912, the seventh in 1926.

² On the point see also F. Tönnies, "Einteilung der Soziologie," *Zeitschrift für d. ges. Staatswissenschaft*, LXXIX, 1 (1925).

"One will find running all through these . . . classifications of groups. . . two . . . criteria of classification: habitual or volitional, personal or impersonal. And this no matter how the phrasing runs. Tönnies as early as 1887 had discussed, in his volume *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, community and society, the deep organic unity of men on the one side and the artificial, mechanical or volitional organization on the other; and had given this distinction a psychological foundation (of the objective psychic type) in an elaborate theory of *Wesenwille* and *Willkür* (later called by him *Kürwille*). The social fact contrast, the institutional opposition, upon which he was resting, derived through Spencer from Sir Henry Maine. On the one side Tönnies sees social situations accepted (*bejaht*) by the individual for their own sake, even though with some sense of their values and purposes; on the other he sees social situations accepted purely as a means to recognized ends; on the one side the individuals feel themselves members of a real social whole, a *Gemeinschaft*; on the other the individuals form a system of persons with a fictive *Gesellschaft*. On the one side will is objective, naturally grown up and bound with thought [our 'non-rational acceptance of standards']; on the other it is subjective, something produced around and through thought [our 'rational decision in the light of conscious choice']."²

Objections to the use that some followers of Tönnies have made of his valuable two-fold division of all social structures need not be discussed here. Biased judgments have frequently been associated with this dichotomy; "community," resting upon "natural" impulses, has been too highly extolled and "society" too summarily condemned. We should be prepared to accept the contrast only if no prejudice for or against one or the other type be implied. It is for this reason that we have preferred to use the terms "isolated sacred structure" and "accessible secular structure." We need not take exception to Tönnies' psychological terminology; after all, he wrote his *magnum opus* over forty years ago. He really means by "objective will" and similar terms only the urges, habits, etc., expressed as actions not accompanied by clear-cut consciousness of rational purpose.

This two-fold division of structures (plurality patterns) and the forces which create them has, up to the present, demonstrated its significance (at least as a heuristic principle). Even if it be suspected that along with the dichotomy just mentioned others which do not incur the danger of antithesis and emotional prejudice should be considered, these two aids will be found indispensable in many investigations. In the analysis of action patterns and plurality patterns, the question of the extent of their dependence upon non-rational acceptance of standards, on the one hand, and of their dependence upon rational decision in the light of conscious choice or purpose on the other, will arise again and again. With the appearance of *Gemeinschaft*

* A. F. Bentley, *Relativity in Man and Society* (1926), pp. 174-5.

und Gesellschaft discussion was transferred to a genuinely sociological plane; a systematic survey of plurality patterns, proceeding "not genetically but logically," was given for the first time, even though the jurists Otto Gierke and Lorenz von Stein had prepared the way for a favorable acceptance of the idea of community.

§2. TARDE, DURKHEIM, WORMS

Unfortunately only a few pages of this over-brief sketch of the literature of our science remain, and we can deal with French sociology only by means of a short review of three investigators, two of whom (among others here unmentioned) undertook to continue the work of Comte, while the third, Gabriel Tarde, went his own way.

Tarde, Durkheim, and Worms differ essentially in their fundamental conceptions of sociology; and Tarde and Durkheim especially may be said to be diametrically opposed in their viewpoints. Tarde conceives of society as the *sum* of the psychical influences of individuals upon individuals. His basic thought is: *La société c'est l'imitation*; imitation is for him the fundamental fact of social relations (cf. chap. xvi, §3).

Durkheim does not derive the social from the individually psychic. For him as for Comte, the psychical life of man is a manifestation of the superpersonal society. Indeed, to such an extent does he seek to stress the primacy and the independence of the social that he even attempts to investigate social facts as realities exterior to the self (cf. chap. v). The main fact for him in social life is the coercion that society exerts upon men ("*Est social le fait, qui est accompli sous la pression de la société*").

If Tarde can be designated an individualist and Durkheim a universalist, Worms, in overcoming this false and artificially constructed antithesis, takes a mediating position (in our opinion the only correct one). According to him, "the social is composed of individual elements and the individual is fulfilled by social elements." Society does not exist as something apart from individuals, but exists in and through the organization of men. The fundamental social fact for Worms is the mental meeting of human beings ("*La rencontre mentale des êtres, voilà pour nous le fait social originaire*").

Tarde's investigations into social psychology still afford us valuable aid in penetrating into human relations, but however important the rôle of imitation in social life, it nevertheless is not the elemental social phenomenon, as we have already noted (chap. xvi, §3.) Therefore, Tarde has combined with his brilliant idea speculations in regard

to the philosophy of history and culture which must be checked and qualified.

Durkheim's approach has been rightly characterized as "sociologism." Bouglé shows that Durkheim is chiefly concerned with the problem of morals, and therein lies the key to his biased view. Durkheim would avoid mysticism in ethics and for that reason strives to make the ethical a purely social matter. From Renouvier, says Bouglé, Durkheim drew the theory that the whole contains more than the parts. Society is for him the only abode of moral life; all imperatives that assign final values of things and men are expressions of the social will.

Whole and part, however, are co-existent and co-valid (chap. iv); the whole serves the part just as the part serves the whole. Furthermore, it must be denied that all morals, all religious and aesthetic norms, can be considered as nothing but expressions of the social will.

Worms, in the last years of his life, when he had outgrown the organicism of his master Comte, was still one of his followers, inasmuch as he could not admit the claim that sociology is a special social science. He does not go as far as Durkheim, for whom sociology was the *ruling* synthesis of the special social sciences, and thus does not deprive the special sciences of their distinctive character; he regards sociology merely as the philosophy of the social disciplines. In so doing, however, the "merely" is far too much; he burdens sociology with duties which make the task of working out a clear, distinctive, non-philosophical problem and solving it a difficult one.

Gabriel Tarde's (1843-1904) chief work is *Les lois de l'imitation*, the first edition of which appeared in 1895 after the majority of the chapters had been published from 1882 on in the *Revue Philosophique*. The seventh edition dates from 1921. The substance of this work, as well as of his *L'opposition universelle* and *La logique sociale*, was summarized by Tarde in his little volume, *Les lois sociales* (1898).

Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) edited twelve volumes of *L'année sociologique*. Of his numerous writings we mention only *Les règles de la méthode sociologique* (first edition 1895; seventh edition 1919). In the preface to the second edition is a clear statement of his theory, as well as in his *De la division du travail social* (first edition 1893; fourth edition 1912) and the little book, well designed as an introduction to his theories, *Sociologie et philosophie* (1924). In it Professor Bouglé (of the Sorbonne) has gathered three important essays by his deceased master and prefaced them with an introduction.

René Worms (1869-1926) was the editor of the *Revue internationale de sociologie* and General Secretary of the *Institute internationale de sociologie*. Of his older work, *Organisme et société* (1896), mention has already been made. Of his numerous other publications we will cite only the little volume to which we have already referred, *La Sociologie, sa nature, son contenu, ses attaches* (1921).

The three small volumes: Tarde, *Les lois sociales*; Durkheim-Bouglé, *Sociologie et philosophie*; and Worms, *La sociologie*, are designed to enlighten beginners in the study of French sociology, and can be obtained at a low price at any bookshop.

§3. SIMMEL AND WEBER

Among the German sociologists of recent times whom we here select (using our point of view as the test) to stand by the side of Tönnies, Georg Simmel (1858-1918) belongs in the first rank.

What we can say briefly about Simmel will not adequately characterize him but will give only a fleeting view of the man's creations.⁴ Systematization of Simmel's thought is an extremely difficult and discouraging task. Since he had no idea of forming either a philosophical or sociological "school," and since in his works he but rarely makes reference to the productions of others, we are compelled to think of him as a unique scientific phenomenon, for whom, in his own words, "the personal attitude toward the world" was decisive. He was no soldier in the rank and file, nor of course was he a leader in the proper sense, but a brilliant and stimulating scout, full of ideas and suggestions. He never attempted, however, to construct a system (a Spencer reversed). He was always inclined to say freely what he thought, and to say it without strict adherence to a formulated plan. He was always independent of academic rules and all artistic and traditional conventions. If we divest the term of all its disparaging and derogatory connotations, we may call this gifted writer a man of letters, one of the greatest, indeed, of all time. Furthermore, this sociologist, too, exactly like so many others, was not only a sociologist, but at the beginning of his literary activity and especially in his last years (from 1910 on) was pre-eminently a philosopher. His need for metaphysics at last overcame his original leanings toward empiricism.

The Simmel of 1915 was a very different man from the Simmel of 1905. We are concerned only with the latter, the man who wished to shape sociology into an empirical theory of society and who opened the way for a "formal" sociology. The characteristic backing, filling, and digressing, the aphoristical and the fragmentary, in his work as a sociologist is consistent with the qualities and defects of this creative

⁴ The Americans have been much interested in Simmel (even at a time when a very small group in Germany was first becoming conscious of his full significance and talent). It is from that country then that the best book on him comes: *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*, by Nicholas Spykman (1925). A most excellent bibliography begins at p. 277 of this volume. On Simmel's personality and philosophy, Max Adler has many worthwhile things to say in his *Georg Simmels Bedeutung für die Geistesgeschichte* (1919).

spirit, analytical and averse to system as he was. Mental robustness, submission to discipline, and intellectual self-denial were foreign to him.⁵

We shall do well here to confine ourselves to his chief work, *Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung* (1908).⁶ Simmel (the Simmel of 1908) was the first in Germany—as perhaps Émile Waxweiler was in Belgium (though of course Waxweiler dealt with the theory of society from the point of view of the natural sciences)—sharply to delimit sociology by cutting it off completely from social philosophy. It was to him a single, special science with a definite object, new but clearly distinguishable. He it was who rendered the important service of distinguishing clearly between (1) the creation of a new science of sociology, and (2) the general modern tendency to observe sociologically the objects of different sciences without in any way endangering their independence or imperilling their continued existence. Indeed, according to Simmel it is not possible today for sociology to bring to light new facts, new materials; but it does draw “a new line through facts that as facts are thoroughly

⁵ Maria Steinhoff, in her essay, “Die Form als soziologische Grundkategorie bei Georg Simmel” (*Köln. Vt. Soz.* IV, p. 215 ff.), has outlined Simmel’s transformation as follows (the citation will serve at the same time to call attention to his most important writings, which are of so much interest to us in the present connection):

“In 1890 Simmel published as his first work his *Soziale Differenzierung*. It is a peculiarity of Simmel’s first writings that they are more analytical than constructive and fail to reveal any positive standpoint of his own. For the first time, in his little article in *Schmollers Jahrbuch* (1894), ‘Das Problem der Soziologie,’ did the goal that the young Simmel set himself become clearer, namely, the founding of sociology as ‘an empirical theory of society.’ Already in 1892 he had come forward with a study, *Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie* (which appeared in 1905 in a completely changed edition): it does not belong with his sociological writings proper, though it takes its departure from the same point of view. Its intellectual attitude puts it among what Frischeisen-Köhler calls his ‘critical’ writings, while as a final conclusion to them it serves ‘to remove obstacles from the path’ and ‘to reject the claims of metaphysics and the philosophy of history.’ After a long interval, the *Philosophie des Geldes* appeared in 1900, which, on the one hand, carried on the sociological problems that had already been raised, and on the other, revealed the far deeper formulation of the question, which puts it in line with the philosophical writings of his later years. The most significant sociological work of Simmel’s is the *Soziologie* of 1908, in which he presents adequately his ‘formal sociology’ and with a wealth of detailed investigations takes a position in advance of all others upon the road already pointed out. This great work was for him an adieu, so to speak, to his sociological investigations.”

⁶ The paragraphs on Simmel are drawn in the main from the somewhat detailed appreciation in the article by Leopold von Wiese, “Neuere soziologische Literatur,” *Arch. Soz.-wiss. Soz.-pol.* XXX, pp. 897 ff.

known.”⁷ New points of view, new abstractions, may be reached by its means. That is, whereas the object of the various older social sciences, such as economics, law, and political science, is the *content* of the processes of sociation, sociology investigates the *forms* of sociation as they arise for innumerable purposes and hence with ever-changing content. The manifold forms by which sociation is accomplished are by abstraction freed from their “most divergent contents,” and presented as psychical phenomena of a special kind.

Despite its foundation in social psychology, for Simmel sociology is in no sense a branch of psychology. Psychical material may predominate in sociology, although sociology may never be concerned with the discovery of the laws of psychical processes. On the contrary, the goal of sociology is to grasp “the objectivity of sociation” (which, to be sure, as has been said, “springs from psychical processes”). Since psychology and sociology are not identical, sociology has its own special object-matter, from which its metaphysics and epistemology are entirely distinct (as is the case with all the other sciences). Simmel assigns the question as to the place of society in the cosmos to the metaphysics of sociology. On the other hand, the questions: Is society possible? Does it exist outside us or only in our consciousnesses? and the like, belong to epistemology, exactly as the metaphysical problems mentioned above belong to definite sub-disciplines of philosophy.

In this way all claims of sociology to an encyclopedic and universal validity, to a synthesis of all the special social sciences, are dismissed; so, too, the tendency to apply the natural scientist's methods of observation to the material of human society is entirely rejected. Moreover, the delimitation of the tasks of sociology, as Simmel effected it, carries still other implications; among them, that in sociology the narrowest possible place should be given to the content and substance of purposive human action; in his dealing with all historical processes only the formal aspects of sociation interested Simmel. The question arises here: Is such a restriction to the forms of sociation possible? Does Simmel's exposition of his program (the special content of the nine excellent chapters in which he sets forth this program cannot here be considered) demonstrate the possibility and the potential productivity of his way of stating the problem?

We must be especially on our guard against apprehending form as something incidental and subordinate to content, i.e., as something “formal” in the derogatory sense. The essence of things is often more apparent in their form than in their content. The same is true of the

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

object-matter of sociology. If we disregard as far as possible the content of social phenomena and give preference to form by the presentation of human relations, we can avoid the fortuitous, the transitory, the incidental, and for the first time we can see deeper into the nature of man. Hitherto unrevealed secrets of the human mind, man's possibilities of development, his motives, his aspirations, at last become clear. The essential nature of culture is first unveiled when it is not sought, all too objectively, in compact, solid units and their summations. The external delimitation of the field of sociology implies a valuable deepening and expansion of the possibilities of knowledge.

Nevertheless, Simmel's investigations ran the danger of being choked up with worthless detail, of being desultory and disordered. There are of course not only very many fine observations among them but also summits which are landmarks of knowledge. And then on the very next page, they sometimes are lost to view in the abundance of forms, in the subtlest and finest of nuances, in the mist of details. *From his numerous theories of the manifold forms of sociation there has arisen no unifying theory of sociation and its forms.*

Despite our acknowledgment of the significance of what Simmel calls the forms of sociation and our retention of his indication of the tasks to be performed, in the present system we have (as already noted—chap. ii, §11) given up the designation "formal" because it is too often misunderstood. The name, however, is purely incidental. On the whole, the science of interhuman behavior takes up the thread of scientific investigation where Simmel dropped it in 1910 in favor of his studies in philosophy. With his *Soziologie* a beginning, although a beginning still somewhat uncertain, had for the first time been made.

Max Weber (1864-1920), whom we have already mentioned as a writer on special sociology and as a social historian, must be named once more at this point, for his methods and the factual results of his investigations have aided in advancing the empirical "general" (theoretical) sociology.

To refer to Max Weber without granting space to an appropriate estimate of his significance is quite as unjust as it is in the case of Simmel, although in a different sense. His personality had such an immense influence that to speak of him merely as having advanced a scientific method is to belittle him. All that is intended here is to select from his chief work, his posthumous and unfinished *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (2nd ed., 1925), certain auxiliary logical conceptions and certain categories which played their part in developing the system here set forth, and to note them *very* briefly.

For him sociology was a science whose goal was to understand and interpret social behavior and to give a causal explanation of its course and consequences. In this view, sociology belongs to the "understanding" sciences (cf. our chap. iii, §4).

Systematic sociology as represented in this work is in accord with this fundamental conception of Weber's to the extent that social behavior is its object too. The concept "social" is here defined as it is defined by Weber, and we also stress the view that only the subjectively intended meaning, not the objective, is susceptible of scientific analysis. We go beyond Weber to some extent, however, for we enlarge the bounds of sociology to include not only the "understanding" of social behavior but also the systematic classification of that behavior.

§4. OPPENHEIMER, SPANN, VIERKANDT

If we were giving a complete account of the literature of modern sociology, and in order to show the wide range of present-day investigation among living German scholars had to mention a series of authors who follow other routes than our own, it would not be possible to leave unmentioned Franz Oppenheimer and Othmar Spann. The former is a social and political writer in the grand manner who argues sociologically, and who carries on the old conception of our discipline as a synthetic science. The latter is the chief representative of what he has called "universalism."

Alfred Vierkandt is harder to characterize. To us it seems that, like Simmel, he belongs among those thinkers who, because of the spiritual convulsion induced by the war, passed through a period of transformation which manifests itself in their scientific works. Vierkandt's most important production, *Die Stetigkeit im Kulturwandel* (1908), a precursor of Ogburn's *Social Change* that in some ways is far superior to it, is replete with the spirit of positivism. Therein lies its strength. In contrast to Tarde, for whom historical innovations spring from genius, from the "great man" who owes his power to non-social sources, Vierkandt maintains that every new thing in civilization is profoundly dependent upon the old, the traditional. He believes that the significance of the extraordinary, of the genius or innovator, is very slight, and he stresses the force of tradition and the desires of men *en masse*: "The supporting and propelling motives of social change are prevailingly and exclusively of a trivial nature." The great things in human affairs, says Vierkandt, everywhere arise from the ceaseless accumulation of small increments.

Although we could not then and cannot now follow him entirely

in his discounting of the value of genius, there is no doubt that this work of his early phase is of great value. Moreover, another work of the same phase is even more important, for in it he emphasized the sociological significance of the concept of "relation," thus travelling farther along the trail correctly blazed by Simmel.

In his later, postwar phase, however, he manifests to an extreme degree a tendency to turn away from positivism. This is more disastrous in his case than for many other authors, inasmuch as his scientific superiorities were so strongly rooted in a method of thought concentrating upon the tangible, the unromantic, the clear. Before the appearance of his *Gesellschaftslehre* (1923) one could have assumed that he would take a prominent part in the construction of systematic sociology, but now the zeal for a "totality concept" seems to be carrying him into a channel that issues in Spann's way of thinking.

§5. CONCLUSION

Now that the total system and its historical background has been presented as impersonally as possible, a few more or less personal remarks with reference to the growth of the German basis of the present treatise may not be amiss; they are quoted from the preface of the *Beziehungslehre* (1924):

"Shortly after receiving my doctorate (University of Berlin, 1902), I made a thorough study of Spencer in an effort to present his system critically,⁹ and in conscious opposition to his all-inclusive, 'cosmic,' social philosophy, I conceived the principles fundamental to this work—just twenty years ago. Even at that time my goal was to show systematically the interconnections of human society, the mutual dependence of human beings, and how one man becomes Destiny, as it were, to another.

"Since that time I have worked steadily at the gradual building of this systematic structure although I could give only scanty leisure hours to putting it in written form, for the outward circumstances of my professional occupation were but little favorable to this purpose. During the first ten years I was confronted by frequently changing tasks in various academic posts and by numerous practical obligations; because of this I seldom had opportunity to bear witness for the study which had first claim on my affections. Future generations of researchers in the sociological field will hardly be able to imagine even the external difficulties we of today, who work together on the foundations of sociology, have had to face.

"When the Institute for Research in the Social Sciences was established in Cologne in 1919, and when the Cologne School of Commerce and Finance was

⁹ Leopold von Wiese, *Zur Grundlegung der Gesellschaftslehre: eine kritische Untersuchung von Herbert Spencers System der synthetischen Philosophie* (Jena: Fischer, 1906).

enlarged into the University of Cologne, I was enabled to cultivate sociology somewhat more. Nevertheless, the demands of my official post, of my regular work in economics, could not be slighted. As a matter of fact, although I have not contributed to the literature of the field in the last few years, I have busied myself in at least equal measure with economic theory, which I separate strictly not only from general systematic sociology but from the sociology of economics as well.

"After all, however, the gradual maturing process (undergone with considerable impatience!) through which my sociological research passed, has perhaps been beneficial to the present work. I could repeatedly think through the same fundamental questions in time-perspective, and could compare my tentative conclusions with the results set forth in the rapidly accumulating literature, so that these ever-returning thoughts of mine gradually joined themselves into a comprehensive system which I feel has been stripped of all irrelevant detail.

"In many essential points I was greatly helped by the work of three authors: Simmel, Waxweiler, and Ross. Simmel's keen and judicious analysis of many interhuman relations left an enduring impression. Waxweiler's clear limitation of sociology to study of the adaptive association of human beings, and Ross' vivid and close-to-life descriptions of numerous concrete social actions and processes also helped to clarify my thinking, facts which I hope this system shows and which I gratefully acknowledge. But at the same time, my study of these writers made me more and more aware of the task I regarded as peculiarly my own. Simmel's analyses needed rounding-out and completion through synthesis and systematization; Waxweiler's researches had to be freed from their handicapping bondage to the natural sciences; and Ross' valuable but scattered contributions had to be joined into a structure resting upon a solid basis of deduction. . . .

"The system here set forth is of course only the bare skeleton of such a structure. My effort has been devoted to the erection of a scaffolding, a comprehensive frame of reference, leaving the filling-in of details to be accomplished later, either by myself or others. No matter how productive and tempting the analysis of single processes frequently was, it has nevertheless been impossible, in the purposely limited compass of this outline, to do much more than indicate the gaps to be filled, to show which questions are to be asked and answered by inductive research, and to arrange the single processes in a unified, deductively ordered system. I sincerely hope that I have provided all those who work along similar lines with as many research leads and aids as possible, although I do not wish to deprive them of the pleasure of following out their own plans. Many times I have denied myself the tempting elaboration of a fascinating problem of detail, in order that the reader's attention might not be diverted from the broad outlines of the present system to minutiae, alluring in their concreteness and closeness to life, but of minor importance in the period of our scientific development immediately before us."

Let it be emphasized, however, that the stress here laid upon systematization implies no derogation of the work of other sociologists who do not tread the same path. It would be folly and presumption

* Leopold von Wiese, *Allgemeine Soziologie: Erster Teil, Beziehungslehre*, preface, pp. vii-ix.

to refer to the sociologists who have been mentioned in the preceding pages as if they had nothing worthwhile to say to us. In the German literature of our science the great men who have died in the last decade—Max Weber and Georg Simmel, Ernst Troeltsch the sociologist of religion, Paul Barth the indefatigable historian of literature, the gifted Eberhard Gothein, the economic sociologist Gustav Schmoller, Adolph Wagner the social moralist and systematizer, the *genuine* phenomenologist Max Scheler—all left behind them works from which sociology as the science of interhuman relations and sociology in a broader sense can derive rich benefits. Among the living we must mention again the pioneer Ferdinand Tönnies; the temperamental Franz Oppenheimer, eager for reforms; Othmar Spann, always ready for a fight despite his romanticism; the economic sociologist and social historian Werner Sombart, noted for his insight and power of artistic creation; the intellectually versatile Alfred Weber; and the talented Kurt Breysig, theorist of history. If only we had space to give here an even partially complete account of the creative work in the field of theoretical or general social science, we should be able to deal with many other investigators well known in other sciences also (Lederer, Michels, Kantorowicz, Eulenburg, Litt, Honigsheim, Stoltenberg, and others).

But with all due recognition and admiration for these personal achievements, the greater part of them, and in particular the works of the older generation, seem to us to reveal a peculiarity which we do not criticize, but which we state simply as a fact: Only very little of all this production has been created by means of conceptual tools and other aids that are strictly sociological; they have all been borrowed from other sciences. The object may always have been society, but the intellectual viewpoints from which these social phenomena have been regarded have usually been non-sociological. Just as the men busied with the investigation of social phenomena in the first three-fourths of the nineteenth century dealt with interhuman behavior either as biologists, historians, or philosophers of history, so the men of the present, in their discussions of social life, write not as sociologists but as psychologists, ethnologists, metaphysicians, moralists, social economists, jurists, and so on. Where this is not the case they have been guided by "intuitions" which lead them to a quite personal, unique, particular, and all too often arbitrary view of one aspect of the intimate connection between man and group.

Between all these individual achievements, often quite remarkable in themselves, there is little connection. Most of the writers present

statements of opinion, which they put forth as definitive, claiming finality for them and often treating them like religious creeds. These statements of opinion are based on the most diverse standpoints, have arisen from the most various ways of thinking, and so, in their totality, yield no distinctive science. Few other disciplines have so brilliant a succession of deep thinkers or erudite scholars as ours. But no other exhibits so motley a variety, such disorderliness, such lack of unity.

It is all too easy to believe that sociology has no method of investigation of its own. That, however, is precisely what it can and must have. Men must cease, in dealing with sociology, to be philosophers, historians, jurists, or economists. It is new ground, unlike any other, on which they tread when they enter upon the study of our science. No one, in devoting himself to the study of law, does so with the intellectual methods of the economist; no one attempts to study physics with the mental tools of the chemist. In the case of sociology, however, men believe they can apply the methods of investigation used by any other discipline, or, as is especially likely, can adopt the viewpoint of the philosopher.

In opposition to all this stands systematic sociology as a distinctive and independent science, which, begun today, can be completed only after the work of a long series of generations to come. Everything depends upon a distinctively sociological schooling of the intellectual outlook. It should not be the outlook of the psychologist, the historian, the philosopher of culture, or the metaphysician. It is not the business of the sociologist to lay bare, as the result of his study, the processes of consciousness or the other processes that go on in the human mind; it is not his task to recount the happenings of the past; nor should he attempt to proclaim the objective meaning of the whole of human achievements; nor is it his to say what "society" "is" and what super-empirical forces reveal themselves in abstract collectivities.

The sole task of the systematic sociologist is the scientific study of interhuman behavior as such.

FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR THE SYSTEMATICS OF
ACTION PATTERNS
(TABLE 2)

FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR THE SYSTEMATICS OF ACTION PATTERNS

(TABLE 2)

I. COMMON-HUMAN RELATIONS

Prerequisites of processes: contacts (socio-psychological factor)

- (1) Primary contacts
 - through advertising, publicity
 - appraising coolly, contemptuously scrutinizing
 - arousing emotion
 - attracting (Small)
 - behaving in such manner as to evoke like response (Ac)
 - blushing, flushing
 - out of curiosity
 - dancing (Thomas)
 - in feasts, orgies, etc.
 - gazing at directly
 - glancing at furtively
 - greeting
 - hypnotizing
 - influencing by suggestion
 - interrogating
 - jesting, joking
 - kissing
 - laughing
 - making another's acquaintance
 - portraying another
 - reacting (specifically, sensitively reacting—Vierkandt)
 - sounding out, pleasing and being pleased by another
 - through speech (as in conversation, etc.)
 - stimulating thought
 - through tenderness, caressing, etc.
 - visiting
- (2) Examples of secondary contacts
 - corresponding, telephoning, etc.
 - inclining favorably toward an absent person
 - wishing oneself with someone (Stoltenberg)
 - yearning, longing for someone

A. PROCESSES OF ASSOCIATION

General processes of association

- (1) arising from friendship, love, liking, sympathy; examples are:
 - being faithful or loyal
 - helping
 - inspiring
 - sharing another's joys and sorrows
 - taking interest in

- (2) by reason of interests; examples are:
 - acting as go-between, i.e., pandering, match-making, etc.
 - imitating
 - making pliable or suggestible
 - pressing upon
 - urging
- (3) from material causes and motives; examples are:
 - action as patron, customer or client
 - employing
 - having patrons, customers or clients
- (4) more general processes; examples are:
 - advancing another's interests
 - advising
 - becoming accustomed to
 - caring for
 - cultivating the acquaintance of
 - educating or training
 - familiarizing oneself with
 - inclining toward
 - influencing
 - leading and following
 - liberating
 - nursing, etc.
 - promoting
 - providing for
 - (Cf. other still more general processes, especially corresponding passive forms.)
- (a) Advance
 - Transitions from contacts: sufferance (toleration) and compromise
 - accepting (socially)
 - acclaiming
 - accompanying, escorting
 - acknowledging, confessing
 - adoring, worshipping
 - adulating
 - alluring
 - amusing, entertaining
 - applauding, voicing approval
 - assenting
 - becoming familiar
 - being spokesman for, advocating the cause of another
 - cheering
 - through coeducation (*Da*)
 - comforting, consoling
 - through compliment
 - condescending
 - confiding in, entrusting to
 - consulting

- dedicating
- enticing
- through gallantry (*Cd*)
- giving and giving reciprocally (Simmel)
- instilling confidence in something by personal example, e.g., presenting
a cup after tasting its contents (Middle Ages), etc.
- interpellating
- making oneself easy of approach
- obtaining patrons, customers, or clients
- pardoning
- petitioning
- referring to another as a means of entrée
- requesting
- rewarding
- searching out, going in quest of another
- seconding
- thanking
- toasting, serenading
- (b) Adjustment
 - believing in someone
 - civilizing
 - coming to terms
 - through common professional interest, "colleagueship"
 - covenanting, forming an alliance (*Ac, Cd*)
 - feeling approval and agreeing
 - giving credit
 - imitating (Tarde)
 - inculcating
 - through influence of the "spirit of the times" (*Zeitgeist*)
 - ingratiating
 - instilling knowledge
 - living oneself into a situation
 - moving to pity
 - through mimicry
 - palliating
- (c) Accordance
 - behaving so as to evoke like response (contacts, 1)
 - being an adherent, a partisan
 - being "permitted" (tantamount to an order) (*Cb*)
 - through cant (Scheler)
 - combining several circles in each of which the person who does the
combining is a member (Simmel)
 - through complaisance
 - condensing (Simmel)
 - covenanting, forming an alliance (*Ab, Ad*)
 - deferring to another's judgment
 - through discretion, tact
 - establishing a home, "settling down" (*Dc*)
 - forming a friendship

harmonizing (*Ad*)
 interceding, mediating
 serving a master's interests
 sharing another's burden
 through style or fashion
 treating (to a drink, etc.)
 vouching for, endorsing

(d) Amalgamation

through elective affiliation or "affinity" (Goethe)
 betrothing
 through compurgation (form of oath in Middle Ages)
 through concentration of population
 at conferences
 through amorous or affectional connections
 through consensus
 through creation of a following
 through rational decision or through non-rational acceptance of the
 mores (*Kür- oder Wesenwillen—Tönnies*)
 at a fair, feast, picnic, etc.
 through fetishism
 through formation of institutions of art and learning
 "ganging" (Thrasher), "clubbing" (Schmalenbach)
 giving shelter, lodging
 harmonizing (*Ac*)
 through inclusion in a circle, party, or group
 through liaison
 through a riotous mob or crowd
 for technical purposes
 through legal and blood relationships
 through settlement, colonization, population movement
 in the Dionysian spirit (orgiastic)
 through lasting conjugal union (M. Weber)

B. PROCESSES OF DISSOCIATION

General processes of dissociation

- (1) arising from enmity, aversion, and hatred; examples are:
 - chasing away and similar phrases using "away"
 - jilting
 - maintaining distance
 - parting company
 - "showing the door"
- (2) by reason of interests; examples are:
 - accusing
 - deserting
 - dismissing
 - extorting
 - giving notice
 - quitting a job

- (3) from material causes and motives; examples are:
 holding oneself aloof
 withdrawing oneself
 (In exceptional cases, relationships classified under 1, 2, or 3 may be found in both the other sub-headings.)
- (4) more general processes; examples are:
 boring
 chasing away
 frightening away
 proving a failure
 taking leave of
 telling tales out of school
 shunning others and isolating oneself (e.g., in order to avoid dependence on others, "to live one's own life," to flee the world and contemplate)
- (a) Competition
 asserting one's claims (*Ca*)
 forestalling
 because of antagonistic interests (*Bc*)
 in economic life
 ousting, crowding out, displacing (*Bc*)
 outbidding
 rivalling (*Bb*, *Bc*)
 securing appointments and privileges
 supplanting another suitor (*Bc*)
- Consequences of *Ba*
 the Dharma principle
 the stimulation of competition
- Preventive of *Ba*
 institutionalization and other *D* and *F* processes
- (b) Contravention ("opposition")
 adopting measures against
 being a thorn in another's flesh
 being suspicious of
 betraying
 branding
 through cabal, intrigue
 challenging, defying
 circumventing
 through conspiracy
 debating
 denouncing secretly
 disavowing publicly
 discountenancing, disapproving
 because of mere dislike
 disparaging, depreciating (*Bc*)
 disquieting, harassing, annoying, perturbing

exposing
 fault-finding, criticizing maliciously
 forcing conformity through majority power (Simmel)
 frustrating, rendering effort vain
 haggling
 through heresy
 hissing at
 hoaxing maliciously
 humiliating
 inciting
 informing against
 lampooning, libelling, slandering
 making charges against, imputing unworthy motives to
 maneuvering another into a minority
 obstructing, restraining
 oppugning
 protecting oneself (*Bc*)
 protesting
 provoking to indiscreet utterance
 putting the burden on another; shifting the burden of proof
 rebuffing, repulsing
 through reprisal (M. Weber)
 because of reserve (Simmel)
 rivalling (*Ba*, *Bc*)
 "snooping"
 snubbing, ignoring wilfully
 spurning, scorning
 standing in another's way, hindering
 thwarting
 upsetting another's plans
 using trickery, conducting a "whispering campaign"
 withholding
 working against

(c) Conflict

abhorring
 attacking
 blaming
 carrying on a feud
 through cleavage (*Ca*)
 defending (*Bb*)
 disparaging (*Bb*)
 duelling
 ejecting or similarly supplanting a rival (*Ba*)
 fighting
 foiling or checkmating
 through hatred of foreigners or strangers
 because of opposing interests (*Ba*)
 through jealousy
 lynching

maligning
 persecuting
 prostituting
 rivalling (*Ba, Bb*)
 undermining (occasionally disguised as conflict)

M. MIXED PROCESSES—A + B

- (a) Primary mixed processes
- "arguing it out," making reasons for disagreement plain
 - through art
 - becoming personal or unduly familiar
 - chaperoning
 - chastening
 - confronting
 - through influential connections
 - coquetting
 - criticizing
 - doing business, trading
 - "giving satisfaction" by duelling
 - impressing another with one's own importance
 - at a masquerade
 - mocking, sneering at
 - obligating
 - playing fair
 - playing games of chance, gambling
 - practicing the confidence game
- (b) Secondary mixed processes
- gossiping
 - maligning, calumniating
 - "opening another's eyes" about someone else
 - playing off similar persons or groups against each other (Simmel)
 - profiting as a third person by the quarrel of two other persons

CONDITIONS ARISING FROM COMMON-HUMAN PROCESSES:

- A** processes predominant: associativeness, affiliation, attachment, absorption, dependence
- B** processes predominant: solitariness, isolation, detachment, reclusion, independence
- A + B + M**: Genesis of plurality patterns (crowds, groups, abstract collectivities)

II. CIRCUMSCRIBED RELATIONS

C. DIFFERENTIATING PROCESSES

General *C* processes:

- through the creation of intermediaries or middlemen, dividing,
- through division of labor, migrating and other types of population
- movement, seceding, separating, severing connections

- (a) Genesis of disparities
- through accumulation of wealth (*Cc, Ea*)
 - achieving distinction (*Cc*)

- through appropriation (M. Weber)
- through asserting claims, demanding favors (e. g., the self-made man, *arriviste*, *parvenu*, social climber, or upstart)
- through cleavage (*Bc*)
- through conceptions of honor or rank (M. Weber)
- through formation of parties
- limiting (*Cc*, *Db*)
- through luxury
- placing at a disadvantage
- rising (in social scale) (*Cc*)
- through schism
- sinking (in social scale) (*Cc*)
- through taboo (*Cb*, *Fa*)
- (b) Domination and submission
 - acting as a guardian
 - through ancestor-worship
 - through authority
 - through autocracy, Caesarism
 - being "permitted" (tantamount to an order) (*Ac*)
 - through charisma (M. Weber)
 - commanding and obeying
 - through religious ceremonial and supernaturalistic congregations
 - deciding issues
 - through dictatorship
 - through direction, management, leadership
 - domineering
 - through efforts toward imperialism
 - through feudalism (*Cc*)
 - forcing, compelling, coercing
 - through hero-worship and saint-worship
 - through importance
 - through informers, *agents provocateurs*
 - through jurisdiction (*Db*)
 - through legalization (*Fa*)
 - levying taxes, imports, and duties
 - through Machiavellianism (Spann)
 - through magic
 - militarizing (*Db*)
 - through patriarchy (*Fa*)
 - through patronage
 - through prestige (Leopold)
 - through slavery
 - subduing (*Db*)
 - subjecting (*Db*)
 - through taboo (*Ca*, *Fa*)
 - terrorizing
 - through theocracy
 - through usurpation
 - through wealth

- (c) Gradation and stratification
 admitting to the nobility (*Cd*)
 through advantage or disadvantage due to ancestry
 assigning to a social class (*Db*)
 through capitalism
 certifying
 in personality classes (Giddings)
 conducting affairs secretly (Simmel) (*Ce*)
 through culture, training, education (*Dc*)
 through decentralization (*Fa*)
 through development of aristocracies (*Cd*)
 distinguishing oneself (*Ca*)
 feudalizing (*Cb*)
 through formation of castes (*Cd*)
 grading
 through the growth of tribes
 impoverishing
 through inbreeding
 through institution of prerogatives
 limiting (*Ca*, *Db*)
 permitting to rise or sink in the social scale (*Ca*)
 through prestige (*Cb*)
 privileging
 rendering conspicuous
 rising or sinking in the social scale (*Ca*)
 through class struggles (*Eg*)
 through style, fashion, mode (*Da*)
 urbanizing
- (d) Selection
 admitting to the nobility (*Cc*)
 through arousal of ambition
 being recognized as gentleman, as lady
 through creation of an *élite*
 determined by beauty
 determined by merit
 through distinction
 exalting
 through exclusiveness
 through formation of aristocracies (*Cc*)
 through formation of castes (*Cc*)
 through gallantry (*Aa*)
 idealizing
 paying homage
 through social selection
- (e) Individuation, separation, and estrangement
 through becoming an aesthete
 through becoming an ascetic
 banishing

through becoming Bohemian
 through boycott, excommunication, outlawry, etc.
 through cashiering (military), degrading in rank
 through chastity
 colonizing (*Fa*)
 conducting affairs secretly (*Cc*) (Simmel) .
 through dispersion and other types of population movement
 through dissidence, apostasy (*Eg*, *Fd*)
 through flight
 through formation of sects
 through becoming an invert
 liberalizing (*Fc*)
 living one's own life
 localizing
 through originality
 as a result of the *laissez-faire* principle (*Ed*)
 refusing shelter, exposing
 regulating
 representing special interests (*Ec*, *Eg*)
 specializing (*Fb*)
 striking (as in labor organization) (*Ec*)
 through unpopularity
 violating "good form" (in any group)

D. INTEGRATING PROCESSES

General *D* processes:

through combination of labor, expanding, through extension of the
 plurality pattern, through growth of the plurality pattern, through
 the ordination of intermediary members, through organization,
 through pioneering, propagating, proselyting

(a) Uniformation

abasing oneself
 through anonymity
 bringing into style (*Cc*)
 through co-education (*Aa*)
 compensating
 co-ordinating
 democratizing
 diffusing (*Db*)
 identifying oneself with
 through group ideology and collective representations
 making proletarian (*Ea*, *Eg*)
 as a member of the "public"
 through public opinion (Tönnies)
 pardoning, granting amnesty (*Db*)
 sharing mutually, distributing equally (*Dc*)
 standardizing (*Db*, *Fa*)

(b) Ordination, superordination, and subordination

through affiliation, membership

- centralizing (*Fa*)
- choosing to be a fellow member, co-operating
- classifying (*Cc*)
- in accordance with competence (*Cb*)
- diffusing (*Da*)
- disciplining
- federating
- forming trusts, mergers, combines
- granting license
- hiring, employing
- incorporating
- inspecting
- legitimatizing
- limiting (*Ca*, *Cc*)
- militarizing (*Cb*)
- mutualizing (*Dc*)
- naturalizing
- pardoning, granting amnesty (*Da*)
- providing with norms (*Fa*)
- recognizing (*Dc*) (Small)
- through reciprocity
- rehabilitating
- self-administering, self-managing
- standardizing (*Da*, *Fa*)
- subduing, taming (*Cb*)
- subjecting (*Cb*)
- totemizing
- treating in utilitarian fashion
- using as a whipping boy or scapegoat
- (c) Socialization
 - through social amelioration, welfare work, organized charity
 - through charity (I Corinthians 13)
 - through collectivism
 - through communism (*Eg*)
 - through cultivation of values peculiar to a folk or people (adult education, folk schools, etc.)
 - through culture, training, education (*Cc*)
 - establishing a home (*Ac*)
 - humanizing (*Fd*)
 - mutualizing (*Db*)
 - through philanthropy
 - recognizing (*Db*)
 - sacrificing oneself
 - sharing mutually, distributing equally (*Da*)

E. DESTRUCTIVE PROCESSES

General *E* processes: see *Eg*

- (a) Exploitation
 - duping

- expropriating
- "making a Cinderella of"
- making proletarian (*Da, Eg*)
- "sponging on"
- through accumulation of wealth (*Ca, Cb*)
- (b) Favoritism and bribery
 - corrupting
 - through nepotism
 - as a consequence of parasitism (*Ef, Eg*)
 - through "pull"
- (c) Formalism and "ossification"
 - through cameralism, bureaucracy
 - through increasing indifference (apathy)
 - mechanizing
 - through petty politics
- (d) Commercialization
 - through accumulation of wealth
 - being unduly acquisitive
 - cornering the market, monopolizing, profiteering
 - through imperialism (*Cb, Fd*)
 - industrializing (*Fb*)
 - through Mammonism
 - as a result of Manchesterism
 - pauperizing (*Eg*)
 - through pleonexia (covetousness, avarice)
 - as a result of the *laissez-faire* principle (*Ce*)
 - purchasing support, protection
 - representing interests, lobbying (*Ce, Ef*)
- (e) Radicalization
 - through chauvinism, extreme nationalism
 - revolutionizing (*Fc, Fd*)
 - through rioting, mutiny
 - striking (*Ce*)
 - following out the program of syndicalism (sabotage, general strike, etc.)
- (f) Perversion
 - anticipating (Ross)
 - becoming renegade
 - through dilettantism
 - misusing
 - through nihilism
 - through parasitism (*Eb, Eg*)
 - through reaction
 - representing interests (*Ce, Ea*)
 - simulating (Ross)
- (g) Outcome of *E*: Deterioration
 - through class struggle (*Cc*)
 - through communism (*Dc*)
 - through demagoguery
 - through dissidence, apostasy (*Ce, Fd*)

through dissolution
 through excesses
 through extravagance
 through mobocracy
 as a consequence of parasitism (*Eb, Ef*)
 through pauperism (*Ec*)
 through proletarianization (*Da, Ea*)
 through pleonexia (covetousness, avarice) (*Ed*)

F. CONSTRUCTIVE, I.E., REMODELLING AND UPBUILDING, PROCESSES

General *F* processes: see *Fd*

(a) Institutionalization

abrogating, setting aside customs opposed to institutional ends
 through appointment
 centralizing (*Cc*), decentralizing (*Db*)
 through ceremonial
 through christening
 conserving elements or tendencies useful to the plurality pattern
 creating a police force
 creating offices
 through custom
 defining and restricting powers
 dogmatizing
 emphasizing economic and material matters
 endowing, establishing, founding
 enforcing rules
 inaugurating methods of political control
 insuring
 introducing and using taboo (*Ca, Cb*)
 legalizing (*Cb*)
 through missions (*Cb, Fd*)
 through patriarchy and gerontocracy (*Cb*)
 paying salaries or stipends (*Fb*)
 providing with ritual
 putting under national and municipal control
 through rational planning
 sacrificing
 through seniority
 standardizing (*Db*)
 symbolizing
 through title
 using tradition
 through vendetta

(b) Professionalization

industrializing (*Ed*)
 instrumentalizing
 paying salaries or stipends (*Fa*)
 through the use of "professionals" (sport)

- (c) Liberation
 - through anarchistic movements
 - balancing
 - through crusades
 - humanizing (*Dc*)
 - liberalizing (*Ce*)
 - redeeming, delivering
 - revolutionizing, (*Ee, Fd*)
- (d) Outcome of *F*: Reconstruction
 - through activism (*Sorel*)
 - through colonization (*Ce*)
 - through cosmopolitanism
 - through dissidence, apostasy (*Ce, Ee*)
 - through imperialism (*Cb, Ed*)
 - through missions (*Cb, Fa*)
 - through modernism
 - through pacifism
 - through reform
 - through regeneration
 - through renaissance
 - through revolution (*Ee, Fc*)
 - through social reforms (Social Gospel, Youth Movement, Feminism, etc.)
 - through transformation

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Abbreviations: (ad) = adaptation; (tr) = translation; (q) = quotation.

Note: Allusions to legendary and historical personages such as Adam, Buddha, Jesus, Mohammed, etc., are not indexed.

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